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Figure 1. Purveyors of the British Breakfast Table, 1910 
Title page: Representational image, (c) Illustrated London News/Mary Evans Picture Library. Scenes 
on an Assam Tea Plantation, original caption: “Purveyors of the British Breakfast Table: Pay-Day on 
an Indian Tea Plantation.” Source: Author unknown/The Graphic, p. 573, available at: British 
Library/findmypast. Discussion of the illustration in chapter 3. 
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1 The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. 
2 BREMAN, 1974, p. 40. 
3 Cf. Dubar Goala And Anr. v. Union of India (Uoi) Representing, Calcutta High Court, August 13 1951. 
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Preface 
It is important that we know where we come from, because if you do not know where you come 
from, then you don't know where you are, and if you don't know where you are, you don't know 
where you're going. 
—Terry Pratchett, 20101 
 
 believe that global history is not determined by a particular trajectory, such as 
development or modernisation, but rather by the history we remember. This memory is 
based on the experiences we have and the beliefs and common understandings we share 
with our fellow human beings. The edited narratives of the history we tell others and 
ourselves are often quite independent from what ‘actually’ happened, as for instance in the 
case of the abolition of slavery and bonded labour. There are many histories—histories of 
nations, of states, of classes, groups and individuals. These histories are closely intertwined 
with the two-hundred-year history of slavery and bonded labour and their abolition that 
transcend geographical frontiers, state borders, oceans and continents. Each morning, while 
writing this dissertation at my desk in Innsbruck, Austria, and in Heidelberg, Germany, I 
enjoy my coffee made of beans from Kenia. I try to act as a responsible consumer, choosing 
the fair-trade option, yet I know that consumer behaviour will not produce the fundamental 
change to end global exploitation of the work force, particularly in the so-called developing 
states.2 I wash my hair with shampoo, a term that has its roots in Hindi. The ingredient 
coconut oil might originate from Sri Lankan coconut farms, shipped across the oceans to 
Europe. The raw material of the textiles I wear are probably produced by agricultural 
labourers on Bihari cotton farms or sewn in sweat shops in Bangladesh or in Kerala, India.3 
The newly paved ground along the Kurfürsten-Anlage that leads my way to the South Asia 
Institute, along the Bahnhofstraße in Heidelberg, is maybe made of stones that have been 
shipped from quarries in India or China.4 
 
1 PRATCHETT, 2010, p. 421. 
2 Activists like Werner Boote or Kathrin Hartmann remind us that citizens, not consumers, can make a 
meaningful change through political action, BOOTE, March 9 2018; HARTMANN, 2018. The idead of activating 
citizens as consumers in the fight against slavery is already over two centuries old, MAJOR, April 30 2015. With 
more than two hundred years of consumers’ action against slavery, this approach has appeared to be rather 
ineffective.  
3 Since global firms are still active in disguising supply chains, it is hard for consumers to know exactly where 
the product or its components come from. Thanks to labour activism and NGOs, some of the involvements of 
German firms in labour exploitation in India are revealed: BURCKHARDT/Femnet, August 2013; Oxfam 
Deutschland, May 2010, for a global list refer to Oxfam Deutschland.  
4 The municipality of Heidelberg has adopted a policy to make acquisitions of the town according to fair trade 
standards, Ministerium für Umwelt, Klima und Energiewirtschaft Baden-Württemberg, 2017, p. 7. 
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The extraction of the resources for these products relies on a cheap labour force. 
Workers are exploited in terms of payment, labour conditions, health and working hours. 
Some forms of these labour conditions, such as debt bondage amount to slavery. Slavery is 
defined in the Slavery Convention of 1926 as “condition of a person over whom any or all of 
the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.”5 But the Temporary Slavery 
Commission that worked on the Slavery Convention also meant to include other forms of 
enslavement by calling for the abolition of “slavery in all its forms.”6 The labourers who work 
under such conditions, the struggles they fight, the pains they suffer and the hardships they 
endure to make a decent living, are part of the history of today’s global work force. The 
regional extraction and processing of quarry stones, mica, gems, cotton, and thousands of 
other products are integrated into a global market. Companies and private consumers alike 
profit from the cheap or even free labour and are complicit in exacting these labour 
conditions. The history of the labourers who produce the raw materials or parts of the end 
products that we consume, is part of the global history. 
I am aware that my scholarly work will not directly contribute to satisfying the needs 
of these workers. There are millions of individuals, past and present, who led lives of 
destitution, insecurity and hardship. Up to this very moment millions continue living difficult 
working lives all over the world. I hope to advance our understanding of the institutional 
developments that attempt to tackle the worst labour conditions. I also endeavour to 
contribute to ending these forms of exploitation through other means that are accessible to 
me: As a volunteer with terre des hommes, I distribute knowledge about child labour and help 
raise funds to support local initiatives. As weak and ineffective as these attempts may be, I try 
to act as a conscious consumer. But what becomes most clear from this research project is that 
strong political action is needed—strong laws, effective enforcement, and transparency as to 
where the products come from and under what conditions they have been produced. 
Economic interests must be curtailed and controlled vigorously. It cannot be that for the profit 
of some, supported by the ignorance of so many, millions of people suffer throughout their 
lives, and “[i]f these products cannot subsist without coercion, they must perish.”7 
 
5 League of Nations, June 28 1919, Art. 1. 
6 League of Nations, June 28 1919, Art. 2. 
7 Lieutenant General E. N. Baker on indigo production in a letter to W. R. Gourlay, Director of Agriculture, 
Government of India, dated February 9 1909, quoted in MITTAL, 1978, p. 113. 
  
xii 
Map of India 
Figure 2. Map of India, 2006 
 
 
Figure 2, Map of India, 2006. Source: Planemad/Wikimedia Commons.  
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Introduction 
I do not think that a person who insists that another who has consented to serve him shall 
perform his work, unlawfully compels such person to labour, because it is the thing which he 
or she has agreed to do, and although if the employer assault [sic] the servant for not working 
to his satisfaction (…). I do not think he thereby commits an offence under Section 374.1 
—Judge Beverly, Bench Calcutta High Court, 1892 
 
ith this judgment, the Calcutta High Court reversed the decision of the Deputy 
Commissioner of Nowgong,2 Major A. Grey, who had convicted Madan Mohan 
Biswas for keeping Honto Lahang, Hoibori Lahingani and Bagi Musulmani “in 
confinement and slavery”3 in violation of the Indian Penal Code’s (IPC) Sections 370 and 
374,4 criminalising the buying and disposing of a slave and exacting compulsory labour. 
Biswas had employed Honto Lahang, and some other men as bonded labourers, who were tied 
to him by debt. Upon the deaths of the male debtors, Biswas forced the children and wives of 
these labourers, among them Hoibori Lahingani and Bagi Musulmani, to work off the debts of 
their deceased relatives.5 According to the female victims, Biswas had punished them when 
they refused to work, declined compensation for their labour and confined them during the 
night. The Deputy Commissioner found the accused Biswas guilty of disposing of his bonded 
labourers as slaves. But the next higher court reversed this decision and the High Court at 
Calcutta agreed with the acquittal.6 Disregarding the way in which the women and children 
had become bonded, the judge argued that the bonded labourers had consented to serve 
Biswas and that he did not agree that Biswas had violated the prohibition of slavery. 
The first legislation against slavery applicable to the whole of the British Raj and the 
princely states under British suzerainty was the Act V7 of 1843, followed by the Indian Penal 
Code (IPC), adopted in 1860.8 Judge Stuart at the High Court of Allahabad, confronted with a 
case in which a labourer was transferred between two employers, gave one reason for the 
struggle to arrive at a decision: He admitted in 1880, that “it is exceedingly difficult to 
understand what is meant to be intended by s. 370.”9 The provisions of the Act V and the IPC 
 
1 Madan Mohan Biswas v. Queen Empress, Calcutta High Court, April 20 1892, p. 581. 
2 Today in Madhya Pradesh, central India. 
3 Madan Mohan Biswas v. Queen Empress, Calcutta High Court, April 20 1892, p. 574. 
4 The Indian Penal Code, Legislative Council of India, October 6 1860. 
5 Madan Mohan Biswas v. Queen Empress, Calcutta High Court, April 20 1892, p. 573–577. 
6 Madan Mohan Biswas v. Queen Empress, Calcutta High Court, April 20 1892, p. 573. 
7 An Act for Declaring and Amending the Law Regarding the Condition of Slavery within the Territories of the 
East India Company, Governor-General in Council, April 7 1843. Hereinafter Act V. 
8 The IPC came into effect in 1862. 
9 Empress of India v. Ram Kuar, Allahabad High Court, March 8 1880, p. 727. 
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were ambiguous: In the example of the case Madan Mohan Biswas v. Queen Empress (1892), 
the executive and the judiciary, as well as the bench of judges, depicted a differing 
understanding of what slavery is and whether the extraction of bonded labour could be 
punished under respective laws.10 Courts before and after this judgement of 1892, struggled 
over the question of how to treat bonded labour.11 This legal uncertainty was also followed by 
contradictory judgments vis-à-vis the same legal provision in similar cases.12 
The case of Madan brings us right to the heart of this dissertation. I argue that after the 
adoption of the Act V and the IPC, the abolition of slavery in India was institutionalised. This 
means that these Indian antislavery policies to this day 
 
stipulate rules that assign normatively backed rights and responsibilities to actors and 
provide for their ‘public’, that is, third party enforcement. (…) Policies (…) are 
institutions (…) to the extent that they constitute rules for actors other than for the 
policymakers themselves—rules that can and need to be implemented and that are 
legitimate in that they will if necessary be enforced by agents acting on behalf of the 
society as a whole.13 
 
In the context of bonded labour, the court struggled with the interpretation of the rules. The 
ambiguity of the law,14 which did not give guidance on how to define slavery or forced labour 
and how bonded labour fits the bill, is at the centre of this work. The tension between the 
spirit of the law—the abolition of slavery—and the continued extraction thereof in the form of 
bonded labour, evolved around the interpretation of the law at the courts and political attempts 
to reform the law. The discourses within the political institutions, colonial and independent, 
reveal not only motivations driven by the colonial imperatives, but also a dilatory process that 
has not been studied until now. This discourse was fuelled by repeated reports on bonded 
labour, which was referred to in different terms. Setting aside the definitional question to 
which I turn further below, and agreeing with the Commissioner of Nowgong that bonded 
labour constituted slavery punishable by the IPC Sec. 370 and 374, table 1 shows that the gap 
between the norm15 and reality persisted throughout the past two hundred years: 
 
 
10 As this question is pertinent to the discourse on slavery and bonded labour, I use them jointly. From my 
definition further below, it will become clear that I am not using these terms interchangeably. 
11 Cf. Koroth Mammad and Another v. The King-Emperor, Madras High Court, August 27 1917, p. 341–345. 
12 For example, judgments at the European Court of Human Rights or the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia; see ALLAIN, 2009, p. 242–243. Anderson makes the same observation towards judgments 
regarding cases under the WBCA, ANDERSON, 2004, p. 441. 
13 STREECK/THELEN, 2005b, p. 12. 
14 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, 11, 21. 
15 A norm can be defined as “a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity,” 
FINNEMORE/SIKKINK, 1998, p. 891. 
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Table 1. Slavery and bonded labour estimates in India, 1807-2016 
Date Region Estimate Description Source 
1807 Malabar  96,368 “Slaves” Logan16 
1811 
Bhaugulpore & Behar, 
Patna & Shahabad 
42,589 “Able bodied male slaves” Law Commission17 
1821 Tinnevelly 324,000 “Agrestic slaves” Law Commission18 
1830 Lower Assam 27,000 “Slaves” Law Commission19 
1840 East-Indies 800,000 “Slaves” Adam20 
1841 British India 15,000,000 “Slaves” Adam21 
1857 Kanara & Malabar 284,894 “Cherumar slaves” 
Madras 
Proceedings22 
1873 British India 54,135,383 “Slave population” Huback23 
1918 Palamau 60,000 “Kamias” Maude24 
1947 Surat  123,000 “Halis (agricultural serfs)” ILO Delhi Office25 
1952 Malabar 
60,000 
In “semi-slavish 
conditions” 
Shrikant26 
1952 Bihar 5,000,000 “Agrestic serfs” MP Nanadas27 
1981 India 2,617,000 “Bonded labourers” Marla28 
2009 India 10,000,000 “Slaves” Bales29 
2012 Asia-Pacific region 11,700,000 “Forced labourers” ILO30 
2016 India 18,300,000 “Modern slavery” GSI31 
Source: Details are indicated separately in each footnote. Note: The terms for slave or bonded 
labour used in the sources were usually not defined; most likely they do not coincide and are not 
comparable. 
 
16 Number based on the Census of 1807, Cherumars are a low caste and “agrestic slaves,” LOGAN, 1951 [1887], 
147, 603, Appendix ccxxxiv. Sarkar explains that agrestic or preadial slaves are agricultural labourers, SARKAR, 
1985, p. 102. 
17 Estimates provided by Buchanan between 1807-1811, referred to in Indian Law Commission, January 15 
1841a, p. 6. 
18 Report of the Collector of 1832, referred to in Indian Law Commission, January 15 1841a, p. 193. 
19 Indian Law Commission, January 15 1841a, p. 152. 
20 ADAM, 1840, p. 11. 
21 Adam William at the General Anti-Slavery Convention indicated that the estimates for British India ranged 
between 10 and 20 million slaves, British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, 1841, p. 77. 
22 The numbers indicated are for Malabar: 187,812, and Kanara: 97,082; Madras Political Proceedings, January 
27 1857, referred to in HJEJLE, 1967, 110, 112, 113. 
23 Letter to the Government of India from J. A. Huback, Secretary to the Government of Bihar and Orissa, 
Revenue Department. The numbers are based on the Criminal Law Commission of 1873, National Archives of 
India, November 1920, Item No. 1, p. 35; the original numbers Huback gives are “one-sixth to two-fifths of the 
entire population.” The census of 1867/8-1876/7 counted 191,018,412 heads under direct British administration, 
Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1878, p. 5, therefore, one sixth to two fifths constituted between 31,863,402 and 
76,407,365 people. 
24 Sir Walter Maude, Extracts from the Proceedings of the Legislative Council of Bihar and Orissa at a Meeting, 
held on July 30 1920, National Archives of India, November 1920. 
25 ILO Delhi Office, June 1947, p. 15; the original number indicated is “14 per cent of the population of the Surat 
District.” The census of 1841 counted 881,058 people in Surat, DRACUP/Census Commissioner, 1942, p. 3, 14% 
therefore, constituted approximately 123,348 people. 
26 Shrikant describes agricultural labourers who are indebted to their landlords, SHRIKANT, 1952, p. 19. 
27 MP Nanadas refers to the report of the governmental Bihar Harijan Enquiry Committee, Lok Sabha, December 
13 1952, p. 2232. 
28 MARLA, January 1981, p. 144. 
29 This includes “domestic service, forced marriages, prostitution, and debt bondage,” 
BALES/TRODD/WILLIAMSON, 2009, p. 19. 
30 International Labour Office, 2012, p. 15. 
31 Walk Free Foundation, 2016, p. 8. 
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The numbers testify that observers recognised forms of labour exploitation as slavery and debt 
bondage; but the table depicts the terminological conflation as well. These testimonies can be 
read as examples of policy failure,32 and, often enough, the Indian state was accused of failing 
to implement its laws.33 Focusing on policy implementation and the “connection between the 
expression of governmental intention and actual results,”34 the numbers indicated above 
reveal that implementation, here in the case of the abolition of slavery and bonded labour, is 
“the classic Achilles’ heel of developing countries.”35 But perspectives on policy failure and 
the search for explanations thereof, often fail to acknowledge the long history of the abolition 
of slavery and bonded labour, as well as the role the implementation gap actually occupies in 
the process of policymaking and enforcement. 
Campbell states that within public policy implementation research, there “is little 
recognition that the internal inconsistencies and contradictions of an institutional arrangement 
may also spawn crises that result in its transformation.”36 Within the institutionalism research 
only “few have incorporated this insight into an analysis of institutional change.”37 Pierson for 
instance identifies several reasons for the emergence of an implementation gap: Limits of 
institutional design that could not have been anticipated by the policymakers; or the result was 
actually a political compromise; or, institutions continue to be contested after they came into 
existence; or simply with the passage of time, a change of the environment can produce 
different outcomes.38 The contributions of Mahoney and Thelen,39 as well as of Streeck and 
Thelen,40 which provide the theoretical foundation of this dissertation, take these issues into 
account in developing their theoretical framework of gradual institutional change. I discuss 
this in detail in the theoretical chapter. With Mahoney, Thelen, Streeck and Pierson’s 
theoretical insights, I move from focusing on “the anomalies of the Indian political system,”41 
and instead ask about the development of the institution of the abolition of slavery with an eye 
on bonded labour.42 Taking an institutional approach to analysing the development of human 
 
32 Cf. PATNAIK, 1985, p. 5; POUCHEPADASS, 2009, p. 32. 
33 Cf. KUMAR, 2005, p. 418. 
34 O'TOOLE JR, 1995, p. 43. 
35 MITRA/SINGH, 2009, p. 186. 
36 CAMPBELL, 2010, p. 92. 
37 CAMPBELL, 2010, p. 101. 
38 PIERSON, 2004, p. 14–15. 
39 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010a. 
40 STREECK/THELEN, 2005b. 
41 BEER/MITCHELL, 2006, p. 996; cf. HATHAWAY, 2002, p. 1990; POE/TATE, 1994, p. 855–856; MERKEL, 2004. 
42 THELEN, 2009, p. 473. 
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rights in India contributes to highlighting the political dimension of the abolition of slavery 
and bonded labour.43 
After Banaji’s major publication in 1933, studies on coercive labour relations in India 
were conducted primarily either on particular Indian regions,44 or focused on specific 
sectors.45 Deeming forms of slavery in India, among them bonded labour, as mild46 distracted 
British legislators and anti-slavery activists in the nineteenth century—this ignorance, 
according to Major47 and Mann,48 also diverted scholarly attention away from South Asian 
forms of slavery and its abolition.49 Consequently, the Indian Ocean and the Indian 
subcontinent are relatively new areas to study slavery and its abolition.50 Since 1985, the 
number of relevant publications increased51—studies on the slave trade, slavery, bonded 
labour, and human trafficking in South Asia and in India have receive growing attention.52 
But only recently do historians’ publications carry titles which include the term bonded 
labour.53 Yet, the issue of abolition of slavery or bonded labour is rarely touched upon beyond 
simply mentioning it.54 The increasing interest in slavery and bonded labour in the South 
Asian Region has not been matched by focused research on policy developments towards the 
abolition of slavery, particularly covering the period after 1843.55 
The definitional question of where to locate bonded labour has more than judicial 
consequences;56 it also carries political and social implications and is of academic interest. It 
 
43 UPADHYAYA, 2004, p. 120. 
44 Cf. Gujarat: BREMAN, 1974; South India: HJEJLE, 1967.  
45 Cf. Assam tea plantations: VARMA, 2011; BEHAL/MOHAPATRA, 1992; BEHAL, 2010; MOHAPATRA, 2004; on 
labour resistance related to indigo production: KLING, 1966; railways: KERR, 2004; agriculture in South India: 
HJEJLE, 1967; Tamil country: MANICKAM, 1982; agriculture in Kerala: SARADAMONI, 1980. 
46 MAJOR, 2012, p. 146. 
47 MAJOR, 2012, p. 10. 
48 MANN, 2012, p. 20–21. 
49 MAJOR, 2012, p. 18–19; CHATTERJEE/EATON, 2006, xi; VINK, 2003, p. 132. 
50 MANN, 2012, p. 21; MAJOR, 2012, p. 19; see for instance the AHRC Research Project, March 2015 - August 
2017 of Bates and Major, BATES/MAJOR. 
51 MANN, 2012, p. 20–21; cf. CAMPBELL, 2005a; ALPERS/CAMPBELL/SALMAN, 2007. 
52 Cf. CAMPBELL, 2004; ALPERS/CAMPBELL/SALMAN, 2007; MANN, 2012; ALI, 2016; SUZUKI, 2017. The first 
major publication to focus on slavery in India, including its abolition, was the extensive monograph by Banaji, 
Slavery in India. His contribution outlines in minute detail the variations of slavery and its abolition. 
Unfortunately, his book ends with the adoption of the Act V in 1843, BANAJI, 1933, xxxiv. 
53 Cf. Damir-Geilsdorf, Sabine, Lindner, Ulrike and Müller, Gesine, Oliver Tappe and Michael Zeuske, eds. 
2016. Bonded Labour. Global and Comparative Perspectives (18th-21st century). Bielefeld: Transcript, which 
unfortunately does not touch upon India; Campbell, Gwyn and Stanziani, Alessandro, eds. 2013. Bonded Labour 
and Debt in the Indian Ocean World. London: Pickering & Chatto, one contribution discusses bonded labour in 
contemporary South India: GUÉRIN, 2013. 
54 MAJOR, 2010, p. 503. 
55 Cf. KUMAR, 1988, p. 259–260. 
56 The answer to the question, whether bonded labour constituted slavery or not, had direct judicial 
consequences: It determined whether a person on trial was charged with heavier or lighter punishment. In the 
case of Madan, a conviction under IPC Sec. 370 would have meant imprisonment for up to seven years and a 
fine. Being convicted under Sec. 374, Biswas had to serve only one year and pay a fine of Rs. 500, Calcutta High 
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becomes politically intricate for states at the international stage when they stand accused of 
committing slavery or bonded labour within their national borders or failing to erase it. After 
all, today the abolition of bonded labour and slavery constitute one of the four core human 
rights stipulated in the International Bill of Human Rights.57 Naming and shaming, as well as 
more drastic measures, are some strategies used by the United Nations (UN) to coerce 
member states to end violations of international norms against forced labour, bonded labour 
and slavery within their national border.58 States can be criticised and presented as bad 
examples,59 and besides international sanctions, also individual states react on slavery and 
bonded labour allegations.60  
The discrepancy between the norm and ineffective enforcement continuously 
challenged the power and legitimacy of the state:61 The British colonial power justified its 
rule over India to civilise and develop her people—the eradication of slavery constituted one 
of those missions.62 The independent state of India after 1947 similarly promised salvation to 
the poor with its massive projects in development and the democratic promise of equality to 
all citizens.63 Both transfigurations of the state claimed the monopoly of power and violence 
within its territory.64 How have the British Raj and independent India responded to these 
challenges, and how have these responses developed over time? Slavery was delegalised65 
with the adoption of the Act V in 1843 and abolished with the adoption of the IPC in 1860. 
But neither defined slavery or mentioned bonded labour. The Workman’s Breach of Contract 
 
Court, April 20 1892, p. 581–582; in another case of a household slave, the judge suggested to apply IPC Sec. 
344 (wrongful confinement) instead of Sec. 370, with equally low punishment, The Queen v. Firman Ali, 
Calcutta High Court, December 2 1871. 
57 The other three are: The non-retroactivity of the law, the right to life, and the right to be free from torture, 
KOJI, 2001, p. 927. This means that these rights may never be violated under any circumstances, even in 
emergency situations—they are non-derogable, United Nations, 1966, Art. 4 (2). 
58 See for example the reappearance of Myanmar (former Burma) as condemned state at UN and ILO for 
extracting forced labour by the army and consequently confronted with embargos, visa restrictions, and other 
coercive measures, HORSEY, 2011, 1-5, 43; MAUL, 2007, p. 490. 
59 For instance, in the case of Myanmar and its use of forced labour by the military forces, cf. THOMANN, 2011, 
p. 82–101; or Pakistan in the shadow of the World Cup in 1995 when journalists and NGOs demonstrated that 
most of the globally consumed soccer balls came from Pakistan and were produced by bonded child labourers. 
As a consequence, the ILO, the US, and other states and organisations acted against child labour in Pakistan, 
LUND-THOMSEN/NADVI, 2010, p. 4–5; Pakistan’s Soccer-Ball Industry, April 6 2000; International Labour 
Rights Forum, February 1999. 
60 The United States, for instance, makes the distribution of aid and bilateral cooperation conditional upon a 
state’s rating in the Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report: William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Re-
authorisation Act of 2008, Congress of the United States of America, 2008, Sec. 103. The definition of human 
trafficking includes bonded labour, WOODITCH, 2011, 473, 476, 487-88. 
61 Singha has framed the same arguments in terms of a competition between the state and the patriarchal claims 
over labour, SINGHA, 1998, xiv; cf. SINGHA, 1998, p. viii–ix; RUDOLPH/RUDOLPH, 1987, p. 213. 
62 MANI, 1987, p. 119, MANN, 2012, p. 165–166, 2004; MAJOR, 2012, p. 7; BASU, 2012, p. 362; PRAKASH, 2002, 
p. 2. 
63 ROY, 2007, Chapter 4; CHATTERJEE, 2004, p. 34; BASU, 2012, p. 363–364. 
64 HAY/LISTER, 2006, 5, 8; PETERS/PIERRE, 2006, p. 209; REINER, 2010, p. 6–7; SINGHA, 1998, p. 129. 
65 CHATTERJEE, 2005, p. 139. 
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Act of 185966 (hereinafter Act XIII, or WBCA), practically legalised the use of debt bondage.67 
Since the 1920s, India was actively involved in the development of the Slavery Convention of 
the League of Nations of 1926, to which it became party in 1927.68 International pressure on 
the Government of India grew to implement the norm.69 But no legal provisions against 
bonded labour were adopted that were applicable to the whole of the British Raj, and regional 
legislation often rather regulated bonded labour, for instance by making the registrations of 
debt agreements mandatory.70 
In 1946, with independence at the horizon, an opportunity for drastic change of the 
rules against slavery and bonded labour opened.71 The Constituent Assembly adopted Article 
23 that prohibited forced labour and begar,72 which is an Indian term for ‘free,’ meaning 
unpaid, labour. Another attempt to define bonded labour more clearly failed: In 1947, and 
again in 1954, members of parliament submitted and withdrew the Free, or Forced and 
Compulsory Labour Bill—a bill unmentioned in any historical account of the abolition of 
bonded labour and slavery in India.73 When India became independent, only ‘toothless’74 
legislative provisions against slavery and forced labour were in place. The discretion of 
interpretation as to whether or not bonded labour arrangements were criminalised by law 
remained with the judiciary and the administration. Then, in 1975, the Indian Parliament 
under Indira Gandhi adopted the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Ordinance, which 
became an act (BLSA) in 1976. The BLSA provides a clear definition and outlines in detail 
 
66 The original title of the act was: Presidency Towns.--Masters and Workmen, Act No XIII. of 1859 [passed on 
May 4 1859], THEOBALD, 1860, p. 275–277. The short title Workman’s Breach of Contract Act was enacted by 
the Indian Short Titles Act XIV of 1897, WIGLEY, 1909, p. 139. Full title: Act No. XIII of 1859, An Act to 
Provide for the Punishment of Breaches of Contract by Artificers, Workmen, and Laborers in Certain Cases, 
Art. II, Legislative Council of India, May 5 1859. Sometimes, the act is referred to as ‘Workmen’s Breach of 
Contract Act,’cf. WHITLEY/Royal Commission on Labour in India/Government of India, 1931, p. 107 or AVINS, 
1967, p. 42. I followed the convention to refer to the ‘Workman’s Breach of Contract Act,’ cf. ANDERSON, 2004, 
p. 431. 
67 SARKAR, 1985, p. 110. 
68 British India constituted an individual actor at the international level: Despite the fact that India was the only 
non-self-governing founding member of the LN, representatives of the British Raj, among them Indian princes 
and nationalist leaders, were able to represent and uphold a position for British India: at times, the Indian 
delegation’s position was in conflict with the position of the British delegation. And while divided into directly 
and indirectly ruled territories, British India constituted a single judicial unit at the LN. MCQUADE, 2019, 1, 5-7, 
10. 
69 LEGG, 2014, p. 107. 
70 Cf. Bihar and Orissa Kamiauti Agreements Act, Government of Bihar and Orissa, 1920, Art. 3, 4. This act is 
reprinted in the Appendix; for a discussion of three regional legislations from 1920 and 1940, refer to 
DINGWANEY, 1985, p. 324. 
71 COLLIER/COLLIER, 1991, p. 6–8. 
72 Also written begaree, CASSELS, 1988, p. 168. 
73 Only Mishra, MISHRA, 2011, p. 324–325, and the commemorative edition of the Lok Sabha Secretariat for the 
former labour minister Jagjivan Ram, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 2005, p. 133, actually mention the bill. The authors 
ascribe the authorship of this bill to Ram, but I show that in the discussion in the Interim Parliament, it was Ram 
who actually requested the withdrawal of the bill. 
74 LEBOVIC/VOETEN, 2009, p. 79. 
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measures to eradicate bonded labour in its own right. In 1982, the Supreme Court entered the 
platform of abolition in India as a main actor to implement the rules. The court’s assumption 
of the power to act suo motu, as well as the adoption of public interest litigation (PIL), 
allowed for NGOs, not aggrieved parties to a rights violation, to come forward to the court 
with bonded labour cases. Finally, the Supreme Court issued an order to the National Human 
Rights Commission to take up the monitoring process of abolition of bonded labour in India.75 
Several authors showed that the ideology of freedom shaped the discursive practices 
and policy outputs76 against slavery and bonded labour in India.77 The ideology of freedom 
has its roots in post-Enlightenment and is expressed by theorists of capitalism and market 
economies such as John Stuart Mill.78 Abolitionists focussed on the contrast between slave 
labour in the West Indies and free79 labour in India. Historical research reveals the fallacies of 
approaching slavery and freedom as a dichotomous concept that guided political activities and 
legal understanding:80 With establishing the dichotomy of free labour and slave labour, the 
antislavery movement blinded itself to the many varieties of Indian labour relationships. The 
dichotomy allowed for the interpretation of the ‘milder versions of slavery’81 in India as free 
labour. Consequently, abolitionists later were troubled to address slave labour exploitation in 
India beyond chattel slavery.82 The work of Major and Prakash insightfully shows how the 
idea of freedom influenced the policy output of the British Parliament and the Government of 
India. Through discursive processes bonded labour relationships and other forms of slavery 
became disguised and legally invisible. Prakash argues that the agricultural labourers in 
Southern Bihar, the kamias, were seen by British officials clearly as slaves, but after 1843 
“they were defined as bonded labourers.”83 And Chatterjee even argues that 
 
delegalisation ensured the erasure of the word ‘slave’ from the superior British 
officers’ memoirs. (...) The gradual erasure of the term itself from official records was 
reinforced by some British officials and judges who denied that terms in local 
languages like bandi, dasi, used by female litigants to describe themselves, actually 
translated as ‘slaves.’84 
 
 
75 MAJOR, 2012, p. 7–11. 
76 Outputs are the products of political institutional processes, such as, for instance, parliamentary or 
governmental policies. Outcomes are the intended or unintended consequences of these outputs, LANE/ERSSON, 
2000, p. 60–61. 
77 PRAKASH, 2002, p. xi–xii; MAJOR, 2010, p. 505. 
78 PRAKASH, 1993, p. 132. 
79 In this context the term ‘free’ refers to non-slave labour. 
80 MAJOR, 2010. 
81 Lord Ellenborough in the House of Lords, Hansard 1803-2005, July 5 1833, Col. 190. 
82 MAJOR, 2010, p. 514, 2012, 315, 321-24. 
83 PRAKASH, 1993, p. 132. 
84 CHATTERJEE, 2005, p. 139. 
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These authors highlight the important point of denomination and definition related to the 
concept of free und slave labour. But, as I show in the following chapters, the term slavery 
was not avoided by official sources altogether. Additionally, Prakash and Chatterjee’s 
observations have trouble accounting for the proliferation of antislavery or anti-bonded labour 
legislation after delegalisation, as well as legislation contradicting the idea of freedom, such 
as the WBCA.  
Prakash explains that “[t]he institution of freedom had to be proclaimed repeatedly, 
because each proclamation was followed by an awareness of failure. Thus the 1843 abolition 
was followed by the discovery of new forms of unfreedom, such as debt bondage, requiring 
the enactment of new emancipatory legislations.”85 But already in the making of the Act V, 
Lord Ellenborough was convinced of the limited effect of any policy against slavery in India, 
and therefore anticipated the policy failure. Chatterjee and Prakash explain contradictory 
developments by resorting to explanations based on wilful ignorance of policymakers or 
sudden new discoveries of slave labour or the redefinition of slavery as bonded labour.86 
Consequently, Prakash suggests that responses to the rediscoveries of slavery were marked by 
ad hoc reactions.87 He is accepting the slavery/freedom dichotomy as the main element within 
the discourse on bonded labour and slavery and as the guiding idea that explains the abolition 
of slavery. The inherent contradictions between the ideal and what was practiced, become 
visible, but Prakash, as well as Chatterjee, has trouble to explain these contradictions and the 
role of other ideas that helped to shape the particular configuration of these contradictions. 
How, for instance, can the abolition of slavery and the WBCA be explained in more 
nuanced ways beyond the freedom/slavery dichotomy, in a period in which free labour 
constituted a rhetorical figure but did not reflect the lived reality of the majority of working 
people?88 Furthermore, looking closely at the timing and content of the changes and non-
changes of the institution of abolition, several puzzles appear: From the perspective of critical 
junctures, events such as the transition of regime change towards democratisation and 
independence in India, offered an opportunity of change.89 Such an opportunity can be used 
by political actors to force political developments into a certain direction that had not been 
possible earlier. Weak provisions to abolish slavery were already in place, namely the Act V 
of 1843 and the IPC,90 but the changes arrived at by the Constituent Assembly and the 
 
85 PRAKASH, 1993, p. 132. 
86 CHATTERJEE, 2005, p. 139. 
87 PRAKASH, 1993, p. 132. 
88 STEINFELD, 2001, p. 1; HAY/CRAVEN, 2004, p. 1. 
89 COLLIER/COLLIER, 1991, p. 6–8, 31. 
90 A. V. Thakkar, Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative), December 16 1949, p. 673. 
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Provisional Parliament did not contribute to strengthening these policies. The window of 
opportunity for the governing powers of India to adopt a decisive law to end bonded labour 
did not materialise in respective legislation. It took almost another three decades and the least 
democratic phase since Indian’s independence—emergency rule between 1975 and 1977—to 
adopt a stringent law that went beyond all previous policies with regard to definitions and 
detail. For the first time, bonded labour was addressed as a form of labour exploitation to be 
banned and prosecuted in its own right. Insights from large-N91 studies of International 
Relations find a negative relation between undemocratic regimes and the adoption and 
implementation of human rights law92—why, then, was the strongest law adopted under 
Indira Gandhi’s emergency rule? Why did this critical juncture, and not independence, open 
the window of opportunity for change? 
Following the political debates, judicial interpretation and developments of anti-
slavery legislation in conjunction with bonded labour, I provide an alternative perspective to 
current understandings of the continued use of bonded labour after the abolition of slavery in 
India. Rather than dismissing the abolition of slavery and the continued existence of bonded 
labour in India after the formal abolition of slavery as pure failure,93 or a measured intention 
to making available slaves as a cheap labour force,94 or lack of political will to abolish slavery 
including bonded labour,95 the case of bonded labour brings to light the struggle of the 
colonial power, but also independent India, to fulfil its promise and justification of 
governance: To civilize the Indian people, abolish slavery, and provide justice and the rule of 
law.96 As the main responsible actor for the effective implementation of human rights, I 
follow the state’s response to bonded labour from the mid-nineteenth century through 
independence to the late twenty-first century. For my purposes, I define the state in line with 
O’Donnell, who writes that the state is: 
 
A territorially based association, consisting of sets of institutions and social relations 
(most of them sanctioned and backed by the legal system of that state), that normally 
penetrates and controls the territory and the inhabitants it delimits. Those institutions 
claim a monopoly in the legitimate authorization of the use of physical coercion, and 
normally have, as ultimate resource for implementing the decisions they make, 
 
91 A large number (N) of cases. 
92 LUTZ/SIKKINK, 2000, p. 633; HATHAWAY, 2002, 1939, 1964, 1967. 
93 Cf. PATNAIK, 1985, p. 5; DINGWANEY, 1985, p. 283; CHATTERJEE, 2005, p. 141–143; KUMAR, 2005, p. 418; 
POUCHEPADASS, 2009, p. 32. 
94 DINGWANEY, 1985, p. 313–321. 
95 CHATTERJEE, 2005, p. 138; KLEIN, 1993, p. 21; RADHAKRISHNA, 1992, p. 188. 
96 PRAKASH, 2002, p. 2; KOLSKY, 2010, p. 2–3. 
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supremacy in the control of the means of coercion over the population and the territory 
that the state delimits.97 
 
It is interesting to note that O’Donnell uses the term ‘claim,’ which is important, since 
claiming a monopoly does not necessarily entail its actual realisation. 
In this dissertation, I show how the slow and piecemeal developments of the abolition 
of bonded labour and slavery summarised above, came about and also assess if and in what 
way these developments marked changes from earlier provisions. This requires taking an 
institutional perspective on the abolition of slavery in India. Changes within legislation 
affecting slave labour can be traced and explained beyond critical junctures, and legal 
developments appear less ad hoc than Prakash portrays them, but rather more incremental. 
The theoretical basis which I use to conduct the analysis of the development of the abolition 
of slavery and its significance towards the abolition of bonded labour in India is based on the 
theory of gradual institutional change.98 The theoretical foundation is laid out in the work of 
Mahoney and Thelen (2010), as well as Thelen and Streeck (2005). They offer a theoretical 
framework to understand institutional change by differentiating between actors of change and 
concomitant modes of change, depending on the political environment in which they are 
placed.99 This allows me to consider the role of actors and structures, as well as the issue of 
the implementation gap that influenced the development of the institution of abolition in India 
until today. With this analysis, I go beyond examining the institutional failure to implement 
human rights law in India, and beyond a mere description of the developments and the current 
situation regarding the abolition of slavery and bonded labour. 
The long-term perspective allows me to place “politics in time,”100 and to trace the 
development and influence of ideas on the political output concerning a serious human rights 
issue. The theoretical framework offers an answer to the inherent policy contradictions, 
through acknowledging compromise, as well as the role of the quality of policies and ideas 
shaping these policies.101 Analysing the discussions within the political and administrative 
system on the abolition of slavery and bonded labour throughout two centuries, I identify a set 
of ideas that go beyond the slavery/freedom dichotomy and which played a crucial role in 
both developing and undermining antislavery policies. Taking ideas such as paternalism or 
human rights into closer consideration allows us to understand in greater detail the subsequent 
legal developments after the abolition of slavery. 
 
97 O'DONNELL, 2011, p. 51–52. 
98 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b. 
99 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b. 
100 PIERSON, 2004, p. 2. 
101 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 8. 
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My approach is therefore problem-oriented and informed by the desire to account for 
the development of the institution of the abolition of slavery and bonded labour in India. 
Outlining its development highlights how the institutionalisation of a human right, the 
freedom from enslavement, including debt bondage, evolved over time. Thereby, I contribute 
to two research fields: First, the history of the abolition of slavery and bonded labour in India, 
and second, comparative political science, theoretically grounded in gradual institutional 
change. The primary focus within this analysis is on the changes the institution has undergone 
or resisted. In the course of this analysis, the question of change itself needs to be addressed: 
When do political scientists speak of a change, and what is change? While change is the core 
focal point of Mahoney and Thelen, they have not provided a clear guide on how to measure 
change. They locate one cause of change in the ambiguity of policies but only give anecdotal 
hints as to what they mean and how to measure ambiguity.102 By dissecting the different 
elements in legal provisions for antislavery laws in India, I propose a way to qualify what 
constitutes a weak or strong institution. This qualification will allow me to determine if 
changes at the rules level have actually taken place or not, and in what way. Other indicators 
of change are the level of implementation, measured in terms of liberations and convictions, 
and a close interrogation of cases decided by the courts. 
Simultaneously, ideational aspects play a pivotal role in the changes that the abolition 
of slavery and bonded labour have undergone. Taking ideas seriously means not only to 
describe political outcomes, but also the content of the outcome. Even though Mahoney and 
Thelen address the issue of ideas, they have not fully integrated this component into their 
theory. I enhance this theoretical framework by integrating ideas as an additional variable. 
This includes the current Zeitgeist, which provides insight into the potential behaviour of 
actors, as well as the political output.103 Hall noted in his contribution that, depending on 
timing, the same events may produce different outcomes.104 Taking the Zeitgeist into 
consideration, which, during this long period moves from being proslavery towards 
antislavery, acknowledges that the ideational environment in which an actor moves makes a 
difference.105 
Since policies against slavery and bonded labour in India have not been analysed from 
a political science perspective, nor has its legal history been studied bridging British colonial 
rule and independent India, this dissertation is an attempt to fill this research gap. Legal 
 
102 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 21. 
103 An output is for instance laws or programmes; the outcome is what happens at the implementation level and 
can either be intended or unintended. 
104 HALL, 2016, p. 34. 
105 DUMAS, 2016, p. 3. 
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provisions are commonly referred to and discussed in scholarly works,106 but the actual 
development of the abolition of slavery in India after its formal abolition, has not been 
undertaken. The abolition of bonded labour and slavery touch upon the relations among 
human beings, and the formation of the state. The abolition of slavery and bonded labour are 
central to political history. Landman calls for more research in the field of political science on 
human rights in order “to provide better and more complete explanations for the variations in 
human rights protection and to enhance the relevance of its findings for the wider policy and 
practical community.”107 My contribution follows the tracks of how policies evolved within 
the political systems and the output the respective political systems generated. Therefore, this 
dissertation aims to understand how and why the institution of the abolition of slavery and 
bonded labour evolved the way it did, and is consequently placed interdisciplinary within the 
fields of history and comparative political science, with inspiration drawn from International 
Relations. 
 
Structure of this Dissertation 
In the first chapter I discuss the conjectures implied above, including the theoretical 
framework. I lay out in detail the theoretical assumptions and gaps that form the starting point 
of my analysis and then offer three suggestions of advancing the theory of gradual 
institutional change: The division of one variable in two; the addition of a type of actor; and 
the explicit inclusion of ideas and Zeitgeist in the theoretical deliberations and analytical 
approach to the history of the abolition of slavery and bonded labour in India. 
In the second through sixth chapter of the dissertation, I present the empirical cases 
and my theoretical analysis based on the theory of gradual institutional change. Here I also 
test the relevant hypotheses, depending on the cases’ conditions, the Zeitgeist, the institutional 
characteristics and the political context. In reiterating the history of the regulation and 
abolition of slavery, forced labour and bonded labour, I begin with the identification and 
discussion of the appropriate starting point. This is simultaneously a discussion and 
description of how the abolition of slavery in India developed as an institution. I trace the 
regulation and abolition of slavery and the slave trade, interrogating in particular the legal 
developments that began in Great Britain and their impact on the issue of bonded labour. I 
begin with the institutionalisation of the abolition of slavery in India, starting with the 
abolition of the slave trade by the British Parliament in 1807. The period from 1807 on is also 
 
106 Cf. DINGWANEY, 1985. 
107 LANDMAN, 2002, p. 566. 
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important, since in this period I trace the development of the norm of the abolition of slavery 
and bonded labour at the international level. As previously suggested, I argue that the 
institutionalisation of the abolition of slavery was completed with the adoption of Act V in 
1843. This constitutes the point from when the institution changed and underwent several 
transfigurations that were meaningful vis-à-vis the question of bonded labour. The time frame 
of this study comprises the years between 1807 and the 1990s: The first attempts to abolish 
slavery by the British until the becoming active of the National Human Rights Commission in 
India in monitoring the abolition of bonded labour. Within these approximately 200 years, 
several potential critical junctures can be identified, which appear useful to structure the 
analysis in the following phases: 
 
Institutionalisation East India Company & British Parliament (1807-1843) 
• 1807: Abolition of the slave trade 
• 1833: Abolition of slavery (except the possessions of the EIC) 
• 1843: Delegalisation of slavery 
 
1st Episode  East India Company and British Raj (1843-1919) 
• 1859: Workman’s Breach of Contract Act 
• 1860: Indian Penal Code 
 
2nd Episode  British Raj (1919-1947) 
• 1925: Repeal of the Workman’s Breach of Contract Act 
• 1926: League of Nations Slavery Convention 
 
3rd Episode  Part one and two (1946-1990s) 
Part one  Constituent Assembly, provisional government & parliament (1946-1952) 
• 1950: Constitutional Article 23 
• Withdrawal of the Prevention of Free or Forced or Compulsory Labour Bill 
 
Part two  Independent India, emergency and post-emergency rule (1952-1990s) 
• Withdrawal of the Prevention of Free or Forced or Compulsory Labour Bill 
• 1976: Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act (BLSA) 
• 1982: Bandhua Mukhti Morcha Case 
• 1993: National Human Rights Commission 
 
Chapters two to six are dedicated to the cases—their description and theoretical analysis. All 
chapters are structured similarly. First, I describe the institutional characteristics, as well as 
the relevant Zeitgeist and actors’ disposition towards the institution. I formulate respective 
theoretical assumptions about possible changes, based on the hypotheses developed in the 
theoretical chapter. The prediction is then followed by a description and simultaneous analysis 
of the historical events. In the final conclusion I outline the observations and discuss how the 
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theoretical framework is able to explain the institutional development of the abolition of 
slavery and bonded labour. From there I move to suggesting future research. 
The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to describing the historical and current 
forms of slavery, bonded labour and forced labour in India. Part and parcel of such a 
description is the role of poverty and caste. At the end of this chapter, I discuss the definition 
of slavery and define bonded labour, as well as forced labour. 
 
Slavery and Bonded Labour in India 
Historical records from the Indian subcontinent documented slavery since Mahmud Ghazni in 
1025 to 1000 BC, and throughout the Delhi Sultanate, in which slaves rose to such political 
power as to establish their own ruling dynasties—the Qutb al-Din Aybak dynasty.108 The 
Mughal Empire109 and the British Empire110 observed and regulated slavery. Under the 
Moghul Empire people became enslaved as war captives and were traded as slaves; women 
were held as concubines by the ruling elite.111 Mann shows that slaves during these millennia 
had been employed in different occupations and that the institution varied, from hereditary to 
temporary enslavement. He argues that the slave trade not only from Africa to the Americas 
but also from Africa to Asia constituted an important part of the history of globalisation. The 
slave receiving societies, their economic, bureaucratic, trade, as well as military systems, 
would have collapsed without slavery.112  
Enslavement in South Asia was not necessarily maintained throughout life; people 
were born into slavery, but slaves could buy themselves out of enslavement.113 Manumission 
was not necessarily inherited. Slaves could own property and valuables,114 and some 
exercised major influence on their master and ruler of the kingdom, as in the famous example 
of the female slave Virubai, who controlled the political affairs of the Maratha king until her 
death in 1740.115 There were slaves who inherited kingdoms116 and became rulers, as it 
happened in 1894 in the kingdom of Rajput.117 But as Patterson points out, the slave’s 
dependence upon a master ensured the loyalty of the slave, and to the very end, the fate of the 
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slave depended on the master.118 The unfixed social status of slaves allowed for their 
integration into society. Social boundaries were not set rigidly, and some individuals enjoyed 
opportunities of social up-ward mobility.119 
Bonded labour in India appears to be just as old as slavery. Kautilya’s Arthashastra,120 
written around 300 BC,121 set rules for debt bondage:122 The punishment for “[a]ny person 
who has once voluntarily enslaved himself if guilty of an offence (…), be a slave for life.”123 
While “[t]he offspring of a man who has sold off himself as a slave shall be an Arya.”124 The 
Arthashastra also acknowledged that whole families in times of distress may choose to bind 
themselves via debt to another more wealthy family, and a worker could also give himself 
into bondage instead of paying a fine as punishment for an offence.125 
The British colonial power also made use of slave labour: Indians were used as 
domestic slaves;126 during the time of the East India Company (EIC), officers travelling 
across the region made use of coolies127 and slave labour as carriers or boat men. These 
practices were already banned in Bengal and Madras in 1795 and 1810,128 but continued until 
the early twentieth century.129 British colonial power also used slave labour for the building of 
the railways and roads,130 and after the abolition of slavery in 1833, Indian labourers were 
moved to plantations on other colonial territories, for instance to Mauritius, Jamaica, Trinidad 
and British Guiana, under the indentured system.131 During the famines in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, British observers described the self-enslavement of individuals into debt 
bondage as a means of survival. They interpreted these actions “with emerging orientalist 
tropes about the inherent passivity, indolence and lack of entrepreneurial spirit that 
supposedly characterised Hindus.”132 According to other historians such as Arnold and Davis, 
the Bengal famine of 1770, with about ten million casualties, was a product of British 
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intervention and seizure of crops. The British colonial power used the prevalence of slavery as 
justification to colonise the Indian subjects who were in need of European guidance, and, 
furthermore, they did not acknowledge their contribution to these human disasters, in which 
debt bondage was a strategy of pure survival.133 
Major interrogates the ‘reality’ of slave labourers from the vantage point of the 
political discourse in the British Parliament in the early nineteenth century. When the 
abolition of the slave trade and slavery came under attack, parliamentarians moved to abolish 
slavery in the West Indies, but several MPs resisted the abolition of slavery in India. In the 
British parliamentarians’ eyes, Indian slave labour seemed to be a mild version compared to 
the slave labour on the plantations in the Americas.134 But Major demonstrates that brutality, 
homicide and chastising of slaves were known to those who experienced slavery on the Indian 
subcontinent. She makes clear that severe punishments have been part of the lives of slaves in 
South Asia and, in many cases, was not different from the brutality exercised on the 
plantations in the Americas.135 
Today, references to slavery in India most commonly refer to debt bondage or bonded 
labour. In 2005 and 2011 the ILO estimated that there were 12.3 million people working in 
forced labour136—the ILO’s definition of forced labour includes bonded labour—and in 2012 
this number rose to 20.9 million137—a change which is attributable not to an actual increase of 
people in forced labour, but rather to different methods used to generate the numbers.138 The 
1819 observations of a collector from Tanjore are strikingly similar to the tales of bonded 
labourers of today:139 
 
[T]he origin of their bondage arises in a voluntary agreement on their part to become 
the slave of some man more powerful than themselves, upon whom they thus impose a 
more strict obligation to protect and maintain them and their families, than if merely 
serving them as labouring servants. (…) When a bond of slavery has been given, it 
ceases not with the life of the party, but is binding upon the descendants of the original 
giver, who continue bound by the condition of it likewise. In return, the owner is 
obliged to find subsistence at all times and under all circumstances, for the family of 
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p. 513–519. 
Introduction 
 
18 
his bondsman, whom he can employ in any manner he pleases, although it is generally 
as a labourer in the fields.140 
 
Another variation of slave labour in India is so-called ‘free’ labour. ‘Free’ translates as 
‘unpaid’ in this context. One name used for free labour is begar, which is explicitly banned by 
the Constitution of India of 1950. Begar (or begaree) has been demanded by the regional 
nobility, or by the British colonial administrators who used carriers and requested other 
services for short periods of time when they toured in the Indian regions. The Elphinstone 
Code of Bombay of 1827 defines begaree as follows: 
 
Compelling a person to serve as a porter or guide by means of personal violence, as 
blows, or such treatment as produces corporal pain or injury: or by means of violence 
to property, as seizing or injuring any article belonging to him or in his occupation: or 
by means of threats expressed in words, or conveyed by conduct denoting an intention 
to inflict some injury to person or property apparently in the power of the culprit to 
effect.141 
 
Begar has most commonly been used to describe forced labour extracted by the state or state 
agents. The Government of India regulated the use of begar by the British administrators142 
and abolished it with the Act V of 1843.143 
Another form of free labour still extracted today is carried out under the auspices of 
caste: In the villages the lowest caste members and Dalits are often requested to perform free 
labour.144 Since most of the bonded labourers are members of the Scheduled Castes (SCs) or 
Scheduled Tribes (STs),145 I discuss this relation in more detail in the following sub-chapter. 
 
Caste and Poverty 
When you sweat, it’s water. When we sweat, it’s blood!146 
—Viramma, a Dalit woman from a South Indian Village, 1997 
 
Caste in India is the institutionalisation of inequality, resulting in discrimination of low caste 
communities and Dalits in the social and economic spheres. While caste is a specific form of 
social stratification in South Asian societies, the concept as such can be found in every 
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society.147 The stratification of society along the lines of caste, allows for upper caste 
members to appropriate the labour or the surplus produced by lower caste members or 
Dalits.148 Consequently, lower caste members and Dalits are primarily the victims of bonded 
labour.149 Caste, contrary to race, cannot be revealed by physical traits, only by social 
practices: the labour an individual performs, the family name the person carries or the 
knowledge a village community shares of its community members.150 Caste overlaps with 
class, but contrary to class, caste divides even workers among each other: Ambedkar observed 
in his work that “[t]he Caste System is not merely a division of labour. It is also a division of 
labourers.”151 
Caste constitutes a marker for the exercise of citizenship, yet also contributes to the 
limitation of citizenship.152 Kosambi explains that the division of labour along caste lines 
originated several thousand years ago,153 and Patnaik confirms that Aryan society 
incorporated different Indian tribes and these tribes conducted different tasks than the 
Aryans.154 While this racialised interpretation of Indian social history needs to be treated with 
caution,155 in the past, as still today, many Hindus make a value distinction between the 
different occupations. This distinction is based on the ritual meaning of the labour exercised 
and is translated into caste relations. Depending on the nature of the labour it can be perceived 
as polluting or pure.156 One line that can be drawn is between manual and non-manual labour 
or the exposure to bodily fluids and corpses.157 Occupations such as manual scavenging, the 
removal of human excrement by hand,158 the skinning of dead animals, or leather 
production,159 belong to occupations deemed ‘polluting’ and are almost exclusively 
undertaken by the lowest castes or Dalits.160 Often Dalits are forced to do these tasks for no 
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remuneration, in some cases even without any compensation, neither cash nor kind.161 There 
are also ‘pure’ occupations, which include polluting duties, such as a post-mortem 
examination in medical professions. Roy reiterates that there are upper caste doctors, who 
conduct post-mortem examinations with the assistance of the low caste sweeper.162 Therefore, 
it is no surprise that the majority of the bonded labour population, but not exclusively, 
consists of lowest caste members and Dalits, followed by tribal people.163 
The results of the National Survey on the Incidence of Bonded Labour estimate that 
2,617,000 bonded labourers, 86.6 percent, belong to the SCs or STs.164 There is not a 
conditional relationship between bonded labour and caste—not all bonded labourers belong to 
the SCs and STs and not all SCs and STs are bonded labourers—but social relations and 
social hierarchy play into the configuration of bonded labour in India. Hjejle discusses the 
first British reports on slavery and bonded labour in South India: Since 1818 the British 
administrators observed the connection of caste, or rather untouchability, and bonded labour, 
which the colonial officers found was absent in areas that had been governed by Muslim 
rulers.165 Similarly, Quirk summarises that “anti-slavery obligations invariably impinge upon 
larger structural questions of social and institutional discrimination, and the (mal)distribution 
of economic resources and political power.”166 
Poverty is another contributing factor that perpetuates bonded labour: Gabhanin argues 
in his study on human trafficking that being poor does not necessarily lead to slavery, but it 
“creates the necessary conditions.”167 Van den Anker,168 Künnemann,169 Iqbal,170 and 
Tomlinson171 agree with the identification of poverty as the main force that pushes people into 
exploitative labour relationships. The assumption that poverty is the main cause of the 
continued existence of bonded labour is supported by quantitative studies on a global scale, 
which correlate between poverty and human rights violations: Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui172 
find in their analysis that generally those countries that rate badly in human rights 
performance are also economically under-developed. The solution to the problem prescribed 
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by this perspective on slavery and bonded labour is economic uplift.173 But capitalism and 
economic growth have not delivered on their promise to serve the general welfare of all 
people. Often in areas of industrial development, a deterioration of labour conditions of the 
poor can be observed. Too often the poor are excluded or treated as the collateral damage for 
development.174 Poverty persists,175 even after the liberalisation of the Indian economy in the 
1990s, and particularly Dalits and Adivasis176 remain largely unaffected by the fruits of 
India’s growth:177 46 percent of the informal agricultural workers in India live below the 
poverty line, even though they have work.178 During the period between 2003 and 2012, the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimated that the working poor, people 
who earn USD 2 or less per day,179 constituted 55.5 percent of the population in India.180 The 
Indian government sets the poverty line at INR 20 per day. According to an Indian 
government report of 2007, 77 percent of the Indian population lived on less than INR 20 a 
day in 2004.181 By the year 2016, the number of those who work and earn less than USD 2 
experienced a sharp decline: The UNDP estimated that the working poor constituted 21 
percent of the population.182 These numbers show that having work does not necessarily 
provide for the possibility of even dreaming of rising out of poverty. The poverty rate also 
shows that a large number of people is at risk to become bonded labourers. 
Dalits and lower caste members are much more vulnerable to poverty than members of 
higher castes, and the majority of the Dalits in agriculture are landless.183 Poverty increases 
the likeliness of landless farmers and workers to submit to exploitative contracts or to bond 
themselves to their debtor.184 Caste and the continued existence of bonded labour play a 
pivotal role in sustaining a cheap workforce. Employers are able to increase the margins of 
gains because of the cheap labour.185 To continuously be able to tap the source of cheap 
labour, caste is essential. The caste system regulates the division of labour and the “division 
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of labourers.”186 Consequently, caste draws the line between those who are exploited and 
those who exploit and helps to explain enslavement patterns.187 
Some commentators styled this logic of vulnerability and exploitation as a charitable 
undertaking: A high court decision of 1880188 and in reports of the British administration of 
the 1840s, slavery and debt bondage were explained to function “as the Indian Poor Law.”189 
Others argue that bonded labour compensates for the lack of access to the formal credit 
market.190 Bonded labour arrangements allow workers to receive a credit which they would 
never receive from a bank.191 But Brass warns against reinterpreting exploitative relations as 
“functional-for-those-who-are-ruled.”192 The bonded labourer-employer relationship is not 
among equals and not only characterised by economic nature; rather, the relationship is 
usually marked by social hierarchy mediated and legitimised by caste193 and often enforced by 
threat or the actual use of physical violence.194 Other scholars found that state supported 
credits are not the solution to the problem either. Credits cannot compensate for caste 
discrimination or notorious underpayment. Microcredits have in many cases proven to 
perpetuate exactly what Yunus claimed to alleviate: Poverty.195 Reports on suicides of debtors 
is a reoccurring theme in the news, even though these credits are intended to help avoid these 
tragedies. Because women comprise the main target group of microfinances, these suicides 
have an increasingly higher rate of female victims.196 
One might wonder why bonded labourers do not ‘simply’ walk away from their 
exploiters. Power, defined in the simple terms of Dahl, finds its perfect empirical expression 
in bonded labour: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B 
would not otherwise do.”197 This power can be exercised on the individual level, but also at 
the community level. Power and control are at the heart of the relations between 
slaveholder/employer, the slave/bonded labourer, and the state. As Mitra put it so eloquently 
in Power, Protest and Participation: “[A]ny act of power requires an implicit complicity by 
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those subject to that power, wherein lies the room for manoeuvre by the powerless.”198 This 
room was used by many Indian labourers, when they removed themselves from the power 
relation, for instance by leaving the tea plantations in Assam.199 Their self-help strategies 
were also forms of resistance: There are reports of violent actions against exploitative 
employers, flight, go-slow tactics, collective protest,200 or coping mechanisms that could also 
be seen as means of resistance, such as drug consumption or suicide.201  
Hjejle describes instances of slaves and coolies in South India who learned of the 
delegalisation of slavery in 1843; in asserting their newly acquired ‘right’ and the inability of 
employers to reclaim them legally, they were confronted with reprisals by upper caste 
members and former slaveholders. These groups resorted to different methods of repression 
that also reflect the power relations, mediated by caste, economic and social position, and 
resulting in better access to judicial institutions of the better-off and higher castes. Such 
methods included: 
 
‘(a) bring false cases in the village courts or in the criminal courts; (b) obtain, on 
application, from government waste lands lying all round [sic] the paracheri, so as to 
impound the pariahs’ cattle or obstruct their way to the temple; (c) have mirasi names 
fraudulently entered in the government account against the paracheri; (d) pull down 
the huts and destroy the growth in the backyards; (e) deny occupancy right in 
immemorial subtenancies; (f) forcibly cut the Pariahs’ crops, and on being resisted 
charge them with theft and rioting; (g) under misrepresentations, get them to execute 
documents by which they are afterwards ruined; (h) cut off the flow of water from 
their fields; (i) without legal notice, have the property of subtenants attached for the 
landlords’ arrears of revenue.’202 
 
The dimension of violence played an important role. In many cases coercion was exercised in 
a variety of forms, such as the threat or actual use of physical violence, threats or actual 
execution of internment, and threats against the lives of the debtor as well as his or her whole 
family. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the tea plantation owners, for 
instance, ran private prisons, where they were allowed to incarcerate workers203 and severely 
punished runaway slaves. Surrounding villages were complicit in returning runaway slaves to 
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the tea plantations.204 Ambedkar gives the example of social boycott—as described above—
which higher caste groups used against lower caste members to coerce them to do ‘their 
duty.’205 Today there are still reports of corrupt police officers who return bonded labourers to 
their employers, and today’s newspapers report on acts of violence too abhorrent to picture 
that bonded labourers can experience, when they choose to run away;206 and Breman 
reiterates equally disturbing treatment of absconding labourers, whom creditors had tied to 
trees and flogged, shaved or beaten to death in the 1990s.207 
Some bonded labourers did run away and ended the exploitative labour 
relationships.208 But for the lot who endured, one has to understand the different coercive 
mechanisms at the disposal of those exacting free or bonded labour. Many workers 
‘voluntarily’ choose to bond themselves and often lacked the knowledge of their rights 
officially granted to them by the state. Or they were unable to access the records of their 
creditor in order to track their amount of debt and down-payment through the work they 
already completed. There were also normative and moral obligations at work that ‘forced 
workers to pay back their debt.’209 The Royal Commission on Labour observed in 1931 that 
the labourers took their contractual obligations seriously and noted the populations’ notion of 
“the sanctity of contract.”210 The caste system was, and is as of today, successful in keeping 
the losers of the social hierarchical system in their place: Often Dalits believed in their 
inferiority and obligation to perform those tasks, and they often also believed that this was 
their duty, or they simply lacked alternative options.211 
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Defining Slavery, Forced Labour and Bonded Labour 
Between the Law Commission Reports of 1841 and the Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP) 
of the US State Department of 2016, organisations, administrators, commissioners and 
scholars described bonded labour as “self-mortgage,”212 “semi-slavery,”213 labour exploitation 
“akin to slavery,”214 or subsumed it under “human trafficking,”215 or “forced labour.”216 
Another term used to describe coerced labour217 since the beginning of the twentieth 
century218 is “modern slavery.”219 The adjective ‘modern’ tries to isolate contemporarily 
observed forms of slavery from supposedly past forms of so-called ‘chattel slavery.’220 In 
other cases it seems that authors use the word ‘modern’ simply because they describe slavery 
as it is found today—and today is modern.221 This use of terminology encompasses various 
forms of exploitation: Bonded labour, forced marriages and human trafficking.222 The 
plethora of terms and the academic discourse exemplify that the question on defining slavery 
is far from resolved.223 Examining several authors’ discussions on the terminological 
conflation does not necessarily clear the confusion.224 Unfortunately, a recourse to 
international legal provisions is not helpful either225—the adoption of additional conventions 
and the defining of new areas of concern, namely the ILO and bonded labour,226 has only 
contributed to the terminological and definitional confusion.227 
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As Major points out, the transatlantic slave trade and the plantation slaveries in the 
Americas were constitutive of the initial legislation of abolition. In addition, slavery is often 
defined from the vantage point of the American experience. The abolitionist discourse drew a 
bipolar line between free labour and unfree or slave labour.228 Different systems of slavery in 
South Asia, never fit this freedom/unfreedom dichotomy.229 And it also did not reflect the 
actual experience of most workers and (female) service providers in the metropolis. Also, in 
Britain, the ‘free’ workers with contracts were legally covered by master and servant laws that 
allowed for criminal sanctioning for breaches of contract. None of the workers were free in 
the sense that they were not exposed to mechanisms of physical compulsion,230 or that they 
could choose their employer, leave their job whenever they wanted, or bargain their wages or 
working conditions.231 But the concept of chattel slavery and the “complete and extreme 
domination as the essential prerequisite of slavery”232 is also only valid for aspects of the 
American slavery experience: The position of the first black slaves that were brought to 
America did not fit the narrow definition of chattel slavery. By the mid-seventeenth century 
the African slave status became increasingly formalised, with the black population forced into 
permanent and inheritable slave status.233 Smedley explains that “[t]hese changes continued 
into the early eighteenth century, and in the process produced a system of bondage that was 
unique in human history. Its primary distinctiveness rested on the fact that such slavery was 
reserved exclusively for black Africans and their descendants.”234 
Eaton argues that in societies organized by social hierarchy, dependencies vary in 
degree, and slavery constitutes the highest degree of dependency. Slavery in India constituted 
only one form of dependency, in a society in which all individuals depended in greater or 
lesser degree.235 Chatterjee insists that restricting the use of the term slavery to arrangements 
similar to the slaveries in the Americas would be buying into the master and ruler narrative 
exercised by the British that ultimately failed to address other forms of slavery in other parts 
of the world: “This perspective [that slavery in India was ‘benign’] on indigenous society 
persisted till well into the twentieth century, and continues to circulate today as a resistance to 
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the ‘universalisation’ and ‘homogenisation’ implied by the term ‘slavery’ itself.”236 Salman 
also supports this observation in the discussion of the Philippines, arguing that “[t]he 
privileged position of the United States and the Americas in this global historiography is 
obviously inadequate for understanding slavery and abolition.”237 Interestingly, shortly after 
the act of 1833, the British parliament adopted an additional act against slavery committed by 
British subjects. This act provided that “all Persons holden in Servitude as Pledges for Debt, 
and commonly called ‘Pawns,’ (….) shall (…) be deemed and construed to be Slaves.”238 
Translations and descriptions of ancient texts indicate that degrees of dependency and 
bondage by debt were known in ancient India,239 but also for instance in Rome and Greece.240 
In ancient Greece was no term that could be translated as debt bondage, but authors 
discussing antique sources testify that people could get caught in debt bondage: The ruler 
Solon, for instance, abolished debt bondage in 600 BC. Bondage and slavery existed side by 
side and were associated with degrees: Bondage was not an agreeable status, but slaves were 
socially inferior to bonded labourers.241 Olivelle, who translated the Arthashastra, describes 
terms that can be understood as bondage through debt, established by monetary exchange or 
in kind: Udaradāsa, bhaktadāsa and āhitaka. Olivelle explains that an udaradāsa was a 
“subsistence slave,” a person who became “a slave in order to obtain maintenance. Thus, no 
sale [took] place.”242 Referring to other sources, the Mānava Dharmaśāstra and the Nārada 
Smr̥ti, the same construct was called “bhaktadāsa.”243 Furthermore, a person could be given as 
a pledge:244 The āhitaka was “someone given to a creditor as collateral. During the time the 
person [was] a pledge, he or she resemble[d] a slave and [could not] act independently.”245 
But a person given as collateral had “more rights than a slave.”246 Another state-sanctioned 
variation of debt bondage could be entered through a judicial process. If an accused person 
was poor and found guilty, the plaintiff could pay the fine ordered by the court as punishment 
and “get work done by him.”247 
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Already the ancient examples show that debt bondage did not fit the dichotomous 
concept of either free or slave labour. Their social status was not as degrading as slavery, and 
it could be entered into and later ended as a relation based on a debt. Therefore, I formulate a 
working definition of bonded labour with hindsight to free labour and slavery. In line with the 
suggestions of other authors,248 I diverge from the dichotomous concept and use a continuous 
model. Ahuja cautions scholars not to fall in the same trap of fixing different forms of 
dependencies on the continuum, which ends up being too simplistic, and brushes over the rich 
real-life experiences and struggles between workers and employers:249 
 
During their working lives, large segments of the workforce have been moving, under 
diverse historical conditions, in and out of various labour forms, of their own accord 
and/or in response to economic or political coercion. Crucially, (…) workers and/or 
their employers have also been known to stretch a labour form to the point of turning it 
into another, qualitatively distinct form.250 
 
In the light of the previous discussion, and for instance the different experiences of the 
bonded labourers exemplified in the case of Madan, “it is clearly understood [that the 
definition of formally free labour is] an abstraction from the much richer and more complex 
reality of concrete historical situations,”251 and it serves “the purpose of marking out larger 
historical tendencies.”252 This also applies to other conceptualisations of forms of unfree 
labour. 
According to Zeuske, chattel slavery encompasses four dimensions:253 Ownership 
rights including the full disposal over the slave’s body by the owner; the transferability of the 
slave by sale and purchase; the demobilisation of the slave; and the slave status being 
hereditary.254 Looking at those elements and the ensuing discussion of Zeuske, it appears that 
there are more elements constitutive of slavery than appear at first sight. The definition of 
chattel slavery invokes a legal dimension, the legally sanctioned ownership right over a 
person enforceable by a court or other state bodies.255 This definition is also given in the 
League of Nations Slavery Convention of 1926, Article 1: “Slavery is the status or condition 
of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are 
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exercised.”256 Allain clarifies that “the status or condition”257 encompasses de jure and de 
facto exercise of slavery, and which therefore allows the use of this article vis-à-vis bonded 
labour. The phrase “any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership”258 removes 
the de jure ‘ownership’ requirement, and the de facto ‘power of ownership’ is sufficient to 
make a judicial case.259 Seeing slavery as one form of labour exploitation on the free/unfree 
labour continuum, the ownership right de jure is the qualifying element for slavery, while 
bonded labour is marked by the de facto ownership. Following the logic of property, the 
property in the person can also be inherited, transferred, sold and purchased,260 a practice also 
familiar in the case of bonded labour, as discussed in the case of Madan.261 
A third dimension, addressed by Zeuske and in the Slavery Convention’s Article 1, is 
the full disposal over the slave’s body by the slaveholder. This relates to the control exercised 
over the slave regarding decisions of life and death, marriage and reproduction. The full 
disposal over a slave includes the appropriation of the production of the slave or the services 
s/he offers, for which the slave is not remunerated or compensated. Regarding the full 
disposal over the slave’s body, Zeuske insists that this is also relevant for debt bondage and a 
condition that renders the distinction between bondage and slavery artificial. He therefore 
suggests to follow Warren, and to use the term ‘debt-slavery’262 instead.263 The exercise of 
control also touches upon another element: The dimension of exploitation, which in the 
estimation of Marx turned the slave into the ultimate proletarian who is dispossessed of the 
surplus he produces and cannot even claim property rights over his or her own body.264 
The reference to the Atlantic trade and Americas’ chattel slavery, also carries implicit 
additional elements, as Zeuske suggests. For instance, the image of black slaves shipped 
across the Atlantic to be used as labourers on plantations in the Americas265 includes: The 
transportation or trafficking of human beings over large distances or the sea.266 Allain and 
Bales refute this element to be constitutive of slavery on the grounds that trafficking does not 
necessarily end in slavery. On the other hand, the experience of slavery after being trafficked 
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cannot be diminished by the prior experience of trafficking.267 I follow the definition that 
trafficking describes a process of transportation of people. It usually occurs in a transnational 
context and therefore is connected to a specific set of policies and jurisdictional conflicts, for 
instance over limiting or expanding migration and respective rules. This usually involves at 
least two jurisdictions: The country of origin as well as the country of destination. Since these 
conflicts differ from those over bonded labour,268 I exclude trafficking from my research 
project. Trafficking would, for instance, include the transportation of coolie and indentured 
labourers by the British to other overseas possessions.269 These processes related to 
indentured labour are based on the complicity of the (colonial) state,270 an issue that also plays 
into the definition of forced labour, which I address further below. Considering this history 
would deviate from my attention to bonded labour, which concerns mainly ‘native’ labour 
exploitation and its abolition. This focus is timely, since most of the recent publications on 
bonded labour or slavery in the Indian Ocean Region rarely address bonded labour and its 
abolition in India.271 
As mentioned above, the process of trafficking usually relates to a place of origin and 
destination. In the American slave trade particularly, the destination is of interest: The 
plantation.272 The plantation regime refers to a specific mode of production273 and the 
integration of the production of raw materials into the global market. This construction 
contributed to the exclusion of slavery systems within the ‘unproductive’ household, as was 
found prevalent in India and referred to as ‘domestic slavery.’274  
Another element inherently connected to trafficking is the slave’s social disconnection, 
which is reinforced by the control of the master over the slave. Patterson described this as the 
“social death.”275 The social disconnection of the slave goes in tandem with the 
reimplantation in an unfamiliar region. Geographically and socially disconnected, running 
away becomes a difficult or impossible undertaking. The reimplantation of a group of slaves 
into a new area that was either already inhabited or ruled by another group carried the 
potential of deepening the element of disconnection. This also contributes to the construction 
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of difference and social hierarchy.276 Smedley makes clear: The difference in the American 
case of slavery did not come naturally. Racism was not the cause of slavery, but slavery’s 
consequence.277 With the plantation image in mind, slaves appear to be easily identifiable 
because of a natural or imprinted physical appearance.278 But also other indicators were and 
are used to construct difference between the slave and the slaver: Social status or the loss of 
it.279 That difference is or becomes embedded in social hierarchy constructed along lines of 
caste, race, class, religion, or criminal record.280 Social hierarchy within which the exercise of 
power281 of masters over slaves occurs is acted out at times with gross violence.282 Slavery is 
the perverted exercise of social hierarchy, and constitutes not an aberration of the norm but “a 
confirmation of it.”283 As a signifier of social hierarchy, the possession of slaves was also 
reason for slaveholders to indulge in pride.284 An example is the observation of Buchanan, 
who wrote on Indian farmers in 1800: “A farmer with such a stock [of oxen, ploughs and land 
of 35 acres that need five families with about 24 people to work] (…) is reckoned a 
substantial man.”285 
Contrary to Patterson’s insistence that the element of alienation is constitutive of 
slavery, but not bonded labour,286 I argue that, looked at it from its end—the exercise and 
maintenance of control287—alienation also applies to debt bondage in India.288 In the case of 
bonded labour, it is the entrenchment within the familiar from which bonded labourers often 
cannot escape. The alienation embedded in the social community contributes to their inability 
to remove themselves from exploitative labour relations. Known to the neighbours, low caste 
members or Dalits are coerced by such means as social control and caste boycott to do as 
requested.289 Consequently, black slaves in the Americas challenged their difference by being 
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baptised,290 low caste members or Dalits challenged their difference within the community by 
attempting to become different through conversion to Islam,291 Buddhism292 or Christianity.293 
Therefore, alienation understood as being disconnected or held apart from the general social 
community is a shared experience of slaves and bonded labourers. 
The element of disconnection and alienation intentionally contributed to the slave’s 
demobilisation. With nowhere to go, and unfamiliar with the location and local language,294 
the slave had little chance to succeed at running away, which ultimately forced him or her to 
stay. To ensure demobilisation the threat or use of violence was applied. British tea planters in 
North India, for instance, collaborated with the surrounding communities to track down 
fugitive coolies.295 And today’s newspapers document cruel tales of bodily mutilation after 
runaway bonded labourers are captured by their debtors.296 The whip has been identified as 
the insignia of America’s chattel slavery.297 Violence, among other points, has constituted a 
key requirement for defining slavery.298 Consequently, when British policymakers assumed 
that violence was absent in slavery practiced in India, this allowed them to withdraw ‘benign’ 
forms of slavery from the discussion of slavery.299 But the use or threat of violence is a means 
to keep slaves in slavery, and this is important, because slavery has not been voluntarily 
entered.300 Contrary to this observation stands the idea that bonded labour is voluntarily 
entered, as for instance argued in the case of Madan.301 The labourers owned the “liberty to 
starve,”302 and the contract or verbal agreement only underlined the fact that they acted as free 
labourers.303 In connection to this is Zeuske’s fourth dimension, the temporal element: The 
slave status constitutes a lifelong condition, because it is inherited by birth.304 Looking at the 
elements of time and involuntary v. voluntary entrance in conjunction with bonded labour as 
exemplified in the case of Madan, I suggest subsuming these elements of entrance to bonded 
labour and the temporal dimension under the absence of exit options.305 In the example of 
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Madan the husbands entered the debt allegedly voluntarily. But the wives and children 
inherited their debt. Even though bonded labour arrangements can end upon repayment of the 
debt,306 the determination whether the debt has been redeemed is within the power of the 
master. Until then, the bonded labourer, like the slave, cannot leave.307 
One condition of labour relations amounting to slavery that is rarely explicitly stated is 
the number of people affected. A single slave does not make slavery, but rather the 
subjugation of a discernible group or, as in forced labour, the extraction of coerced labour of 
many people within a confined structure—the prison, for instance.308 To use another gross 
human rights violation to exemplify this point: It depends on the context to determine whether 
a murder case is either homicide or genocide.309 Most scholars draw on the notion of coerced 
labour following traceable pattern of human interaction that affect a larger number of 
people.310 
A last element, which is related to the definition of forced labour, is the question of 
who is the master. I follow the initial suggestion of the ILO and the British translation of 
begar311 that reserved the extraction of forced labour for the state.312 It was particularly the 
colonial states which the ILO was commissioned to supervise when the ILO Convention on 
Forced Labour was adopted in 1930.313 Begar, veth, or vethbegar are the respective terms 
used by Indian rulers, and the British in India.314 According to Kadam, veth and begar both 
mean ‘work without pay,’ and he explains that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries these 
terms were used to denote labour extracted by the government without remuneration.315 
Within the colonial context, forced labour was extracted either directly by the colonial state or 
by intermediary private entities working in conjunction with the state316—it was based on the 
state’s support and legal sanction, as in the case of indenture.317 Since 2001, bonded labour is 
covered explicitly by both the United Nations318 and the ILO.319 I suggest limiting the use of 
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the term ‘forced labour’ to the exercise of coerced labour by the state. In terms of the 
extraction of forced labour, the state occupies a special role, namely as the claimant of the 
monopoly on violence as discussed above. The maintenance of armies, prisons, public works, 
workhouses, and indenture are all embodiments of this violence, as well as manifestations of 
labour coercion.320 
Considering several of the above discussed elements, the Venn-diagram (Figure 3) 
visualises the continuum between slavery, bonded labour and free labour. The graphical 
overlap also depicts the conceptual overlap, as well as the range of conditions within which 
both, slavery and bonded labour, can move. Patterson suggests that the presence of some or 
all elements of his definition make his “approach (…) polythetic.”321 Depending on time, 
place and individual labourer/employer relationship, bonded labour can share several features 
with slavery. At one time it can occupy the field in the middle, or it can move within a 
worker’s lifetime to the left or right side of the diagram. Progressing towards the left would 
reflect the Indian Law Commission’s description of bonded labour of 1841, when one 
commentator observed that the labour relation ‘degenerated into slavery:’322 
Figure 3. Free labour – bonded labour – slavery – continuum 
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There are two differences between slavery and bonded labour: The first is that in 
slavery the property claim is exercised de jure.323 This no longer exists, as there is no country 
in which the property in a slave can be claimed in court.324 Yet, Allain’s argument is useful in 
observing the de facto claim of property rights in a human, thereby making it possible to 
punish offenders under slavery abolition legislation.325 The second qualification that separates 
bonded labour from slavery is the establishment of the employer/labourer relationship based 
on a debt fixed in word or on paper constituting a contractual obligation which also carries a 
moral dimension. 
Bonded labour constitutes a form of labour exploitation on the free/unfree labour 
continuum in its own right. On this continuum, bonded labour is not fixed—it can move and 
cover certain elements at one time and other elements at another time. It can be defined as a 
condition that is temporarily unspecified and based on a debt, stated in writing or as oral 
agreement. Depending on the legal context, this contract may or may not be upheld in a court. 
The bonded labour relationship has been entered voluntarily or involuntarily, for instance by 
inheritance of a debt, and in any case lacks an exit option initiated by the bonded person. Part 
and parcel are the exploitation of the labourer who may or may not be remunerated. The 
relationship to the master can be temporary or lifelong. A bonded labourer can be exposed to 
violence and total control. This could entail that the debt, and therefore the labourer, is 
transferred to another master, who is not a state agent but a private person. Social hierarchy 
separates the master from the bonded labourer and systematically exposes a larger number of 
people to this form of labour exploitation within a state or society. 
In this dissertation, my main focus is on bonded labour. Since in this case, anti-slavery 
legislation and the discourse on slavery are relevant, taking into account also that political 
actors referred to both forms of labour exploitation at times interchangeably, I refer to them 
both in conjunction throughout this text. In the following chapter I discuss and present the 
theoretical framework. From there I formulate the hypotheses that are tested in this 
dissertation. In addition, I outline the methods with which I analyse this case. 
 
323 For the Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines on the Legal Parameters of Slavery the “control over a person 
tantamount to possession is sufficient,” Research Network on the Legal Parameters of Slavery, March 3 2012, 
Guideline 5. 
324 Research Network on the Legal Parameters of Slavery, March 3 2012, Guideline 6. 
325 ALLAIN, 2009, p. 241, 2015, p. 26–27. 
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Chapter 1 
Theory & Method 
he continuous concern of the League of Nations (LN), the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and the UN (United Nations) towards the issue of slavery, 
forced labour and human trafficking demonstrates: The abolition of slavery is a real-
world issue affecting many individuals globally, both in the past and today.1 Choosing this 
issue as the focal point of my research, I dedicate this work to the “exploration of how far 
politics can help explain human experiences and help resolve human difficulties.”2 With the 
institution of the abolition of slavery at the centre of my inquiry, I analyse how a central actor 
in India, the state, has dealt with one of the gravest human rights abuses. Landman explains 
that empirical social theories are primarily used to understand and offer explanations of the 
social world, why this world looks the way it does.3 In understanding the connections between 
the different social and political phenomena, a political science theory “illuminates a causal 
mechanism regulating variation in a phenomenon.”4 In this chapter, I outline the theoretical 
framework I employ to address the issue of the abolition of slavery and bonded labour and 
respond to my research questions. The theoretical foundation rests on the work of Mahoney 
and Thelen’s Explaining Institutional Change5 within historical institutionalism, which I test 
and advance in this dissertation. 
 
Historical Institutionalism  
Since the 1980s scholars of political science started to pay attention to the processes of change 
of institutions. Institutions such as education,6 or democratic institutions, race and affirmative 
action laws in the United States,7 the capitalist economic setup of OECD countries,8 and other 
institutions are all on the research agenda. Before this period, the issue of change was 
neglected.9 
 
1 International Labour Office, 2005; Walk Free Foundation, 2017. 
2 BELTRAN/COHEN/COLLIER et al., 1999, p. 129, italics in the original. 
3 LANDMAN, 2006, p. 37. 
4 SOUVA, 2007, p. 557. 
5 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b. 
6 THELEN, 2004. 
7 LIEBERMAN, 2007b. 
8 BECKERT/EBBINGHAUS/HASSEL et al., 2006. 
9 CAMPBELL, 2010, p. 89–90. 
T 
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The classic assumption of historical institutionalism is that “initial policy choices, and 
the institutionalized commitments that grow out of them (…) determine subsequent 
decisions.”10 Scholars of Historical Institutionalism (HI) also observe that institutions do 
change, and punctuated equilibria or critical junctures are the concepts that are invoked to 
understand institutional change. Borrowing from evolutionary biology and the work of Gould 
and Eldredge,11 scholars of political science applied the concept of punctuated equilibria to 
political science questions. Within this line of explaining institutional change, change is 
depicted as an external force with “short bursts of rapid institutional change followed by long 
period of stasis.”12 Critical junctures are “an immediate response to an external shock such as 
the depression of the 1930s, the debt crisis of the 1980s, an international wave of social 
protest, or a war—it may occur more or less simultaneously across a number of countries and 
hence may be relatively easy to identify.”13 Other external factors may be the threat of an 
invasion or adjustments of national policies according to international system requirements.14 
But also economic crisis,15 revolutions, political regime change,16 or electoral changes17 
puncture stability.  
On the other hand, external shocks are not always followed by an alteration of the 
institution, and not every institutional change is caused by external shocks.18 While historical 
institutionalists are strong in explaining stability and continuity, incremental change of 
institutions is largely undertheorised.19 Mahoney and Thelen, and earlier Thelen and 
Streeck,20 address this omission in their theoretical framework.21 Mahoney and Thelen argue 
that scholars frequently resort to the concept of critical junctures to introduce change in stable 
institutions. During critical junctures, usual paths of institutional action are drastically altered. 
The alteration takes place in such a way that earlier constraints of existing institutions are 
removed and “dramatic change is possible.”22 Inherent forces or inbuilt settings that provide 
 
10 PETERS, 2012, p. 20. 
11 ELDREDGE/GOULD, 1972, 84, 98. 
12 KRASNER, 1984, p. 242. 
13 COLLIER/COLLIER, 1991, p. 31. 
14 KRASNER, 1984, p. 238. 
15 BAUMGARTNER/JONES, 1993; CAMPBELL, 2010, p. 92. 
16 THELEN, 2009, p. 474. 
17 BAUMGARTNER/JONES, 1993, xvii. 
18 VAN DER HEIJDEN, 2011, p. 9. 
19 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 2. 
20 STREECK/THELEN, 2005b. 
21 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 1. 
22 CAPOCCIA/KELEMEN, 2007, p. 341; cf. MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 7. 
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room for change are not visible and remain unexplained23 and “more incremental or 
evolutionary (i.e. path dependent) change”24 is not addressed. 
Looking at the case of the abolition of slavery in India, there are critical junctures 
during the period I consider. For instance, the emergency rule of Indira Gandhi and its 
aftermath might turn out as critical junctures for the adoption of the BLSA and the appearance 
of the Supreme Court as a major actor in the implementation of the norm. But the critical 
juncture of transition from colonial rule to democratic rule in 1947 was followed only by 
marginal25 transformation of the institution of the abolition of slavery. Furthermore, the 
changes that took place in the aftermath of the critical junctures were not radical since the 
normative core—the abolition of slavery—remained stable. Not only are the moments of 
change difficult to grasp with the concept of critical junctures, but also the quality of the 
changes is not accounted for.  
On the other hand, IR scholars expect an example of “window dressing,”26 but in fact, 
India adopted antislavery legislation with the Act V and the IPC even before international 
conventions against slavery and forced labour were adopted.27 IR scholars observe a 
correlation between human rights treaties and democratic governments being more eager to 
become parties to human rights conventions, which in turn means that national legislation has 
to be adjusted to the new rules. At the same time, India adopted its most detailed act in its 
least democratic phase since independence, under Indira Gandhi. And while this autocratic 
regime phase poses one of the critical junctures that led to gradual institutional change, other 
critical junctures did not produce alterations, while new rules were adopted when there was no 
critical juncture in sight.  
How, then, can we explain the changes the institution of the abolition of slavery 
underwent? How can we explain the timing of the changes that occurred, or the failure to 
make changes at critical junctures? HI and its variant of gradual institutional development 
appear as a fruitful theoretical foundation to approach the issue of change of the institution of 
the abolition of slavery in India. In the following chapter I discuss and present the theoretical 
framework. From there I formulate the hypotheses that are tested in this dissertation. 
 
 
23 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 7. 
24 CAMPBELL, 2010, p. 92. 
25 Further below I discuss the quality of change, what change is, and how to measure it in the particular case of 
the abolition of slavery in India. 
26 HAFNER-BURTON/TSUTSUI, 2005, p. 1378. 
27 Hill remarks regarding this observation that “[t]he fact that human rights treaties seem to have an effect on 
states that are likely to respect human rights in the absence of a commitment to the regime should raise some 
eyebrows,” HILL, 2010, p. 1161. 
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Institutions and Actors 
To describe the abolition of slavery I already used the term institution. How does the abolition 
of slavery qualify as an institution? North’s classical definition explains that institutions are 
“humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction” that 
“consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of 
conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights).”28 Similarly, Hall defines 
institutions in stricter terms as “the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard 
operating practices that structure the relationships between individuals in various units of the 
polity and economy.”29 The definitions rely on actual practices that constitute institutions. But 
what if these policies do not effectively constrain the behaviour of actors, such as the Indian 
Constitution or the Indian Penal Code (IPC), as the estimates of bonded labour today and in 
the past indicate? In addition, Blyth wonders how change can even be conceivable under this 
notion of institutions: “If institutions structure agents’ choices so completely, why would the 
agents inside these institutions ever get the urge to change their environment?”30 
Slavery can also constitute an institution: As long as slavery is sanctioned by the 
political system, it is an institution. According to the definition of an institution given in the 
introduction,31 slavery no longer constitutes an institution, as soon as the third-party 
enforcement is removed. This would not be the case with Hall and North’s definitions of an 
institution: The continued existence of slavery exacted on the basis of informal rules, such as 
traditions or caste, could in Hall’s terms be framed as the ‘compliance procedures’ within a 
polity and therefore still be an institution. According to Hall’s definition, the institution of the 
abolition of slavery would constitute the formal rules not to enslave any person and would 
also regulate the relationship between citizens, and between citizens and the state.32 The rules 
intend to structure the behaviour of actors but fail to do so, as already demonstrated in the 
introduction. The definition of Thelen and Streeck, given in the introduction, overcomes this 
issue: Their definition does not build on the actual enforcement of the institution.33 
Mahoney and Thelen treat the issue of implementation and the failure to implement 
rules and policies differently. They highlight that institutions are 
 
28 NORTH, 1991, p. 97. 
29 HALL, 1986, p. 7. 
30 BLYTH/HELGADÓTTIR/KRING, 2016, p. 148. 
31 STREECK/THELEN, 2005b, p. 12. 
32 Forced prison labour and military service are seen as forced labour, but legalised under the Forced Labour 
Convention of 1930, Art. 2, 2.a) and c), International Labour Organisation, 1930; International Labour 
Conference, 1962, p. 2002. The question of military service was also discussed in the Constituent Assembly of 
India, Constituent Assembly Debates, May 1 1947. 
33 STREECK/THELEN, 2005b, p. 12. 
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distributional instruments laden with power implications (…) [which] inevitably raise 
resource considerations and invariably have distributional consequences. Any given 
set of rules or expectations—formal or informal—that patterns action will have 
unequal implications for resource allocation (…). This is true for precisely those 
institutions that mobilize significant and highly valued resources (e.g., most political 
and political-economic institutions) (…).34 
 
The abolition of slavery and bonded labour as a distributional instrument affects the three 
main actors—the state, bonded labourers and employers—in different ways. The state claims 
the monopoly of violence and is in charge of facilitating implementation by making resources 
and structures available (i.e., inspectorates, policing, courts, the prison system, and 
administration of compensations).35 All processes—the identification of bonded labourers, the 
prosecution of offenders, and the rehabilitation of and compensation for bonded labourers—
require resources in terms of funds, as well as man-power, time, and infrastructure that either 
must be developed, or existing infrastructure must be dedicated to this purpose. Other 
resources of interest to the state are status and legitimacy. Status plays an important role 
within the international community of states but also at the national level. Status is connected 
to influence, credibility and legitimacy.36 As already pointed out in the introduction, states can 
be criticised and presented as bad examples at the international level.37 Similarly, the British 
Raj was confronted with questions of legitimacy as a result of labour resistance, such as that 
of the indigo farmers in the late 1850s, and with criticism from members of the legislative 
assemblies for the use of coolie labour on the Assamese tea plantations.38 
On the other hand are the employers and their economic interests in labour 
exploitation.39 The effective implementation of the abolition of slavery would mean that 
employers would suffer a loss of economic profits, or, if they choose not to abide by the rules, 
they risk criminal prosecution. Historically, the punishment of slaveholders has not been self-
evident, such as when abolition was about to be legally formalised in Britain: The state 
compensated former slaveholders for losing their labour force due to abolition with £20 
million40 and the Court of Directors of the East India Company contemplated compensation of 
 
34 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 8, italics in the original. 
35 JAYAL, 2013, p. 156. 
36 HAFNER-BURTON/TSUTSUI, 2005, p. 1378. 
37 THOMANN, 2011, p. 82–101; LUND-THOMSEN/NADVI, 2010, p. 4–5. 
38 KUMAR, 2012, 259, 296; see also YEO/WRIGHT, 2011. 
39 Cf. KUMAR, 2012, p. 95–97; SHARMA, 2009, p. 1293; MUNDLE, 1979, p. 115; cf. KARA, 2012, 12-15, 145-46; 
ROGOWSKI, 2013, p. 194–195. For a study on what employers of bonded labourers in India think, with 
interviews conducted in 2017, see CHOI-FITZPATRICK, 2019, p. 56–57. 
40 DRAPER, 2010, p. 2; TEALL, 1897, p. 3. 
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slave owners in India in 1833.41 In the United States, congressmen also suggested 
compensation of slaveholders in 1865, but did not succeed.42 The idea to compensate former 
slaveholders was not off the table and still contemplated by the German delegates at the 
Temporary Slavery Commission of the League of Nations in 1926.43  
Lastly, the labourers themselves are actors interested in having control over the lives 
they live, their labour and wellbeing. Despite being exploited as slaves and having no or “low-
intensity citizenship,”44 studies such as those of Genovese depict vividly the agency of the 
oppressed and their resistance to exploitation.45 
 
Gradual Institutional Change 
Mahoney and Thelen (2010) propose a theory of gradual institutional change in which they 
address the issue of the “gradual evolution of institutions”46 within the realm of HI. In the 
implementation process of a policy, a gap might appear between the intention and the 
outcome of a policy. This discrepancy may evolve over time or exist outright from the 
inception of the institution.47 One reason for this is the two-level game:48 On one level, 
policymakers formulate acts and policies, but cannot envision or respond to all potential 
questions that might arise during implementation. On the street-level, another set of actors is 
in charge of implementation of these policies; they have to interpret the meaning of the 
provisions of those rules. In addition, there is the third level, the targeted population of the 
institution and its challengers who contribute their share to the development of an 
institution.49 Mahoney and Thelen argue “that institutional change often occurs precisely 
when problems of rule interpretation and enforcement open up space for actors to implement 
existing rules in new ways.”50 One example they give51 is the work of King, who shows along 
the example of the United States, that the executive and administration granting 
unemployment benefits were free to interpret applicants’ behaviour towards “actively seeking 
work.”52 The consequence of administrative interpretation was the separation of job-seekers 
 
41 Court of Directors, 1833, p. 327; NICOLLS/BIRD/CASEMENT et al., 1841, p. 5–6. 
42 MCPERSON M., 2011, p. 12; RODRIGUEZ, 2007, p. 150. 
43 ALLAIN, 2008, p. 77. 
44 O'DONNELL, 1993, p. 1361. 
45 GENOVESE, 1974, p. 587–660. 
46 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 2. 
47 Cf. ACKRILL/KAY, 2006; WINCOTT, 2011, p. 152–153; LIEBERMAN, 2002a, p. 697, 2007b, 175-76, 201. 
48 PUTNAM, 1988. 
49 HILL/HUPE, 2002, p. 4. 
50 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 4. 
51 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 20. 
52 KING, 1995. 
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into worthy and unworthy recipients of unemployment benefits. Assuming a “policing role”53 
over unemployment recipients, the administration worked in a manner not intended, while at 
the same time failing to meet the intended goal of bringing people back into work relations.54 
Some actors within the polity profit from an implementation gap and contribute to its 
growth, or prevent its closure. Other actors might try to change the institution in order to close 
the gap.55 “Actors with divergent interests will contest the openings (…) ambiguity provides 
because matters of interpretation and implementation can have profound consequences for 
resource allocations and substantive outcomes.”56 The level of actors’ compliance with the 
rules has an effect on the mode of change of an institution.57 Through this theoretical 
acknowledgement of the implementation gap, compliance is not the dependent variable, but 
one of the independent variables to explain stability or change.58 
To understand institutional change, attention needs to be paid to several independent 
variables: (1) The political context, if for instance changes can be enacted in parliament. (2) 
The institutional characteristics, which can be determined by the ambiguity of the rules and 
the level of enforcement. The other variables are (3) the actors and their disposition towards 
the institution, and (4) ideas. Since (1) and (2) provide the background conditions within 
which actors operate, the same actors can be expected to behave differently when the political 
context or the characteristics of the institution are different.59 
 
Modes of institutional Change 
Referring to the earlier work of Hacker,60 Schickler,61 Thelen and Streeck,62 Mahoney and 
Thelen introduce several modes of institutional change. Depending on the actors’ behaviour, 
different forms of institutional change take place. These modes of change are linked “to 
features of the institutional context and properties of institutions themselves that permit or 
invite specific kinds of change strategies and change agents.”63 To better understand the 
dependent variable (change) and to connect the different forms of change to the independent 
variables, Mahoney and Thelen suggest a typology of four modes of change. These are 
 
53 KING, 1995, p. 14. 
54 KING, 1995, xii-xiii, 54, 186. 
55 VAN DER HEIJDEN, 2011, p. 11. 
56 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 11. 
57 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 20–21. 
58 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 10. 
59 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 18–19. 
60 HACKER, 2004. 
61 SCHICKLER, 2001. 
62 STREECK/THELEN, 2005a. 
63 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 4. 
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displacement, layering, drift and conversion. In Beyond Continuity (2005) Streeck and Thelen 
identified a fifth mode of change, which they dropped while developing the theoretical 
framework in Explaining Institutional Change:64 exhaustion.65 The authors explain that this 
process of change rather describes the breakdown of an institution than its change.66 
The first mode of institutional change is displacement, which refers to changes that 
occur through the removal of existing policies and their replacement by other rules. Hacker 
describes the same mode of change but calls it ‘revision.’67 An example for this mode of 
change is the displacement of the oligarchic regime in Indonesia by an autocracy under 
Suharto.68 Another example is the change of British economic policies: Keynesianism was 
displaced by Neoliberalism in the 1980s.69 
The second mode of change is layering, which describes a change through the addition 
of new rules to already existing ones. Layering occurs when a gap between the policy goal 
and enforcement appears and actors choose not to replace the existing policies. The existing 
institution is amended to either ensure or distort the implementation of the spirit of the rules 
through the addition of “rules, policy processes or actors.”70 Thelen reiterates the case of the 
privatisation of social security as an example for layering. Public social security was not 
replaced, but layers of private social security schemes diverted a portion of the paying 
population from the general social security system and undermined the functioning of public 
social security programmes.71 
The third mode of change, drift, is characterised by a change of the environment which 
impacts rules. The rules continue to exist, but they produce different outcomes from the time 
of the institution’s creation. This form of institutional change can, for instance, be attributed 
to actors refraining from changing the rules or neglecting them. Hacker describes this mode of 
change by example of the welfare provisions in the US and the increase of private benefits. 
While the policymakers did not change the existing policies, the targeted population had 
undergone significant transformations: New family models had formed with an increasing 
number of single parents, and the number of insecure work relations had grown. These 
changes in the population had the consequence that the number of people benefitting from 
 
64 The fifth mode of change is mentioned in STREECK/THELEN, 2005b, p. 1, but not in MAHONEY/THELEN, 
2010b. 
65 Cf. FALLETI/MAHONEY, 2015, p. 222. 
66 STREECK/THELEN, 2005b, p. 29–30. 
67 HACKER, 2004, p. 247. 
68 SLATER, 2010, p. 148. 
69 STREECK/THELEN, 2005b, p. 20. 
70 VAN DER HEIJDEN, 2011, p. 11, summarizing MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 17. 
71 THELEN, 2003, 226-227, 231; cf. BÉLAND, 2007, p. 33. 
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welfare provisions declined. Because of actors undermining adjustment efforts of the 
government, drift took place while the rules of the welfare policy remained stable.72 Actors 
like Clinton attempted to change the formal policy to bring the outcomes back on track to 
realise the initial intention of the policy, but failed. Another example is the American 
(alcohol) prohibition: “[B]y suppressing suppliers of alcohol, Prohibition in the United States 
created highly profitable opportunities for bootleggers. Whereas the bootleggers embraced 
Prohibition because of the high profit margins it produced, their activities subverted the effort 
to prevent the consumption of alcohol—the main point of Prohibition.”73 
The fourth mode of change which Mahoney and Thelen describe is conversion. 
Conversion happens when the existing rules are enacted or interpreted differently than before 
to react to new challenges.74 Hacker, Pierson and Thelen75 use the American Sherman 
Antitrust Act of 1890 as an example for conversion. This law was intended to protect trade by 
breaking up business trusts.76 But it was this legislation which corporations invoked to 
undermine the formation of unions. Thelen observes for the case of vocational training in 
Germany that conversion “can be a consequence of the incorporation of groups, previously on 
the margins, who turn existing or inherited institutions to new ends.”77 
One question is whether a line between the ‘discretion of interpretation’ and outright 
corruption should be drawn.78 For corruption it is irrelevant if the rules are ambiguous and 
allow for a lot of room for interpretation or not. Under corruption, the rules cannot be invoked 
to explain behaviour of the actors. This is a problem which has not been explicitly addressed 
in the contributions on institutional change discussed above. It is related to the question of 
other criminal behaviour, as the above-mentioned example of bootleggers profiting from and 
at the same time undermining Prohibition.79 Looked at from the angle of institutional change, 
corruption is the behaviour of actors that engenders change of an institution and therefore can 
be described within this theoretical framework.80 The approach of gradual institutional change 
allows us to acknowledge that criminal behaviour also influences the characteristics of the 
institution and subsequent change. An emerging gap within or beyond discretion of 
 
72 HACKER, 2004, 246, 249-250. 
73 ONOMA, 2010, p. 69. 
74 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 15–18. 
75 HACKER/PIERSON/THELEN, 2015. 
76 HACKER/PIERSON/THELEN, 2015, p. 181. 
77 THELEN, 2003, p. 228. 
78 Kennedy raises a similar question, KENNEDY, 1999, p. 462. Waylen observes this in the case of informal rules, 
WAYLEN, 2014, p. 217. 
79 ONOMA, 2010, p. 69. 
80 ONOMA, 2010, p. 65. The case of Onoma concerns the issuance of land documentation, a governmental report 
described the process of issuing these documents as being marked by corruption, Republic of Kenya, 2004, 8, 
18, 192. 
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interpretation has consequences on actors and their ideas about the institution, which in turn 
have an effect on the actors’ behaviour. The question of corruptive behaviour is factored in by 
the consideration of actors, whether they adhere to the rules of the institution or if they violate 
them.81 This also means that it is important to keep the two variables, 1) discretion of 
interpretation and 2) actual enforcement, separate. As a consequence, the patterns of change 
that Mahoney and Thelen observe occur at two different levels: At the rules level and at the 
outcome level.82 
Another question is why one change is happening over another one. Mahoney and 
Thelen offer the theoretical framework which establishes the causal relationship between the 
dependent variable and the independent variables. By linking the mode of change to several 
variables, they can explain why, for instance, layering happened and not drift. The 
independent variables they include are: The political context, the characteristics of the 
institution,83 the actors and the variable ideas, which Mahoney and Thelen did not develop 
well. In the following, I discuss these variables. 
 
Political Context 
The first two variables are the political context and the characteristics of the institution. The 
two questions regarding the political context and institutional characteristics are (a) whether 
there are veto possibilities, and (b) whether the rules of the institution leave room for 
interpretation and enforcement.84 Veto-players are political actors on which the development 
of a formal policy change depends. These can be individual actors or collectives, such as 
parties in parliament. Institutional actors are those actors prescribed by a constitution, for 
instance, to adopt or reject policies. Changing the status quo becomes less likely the more 
distant the actors are positioned regarding a policy issue. The more veto-players are needed to 
assent to a new policy or policy reform, the more stable the status quo is and less likely formal 
change. The number of veto-players, as well as their cohesion in a policy question, needs to 
be considered. The number of veto-players alone does not determine the likeliness of change, 
 
81 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 23. 
82 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 15–18. 
83 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 31–32. 
84 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 18. Regarding veto possibilities, Mahoney and Thelen rely on the work of 
Hacker, MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 18. Hacker himself relies on Immergut and Tsebelis, HACKER, 2005, 
p. 42. 
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but rather the cohesion of the veto-players on the issue to block or advance, for instance, a 
new act.85 
Mahoney and Thelen explain that veto possibilities, and concomitantly the modes of 
change, vary: The displacement of old rules and the creation of new ones is most likely where 
actors face a small number of veto points or only weak veto points. Layering is most likely 
with strong veto-players that can prevent changes of the targeted institution. There is a high 
chance for drift when rule interpretation is relatively open but veto points are too strong to 
allow for a new decision to change these rules. And lastly, where there are only few veto 
possibilities and a high degree of discretion in interpreting or enforcing rules, conversion, the 
alteration of the enforcement of those rules, is likely to occur.86 In the part on my hypotheses I 
return to these causal relationships. 
Immergut provides a set of indicators87 which are useful for the operationalisation of 
veto points at the policy-making level. The summary below is a version of Immergut’s table:88 
Table 2. Political arenas and moves indicating veto points (Immergut, 1990) 
 
Arena Move 
Executive Members of Parliament can overturn executive decisions. 
Legislative No stable parliamentary majority. 
No party discipline required. 
Electoral Members of the electorate can overturn parliamentary decisions 
Potential for shifting voters or a referendum. 
Source: Table adapted from IMMERGUT, 1990, p. 397. 
 
One might argue against using veto points for the colonial period of India, since 
Immergut limited her concept of veto points to “specific characteristics of democratic political 
institutions.”89 The regime in India between 1833 and 1946 was clearly not democratic. But in 
one of the cases Immergut analyses, the country experienced undemocratic phases during the 
period she considers: In France, policy changes were possible because the government 
removed democratic veto points,90 and governed through ordinances across parliament.91 She 
concludes that “French Social Security was introduced in precisely such an extraordinary 
period. The executive could issue legislation directly by Ordinance, the parliament was 
 
85 HACKER, 2004, p. 247. 
86 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 18–21. 
87 IMMERGUT, 1990, p. 397. 
88 IMMERGUT, 1990, p. 397. 
89 IMMERGUT, 1990, p. 395. 
90 In the Polity IV France is rated as having 5 points during the beginning of the Fifth Republic, qualifying as an 
anocracy, which Immergut analyses, Polity IV Project, 2014. 
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merely consultative, and it was composed, in any case, overwhelmingly of representatives of 
the resistance coalition.”92 Therefore, this concept can also be used for non-democratic 
regimes. 
 
What is Change? 
When conceptualising change, some aspects or elements must remain stable to make sure that 
one is still talking about something that has been changed, not replaced or removed 
altogether. The word ‘change’ as such implies a form of stability, something that remains 
constant. Or, as Béland put it: The institution’s “development itself remains path 
dependent.”93 In the research on social security, the concept of making arrangements to offer 
welfare provisions to citizens remains stable, while the targeted population or the benefits 
received, for instance, change. In Thelen’s work on vocational training the concept of 
preparing citizens for the labour market through educational programmes remains stable, 
while the parameters of the educational system change.94 Thinking of change this way, the 
mode of exhaustion does not constitute a form of change, since that would involve the end of 
the institution.95 
Campbell observes that scholars often do not address the question of what change is. 
He notes that “surprisingly little effort has been devoted to defining exactly what we mean by 
institutional change in the first place.”96 He opines that it might be easier to determine change 
at the outcome level,97 but also concedes “that changes in rules qualify as institutional 
change.”98 Above I discussed Mahoney and Thelen’s typology of institutional changes, noting 
that they can occur on either one or both levels: The rules level or the enforcement level.99 
Hacker observes that institutions can undergo “formal revision,”100 or the policy can remain 
stable but produce changing outcomes.101 Campbell adds that “if institutions actually consist 
of both rules and functional outcomes, then the question becomes how much change has 
occurred if the rules but not the function change, or if the function but not the rules 
 
92 IMMERGUT, 1990, p. 400. 
93 BÉLAND, 2007, p. 32. 
94 THELEN, 2004. 
95 STREECK/THELEN, 2005a, p. 29–30. 
96 CAMPBELL, 2010, p. 107. 
97 CAMPBELL, 2010, p. 108. 
98 CAMPBELL, 2010, p. 108. 
99 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 15–18. 
100 HACKER, 2004, p. 245. 
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change?”102 In the following discussion of the institutional characteristics that comprise the 
level of enforcement, as well as the quality of the rules, I suggest how to empirically account 
for change. 
 
Institutional Characteristics  
One of the variables Mahoney and Thelen suggest is the ‘level of discretion in interpretation 
and enforcement.’103 Here the ambiguity of the rules, as well as the actual enforcement, are 
the operational value to determine if the level of discretion is high or low.104 They explain that 
“there is tremendous space for diverse outcomes even under stable rules, given different 
interpretations (narrow/broad) and enforcement (vigorous/lax) of those rules.”105 In their 
further deliberations Mahoney and Thelen do not differentiate between the rules level and the 
enforcement level.106 Yet, they indicate a difference by explaining that rules can be 
interpreted either ‘narrow or broad,’ and enforcement can be exercised either ‘vigorously or 
lax.’107 Therefore, Mahoney and Thelen consider only two of four possible combinations. 
Table 3 highlights the variations Mahoney and Thelen integrate in their theoretical 
consideration—the combinations of the level of interpretation and enforcement, that are either 
low or high. The mixed results are not part of their consideration and I suggest to take the 
mixed characteristics of the institution into account as well: 
Table 3. Characteristics of the targeted institution 
Interpretation Enforcement Level of discretion 
Broad Lax Low 
Broad Vigorous Mixed 
Narrow Lax Mixed 
Narrow Vigorous High 
Note: According to the concept of Mahoney and Thelen, ‘broad’ interpretation 
and lax enforcement translates as ‘high level of discretion;’ ‘narrow’ 
interpretation and ‘vigorous’ enforcement translates as ‘low level of discretion,’ 
cf. MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, 20 21, 28. 
 
The omission of mixed characteristics of the institution, fails to account for one of the main 
arguments: The dependency of change on the ambiguity of the rules and the implementation 
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103 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 19. 
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gap. This problem becomes clear when they discuss civil rights and the work of Lieberman. 
They first describe the US-American civil rights provisions as weak, but then argue that it 
turned out strong, because actors managed to effectively enforce the rules. Therefore, at two 
points in time, the rules appear weak, since they do not change, but the implementation level 
appears once as ineffective and once effective.108 Mahoney and Thelen lump these two 
phenomena together in one variable, the low or “high level of discretion in 
interpretation/enforcement.”109 I suggest keeping the rules and the enforcement level separate 
and splitting this variable into two: The discretion of interpretation and the enforcement level. 
This is also important, since a combination of weak rules and strong enforcement, for 
instance, is theoretically accounted for. 
 
Ambiguity – The level of Discretion in Interpretation 
Are the rules of the institution ambiguous, or do they leave a high level of discretion to 
interpretation?110 Hacker observes in his contribution that policies vary regarding the 
precision or sheer amount of provisions for interpretation.111 The mode of change is 
dependent on the ambiguity that may arise from less precise provisions.112 In his study on race 
politics in the United States, Lieberman shows in the case of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 how 
a weak law turned into a powerful tool, because executing actors and civil society helped to 
interpret it in an expansive manner.113 Compared to the “strong-worded” race policies in the 
UK and France,  
 
the institutional form of the law [the Civil Rights Act of 1964] and the enforcement 
mechanism that the law created (...) provided unexpected openings for advocates of 
race-conscious policy to press their case and push the state toward a set of 
enforcement practices that went beyond the initial color-blind policy settlement.114 
 
Rocco and Thurston write that “[w]ithout a doubt, providing evidence to evaluate an 
institution’s initial ambiguity is difficult.”115 But how can the ambiguity of an institution be 
measured? Mahoney and Thelen do not specify what ambiguity is, and what “high” or “low 
discretion,” or ‘narrow and broad interpretations of rules’ are.116 One example of an 
 
108 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 22. 
109 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 19. 
110 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 18. 
111 HACKER, 2004, p. 246–247. 
112 HACKER, 2004, p. 247. 
113 LIEBERMAN, 2002b, p. 140; MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 13. 
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ambiguous provision in relation to the abolition of slavery is Article 4 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 that states: “No one shall be held in slavery or 
servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.”117 This 
declaration is the provision of a norm, but it does not specify what slavery is, and how victims 
and perpetrators are to be treated. As a declaration, it is clear that the UDHR does not intend 
to indicate these details, but it exemplifies which questions remain open.  
As mentioned in the sub-chapter on defining slavery, bonded labour and forced labour, 
an important part of legal provisions are definitions.118 The first question when determining 
the ambiguity and evaluating the quality of a policy against slavery, forced labour or bonded 
labour is, therefore, if it contains a definition. Particular attention needs to be paid in the 
context of this dissertation if the definition of forced labour or slavery includes or excludes 
bonded labour or leaves room of interpretation. The second component referred to in several 
sources are the provisions for punishment: Scholars point out that international laws are often 
not effective because they do not come with coercive means which force states into 
compliance.119 What is requested at the international level is also observed for the national 
level and the treatment of perpetrators on the ground.120 The last three components necessary 
for the qualification of antislavery laws are the indication of a time frame, enforcement 
mechanisms and provisions for compensation or rehabilitation.121 Miers criticises the absence 
of a time frame in the Covenant of the League of Nations and its provisions against slavery.122 
Furthermore, she observes that the first international attempt to ban the slave trade, the 
General Act and Declaration of Brussels of 1890, failed because “[t]he major loophole (…) 
was that the treaty contained no provisions for its enforcement.”123 This encompasses the 
enumeration of competent authorities in charge of implementation on the ground: Among 
them are executive or judicial bodies, such as magistrates, labour inspectors; or agencies set 
up specifically for the purpose of enforcing the abolition of slavery.124 The last question is 
 
117 United Nations, 1948, Art. 4. 
118 Cf. MIERS, 2008, p. 22–23; AP-Forced Labour Net/International Labour Organisation, 2014. 
119 HAFNER-BURTON/TSUTSUI, 2005, p. 1378; MIERS, 2008, p. 22–23; LEBOVIC/VOETEN, 2009; FORSYTHE, 
2006, p. 89. 
120 BALES, 2007, p. 57; International Labour Office, 2005, p. 2, 2005, p. 17. Cf. also THOMANN, 2011, p. 191. 
Calls for stronger punishment seem to follow the underlying assumption that if punitive provisions were installed 
and effectively enforced, actors would abide by the law, cf. International Labour Office, 2005, p. 83. This 
assumption is contradicted at the micro level by criminologists who testify that there is no correlation between 
law abidance and the provision of coercive measures, cf. CLINARD/QUINNEY/WILDEMAN, 2015, 26ff. 
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whether there are provisions for compensating victims and structures set up for victim 
support.125 
These five components—the definition of slavery, forced or bonded labour, the 
provisions for punishment and compensation, as well as the enumeration or installation of 
competent authorities—are the parameters that are necessary in considering the quality of the 
rules and determining the level of ambiguity. If all components are specified, the rules are 
strong and leave little room for discretion to interpretation. If less than half are covered, the 
rules can be described as weak and ambiguous. 
Table 4. The formal institutional characteristics 
Law Definition Bonded labour Timeline Punishment Rehabilitation 
Competent 
authorities 
Slavery 
Abolition 
Act, 1833 
No N.A. Yes126 No No127 Yes128 
UDHR, 
1948 
No N.A. No No No No 
 
This table helps to evaluate the formal characteristics of the institution which I conduct in 
each episode. In addition, I present cases of the high courts or the Supreme Court of India 
dealing with bonded labour or slavery. Through this analysis I can test if the rules left room 
for discretion of interpretation and, if so, how the courts made use of this discretion. 
 
Enforcement – The actual gap between the Norm and Reality 
Depending on the institution, actors not only have different degrees of interpreting the rules, 
but also a certain amount of discretion granted to enforce them. This issue is the level of 
compliance with those rules and also plays into the mode of change of an institution.129 
Viewed as an independent variable, implementation highlights how institutions change in 
ways that policymakers did not predict. Researchers often overlook these changes130 when 
they are concerned with the output and the failures the institution suffers. The actions of all 
 
125 International Labour Conference, June 2009, p. 40. 
126 Abolition to be effective as of August 1 1834, Parliament of the United Kingdom, August 18 1833, XII. 
127 Compensation was provided for former slaveholders. 
128 A committee can be appointed by his Majesty, if deemed necessary, Parliament of the United Kingdom, 
August 18 1833, Art. XIV. 
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actors, from the executive down to the street-level bureaucrat131 need to be considered for the 
scholar to be able to judge the effects of a policy.132  
The implementation or enforcement can be measured in different ways: Enforcement 
can be determined by the estimated number of victims and holding those estimates against 
prosecutions and convictions. This approach is not very reliable and, in the case of slavery, 
can only be indicative of tendencies: Since 1843 and the 1860s the trade in humans and the 
exercise of slavery has been criminalised in India. Criminalisation is usually followed or 
accompanied by the formerly legal business becoming hidden, hardly accessible to 
governmental observers.133 To a certain extent, the accuracy of slavery and bonded labour 
estimates is not necessary for the policymaking process. In the following sub-chapter, I 
explain why. 
 
Ideas 
Ideas as a driving force of politics have been closely studied in the political science since the 
1990s. But Blyth et al. are convinced that “less attention was paid to ideas as core analytic 
variables in the decades that followed.”134 Ideas, ideologies, and beliefs are closely tied to the 
legitimacy of policies135 and play a vital role in the political process. Béland and Cox go so 
far as to identify ideas as “primary source of political behaviour,”136 and that these ideas are 
substantially reflected in the institutions.137 In their theoretical deliberations on gradual 
institutional change, Mahoney and Thelen remain vague on the question of ideas and their 
role causing change.138 They touch upon ideas rather indirectly,139 speaking of the 
contestations of actors, and “struggles over the meaning, application, and enforcement of 
institutional rules.”140 
It is worthwhile here to frame the word ‘meaning’ in terms of ideas. Acknowledging 
the role of ideas and including them in the theoretical framework, closes the circle of the 
definition of policies as institutions, which “stipulate rules that assign normatively backed 
 
131 LIPSKY, 2010, p. 3. 
132 HACKER, 2004, p. 247. 
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rights (…) and that are legitimate.”141 Norms are “a standard of appropriate behaviour for 
actors,”142 and actors who entertain corresponding ideas gain legitimacy. The changes 
institutions undergo are the result of actors’ agency—the decisions they make, which are also 
based on the ideas they hold. In turn, ideas are reflected in the policies, although potentially 
distorted by compromise.143 This insight acknowledges that actors do not operate in a 
vacuum, but rather that ideas influence what actors think of a problem and the solutions to be 
applied.144 In relation to the implementation gap, ideas are the connecting element that fills 
the space between the institutional ideal and its reality and which engenders change.145 
Ideas are the mind-sets of people—what they think, where they identify political 
issues, how they judge these problems and what solutions they believe are best to address or 
alleviate these problems. Béland and Cox define ideas in the following way: 
 
[I]deas are causal beliefs. This simple definition involves many discrete dimensions. 
First, as beliefs, ideas are products of cognition. They are produced in our minds and 
are connected to the material world only via our interpretations of our surroundings. 
Our minds can create ideas from any of a multitude of sensory perceptions, or the 
mind can create ideas based on no connection to reality at all. (…) Second, as causal 
beliefs, ideas posit connections between things and between people in the world. 
These connections might be causal in the proper sense, such as suggesting that one 
event was responsible for bringing about a series of successive events. But ideas can 
be causal in more informal ways, by drawing connections between things or people 
that we believe are related to one another. Finally, causal beliefs, or ideas, provide 
guides for action.146 
 
In order to structure ideas, I follow Béland’s analyses of the social security system in the 
US.147 Paradigms are the overarching principle of an idea. Béland identifies several paradigms 
that were crucial in shaping the mode of change that occurred in the episodes he identified.148 
Interests and rational choice have the basic assumption at heart that politics is about 
competition and that people have clear interests that are transitive and guide actors to adopt 
specific strategies to realise their interest.149 Béland and Cox assert that politics is still about a 
power struggle, but that actors’ motivation is based on a variety of ideas, which might be 
grounded in interests, but also informed by ideational concepts, as well as emotions. As such, 
ideas are not only reflective of the actors’ interests, but also what actors “deem to be 
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appropriate, legitimate, and proper.”150 This also means that within political debates it is 
possible that the sheer facts become irrelevant, (i.e. scientifically) inaccurate,151 or even facts 
may become controversial.152 This is in contrast to interests, since these are supposedly 
objective and fixed, which is not the case with ideas.153 A single actor may hold beliefs that 
are irreconcilable with the interests of that person or with the truth.154 For the identification of 
relevant ideas and paradigms, it is instructive to turn back to the elements that are constitutive 
of slavery, forced labour or bonded labour, as discussed in the introduction. These elements, 
such as violence, or social hierarchy, are embedded in paradigms that sanction certain 
behaviour and norms that are constitutive of coercive labour relations. These paradigms exist 
independently and outside of slavery or bonded labour relations and, as I argue, allow labour 
exploitation that can constitute slavery to continue, through a combination of these legitimate 
elements. I discuss this in more detail in the respective chapters on the episodes. 
The Zeitgeist, which reflects ideas of a large community or society, represents ideas 
that are “widely shared and not open to criticism in a particular historical moment.”155 Mehta 
provides the example of the principle of accountability of people as an idea that enjoys the 
status of Zeitgeist.156 To respond to the question as to when an idea or a norm becomes a 
Zeitgeist, Finnemore and Sikkink suggest a useful tool for analysis. This concept allows us to 
also consider the developments at the international level, as it was devised to do so. 
According to Finnemore and Sikkink, norms undergo three different stages before they 
become accepted international norms, or Zeitgeist. The first stage is the emergence of the 
norm. As soon as a tipping point is reached, where a certain number of actors accept the 
norm, the second stage begins. During this stage the norm becomes institutionalised.157 For 
the next tipping point to arrive, critical actors, as well as a critical mass of actors, need to 
accept the norms.158 With this first tipping point, the second stage occurs: The norm cascade. 
This means that norms have been accepted by enough actors to become a tool to pressure 
those actors who have not yet accepted or adhered to the norm. If another critical mass and a 
number of critical actors accumulate, the third stage is reached. In the third stage, norms 
become internalised and “acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of 
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broad public debate.”159 This means that these norms are not up for further negotiation as 
such. In the case of the abolition of slavery and forced labour, this means that no state will 
question the illegality and wrongness of these practices and violations thereof.160 
In this paragraph I propose a norms cycle of the abolition of slavery in the terms of 
Sikkink and Finnemore. Stage 1, the norm emergence occurred between 1807 and the 1920s, 
when the norm of the abolition of slavery developed. With the proliferation of bilateral and 
international agreements, as well as regional laws in India, the norm had taken a strong hold 
within the policymaking community at the international level as well as the regional level of 
the British Raj. The Versailles Treaty, and the beginning of the negotiations for the 
development of an international convention to abolish slavery at the LN marked the tipping 
point. At stage 2, norm cascade, the norm became institutionalised by conventions, such as 
the Slavery Convention of 1926, and monitoring mechanisms, such as the Advisory 
Committee of Experts on Slavery.161 By the end of 1930, one third,162 of the members to the 
League of Nations became state parties to the Slavery Convention—20 of 49 had signed, 
ratified or acceded.163 Among the states committed to the convention, 20 members were 
critical states164 that formed the “critical mass of relevant state actors,”165 such as the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Spain, India, and China. A simultaneous development confirms 
the occurrence of the norm cascade: The General Conference of the ILO adopted the Forced 
Labour Convention (C29) in 1930. At the end of 1935, 15 ILO members out of 62 member 
states had ratified the Forced Labour Convention—almost one quarter. By the end of 1947 
almost one third, 21 of 66 member states of the ILO, were parties to the convention. With 
only two exceptions, the relevant number of critical states had ratified the convention.166 
Stage 3, the internalisation occurred around the 1930s. The internalisation of the norm began 
and the abolition of slavery had acquired “a taken-for-granted quality and [was] no longer a 
matter of broad public debate.”167 
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This model highlights that the emergence of the norm is not a signifier of an 
antislavery Zeitgeist. Based on the development of the norms cycle following Finnemore and 
Sikkink, I place the emergence of the antislavery norm as Zeitgeist around 1935. This is 
relevant for the analysis of the hypotheses and the influence of the Zeitgeist on the behaviour 
of actors. But it is not only the Zeitgeist that helps us to understand institutional change. Other 
ideas need to be entertained. An example in the context of the abolition of slavery is the 
compensation of former slaveholders by the British Parliament in 1833.168 Compensation for 
slaveholders reflects the idea that former slaveholders had lost their property, a value as such 
above all.169 The loss of this property due to the liberation of slaves justified the compensation 
of former slaveholders, but not the compensation of lost remuneration for the former slaves or 
compensation for the physical, psychological and social damage they endured. Therefore, I 
diverge from earlier research that focused on the idea of freedom170 and focus on other 
paradigms that are present in the respective episodes and that help us to understand the 
particular events. Since ideas and the Zeitgeist change, I discuss them in more detail in each 
episode separately. 
The Zeitgeist at the international level does not necessarily reflect the Zeitgeist at the 
national level. Therefore, to consider the Zeitgeist at the national level, it has to be 
interrogated separately. Finnemore and Sikkink suggest that the development of a norm into 
Zeitgeist is similar at the international and the national level.171 To determine the Zeitgeist at 
the national level, several sources are indicative: Political party programmes, statements of 
politicians, adopted legal provisions, and court cases.172 
 
Agents of Change 
Looking at the agents of change, Mahoney and Thelen ask two questions that help to classify 
the actors in four basic groups: The first question is whether the actors drive for change of the 
rules and whether the actors abide by the rules. The nature of change is influenced by the 
disposition of the actors towards the institution and is dependent on the institutional 
environment and the veto possibilities.173 Mahoney and Thelen thereby differentiate between 
the insurrectionaries, subversives, opportunists, and symbionts. Insurrectionaries seek to 
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actively change the rules while probably also not abiding by them—their goal is the 
displacement of the rules. Symbionts are those actors who exploit the institution to their 
advantage either in a parasitic or a mutualistic manner. Parasitic symbionts cause drift of the 
rules; they support the rules’ persistence and device attempts to undermine institutional 
reforms174 while at the same time “violating the spirit”175 of the institution. Mutualist 
symbionts, on the other hand, violate the institutional rules in order to sustain the spirit of the 
institution. Subversives do not violate the rules but seek the displacement of the institution’s 
rules. Subversives are most likely to cause change in the direction of layering or conversion. 
The last actors are opportunists who neither seek to change nor to maintain an institution, but 
to extract gains to their advantage without investing any resources in either change or 
maintenance of the institution. Since change involves higher risks, opportunists are more 
likely to opt for stability and thereby contribute to the inertia of an institution or its 
conversion.176 
Mahoney and Thelen ascribe an important role to the agents of change. Firstly, their 
actions are guided or ‘encouraged’ by the institutional provisions: “Those who benefit from 
existing arrangements may have an objective preference for continuity but ensuring such 
continuity requires the ongoing mobilization of political support as well as, often, active 
efforts to resolve institutional ambiguities in their favour.”177 Depending on the nature of the 
institutions, agents choose different strategies. Secondly, change agents choose a behaviour 
that is either active or inactive, to prompt particular outcomes.178 The characteristics of the 
political context, as well as of the institution, influence both the type of change agents and the 
type of institutional change. The actors’ strategies to bring about change vary from open 
changes through official venues, to means beyond observation or supervision.179 Hacker 
specifies that actors are able to engender change, by choosing “not to attack such institutions 
directly. Instead, actors may seek to shift those institutions’ ground-level operation, prevent 
their adaptation to shifting external circumstances, or build new institutions on top of 
them.”180 
Based on both variables, (1) the political context (the veto possibilities) and (2) the 
characteristics of the institutions (the level of discretion to interpret the rules or to enforce 
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them), Mahoney and Thelen propose a model to predict which kind of potential actors are 
most likely to emerge and which mode of incremental change they will cause. The mode of 
change can be the unintended result of actors or the accumulative effect of actors working in 
different directions. But, as Hacker shows, the mode of change can also be the intended result 
of actors.181 
Regarding the denominations of the change agents, for instance the parasitic 
symbiont,182 the terms introduced seem to carry a negative connotation and place a value 
judgment on the actors and the outcomes they produce. In Mahoney and Thelen’s 
descriptions, it seems as if change actors are all ill meaning: Insurrectionaries “seek to 
eliminate existing institutions,”183 and symbionts ‘exploit’ the existing institution for their 
private gain.184 Rocco and Thurston write also that actors’ behaviour causing layering “may 
or may not be related to a desire of a ‘destructive’ nature.”185 But they contend that the actors 
mostly have negative intentions.186 I do not suggest other names in this dissertation to avoid 
adding another ‘layer of labels.’187 But I will add one kind of actor, who is not explicitly 
covered, but is observed by Mahoney and Thelen discussing Lieberman’s example of the 
Civil Rights Act.  
In Lieberman’s example, the provisions for equal employment opportunities is a case 
of a weak law, weak implementation,188 and strong veto opportunities on the side of the 
preservers of the status quo. But because of the bureaucracy, civil society and the judiciary 
acting strongly in favour of the spirit of the law, the institution underwent change in the mode 
of conversion (new interpretation and enactment of rules).189 The institutional and political 
environment was in essence against the intent of the spirit of the rules.190 But the EEOC, 
working together with private actors, such as the NAACP (National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People),191 and in tandem with plaintiffs making use of the Civil 
Rights Act in the Courts, contributed to strong implementation of the law in the form of 
affirmative action. After the adoption of the act, the judiciary used its discretion of 
 
181 HACKER, 2004, p. 248. 
182 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 24. 
183 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 23. 
184 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 24. 
185 ROCCO/THURSTON, 2014, p. 46. 
186 ROCCO/THURSTON, 2014, p. 46. See for a similar observation in the work of Hacker, BÉLAND, 2007, p. 23. 
187 ROCCO/THURSTON, 2014, p. 38. 
188 Measured in backlog of the bureaucracy and the absence of impositions of remedies, LIEBERMAN, 2007a, 
p. 11–12.  
189 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 17–18. 
190 LIEBERMAN, 2007a, p. 2. 
191 LIEBERMAN, 2007a, p. 14. 
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interpretation and relied, for instance, on information provided by the EEOC to argue 
rulings.192 The result was “one of the strongest affirmative action regimes in the world.”193 
The actors in the bureaucracy cannot be described in the terms Thelen and Mahoney 
offer:194 They were not insurrectionaries, since they did seek to preserve the spirit of the rules. 
They were not symbionts, since they were seeking to preserve the institution and neither 
violated nor followed the rules—they rather extended the interpretation of the rules towards 
the preservation of the institution.195 Consequently, they did not act like subversives. Being 
invested in change, they also cannot be described as opportunists. Instead, actors at the 
bureaucratic, judicial and civil society level ganged up as the defenders196 of the spirit of the 
rules and drove for change at the implementation level. Despite the absence of changes at the 
rules level these actors were able to fundamentally transform the working of the state towards 
the realisation of civil rights in the US.197 I therefore suggest adding another actor described 
but not formalised by the Thelen and Mahoney: The defender. Defenders stick not only to the 
rules but the spirit of the rules, and are interested in the preservation as well as effective 
implementation of these rules. While opportunists are the closest to the defenders, both might 
be described as having ambiguous positions towards the existing rules of the institution. But 
the difference is that opportunists dread investing resources in change,198 while defenders are 
eager to do so. 
In the case of the institution of the abolition of slavery, I expect to find two different 
kinds of actors: Antislavery actors who are active against slavery or bonded labour or who 
speak against slavery and for the freedom from enslavement; and proslavery actors, who 
defend slavery and bonded labour and may (but not necessarily) profit from it.199 Therefore, 
the latter encompasses politicians defending slavery but having no direct stakes, as well as the 
employers of bonded labourers. The preference for the term pro- or antislavery lays less in the 
actual definition and more in a desire for simplicity, as rules against slavery were the 
framework within which bonded labour was initially addressed. 
My analysis begins when the institution of the abolition of slavery was already in 
place. This means that my theoretical concern is not on the emergence of the norm and the 
 
192 LIEBERMAN, 2007a, 22-23, 25. 
193 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 13. 
194 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 22–25. 
195 LIEBERMAN, 2007a, p. 10. 
196 Rocco and Thurston refer to “institutional defenders,” but they do not formalise them as an own category of 
actors as I suggest; see ROCCO/THURSTON, 2014, p. 45. 
197 LIEBERMAN, 2007a, p. 10. 
198 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 26. 
199 For a similar definition refer to DUMAS, 2016, p. 2. 
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creation of the institution but its development thereafter. Depending on the institutional 
characteristics, the level of ambiguity and the enforcement of the abolition of slavery, pro- 
and antislavery actors are positioned differently towards the institution: They can be identified 
either as the change agents or as defenders of the status quo. If legislation against slavery and 
forced labour suffers from an implementation gap, proslavery actors probably want to 
preserve the status quo since a strong law, but weak implementation, allows for the discretion 
to continue labour exploitation. On the other side, antislavery actors are interested in change 
when implementation fails the spirit of the institution. But if implementation is strong, weak 
rules are probably not interesting for them to change, which Thelen and Mahoney explain 
with the costs that need to be invested to actively induce change.200 Table 5 summarises the 
expectations of the actors’ disposition towards the institution depending on the characteristics 
of the antislavery institution: 
Table 5. Dominant agents of change depending on characteristics of the institution 
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The actors’ disposition towards the institution depends on its characteristics; the actors’ 
behaviour is also contingent on the Zeitgeist in which they act. For instance, strong believers 
in the right to be free from enslavement behave differently in an environment where slavery is 
a common form of labour exploitation and even legally sanctioned, as compared to actors who 
are in an environment in which slavery is legally abolished.201 Acknowledging the insights of 
the scholarly work in the field of IR and the work on ideas, I expect different forms of 
behaviour of actors, depending on the current Zeitgeist: In times where there is a proslavery 
Zeitgeist, proslavery actors speak out and act openly in favour of slavery. When the norm of 
 
200 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 26. 
201 DUMAS, 2016, p. 3. 
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the abolition of slavery has achieved the taken-for-granted-ness,202 it can be expected that 
proslavery actors no longer speak out directly in favour of slavery.203 In a period where the 
Zeitgeist leans towards the acceptance of slavery, open resistance to infringements on slavery 
is possible, as was the case with the British abolition of slavery in 1833, against which 
petitions were submitted to the British Parliament and the King.204 Proslavery actors rather 
attempt to limit the scope as to which forms of labour relations constitute slavery, and try to 
enact or maintain legislation that undermines existing antislavery legislation. 
 
Causal Relationship and Hypotheses 
Based on the insights of Mahoney and Thelen205 and the outline of the theoretical 
assumptions, I formulate several hypotheses. Hypotheses are statements that establish the 
relationship between cause and effect.206 While a hypothesis expresses this relationship, the 
theory provides an explanation as to why this relationship exists.207 The following causal 
relationship between the dependent variable—the change of the institution—and the 
independent variables—the institutional environment, the actors, and ideas—is visualised in 
the graph below. The arrows mark causality: 
Figure 4. Causal relationship between the variables 
 
 
 
202 FINNEMORE/SIKKINK, 1998, p. 895. 
203 DUMAS, 2016, p. 3. 
204 An example of a petition against the abolition of slavery, see Planters, Merchants, and others interested in the 
Welfare of the Island of Tobago, April 17 1832, p. 854. 
205 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b. 
206 SOUVA, 2007, p. 557. 
207 SOUVA, 2007, p. 557. 
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Depending on the actors’ disposition towards the institution and depending on the political 
environment in which the actors act, one or the other mode of change will occur. Among the 
set of actors, there can be two options: Actors who either uphold the rules as they are, or 
actors who are in favour of changing the rules. Earlier, I showed that the different modes of 
change are connected to either the outcome level or the output level, and in some cases with 
both levels. In Mahoney and Thelen’s theoretical summary it appears that this distinction of 
location is not factored in explicitly: 
Table 6. Expected modes of change (Thelen & Mahoney, 2010) 
  Discretion of interpretation & enforcement 
  Low  High 
V
et
o
 p
o
ss
ib
il
it
ie
s 
S
tr
o
n
g
 
Layering Drift 
W
ea
k
 
Displacement Conversion 
 
Source: MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 19. Note: The mode of change depends on the political 
context and the veto possibilities the political context affords, and the discretion of 
interpretation and enforcement granted to actors regarding the targeted institution. 
 
This table shows, for instance, that if there is a low level of discretion in interpretation and 
enforcement of the institutional rules, and if there are strong veto possibilities on the side of 
relevant actors to prevent change, layering is the most likely to occur. Incorporating the two 
variables, the level of discretion and level of enforcement, as well as the theoretical 
assumption of the Zeitgeist and the two sets of actors, the tables in the Appendix summarise 
all hypotheses, in some cases illustrated with an example. The hypotheses are written in full 
sentences, with (a) indicating an antislavery Zeitgeist and (b) indicating a proslavery Zeitgeist. 
The relevant hypotheses I test in this dissertation are the following six: 
Hypothesis 3a: If antislavery rules are weak and enforcement ineffective and preservers of 
the status quo have strong veto possibilities, antislavery actors behave like subversives 
causing displacement to remove contravening legislation or208 like defenders causing 
conversion. 
 
208 Thelen and Mahoney suggest for the combination of these variables that change agents will be parasitic 
symbionts, MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 28.  
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Hypothesis 4a: If antislavery rules are weak and enforcement ineffective and if veto 
possibilities of the preservers of the status quo are weak antislavery actors are the 
change agents and induce change by layering as subversives, or displace contravening 
legislation as insurrectionaries.209 
Hypothesis 4b: If antislavery rules are weak and enforcement ineffective and if veto 
possibilities of the preservers of the status quo are weak antislavery actors act like 
insurrectionaries causing displacement or layers. 
Hypothesis 6b: If the rules are weak but enforcement is effective and veto possibilities are 
weak proslavery actors acting like subversives cause change by layering. 
Hypothesis 7a: If rules are strong and enforcement ineffective and veto possibilities are 
strong antislavery actors change the institution as defenders by layering (i.e. new 
actors). 
Hypothesis 8a: If the institution has a strong policy but enforcement is ineffective and veto 
possibilities are weak antislavery actors are likely to be the actors of change as 
defenders causing layering. 
 
Method 
To test my hypotheses, I chose the method of process tracing. The idea of process tracing is to 
follow at “close range”210 with a “thick description”211 of the processes that took place. The 
order of the processes is one central aspect that needs to be taken into account to make 
meaningful statements about the relation between the causes and consequences in the 
historical process. This method is particularly suitable for “measuring and testing 
hypothesized causal mechanisms”212 for the single-case study.213 Mahoney explains that 
“[p]rocess tracing tests can be used to help establish that (1) an initial event or process took 
place, (2) a subsequent outcome also occurred, and (3) the former was a cause of the latter.”214 
George and Bennett explain that: 
 
In process-tracing, the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview 
transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes 
 
209 Under those conditions Thelen and Mahoney suggest the mode of change to be conversion, 
MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, 17, 18, 27. 
210 COLLIER, 1999, p. 4. 
211 COLLIER, 1999, p. 5. 
212 BENNETT/CHECKEL, 2015, p. 3–4. 
213 MAHONEY, 2012, p. 570. 
214 MAHONEY, 2012, p. 570. 
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or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening 
variables in that case.215 
 
Much like scholars of American political development (APD) I apply “the ‘causes-of-
effects’ approach to explanation.”216 According to Galvin, APD scholars look at present 
political problems, “the real world,” and move backward in history to identify the causes of 
those political problems.217 What facilitated the policy changes of legislation against bonded 
labour in India? What explains the advent of actors such as the Supreme Court or the NHRC 
in the 1980s? Through process tracing it will be possible to identify the particular factors that 
caused the outcomes in a deductive manner.218 Although lacking a general effect of the 
independent variables, “[what] this approach sacrifices in the generalizability of its causal 
claims, it more than makes up for in its ability to generate causal specificity and substantive 
understanding.”219 
My analysis of the institutional development of the abolition of bonded labour in India 
is historically grounded. Using the theory of gradual institutional change to explain the 
institutional changes of the abolition of bonded labour, I put this theory to the test. The theory 
offers general assumptions: It makes general inferences about the development of institutions 
under certain conditions with a broad range of applications.220 If the theoretical propositions 
are generally applicable, they should also hold in the specific case of the institution of 
abolition of bonded labour.221 By testing the theory, this study is a qualitative study, with a 
single-case conducting a within-case comparison. I analyse the abolition of bonded labour 
throughout different periods and compare them to each other. Within these periods there are 
variations, where changes do and do not occur, while other variables remain constant.  
The advantage of this approach is that a limited number of cases allows the researcher 
to “move back and forth between theory and history in many iterations of analysis” and to 
“formulate new concepts, discover novel explanations, and refine pre-existing theoretical 
expectations in light of detailed case evidence.”222 There might arise the problem that the 
results derived from this particular study on this particular case are not easily transferred to 
other cases,223 but Mahoney explains that “comparative historical studies can yield more 
 
215 GEORGE/BENNETT, 2005, p. 6; cf. BENNETT/CHECKEL, 2015, p. 6. 
216 GALVIN, 2016, p. 209. 
217 GALVIN, 2016, p. 209. 
218 BENNETT/CHECKEL, 2015, p. 18. 
219 GALVIN, 2016, p. 210. 
220 RUESCHEMEYER, 2003, p. 309. 
221 RUESCHEMEYER, 2003, p. 312. 
222 MAHONEY/RUESCHEMEYER, 2003, p. 12. 
223 MAHONEY/RUESCHEMEYER, 2003, p. 9. 
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meaningful advice concerning contemporary choices and possibilities than studies that aim for 
universal truths but cannot grasp critical historical details.”224 Anticipating that the 
observations of causal relations or correlations may potentially only apply to this specific case 
does not detract from the insights that are derived from this particular case.225
 
224 MAHONEY/RUESCHEMEYER, 2003, p. 9. 
225 GALVIN, 2016, 216, 220. 
  
66 
Chapter 2 
Institutionalisation: EIC & 
British Parliament,  
1807-1843 
 
his sub-chapter focuses on the inception of the institution of the abolition of slavery 
and bonded labour and provides an introduction to my cases. It also serves as the 
basis for my discussion and argument regarding where to set the starting point of my 
research. Here I follow the call of Bennett and Checkel to “make a justifiable decision when 
to start,”1 trying to go back in time far enough, but not too far. One guide to determine an 
appropriate starting point is the definition of the institution of the abolition of slavery and 
bonded labour—the moment in time from which the abolition of slavery can be said to have 
become an institution. That is, when the rules against slavery, bonded labour and forced 
labour “constitute rules for actors other than for the policymakers themselves—rules that can 
and need to be implemented and that are legitimate in that they will if necessary be enforced 
by agents acting on behalf of the society as a whole.”2 
“[T]he society as a whole”3 poses a challenge to the analysis, since in the case of India 
it carries a territorial dimension. The territorial expansion of British India, independent India, 
as well as earlier kingdoms, such as under Kautilya, have undergone several changes: For 
instance, the country which is today Pakistan was part of the British Raj, but became an 
independent state from India in 1947. And while the British governed over large territories of 
India, its rule over the princely states was only indirect. Many of the native-ruled states 
maintained their legal and executive sovereignty until their accession to India after 
independence. Burma4 constituted a part of British India, until it became an independent 
colonial entity in 1937. Finally, due to the resulting complexity with about 500 princely states, 
and, subsequently, potentially 500 different histories of the abolition of slavery, I limit my 
 
1 BENNETT/CHECKEL, 2015, p. 26. 
2 STREECK/THELEN, 2005b, p. 12. 
3 STREECK/THELEN, 2005b, p. 12. 
4 Today Myanmar. 
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focus on British rule under the EIC (East India Company), the British Raj, and independent 
India. Thereby I am be able to draw out continuities between the colonial state and the 
independent Indian state. This means that I only mention in passing other jurisdictions and 
dealings with slavery in the princely states, as well as the Portuguese colonial rule in Goa and 
the French colonial territories in India. 
The sources of this chapter are variegated: I rely on the work of other scholars and the 
primary sources they used. Wherever possible, I make use of and refer to primary sources, 
such as governmental reports, judges’ decisions, personal communications or 
interdepartmental communications of the colonial administration, the British Parliament,5 
legal texts and commentaries, governmental and non-governmental reports, and newspaper 
articles. Primary sources were obtained from the British Library India Office Records, the 
National Library of India, as well as material made available online.6 Before I take up the 
history of the abolition of slavery by the British, I briefly discuss earlier legal legacies, before 
the British became the colonial power over India. 
 
Regulating Slavery 
More than 2000 years ago, Indian rulers already attempted to regulate or ban some forms of 
slavery or the slave trade. The Arthashastra, written by the statesman and philosopher 
Kautilya around 300 BC, referenced to the treatment of slaves and regulation of slavery.7 The 
chapter Rules regarding Slaves and Labourers regulated who could be sold into slavery or 
bought as slave.8 For instance, it was forbidden to sell an Arya (a member of the ruling clan) 
into slavery. Some forms of slavery that appear to be bonded labour were permitted:9 
 
It is no crime for Mlechchhas [foreign born people] to sell or mortgage the life of their 
own offspring. But never shall an Arya be subjected to slavery. 
But if in order to tide over family troubles, to find money for fines or court 
decrees, or to recover the (confiscated) household implements, the life of an Arya is 
mortgaged, they (his kinsmen) shall as soon as possible redeem him (from bondage); 
and more so if he is a youth or an adult capable of giving help.10 
 
 
5 Available at Parliament of the United Kingdom. 
6 Available at The Internet Archive, Google and HathiTrust. 
7 MANN, 2012, p. 13; CHATTERJEE, 2014, p. 343. 
8 SHAMASASTRY, 2010 [1915], p. 260. 
9 SHAMASASTRY, 2010 [1915], p. 260. 
10 SHAMASASTRY, 2010 [1915], p. 260. 
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This law prescribed who might be treated as a slave and regulated the treatment of slaves by 
their masters, as well as provided rules for bonded labour. 
Later laws also regulated rather than abolished slavery: The Mughal Emperor Akbar, 
for instance, who ruled over large parts of northern India between 1556 and 1605, banned the 
trade with eunuchs.11 His son Jahangir, Mughal Emperor from 1605 until 1627, passed a law 
to prohibit the employment of eunuchs in 1608.12 In the period between 300 BC and the 
seventeenth century, the institutionalisation of the abolition of slavery and forced labour had 
not yet taken place in India. Some forms of slavery were banned, and certain individuals were 
exempted from enslavement, but at the same time some forms of slavery were acceptable and 
legally sanctioned. 
Before the abolition of slavery in 1833, the British legally extracted slavery and forced 
labour in India. The East India Company employed slaves on its own tea plantations,13 and 
British nationals living in India kept ayahs,14 housekeepers and cooks, or gardeners, as slaves. 
They claimed and exercised ownership rights over runaway domestic servants in the courts 
and offered rewards for the return of runaway slaves through advertisements in the 
newspapers.15 Government officials made use of temporary slave labour, usually called begar: 
Villagers or field workers were recruited to carry the material needed by travelling officials, 
or for taking care of public works, building roads or maintaining water supplies.16 
The EIC addressed the issue of slavery and attempted to regulate the practice of slave 
holding by British nationals early on: Warren Hastings, Governor-General of Bengal, issued a 
declaration that a master shall not exercise his power over a slave for more than one 
generation in 1774.17 By the 1790s the presidencies of Malabar and Madras prohibited the 
slave trade. By the 1820s several presidencies had legislations installed that prohibited the 
abuse of slaves, and criminal courts sat on trials against violent slave owners who had killed 
their slaves.18 Other regulations towards the use of coolies and begar (or begaree) by British 
officials, as well as the slave trade, were adopted in Bengal, Bombay, Assam, and Madras 
 
11 HAMBLY, 1974, p. 129. 
12 HAMBLY, 1974, p. 129. 
13 CASSELS, 2010, p. 186. 
14 Nannies and wet-nurses of Indian origin. 
15 CHATTERJEE, 2017, 161, 164, footnote no. 6. Examples of advertisements offering rewards for returned 
runaway slaves: June 17 1784, December 2 1784, December 8 1785, July 20 1786, May 17 1787, SETON-KARR, 
1864a, 44-5, 66, 120, 179, 217-18; May 7 1789, July 12 1792, SETON-KARR, 1864b, 498-99, 538-39. 
16 CASSELS, 2010, 168-69, 235-36. 
17 PRAKASH, 1996, p. 12. 
18 CASSELS, 2010, 186-87,197.  
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between 1800 and the 1840s.19 In Bombay, Madras and Bengal, for instance, the use of 
begaree or coolie labour became allowed under the condition that the labourers were duly 
remunerated.20 With these legislations the EIC tried to regulate slavery and abolish the slave 
trade. But at the same time, these attempts were in conflict with other legislations of the 
period from 1790 up to the 1820s, which the EIC had adopted to ensure the supply of labour 
for British officers and collectors. These regulations allowed for the punishment of 
individuals or communities who resisted offering their labour to the company.21  
The EIC attempted primarily to address the use of slave labour by British nationals, as 
the use of slaves by the native population was legally sanctioned according to British 
assessments.22 During Company rule, the British began to develop a legal framework 
applicable to the whole of the directly ruled Indian territories. Under Hastings several 
religious law codes of Hindus and Muslims were translated and collected in a compendium as 
reference for judges. The goal was a general law to govern the diverse Indian subjects and it 
was developed with the help of the Indian elite.23 The compendium was supposed to ensure 
the protection of the religious rights and property rights of the Indian subjects. Governor 
Cornwallis requested the development of a legal code for the Indian population in respect to 
the different religions and customs of Hindus and Muslims. This legal code was adopted as 
part of the Cornwallis Code of 1793.24 It granted “that in suits regarding succession, 
inheritance, marriage, and caste, and all religious usages and institutions, Mahomedan laws 
with respect to Mahomedans and the Hindoo laws with regard to Hindoos, are to be 
considered as the general rules by which Judges are to form their decisions.”25 In 1795 the 
British Parliament adopted an act that again guaranteed the respect of the British EIC towards 
Hindu and Muslim personal law.26 The basis for the development of Hindu and Muslim 
personal law regarding slavery was founded on translations of Hindu and Muslim scriptures,27 
namely the English translation from Persian by Hamilton, volume three of The Hedaya, or 
Guide: A Commentary on the Mussulman Laws,28 published first in 1791, and Halhed’s 1776 
 
19 BANAJI, 1933, p. 248–313. 
20 CASSELS, 2010, 166, 168-69; MAJOR, 2012, p. 52–54. 
21 CASSELS, 2010, 171-72, 178-82. 
22 CASSELS, 1988, p. 36; MAJOR, 2012, p. 139–142. 
23 CASSELS, 2010, 167, 174-75; PRAKASH, 1993, p. 133; WASHBROOK, 1981, p. 653. 
24 CASSELS, 1988, p. 63. For a detailed description of the translation and codification of Hindu and Muslim 
personal law see COHN, 1996, 27-30, 72-5. 
25 Cornwallis Code, Regulation IV of 1793, Sec xv., quoted in CASSELS, 2010, p. 175. 
26 Bengal Regulation III and IV, 1793 (35 Geo III c.155), CASSELS, 2010, 181, 406. 
27 CASSELS, 1988, p. 63–64. 
28 AL-MARGHINANI/HAMILTON, 2013 [1791]. 
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translation of A Code of Gentoo Laws or, Ordinations of Pundits.29 The Calcutta Sudder 
Dewanny Court ruling of April 12 1798 recognised slavery as “law of the land.”30 Until the 
Act V of 1843, courts in India enforced the right of masters over slaves on the ground that they 
recognised Hindu and Muslim laws that allowed slavery.31 Runaway slaves from the princely 
states who fled into the territory of the EIC had to be reinstituted to their owners.32 
 
Abolishing the Slave Trade, 1807 
The British government began to act against the abolition of the slave trade in the beginning 
of the nineteenth century. Historians have established that the norm of the abolition of slavery 
and the slave trade was fostered by civil society in Great Britain.33 Groups such as the Society 
for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade (founded in 1787),34 the London Society for 
Mitigating and Gradually Abolishing the State of Slavery throughout the British Dominions 
(founded in 1823), and later the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society (founded in 1839),35 
lobbied for the ban of the slave trade and the abolition of slavery. A general abolition of 
slavery was the long-term aim, but for strategic reasons these advocates chose to focus on the 
slave trade and the abolition of slavery in the West Indies.36 
In 1791 the British Parliament voted against a first bill to abolish the slave trade 
submitted by Wilberforce.37 But with increasing pressure by the public and civil society, and 
the support of members of Parliament, such as Wilberforce himself, the British Parliament 
adopted the Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade in 1807.38 The House of Lords voted for 
the bill with 100 ayes and 34 nays; in the House of Commons 283 voted in favour and 16 
against.39 The Slave Trade Act of 1807 prohibited the trade in slaves for British merchants 
only,40 but it was the starting point for the British government in the fight against the global 
slave trade.41 In the following decades the British concluded several bilateral and multilateral 
 
29 HALHED, 2013 [1776]. 
30 CASSELS, 2010, p. 237. 
31 CASSELS, 2010, p. 198; Indian Law Commission, January 15 1841a, p. 4–5. 
32 CASSELS, 2010, p. 181. 
33 Cf. WALVIN, 1982, p. 30; DRESCHER, 2009, p. 263; PRAKASH, 1993, p. 134; DIRKS, 2008, p. 33. 
34 DIRKS, 2008, p. 32. 
35 MIERS, 2008, p. 18. 
36 WILLIAMS, 1944, p. 189; MAJOR, 2010, p. 516. 
37 DIRKS, 2008, p. 32–33. 
38 Slave Trade Act of 1807, Parliament of the United Kingdom, March 25 1807. 
39 MERRILL, 1945, p. 397. 
40 FISCHER, 1950, p. 43–45. 
41 KEENE, 2007, p. 313; MIERS, 2003, p. 14–15; BANAJI, 1933, p. 286. 
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treaties with other slave trading nations:42 In 1810 the Portuguese pledged to only trade slaves 
within its territories; the Anglo-Swedish Treaty of 1813 provided that Sweden banned its 
slave trade; in 1814 the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty followed, and several more.43 In 1846 the 
British reached a treaty with Persia to stop the slave trade with black slaves, and made further 
agreements to end the slave trade with the Ottoman Empire (1857), Zanzibar (1873), and 
Egypt (1877).44 
Regarding the implementation of the Slave Trade Act of 1807 in the Indian Ocean 
region, Mann argues that the few vessels of the Royal Navy, charged with controlling ships, 
were by far not enough to cover the trade routes along the Indian Ocean. Ships of different 
origins disguised their identity by travelling under the flags of other nations who had no 
treaties with Great Britain. Rajas of the Indian subcontinent continued to order black slaves 
from Africa.45 Portuguese officials and Portuguese traders as well as slaveholders in India 
demonstrated resistance towards the abolition of the slave trade and slavery. The bilateral 
agreement between Great Britain and Portugal of 1818, an edict of the Portuguese crown of 
1836, and another English-Portuguese agreement of 1848 were ineffective: Slaveholders did 
not, as requested according to the agreement, announce the number of their slaves, and also 
officials in the administration helped to disguise the real number of slaves. Well after the 
abolition of the slave trade, the Portuguese trade in slaves flourished in the nineteenth 
century.46 Another problem of implementation was that East India Company law, and laws 
adopted by the Indian government, did not apply to the princely states. 
Civil society and MPs striving for the abolition of slavery were the “norm 
entrepreneurs”47 that Sikkink and Finnemore identified as crucial for the development of a 
norm. They were the active agents in creating the normative environment, pressing their own 
government and other nations to implement this norm through the adoption of bilateral or 
multilateral agreements against the slave trade.48 This formalisation of the abolition of the 
slave trade from 1807 on can be described as the norm’s emergence,49 during which the 
British Empire undertook efforts to convince other states to adhere to the norm prohibiting the 
slave trade. But with the abolition of the slave trade, the institutionalisation of the abolition of 
 
42 KEENE, 2007, p. 333; ALLAIN, 2008, 2-3, 19; FISCHER, 1950, p. 43–45; KAUFMANN/PAPE, 1999, p. 634. 
43 LOVEJOY, 2000, p. 290. For a detailed list refer to LOVEJOY, 2000, p. 290–294. 
44 KLEIN, 2005, p. 181. 
45 MANN, 2012, p. 182–184. 
46 MANN, 2012, p. 184. 
47 FINNEMORE/SIKKINK, 1998, p. 895. 
48 FINNEMORE/SIKKINK, 1998, p. 895. 
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slavery and eventually bonded labour, had not yet taken place. Although the prohibition of the 
slave trade and trafficking did call for third-party enforcement, no rights for the victims of the 
slave trade arose from the provisions. 
 
Abolishing Slavery, 1833 
Collectors of the East India Company described bonded labour in agricultural settings in their 
reports as early as 1775.50 But neither systematic evidence nor statistical information on 
bonded labour or slavery was available by that time, and the first census was conducted after 
1840.51 One group to document slavery and bonded labour in India were missionaries to 
India. Abbe Dubois described in his publication of 1822: 
 
Throughout the whole of India the Pariahs are looked upon as slaves by other castes 
and are treated with great harshness. Hardly anywhere are they allowed to cultivate the 
soil for their own benefit but are obliged to hire themselves out to the other castes, 
who in return for a minimum wage exact the hardest tasks from them. 
Furthermore, their masters may beat them at pleasure (...). In fact, these Pariahs 
are the born slaves of India (...).52 
 
Within a span of two weeks, the British Parliament discussed the East India Charter 
Bill (or Government of India Bill) and the Slavery Abolition Bill.53 The East India Charter 
Bill was first read in June 28 1833, and the Slavery Abolition Bill was discussed the following 
week.54 Since the EIC was responsible to the sovereign, and not Parliament, the British 
Parliament had not discussed slavery in India before.55 The main issue the MPs addressed was 
slavery in the West Indies. Major argues that India was not referred to in the discourse on the 
abolition of slavery in the public sphere56 and in Parliament, because activist groups had 
focused on the West Indian slaveries. These groups had to calculate their impact and 
resources and therefore concentrated on the ‘worst’ situation with an intention to continue 
from there57—the perception among parliamentarians, but also abolitionists, was that slavery 
on the subcontinent was not as harsh as compared to the slavery experience in the Americas. 
This assessment was possible due to a lack of information, and because of the interrelated 
 
50 CASSELS, 2010, 166, 166. 
51 BANAJI, 1933, p. 195; the first census in Malabar (South India) was conducted in 1857 and the “slave 
population” was estimated to comprise 187,812 people, LOGAN, 1951 [1887], Appendix XIII., clxxv. 
52 DUBOIS/BEAUCHAMP, 1897, p. 50–51. 
53 TEMPERLEY, 2000b, p. 169. 
54 TEMPERLEY, 2000b, p. 169. 
55 TEMPERLEY, 2000b, p. 169. 
56 PEASE, 1842, p. 94. 
57 MAJOR, 2010, p. 518. 
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issue of caste obligations and slavery, as several authors argue.58 As a result of political and 
economic interests, on the side of MPs59 who profited from the trade of the EIC, as well as the 
political strategy of abolitionist groups to focus on the West Indies, India was off the agenda. 
In the discussion of the Slavery Abolition Bill, Indian slave labour and bonded labour were 
even portrayed as the free labour alternative against the slave labour of the West Indies,60 
from where “any quantity of sugar might be obtained, the entire produce of free labour.”61 
One reason why abolitionists finally succeeded to abolish slavery through the British 
Parliament, was a reform of the parliamentary system in 1832, which increased voter 
influence. The election campaign focused on the abolition of slavery in the West Indies, and 
nominees pledged to their constituents to vote in Parliament for the abolition of slavery. The 
majority of the West Indian lobby was dismantled. British Parliament offered practically no 
veto for the abolition of slavery in the West.62 With a clause of a seven years transition period, 
the provisions for apprenticeship allowed slaveholders to continue to employ their former 
slaves as apprentices. It also provided a compensation for the slave owners and the Abolition 
of Slavery Bill was accepted in the British Parliament and received royal assent in August 
1833.63 The British Parliament abolished slavery, its trade and the actual possession of slaves 
for all British nationals throughout the whole of the British Empire—with one exception. 
Listed as one of the last items in the document of over 15,000 words, parliament declared in 
paragraph LXIV: “And be it further enacted, That [sic] nothing in this Act contained doth or 
shall extend to any of the Territories in the Possession of the East India Company, or to the 
Island of Ceylon, or to the Island of Saint Helena.”64 Consequently, this act did not apply to 
the Indian subcontinent or the indirectly ruled territories, the princely states.65 
But the issue of slavery in India was not off the table. In 1834 the charter of the East 
India Company expired, and the British Parliament had already begun drafting the renewed 
charter in June 1833.66 During this renewal, two abolitionists,67 Charles Grant, President of 
the Board of Control of the EIC, and T. B. Macaulay, the Secretary of the Board of Control, 
 
58 TEMPERLEY, 2000a, p. 169–170; MAJOR, 2012, p. 205–209. 
59 MAJOR, 2012, 8-9, 11, 45. 
60 WILLIAMS, 1944, p. 186–188; MAJOR, 2010, p. 502, 2012, p. 326–327; DRESCHER, 2009, p. 387. 
61 Mr. Buckingham in the House of Commons, Hansard 1803-2005, May 31 1833, Col. 231. 
62 DRESCHER, 2009, 260, 263, 269. 
63 SHERWOOD, 2007, p. 150. In 1838 the British Parliament removed the system of apprenticeships, DRESCHER, 
2009, p. 264. 
64 Parliament of the United Kingdom, August 18 1833. 
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declared that slavery in India needed to be fully abolished.68 Grant introduced a clause to the 
bill for the new company charter providing “that all rights over any person, by reason of such 
persons being in a state of slavery, shall cease throughout the said territories on”69 April 12 
1837. But this provision in the charter bill was met with serious resistance: The defenders of 
the status quo argued that the EIC should not interfere with slavery in India.70 Lord 
Ellenborough explained that an interference into the social matters of the Indian people would 
lead to turmoil: 
 
Now, what were called domestic slaves71 in India were not really slaves, (…); but their 
condition was that of the mildest state of domestic servitude. There were parts of 
India, no doubt, where the state of those slaves was of a more severe description,—in 
Malabar for instance; but then the noble Marquess himself admitted, that their slavery 
there was a slavery of caste. It would be a violent outrage on the feelings and 
prejudices of the natives of India thus to abolish all castes there, and to say, that 
slavery should no longer exist in that country. The attempt to establish such a state of 
things would lead most certainly to bloodshed in every part of India. In fact, it was 
insanity to make the attempt.72 
 
The Court of Directors of the EIC rejected73 the proposal to set a time frame to abolish 
slavery in India on the grounds that “any plan which may be calculated to improve the 
condition of the Natives, by abolishing slavery, without doing violence to the feelings of caste 
or to the rights of property, cannot fail to meet with the Court’s cordial approbation.”74 And 
Mr. Tucker in the Companies Court of Directors dissented from the abolition of slavery, 
arguing that it posed a violation towards the respect of the Mohammedan and Hindu laws. He 
expressed his fear that the abolition of slavery would lead to an uproar and ultimately 
resistance against the colonial power.75 
Through Ellenborough’s statement quoted above, the idea of slavery in India being a 
benign form of slavery shines through: The Indian slaves “were not really slaves.”76 Grant 
also explained, “generally speaking, slavery is not so severe in the East Indies, in consequence 
 
68 TEMPERLEY, 2000b, p. 169. 
69 East India Company, 1833b, p. 297; cf. East India Slavery, February 10 1841, p. 39; East India Company, 
1833a, p. 262. 
70 TEMPERLEY, 2000b, p. 170. 
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of its being the effect of caste, and connected with religion.”77 Policymakers identified forms 
of labour exploitation in India as slavery. But some commentators suggested to abstain from 
interfering with slavery in India, which were judged as being a mild version of slavery and 
entangled with religion and caste. Jenkins explained that “there is nothing in the situation of 
slaves in that country, which approaches at all to that of the same class in the West Indies.”78 
According to several historians, these arguments served a very practical problem: With a very 
limited number of officers stationed in India, to actively enforce the abolition of slavery 
would have been an impossible task. Related to this problem was the reliance on the 
cooperation of the native elites, and abolition risked alienating this elite.79 On the other hand, 
Cassels suggested that there was a serious concern of the colonial rulers towards respecting 
native customs and the protection of labourers.80 She criticises that contributions like 
Prakash’s are 
 
inclined to regard the Company’s law making process as a colonial exercise. (…) Yet, 
Prakash and another Bihar scholar,81 both observe that Act V 1843 made it impossible 
to perpetuate any form of bondage which smacked of a master-slave relationship. Such 
an acknowledgement of the force of law rather undercuts the need to dismiss all 
British law in India as a colonial exercise in projecting western notions of power 
relationships onto Indian society.82 
 
She rejects the verdict that the production of law was either a “colonial exercise”83—with 
legislators adopting laws against slavery, while allegedly intending to continue to coerce 
workers in the form of bonded labour or coolie labour—or purely cynical action, since 
policymakers knew that their laws would be ineffective.84 
Cassels85 criticises approaches that emphasise rational imperatives of colonial rule. 
Interrogating social legislation,86 she traces the developments of legislations since Governor-
General Warren Hastings from 1793 until 1843. According to her observation, slaves and 
bonded labourers, in the eyes of the British administrators enjoyed a level of protection—
 
77 Speech of Charles Grant, held on June 13 1833, quoted in East India Slavery, February 10 1841, p. 39. 
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protection they would lose upon manumission.87 She highlights that the insights of “the men 
on the spot”88 had been ignored by metropolitan antislavery actors, while the colonial power 
attempted to respect native customs and laws by the protection of Hindu and Muslim civil 
law. Against the repeated trope of describing the Act V as a failure, she remarks: “The 
argument that the economic reality of slavery continued in the form of debt bondage does not 
undermine the fact that after Act V 1843 the status of legality was denied to the institution of 
slavery in the Company’s Indian territories.”89 
In their deliberations, the commentators on the Charter Bill for the EIC did not give a 
definition of slavery. The Court of Directors explained: “[T]he term “slave” may be construed 
to have a more extended signification, and to include domestic slaves, and also numerous 
class of labourers, by which whole districts in some parts of India are cultivated.”90 It might 
be that they thought of bonded labour and explicitly mentioned domestic slavery as 
potentially falling under the definition of slavery. More revealing are the words of Tucker, 
who wrote in his comments on the bill submitted by Grant: “Domestic slavery exists in 
Bengal; but the slave or bondman is in reality a servant (…). The parent, during these seasons 
of distress [famines], is willing to part with his child for food, to prolong the existence of 
both.”91 The policymakers did in fact have different forms of labour exploitations in mind 
which they found to constitute slavery. But Lord Auckland reduced the rather wide 
interpretations and defined slavery along the lines of chattel slavery as “an entire subjection, 
sanctioned and upheld by the law, of an individual and his family to the will of a master, and 
the absolute claim of property, with the right also and the means of enforcing that claim, of 
one man over another.”92 
In the discussion of the House of Commons and the House of Lords, even the 
abolitionists conceded to the arguments of the EIC against abolishing slavery in India.93 The 
EIC was able to convince the parliament that it would become active against slavery in India 
without respective legislation forcing them to do so.94 Therefore, Grant’s suggestion was not 
completely rejected, but was modified.95 The House of Lords, as well as the House of 
Commons, supported the Court of Directors and voted to remove the deadline for the EIC to 
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instate the abolition of slavery.96 With respect to slavery, the British Parliament approved of 
the clause, requesting the Governor-General in Council “to take into consideration the means 
of mitigating the state of slavery, and of ameliorating the condition of slaves, and of 
extinguishing slavery (…) so soon as such extinction shall be practicable and safe.”97 The 
same paragraph contained provisions for the Governor-General to draft laws and regulations 
and to report back to parliament on a yearly basis.98 
 
Removing Slavery’s Civil Status in India, 1843 
The Governor-General99 was the newly created post, enacted by the Government of India Act 
of 1833. Additionally, it provided for the installation of the Government of India residing in 
Fort William in Bengal. The Governor-General was put in charge of enacting legislation of 
British nationals as well as of the Indian population in British India. Four members of the 
India Council were commissioned to advise him. When the Council met for legislative 
purposes, it was referred to and acted as the Legislative Council. Legislation that had received 
the assent of the Governor-General needed the approval of the Board of the Directors and 
parliament in Britain. The Governor-General’s veto position was not questioned and only 
challenged once in 1844. The Government of India Act constituted the foundation of the 
development of the Penal Code,100 which I discuss in the following chapter. 
A few years after the adoption of the new charter, F. Buxton asked in parliament 
which measures the EIC had taken up to abolish slavery in India. John Hobhouse, President of 
the Board of Control of the EIC, assured him that the company had not lost sight of this 
goal,101 but effectively, the EIC had not taken any steps against slavery in India.102 In the 
consecutive years after the adoption of the Charter Act of 1833, non-governmental reports on 
 
96 HJEJLE, 1967, p. 97. 
97 Government of India Act of 1833, Parliament of the United Kingdom, August 28 1833, Para. LXXXVIII. Also 
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valuable than the Rupees circulated by the East India Company), Merriam Webster, May 15 2020; a Councillor 
received 60,000 Sicca Rupees (presumably per year), Government of India Act of 1833, Parliament of the United 
Kingdom, August 28 1833, Section 76. It would have taken 1250 years for an Assam tea plantation worker to 
earn that amount a councillor made in one year. 
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Indian labour conditions were published in Great Britain.103 Also, the government published 
several volumes on Slavery in India: Papers Relative to Slavery in India between 1828 and 
1841. James Peggs, a missionary, who returned from Orissa, published on slavery in India in 
1830.104 In addition, he wrote a summary of the governmental publication on slavery to 
disseminate information on slavery in India among British subjects.105 In the same year, the 
American abolitionist William Adam, who wrote about native forms of enslavement, 
suggested that there were more than 800,000 slaves in British India. In his definition of 
slavery he included debt slavery, and used the example of agricultural bonded labour, and free 
(of payment) labour exacted under the umbrella of caste.106 In 1840, at the first World Anti-
Slavery Convention in London, Adam estimated that there were about a million people 
enslaved in India.107 And at the World Anti-Slavery Convention in London in 1843, James 
Peggs reiterated estimates of the number of slaves in British India which ranged from 10 to 20 
million people.108 
These numbers are hardly comparable with each other, nor with later estimates. The 
respective definitions of slavery were different109 or not clarified, let alone the methods by 
which the authors arrived at those numbers. The number of 20 million slaves in India was 25 
times more the number of people liberated by the Slavery Abolition Act of 1833,110 and it was 
more than “four times greater than the entire slave population of the New World.”111 Accurate 
or not, what is interesting about these numbers is their consequences in terms of the ideas they 
reflect: Some actors perceived slavery in India as a grave problem. For antislavery activists it 
was clear in any case that the task of realising emancipation for all people in the world was 
not yet achieved. For that purpose, the British India Society was founded in 1839, the same 
year that the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society was founded. Together they organised 
the first World Anti-Slavery Convention in London, to work towards the full abolition of 
slavery, also in India.112 
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The abolitionist movement turned its focus towards slavery of the East Indies:113 
Antislavery societies began to publish for the abolition of slavery, petitioned parliament 
requesting the abolition of slavery in India.114 They lobbied for their issue and personally met 
the Prime Minster, as well as Lord Ellenborough, who was the President of the Board of 
Control of the EIC, and Governor-General of India from 1842 to 1844. With a new region to 
focus on, the pressure on the EIC to act increased. In September 1841, Ellenborough sent a 
letter to Auckland, the Governor-General of India (from 1836 until 1842), cautioning him of 
the agitation of the Anti-Slavery Society and requesting that he drafted an act against slavery 
in India.115 
At the same time, another legal provision paved the way for the abolition of slavery in 
India. Based on the Government of India Act of 1833, the Indian Law Commission under T. 
B. Macaulay, the law member of the Council in India, was installed.116 In 1835, the five 
members—T. B. Macaulay, one additional member and three representatives of the Provinces 
Bombay, Madras and the North-Western Provinces (NWP)117—began to work on a general 
criminal code that should apply to British nationals as well as the Indian people.118 Up to that 
point, British nationals residing in India were exempted from criminal prosecution by the 
magistrates or any court. Felonies could only be punished with fines of maximal Rs. 500, or 
two months imprisonment if the fine could not be paid.119 The task of developing a code was 
completed by four law commissions which produced the codification of the civil and criminal 
law, the Indian Penal Code (IPC), as well as codes for civil and criminal procedures.120 
With the enquiries for the development of the general code, one question evolved 
around the request of the Court of Directors of the EIC “that no act falling under the definition 
of an offence should be exempted from punishment because it is committed by a master 
against a slave.”121 If the then current legislation in British India did not already cover this 
goal, an act should be drafted to make such a provision.122 Therefore, Secretary Grant asked 
the Law Commission to make an enquiry and to find out whether the law in force was 
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sufficient or if further legislation should be adopted.123 In 1834 the law commission had 
already sent a legislative despatch to India, requesting the preparation of a report in relation to 
the timing of the abolition of slavery.124 By 1838 the Law Commission collected information 
on the issue of slavery in India based on witness testimonies, judges’ commentaries, earlier 
reports, such as the report of Dr. Francis Martin Buchanan125 who conducted his field research 
in 1800 and submitted his report in 1807 on North Arcot (South India);126 other references 
were magistrates, slave owners, and natives,127 pundits (religious scholars), and mookhtears 
(head of a village).128 The Commission compiled a large amount of material on slavery and 
submitted the report in 1841.129 The report consists of two volumes: The first contains reports 
on slavery in Bengal, Assam (part of Bengal), Madras, Bombay, Arabia and Africa,130 and the 
second volume is the appendix with the submissions of the witnesses.131  
The report highlighted the brutality with which some masters treated their slaves: 
 
The Pathans of Rohilcund, naturally a choleric race, enforce the services of their slave 
by beating them either with a rattan or a staff; and the latter mode of punishment is 
sometimes carried to such an extend [sic] that the arms and legs of the slaves are 
broken by the violence of the blows inflicted. An absconding slave they tie with a 
string, or place fetters, light or heavy, on his legs in the manner practiced with convicts 
in public jails.132 
 
This quote testifies that the treatment of slaves in India was anything but benign. Yet, the 
author of this passage softened the power of the testimony, indicating that this information 
was outdated since the witness had left the region thirty years ago. The chapter concluded that 
“the system of slavery prevailing in this part of India is of a very mild character.”133 
The very last subchapter of the report on Bengal is dedicated to the Practice in the 
Courts in the case of Bondage, a separate chapter on bonded labour. This part documented the 
reports of judges and how they treated cases of bonded labour. They described the occurrence 
of debt bondage and cases of maltreatment of the bondsmen and the transfer of their debt to 
the next generation in case the bondsman died, what virtually equalled being born into 
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slavery. They also reported cases of reclaiming runaway bonded labourers. Until shortly 
before the composition of the report, the witness claimed that runaway bondsmen had even 
been restored with the help of the magistrate.134 The report referred to ‘bondsmen,’135 to 
people who had committed ‘self-sale,’136 or who had bound “themselves to work for other 
either for life, or for a specific term, in consideration of a sum advanced to them for a 
marriage or other occasion.”137 All these terms described bonded labour relations. The Indian 
Law Commission came to the conclusion that an adoption of an additional act would be in 
order since there were different legislations and interpretations of slavery used in the courts 
and by the magistrates. They recommended the adoption of a law applying to the whole of 
British India, and the law commission submitted a draft act along with its recommendation.138 
The report contains a lot of information and reflects that administrators had knowledge and 
awareness of slavery and bonded labour.139 
Several voices expressed their dissatisfaction with the suggestion of the commission 
aiming at the abolition of slavery and the prohibition of the sale of children as slaves. 
Commenting on the report, John Hobhouse, the President of the Board of Control of the EIC, 
complained of the committee’s work to Auckland,140 and in a minute to the Court of 
Directors, he pointed at “the generally mild character of what is termed slavery in this 
country.”141 He expressed his deepest doubts that slavery legislation and executive action 
would change or contribute to the freedom of the bonded agricultural labourers, referred to as 
‘agrestic serfs.’142 C. H. Cameron, member of the Law Commission and member of the 
Council in India, expressed his belief that slavery in India “mitigates the evils of poverty, at 
all times pressing heavily upon the lower orders, in times of dearth and famine pressing with 
intolerable severity. Slavery may be regarded as the Indian poor law and preventive of 
infanticide.”143 H. T. Prinsep, member of the Council in India, argued similarly when he wrote 
against this clause, explaining that the sale of children as slaves provided ‘a blessing in 
disguise’144 during times of famines. 
 
134 Indian Law Commission, January 15 1841a, p. 137–138. 
135 Indian Law Commission, January 15 1841a, p. 158–159. 
136 Indian Law Commission, January 15 1841a, p. 146. 
137 Indian Law Commission, January 15 1841a, p. 149. 
138 Indian Law Commission, January 15 1841a, 1-3, 8. 
139 DINGWANEY, 1985, p. 313. 
140 Letter from Hobhouse to Auckland, January 30 1841, quoted in HJEJLE, 1967, p. 97. 
141 Minute of Lord Auckland, dated May 6 1841, printed in Lord Auckland, 1842, p. 60; cf. Indian Law 
Commission, January 15 1841a, p. 13. 
142 Lord Auckland, 1842. 
143 Minute of C. H. Cameron, Indian Law Commission, January 15 1841a, p. 13. 
144 Consultation Number 8, Minute by H. T. Prinsep, January 11 1842, referred to in BANAJI, 1933, p. 392. 
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Auckland, the one person with strong veto possibilities, decided against the draft act145 
and referred the issue back to the Law Commission.146 Consequently, the adoption of Act V 
was finally possible, according to Temperley, because of a personal change in the office of the 
Governor-General in India: Lord Ellenborough took over the position of Auckland who had 
resigned from the post.147 He adopted the initial submission of the Law Commission but 
without the provision penalizing the sale of children.148 The act is reprinted in the Appendix. 
The adoption of the Act V was well received among antislavery actors and commented 
upon in publications in India,149 Great Britain150 and America151 in 1843. An American 
journal published the act in full, claiming that this act constituted the abolition of slavery in 
India, supporting their own cause against slavery.152 The interpretation of the act was that it 
abolished slavery, announcing this with headlines such as “Abolition of Slavery in India.”153 
In Great Britain the Foreign and British Anti-Slavery Society celebrated the success it claimed 
credit for, explaining that the act “virtually abolishes slavery throughout the whole of British 
India.”154 While admitting this act being “defective”155 their prognosis was that because of the 
act “millions more, born free, will be prevented from becoming slaves by sale and purchase, 
to perpetuate that system of cruelty and sin.”156 
Some scholars celebrate also the adoption of the Act V of 1843 as “the death-blow on 
slavery,”157 and Guha maintains that the British abolished slavery with the Act V of 1843.158 
Prakash also speaks from 1843 on as “after the abolition of slavery.”159 This would seem to be 
the perfect starting point where the abolition of slavery in India was finally institutionalised. 
But looking at the provisions of this law, the abolition of slavery had actually not become 
institutionalised.160 This law did not emancipate slaves; it only regulated slavery.161 It banned 
 
145 Government of India Act of 1833, Parliament of the United Kingdom, August 28 1833, Para. LXXXVIII. 
146 TEMPERLEY, 2000b, p. 181. 
147 TEMPERLEY, 2000b, p. 183, 1972, p. 107. 
148 CASSELS, 2010, p. 203. 
149 Abolition of Slavery in India, May 3 1843. 
150 JOHNSON, 1843. 
151 Slavery in British India, August 1843. 
152 The East Indies, 1844, p. 22; cf. Slavery in British India, August 1843. 
153 Abolition of Slavery in India, May 3 1843. 
154 JOHNSON, 1843, p. 19. 
155 JOHNSON, 1843, p. 20. And in a letter to Queen Victoria, printed in the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery 
Reporter, Clarkson noted in a sub-sentence: “[T]he abolition of slavery is not expressly declared by this Act” 
CLARKSON, November 29 1843, p. 217. 
156 JOHNSON, 1843, p. 20. 
157 BANAJI, 1933, p. 124. According to Banaji, slavery actually died twice: With the Act V in 1843 and the IPC 
enacted in 1860, BANAJI, 1933, p. 336. 
158 GUHA, 1977, p. 10. 
159 PRAKASH, 2002, p. 1. 
160 DINGWANEY, 1985, p. 312. 
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the right to purchase or sell persons into slavery and criminally sanctioned abuses if 
committed against a slave, the full title of the act already hints at the continued acceptance of 
slavery: An Act for declaring and amending the law regarding the condition of slavery within 
the territories of the East India Company.162 Writing for the Calcutta Review in 1848, barrister 
and advocate at the Calcutta Supreme Court William Theobald noticed that “[p]rotection 
against every kind of wrong is given to the slave, except the fact of slavery.”163 
Essentially, the act did not ban the ownership over a person or the possibility to inherit 
the status of slave parents. It also did not define slavery and did not grant any right to be free 
from enslavement. In 1884 judge Spankie of the Allahabad High Court concluded in 
discussing the Act V of 1843 “that the private sale of a free person for the purpose of being 
dealt with as a slave is not prohibited by this law.”164 More accurate appear the assessments of 
Temperley165 and Chatterjee,166 who describe the situation as the ‘delegalisation’ of slavery 
with the Act V—the removal of property rights over other human beings or the withdrawal of 
the civil status of slaves.167 The Act V withdrew the option of slave owners to claim their 
property rights through the magistrates and the courts, by declaring that “no rights arising out 
of an alleged property in the person and services of another as a slave shall be enforced by 
any Civil or Criminal Court or Magistrate within the territories of the East India Company.”168 
‘Voluntary bondage,’ or, according to the assessment of judge Spankie: ‘[A] person being 
dealt with as a slave against his will,’ was not the employer/labourer relation the British 
legislators had in mind.169 Bonded labour was not covered by the Act V. 
But the Act V was not a complete failure: After all, it ended the opportunity for 
slaveholders to assert their claims over slaves with the help of magistrates and the courts and 
enabled the executive and judiciary to legally cope with the excesses of slavery. From an 
institutional perspective, the abolition of slavery did not gain the status of an institution with 
the adoption of the Act V of 1843. And while some authors treat the adoption of this act as the 
critical juncture to end their analysis,170 the act was not in fact a critical juncture: It combined 
elements of continuity and change. On the one side, the colonial power continued to be 
 
161 DINGWANEY, 1985, p. 312; cf. MAJOR, 2010, p. 501. 
162 Governor-General in Council, April 7 1843. 
163 THEOBALD, January-June 1848, p. 154–155. For as similar observation, cf. MAYNE, 1861, p. 303 
164 Empress of India v. Ram Kuar, Allahabad High Court, March 8 1880, p. 730. 
165 TEMPERLEY, 2000b, p. 183. 
166 CHATTERJEE, 2005, p. 138. 
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168 Governor-General in Council, April 7 1843. 
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reluctant to interfere with the business of the native people.171 With a law that only required 
the magistrates and courts not to enforce any property rights in labourers, active intervention 
was still not an option. Yet, it constituted an interference and change from earlier legal and 
administrative practices. The change was not critical—this act did not delineate any right or 
norm towards the abolition of slavery: It did not stipulate “rules that assign normatively 
backed rights and responsibilities to actors,”172 which would require “‘public’, that is, third 
party enforcement.”173 
Although abolition had not gained the status of an institution, contemporary actors still 
reacted to the Act V as if it had constituted the institutionalisation of the abolition of slavery in 
India. Contemporary pro- and antislavery actors interpreted it that way: The above quoted 
comments of antislavery organisations and representatives do bear witness to this 
interpretation of the law as an institution. So did those who profited from slave labour: After 
the adoption of Act V, about 1400 zamindars of Bengal174 petitioned against the Act V arguing 
that it would violate the guarantee of India’s government to respect Hindu and Muslim 
customs.175 Furthermore, the abolition of slavery “would tend to the ruin of all India, specially 
[sic] that of the respectable part of the population of Sylhet. From time immemorial slaves of 
both sexes were engaged in the services of respectable men and performed drudgeries of 
various descriptions.”176 And in Assam the landowning upper-castes sent 1000 petitions to the 
government and demonstrated against the Act V.177 
The reaction of the zamindars can be understood in the framework of gradual 
institutional change: The zamindars were profiteers of slavery, which the Act V delegalised 
and they made use of the political venues accessible to them, namely petitioning. Proslavery 
actors can be described as the losers of this policy. They rose to resist it in order to maintain 
the status quo. The delegalisation of slavery can therefore be described in the terms of the 
definition of an institution. The adoption of the Act V appears to be a useful starting point in 
analysing how the abolition of slavery developed as an institution. The expressions of the 
zamindars are also an indicator for the Zeitgeist that prevailed in this period: The Zeitgeist 
 
171 Non-interference was a common practice established by the British and observed by historians; cf. BANAJI, 
1933, p. 280–281; SINGHA, 1998, p. 272; RAMAN, 1994, p. 748–749; GILMOUR, 2007, p. 18; ROCHER, 2010, 
p. 78–80; Regulation IV, Section 15, 1793, (reiterated in the Act of Parliament, 35 Geo III c. 155, 1795) quoted 
in CASSELS, 2010, p. 175; Queen in Council, November 1 1858. 
172 STREECK/THELEN, 2005b, p. 12. 
173 STREECK/THELEN, 2005b, p. 12. 
174 CASSELS, 2010, 206, footnote No. 129; cf. DINGWANEY, 1985, p. 311. 
175 Quoted in CASSELS, 2010, p. 205–206; BANAJI, 1933, p. 402. 
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was still proslavery. It was still possible for zamindars to express their discontent openly and 
to explicitly reject the abolition of slavery. 
Describing the ‘characteristics of the targeted institution,’178 the Act V offered a high 
level of discretion179 for interpretation. Without a definition of what slavery was and by not 
enumerating the competent authority to enforce and supervise the act’s provision, this 
appeared to be a weak law. According to Prakash, the legal withdrawal of ownership over a 
person resulted in the increased use of bonded labour contracts and monetarised the 
kamia/malik relationship, which had been marked by social reciprocity until this point. After 
1843 this relationship entered into a new configuration to the disadvantage of the labourer and 
offered another means for employers to exploit labourers.180 An allegation that lacks 
substance,181 and while this does not invalidate Prakash’s argument, British administrators 
described the existence and demonstrated the prevalence of bonded labour before the 
abolition of slavery.182 In light of the continued use of bonded labour, Guha, Kumar and 
Mann agree that the implementation of the abolition of slavery under the Act V largely 
failed.183 These authors’ quite negative evaluation of the Act V’s effectiveness is not 
necessarily justified: They hold the outcome against an expectation that is not met by the 
provisions of the act. The Act V did not provide for emancipation—neither in spirit, nor on 
paper. The emancipation of slaves and bonded labourers on the basis of the Act V was only 
possible if the judiciary and executive had used the discretion of interpretation of the act 
expansively. 
While not directly interfering, the Act V accomplished two things: The Act V of 1843 
was the first act concerning slavery in India that broke with the British colonial rulers’ 
doctrine not interfering with the internal customary affairs of the colonial subjects,184 namely 
the intertwined issue of slavery and caste. It thereby constituted an entry point for the British 
government to regulate the relationships within the subject population. It should be kept in 
mind, that in the Reports of the Indian Law Commission upon Slavery in India of 1841, 
bonded labour relations were described under the heading of slavery.185 And while the 
colonial government found an entry point into the labour/employer relationship of the native 
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population, by not actively interfering, allowed for a continued respect towards customary 
practices and the scriptures of Hindu and Muslims.186 
 
Conclusion 
In the first sections of this chapter on the attempts to regulate slavery and bonded labour in 
India, old sources, such as the Arthashastra, as well as later commentaries, testified that 
bonded labour already existed thousands of years ago. Before the adoption of the Act V, the 
Law Commission of India observed forms of bonded labour. The debates on these forms of 
exploitation depicted them as benign and mild. Even though the commissioners rejected the 
idea that these forms of labour exploitation constituted slavery, they still enumerated them. 
They could not ignore bonded labour, since it did not appear self-evident that bonded labour 
did not constitute slavery, but the invocation was followed by outright rejection: Repeatedly, a 
commentator would make the comparison to slavery, and in the next moment withdraw 
slavery cases, or bonded labour, from this comparison because “domestic slaves in India were 
not really slaves.”187 
The first British law for the abolition and emancipation of slaves was passed only for 
the West Indies in 1833. After that antislavery groups moved their attention to slavery in India 
and placed pressure on the EIC. Upon the suggestions of the Law Commission and made 
possible by a new Governor-General, the Act V was adopted and celebrated as the abolition of 
slavery. The outcome, the actual content of the Act V, can be analysed in terms of gradual 
institutional change. The Governor-General adopted a very weak law, because he believed 
that slavery in India was mild, and he was convinced that executive intervention might cause 
social turmoil and threaten British rule over India. Consequently, the result was a 
compromise: The Act V aspired to the abolition of slavery in India without offering 
enforcement mechanisms beyond abstention by magistrates and courts from protecting 
ownership rights.188 While the act did not offer any tools to the executive and judiciary to 
actively interfere with the slave/employer relationship, the exception of penal offences 
allowed a small entry point to intervene between the two. And it demonstrated that pressure 
from civil society led to governmental action against slavery. 
 
186 CASSELS, 2010, 167, 174-75. 
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The Act V of 1843 is a useful starting point to begin my analysis. Strictly speaking, the 
Act V does not fulfil the requirements of an institution as defined earlier.189 But political 
actors reacted to it as if the abolition of slavery had been institutionalised. Therefore, I 
describe and analyse developments in the abolition of slavery from that point forward. The 
following first episode begins with the adopted Act V of 1843 and ends in 1919. The second 
episode ends with India’s independence on the horizon, the beginning of the work of the 
Constituent Assembly and the Interim Government in 1946. The third episode covers the 
period of the work of the Constituent Assembly, the aftermath of independence, as well as 
Gandhi’s emergency rule and the adoption of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act.  
 
189 STREECK/THELEN, 2005b, p. 12. 
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Figure 5, Map of British India 1860. Source: Kmusser/Wikimedia Commons. 
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n April 7 1843 the Council of India passed the Act V. While this act does not fulfil 
the requirements for a policy to be described as an institution, actors already 
behaved towards the adoption of the Act V as if it were a strong policy. I begin 
with the description and analysis of the events and institutional changes since 1843. First, I 
discuss the institutional characteristics and the Zeitgeist prevalent around this time. These two 
factors determine the actors’ behaviour, depending on the question if they are pro- or 
antislavery, and future changes. After this discussion I introduce the political context and 
identify the veto points along Immergut’s model. Based on the respective conditions I select 
the hypothesis to be tested in this episode, the expected actors and changes, as discussed in 
the theoretical chapter. From there I describe and analyse the subsequent events, namely the 
adoption of the Workman’s Breach of Contract Act (WBCA) and the Indian Penal Code 
(IPC). The discussion of several court cases shows how these laws were applied at the judicial 
level, and it is possible to draw inferences if the judges contributed in changes of the 
institution. I close with a concluding discussion of the hypothetical assumptions and observed 
occurrences. 
In this chapter I rely on secondary sources, as well as primary sources, such as: 
Internal communications of the British administration retrieved at the National Archives of 
India (NAI); the debates at the British Parliament,1 as well as the Proceedings of the 
Legislative Council.2 Furthermore, I employ governmental reports, such as the report of the 
Indian Law Commission (1841), or the Indigo Commission Report (1860), as well as petitions 
submitted to the regional and central government. For the discussion of the case law at the 
 
1 Available at: hansard.parliament.uk. 
2 Available at: The Internet Archive. 
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higher courts I draw inspiration from secondary sources, but also selected cases that are made 
available in online archives.3 
 
Institutional Characteristics 
As highlighted in the theoretical chapter, the variable of the institutional characteristics—the 
level of discretion and enforcement—should be split into two variables: The variable of 
discretion in interpretation, which attempts to qualify whether the law or policy is strong or 
weak, and the enforcement variable, which considers the actual enforcement of the policy, 
regardless of whether it is a strong or weak policy. Since the institution of the abolition of 
slavery had only been completed by 1843, actors could only observe how the law was 
enforced with the passage of time. Therefore, I start with the institutional characteristics 
regarding the discretion of interpretation. Later I discuss the enforcement of the institution. 
 
Discretion of Interpretation 
By the year 1843 the Act V was in force, but the Indian Penal Code was not yet adopted. In 
1835 the work on the IPC began, and in 1837 a first draft of the abolition of slavery through 
the IPC was already published and suggested: 
 
Whoever kidnaps any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that the 
consequence of such kidnapping may be grievous hurt to that person, (…) or the 
slavery of that person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a 
term which may extend to fourteen years and must not be less than two years, and 
shall also be liable to fine.4 
 
This passage underwent additional changes, but it was clear since the 1830s that the IPC 
would provide punishment for the extraction of slave labour. By the year 1843 the only 
regulation for the whole of British India was the Act V. Did the Act V “afford actors 
opportunities for exercising discretion in interpretation?”5 Table 7 gives a brief overview: 
 
3 Available at: The Internet Archive; Indian Kanoon; ILI; GIPE; Google—I thank the Google Books Team who 
has been very responsive to my requests to make digitised sources available. 
4 Indian Law Commission, 1838, p. 52. 
5 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 18. 
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Table 7. Characteristics of the formal institution, 1843 
Law Definition Bonded labour Timeline Punishment Rehabilitation 
Competent 
authorities 
Act V, 
1843 
No N.A. No No No No 
 
Regarding the provisions that might curtail the discretion of interpretation, major elements, 
such as the definition of slavery and how to treat bonded labour, were not covered. Slavery 
did not constitute a criminal offence in its own right. The Act V did not indicate a timeline as 
to when it had to be fully enforced. Regarding punishment for violations, the Acv V 
criminalised the trade and any offence that already constituted a criminal act if committed 
against a free person. It did not provide explicitly defined means of punishment. 
Compensations were neither granted for former slaves nor slave holders. The discretion of 
interpretation of this policy was high—therefore, the Act V was a weak law. 
The Act V was also limited in scope geographically since it only applied to British 
territories. Beyond the reach of the EIC and the British Raj, the princely states continued with 
their own policies and largely did not adhere to the Act V. The Nawab of Dhaka explained that 
the Act V did not apply to his territory in 1878 and the Rajuputanas declared slavery to be an 
integral part of the royal culture.6 Slavery in the princely states of Rajasthan and central India 
remained legally sanctioned until 1947.7 Klein argues that most rulers within the Indian 
Ocean region seemed uninterested in abolishing slavery.8 But there are also historical 
accounts of rulers in the princely states, who took up the challenge to abolish slavery: 
Allegedly influenced by the British resident to the princely state,9 the Rani Lakshmi Bai of 
Travancore promulgated a proclamation that prohibited the trade in slaves in December 
1812,10 and abolished slavery in 1855.11 The native states and their position and behaviour 
towards slavery and its abolition are not well studied,12 and such references are usually 
anecdotal. Their case would be an interesting topic for future studies to trace continuities and 
discontinuities beyond British India.13 
 
 
6 MANN, 2012, p. 200; YADAV, 1988, p. 540–541. 
7 CHATTERJEE, 2005, 143, 151. 
8 KLEIN, 2005, p. 180. 
9 CASSELS, 1988, p. 66. 
10 MENON, 1878, p. 371; CASSELS, 2010, p. 178. 
11 AIYA, 1906, p. 119–120. 
12 KUMAR, 1993, p. 116. 
13 Cf. CHATTERJEE, 2014, p. 343. 
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Paradigms and Zeitgeist 
Three main paradigms emerge from a closer interrogation of the discourse on slavery and 
bonded labour before 1843 and a few decades after. These ideas are also reflected in the legal 
provisions and empirical practices: (1) The non-interference paradigm, (2) the protection or 
paternalist paradigm and (3) the ideology of work paradigm. These paradigms are 
interconnected but also in conflict with each other and contain the following ideas: The first 
paradigm, the non-interference paradigm,14 is based on the legislatively-grounded norm that 
the British not interfere with the customs of the local population, discussed above. Warren 
Hastings encoded the principle of non-interreference with the development of personal Hindu 
and Muslim laws in the 1770s.15 The non-interference paradigm became enshrined in the 
Cornwallis Code of 1793, a set of legislative provisions for the governance of India. The code 
regulated the use of “Mahomedan laws with respect to Mahomedans, and the Hindoo laws 
with regard to Hindoos (…) as the general rules by which the Judges are to form their 
decisions.”16 Queen Victoria evoked the respect towards indigenous customs after the 
institution of India as Crown Colony in 1858.17  
Arguments against the abolition of slavery in India partially derived their legitimacy 
from the assumption that the abolition of slavery constituted an illegitimate interference with 
the social order of the native population. Another fear of policymakers was that the removal 
of rights over slaves would cause social unrest against the EIC, or later against the colonial 
government of India.18 The British Parliamentary discourse on the abolition of slavery in 
India, discussed in the previous chapter, and Wellington’s statement underlines this paradigm, 
when he called “upon their Lordships to deal lightly with the question [of slavery], as [sic] 
they valued the maintenance of British India.”19 He explained that “there was hardly a family 
in India which was without domestic slaves; certainly there were no Mussulman families who 
had not female slaves, and any attempt to deprive the Indians of their slaves would inevitably 
produce the greatest dissatisfaction, if not absolute insurrection.”20 As discussed above, the 
Act V constituted a departure from the non-interference paradigm, while at the same time it 
 
14 Non-interference was a common practice established by the British and observed by historians; cf. BANAJI, 
1933, p. 280–281; SINGHA, 1998, p. 272; RAMAN, 1994, p. 748–749; GILMOUR, 2007, p. 18. 
15 ROCHER, 2010, p. 78–80. 
16 Regulation IV of 1793, Section 15, (re-enacted as Act of Parliament, 35 Geo III c. 155, 1795), quoted in 
CASSELS, 2010, p. 175. 
17 Queen in Council, November 1 1858. 
18 Lord Ellenborough in the House of Lords, Hansard 1803-2005, July 5 1833, Col. 190. 
19 Lord Wellington in the House of Lords, Hansard 1803-2005, August 5 1833, Col. 323. 
20 Lord Wellington in the House of Lords, Hansard 1803-2005, August 9 1833, Col. 447. 
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managed the legal stretch towards the respect of local customs, by not actively interfering into 
the slave/slave owner relationship. 
The second set of ideas evolved around the protection or paternalist21 paradigm. It 
shares one feature with the third paradigm, the ideology of work: violence. The developing 
colonial state claimed to protect its subjects, as for instance expressed by Queen Victoria in 
1858.22 Part of this protection is the state’s claim to the monopoly of violence, which aligns 
well with the colonial concept of trusteeship.23 This included the protection of slaves from 
excessive maltreatment. The protection from maltreatment had already found legal 
foundations in some provinces and judicial practices before 1843.24 But the protection’s flip 
side was the measured use of violence. It has been compared with the parent who uses 
violence against the child for its own ‘benefit.’25 The protection paradigm was deeply 
ingrained in the colonial discourse.26 It reflected the serious trust in authority and the 
acceptance of violence as means to exercise control. This was expressed by the Governor of 
Bengal in 1893, when he explained that “the tea planter as master of a large and irregular 
labour staff must enforce discipline by occasional severe measures which need not be looked 
into too closely, because these are substantially just and for the general good of the coolies.”27 
The development of a whole nation was described as the ‘white man’s burden’ or the 
‘civilizing mission’28 and could be observed at the global imperial level, as well as the 
individual level: The state and its relationship to the colonial subjects, the planter and his 
relationship to the coolie. Part of the protection paradigm was also the attempt to identify 
positive effects of slavery. Some commentators of the 1840s justified slavery because of its 
function as India’s poor law.29 Social relations based on slavery were depicted as inherently 
good, as a mechanism to save the poor from sheer demise. It ignored that the assumed choice 
was often only between two evils—death or total subjugation.30 
Concerning the monopoly of violence, the state did not provide the right to freedom, 
but claimed to control the exercise of violence of intermediaries, which the state legitimised 
 
21 ANDERSON, 2004, p. 422; KERR, 2004, p. 23; Mohapatra speaks of the “paternal ideology,” MOHAPATRA, 
2016, p. 220. For connecting slavery and paternalism, see CHATTERJEE, 2005, p. 141. 
22 Queen in Council, November 1 1858. 
23 GRANT, 2005, p. 19–21. 
24 PRAKASH, 1993, p. 135; CASSELS, 2010, p. 165–208. 
25 Mr. Cameron’s Minute, Indian Law Commission, January 15 1841a, p. 13; cf. BANAJI, 1933, p. 20, 1933, 
p. 391–392. 
26 HAY/CRAVEN, 2004, p. 37; MIERS, 2003, p. 15. 
27 Note of the Governor of Bengal, September 1893, quoted in MOHAPATRA, 2004, p. 476. 
28 MANN, 2004, 5, 8, 25; cf. MAUL, 2007, p. 481. 
29 Mr. Cameron’s Minute, Indian Law Commission, January 15 1841a, p. 13. 
30 CHAKRAVARTY, 2016, p. 265. 
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and regulated by law.31 Mediated through social hierarchy, the exercise of a certain degree of 
violence allowed the power of the intermediaries over others—such as fathers over children,32 
husbands over wives,33 whites over Indians,34 employers over workers and, essentially, the 
state over its subjects. As one judge in Benares put it in 1871: “A person is treated as a slave 
if another asserts an absolute right to restrain his personal liberty, unless that right is conferred 
by law as in the case of a parent, or guardian, or a jailor.”35 This ‘conferred right’ was limited 
by legal restrictions on the legitimate degrees of violence exercised by husbands, fathers, 
slaveholders and employers.36 The Act V fell neatly into the terms of the current paradigms. 
As Temperley notes, it was not surprising that the members of the law commission of 1841 
“spent much time discussing whether owners should be allowed to continue employing ropes 
and canes as a form of ‘moderate chastisement,’ noting that a ‘moderate right of correction’ 
was traditional in India and by no means confined to slaves.”37 
The paternalist paradigm also served a very practical problem: Some of the actors in 
the policymaking arena, for instance, Lord Auckland38 or Hobhouse,39 did express their 
concerns about the applicability of the ideal of the abolition of slavery in India. There was a 
valid point that, due to the intersection of social relations mediated by caste and labour, this 
issue was difficult for a company respecting theses relations to enforce.40 Furthermore, there 
was the problem of a limited reach due to a lack of personnel to oversee the implementation.41 
The state did not penetrate either the Indian subcontinent or its society too deeply.42 While 
never having fully owned the monopoly on violence,43 the state now shared this monopoly 
with the intermediaries,44 which the state tried to control. 
 
31 Mohapatra describes this as the ‘privatisation of labour regulations,’ MOHAPATRA, 2016, p. 222; on the power 
conferred to shipmasters over seafarers, AHUJA, 2013, p. 115. See also SINGHA, 1998, p. 129. 
32 Indian Law Commission, January 15 1841a, p. 3; Mr Cameron’s Minute, Indian Law Commission, January 15 
1841a, p. 13. 
33 ABRAR/LOVENDUSKI/MARGETTS, 2000, p. 244; Indian Law Commission, January 15 1841a, p. 15. 
34 KOLSKY, 2010, 11, 19. 
35 Queen v. Mirza Sikundur Bukhut, Allahabad High Court, June 20 1871. 
36 For a study on violence exercised by British nationals in India, see KOLSKY, 2010. 
37 TEMPERLEY, 2000b, p. 176; cf. NICOLLS/BIRD/CASEMENT et al., 1841, p. 5–6; Indian Law Commission, 
January 15 1841a, p. 340–343, January 15 1841a, 12: iv; Mr. Cameron’s Minute, speaking against correction 
Indian Law Commission, January 15 1841a, p. 12. 
38 Lord Auckland, 1842. 
39 Letter from Hobhouse to Auckland, January 30 1841, quoted in HJEJLE, 1967, p. 97. 
40 CASSELS, 1988, p. 59–60. 
41 In the Assam tea gardens, for instance, planters had trouble securing local workers and restoring runaway 
labourers who made themselves scarce in a terrain hardly penetrated by the British, SHARMA, 2009, 1296, 1299, 
1300. 
42 VARMA, 2017, p. 50. 
43 POUCHEPADASS, 1999, p. 38; ERIKSEN, 2011, p. 240. 
44 In the case of Assam a commissioner explained that “with so few magistrates in the district, it must be planter 
himself that we must look to for the maintenance of order among these large bodies of labourers,” in W. A. 
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The third paradigm is the ideology of work. The paternalist paradigm is easily 
detectable, since expressions of it were mostly explicit.45 The ideology of work is less explicit 
and can be read against the grain when there is for instance talk of idleness.46 Regarding the 
labourers in the mines and the recruitment of the local population the Bengal Labour Enquiry 
Report of 1896 testified: 
 
The Sonthali and Bauri (…), like most aboriginals, prefer to idle when they have 
earned enough to satisfy their immediate wants. Having had no competition in the 
labour market, they have hitherto been able to dictate their own terms, and have taken 
holidays when and as often as they like, since three or four days’ hard work suffices to 
keep them and their families in the utmost comfort of [sic] the rest of the week.47 
 
Remarkably absent from all the interrogated primary sources is the critical questioning 
of the legitimacy of work, or the use of violence to coerce people to work. After the abolition 
of slavery, Kale observes that two recurring complaints of employers were about labour 
shortage and that former slaves were not eager to work beyond subsistence level.48 The 
Assam Labour Enquiry Committee remarked repeatedly that higher wages would attract 
workers to come to Assam, despite its “bad name.”49 Employers countered such suggestions, 
arguing that higher wages “only means less work and more leisure.”50 Former slaves seemed 
to actively question the legitimacy of work. In 1883 Lafargue exposed the underlying 
ideology of work in Marx’ critique of capitalism and French legislation of 1848 enshrining 
the right to work.51 The ideology of work is related to the paternalist paradigm: In both 
paradigms social hierarchies are at work and both accept and legitimise the use of violence. 
Work was conceived of as an exercise to educate and liberate workers by forcing upon them 
discipline and the experience of hard labour. Through these labourers, the development of a 
 
Stoddard: Reports on the Tea and Tobacco Industries in India (London, 1874), p. 87, quoted in VARMA, 2011, 
p. 69. 
45 I borrow the term from ANTHONY, 1978 and UPADHYAY, 2009. 
46 Cf. King’s discussion of unemployment legislation in the US and GB, which was punitive in nature against 
idle workers, KING, 1995, 38, 61. 
47 Bengal Labour Enquiry (Williams) Commission 1895-1896: Report and Appendices (Calcutta: 1896), p. 10-
11, quoted in PUNEKAR/VARICKAYIL, 1989, p. 73. 
48 KALE, 1998, p. 44–45. 
49 VARMA, 2011, p. 113–115. Varma explaines how among prospective workers and in the public the bad 
working conditions in the Assam tea plantations were known. The damaging reputation was met with increasing 
resistance of labourers to go there; see also EDGAR, 1873, xviii; No. 35. Mr. E. B. Clair Smith, General Manger 
of Wards and Encumbered Estates, Manbhum, Assam Labour Enquiry Committee, 1906a, p. 27; see also witness 
No 47, Assam Labour Enquiry Committee, 1906a, p. 36; witness No. 98, Assam Labour Enquiry Committee, 
1906a, p. 75. 
50 Extract from speech of Chariman, Duars Tea Company at the 20th Annual Ordinary General Meeting of the 
Company, 1905, reprinted in Assam Labour Enquiry Committee, 1906a, p. 237. 
51 LAFARGUE, 2015 [1883]; original title: Le droit à la Paresse, (Eng.: The Right to Be Lazy). 
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nation was supposed to be achieved. Furthermore, the control over people, the use of violence 
at the work place, and work itself, appeared as a strategy for the execution of the civilizing 
mission.52 Christianity offered the foundation for the idea of the liberating qualities of labour, 
preferably hard labour. The features of punitive labour legislations were built upon this 
principle and found their most perverted reflections in the famine relief camps and the prison 
system that usually entailed forced labour (called hard labour) as punishment.53 Within this 
logic, work serves as liberation and punishment at the same time. While the idea of possession 
over a person was rejected, the respective features of violence,54 labour, social hierarchy and 
control were upheld and therefore provided the breeding ground for the continuation of labour 
relations approximating slavery on the free/slave labour continuum. With this argument, I 
underline the importance of undermining ideas in contrast to the idea of freedom. While the 
ideal of freedom led to the abolition of slavery and probably constituted a sincere attempt to 
better the condition of slaves, the other paradigms were still impacting state/subject and 
employer/worker relationships. Features of these relationships were also constitutive of 
bonded labour and slavery and contributed to their continuance. 
At the international level, the tide towards an antislavery Zeitgeist had not yet gained 
momentum. Civil society and MPs in Britain were the norm entrepreneurs that Sikkink and 
Finnemore identified as crucial for the development of the norm of the abolition of slavery. 
They were the active agents who created the normative environment, pressing their own 
government and other nations to implement this norm.55 The process of undergoing 
formalisation, the conclusion of bi- and multilateral treaties abolishing the slave trade from 
1807 on, can be described as the norm’s emergence,56 during which the British Empire 
undertook efforts to convince other states to adhere to the norm prohibiting the slave trade, as 
discussed in the introduction. The period after 1843 was still in the first stage of the norm’s 
development and had not yet gained the quality of ‘taken-for-grantedness.’57 At the national 
level in India, the Zeitgeist had already moved towards the second stage: The delegalisation of 
slavery was accomplished and its full prohibition was about to be enacted. 
 
 
52 KERR, 2004, p. 23. 
53 DAVIS, 2001, p. 144. Hard labour as punishment was also enshrined in other penal acts in colonial India, for 
instance in the Thugee Act XXX of 1836, SINGHA, 1998. Hard labour was enforced under conditions of slavery 
and is also enshrined in Chapter III on Punishments in the IPC, but became reinterpreted in the 1970s, not being 
meant to be punitive and changed into ‘light labour,’ Fifth Law Commission of India, June 1971, p. 64. 
54 HAY/CRAVEN, 2004, p. 1–2. 
55 FINNEMORE/SIKKINK, 1998, p. 895. 
56 FINNEMORE/SIKKINK, 1998, p. 894. 
57 FINNEMORE/SIKKINK, 1998, p. 895. 
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Political Context 
Executive and Legislative Arena 
In the beginning of this episode, the administration of India was regulated by the Government 
of India Act of 1833, which formed the basis for the installation of the Governor-General. He 
was in charge of enacting legislation for British nationals in India, as well as the Indian 
population. The India Council consisted of four members, who assisted the Governor-General 
with advice. When the Council met for legislative purposes it was referred to and acted as the 
Legislative Council. The assented legislation of the Governor-General needed the approval of 
the Board of the Directors and parliament in London. With no elections and no parliament in 
India, executive decisions could not be vetoed. Therefore, the India Council constituted no 
veto point,58 which, for the purpose of analysis, translates as weak veto possibilities for the 
defenders of the status quo. 
After the Indian uprising of 1857, the British Crown liquidated the EIC and seized the 
governing power over India. Under the Government of India Act of 1858,59 the Secretary of 
State for India was appointed by the Queen. He was nominally but not effectively responsible 
to the British Parliament. The Secretary of State at the India Office in Whitehall, London, 
held the executive power and was responsible for governing India, Burma and Aden. The 
Council of India, also situated in the India Office, could advise, but not veto decisions of the 
Secretary of State. He occupied a supreme position over the Government of India, with “the 
final control and direction of affairs”60 vested in him.61 He appointed three of the five 
members of the Imperial Legislative Council,62 while two were to be elected by the Queen; 
but from 1869 on, he appointed all five. The Governor-General could appoint another six to 
twelve members. The five individuals appointed headed the executive departments—home, 
military, revenue, finance, and law. Under this changed constitution, the veto possibilities 
were still weak. The appointed members of the Governor-General had legislative powers; they 
proposed acts, and discussed petitions and private bills submitted to the Council. An act had 
to be assented by the Governor-General. Without any parliamentary responsibility, the 
Legislative Council functioned in an advisory manner and did not constitute a veto possibility 
that was able to overturn executive decisions. 
 
58 Cf. IMMERGUT, 1990, p. 400. 
59 Government of India Act of 1858, Parliament of the United Kingdom, August 2 1858. 
60 MISRA, 1970, p. 24. 
61 MISRA, 1970, p. 22–24. 
62 Also referred to as Governor-General’s Legislative Council. 
Chapter 3  
1st Episode: EIC & British Raj,  
1843-1919 
 
 
98 
In the provinces, provincial legislative councils were set up: The Bengal Presidency, 
the Bombay Presidency, the Madras Presidency and the North-Western Provinces. They were 
reinstated by the Indian Councils Act of 1861. The provincial legislative councils had 
legislative powers over their territories, with the exception of the Bengal Presidency, which 
could pass policies for the whole of British India. Bills passed by the provincial legislative 
councils needed the assent of the Governor-General. These councils also did not constitute a 
veto possibility. Since 1861 Indians could be nominated to the Legislative Councils, which 
formed an access point for Indian interests to be represented through the nomination of non-
official members.63 Here Bhattacharya makes the convincing point that the social, and I would 
add racial,64 distance between the British ruling class and the Anglo-Indians65 vis-à-vis the 
Indian population was marked by a sharp separation in terms of access to and influence on the 
political decision makers. Anglo-Indians had several advantages that the Indians lacked, such 
as the ability to sell their interests to the political elite and to garner sympathy.66  
But at the same time, sympathy was not naturally given. Mayo, for instance, Viceroy 
of India from 1869 to 1872, stated that the non-official Europeans “come here to get as much 
money out of the Blacks as they can. I have no sympathy with this class and they know it.”67 
Kolsky also shows in her monograph that the British did not constitute a monolithic entity. 
The ruling British elite and, for instance, the planters, were divided by class and social 
hierarchy. Their relationship among the British was regularly marked by conflict.68 
In 1857, after the Indian rebellion, which the British called ‘the Mutiny,’ the colonial 
power decided to incorporate the Indian voice, in order to better understand and know “what 
the natives think.”69 But the appointed Indian individuals selected represented the Indian 
aristocratic and western-educated elite.70 During the period between 1861 and 1892 altogether 
45 native Indians served in the Imperial Legislative Council, 25 of them were zamindars, 
seven were rulers of the princely states. Historians have carved out how closely these council 
members were serving their own interests. Some of the Indian members used their position 
and access to power to secure rights to exploit the land just like the British. The colonial 
imperative to secure the loyalty of Indian elites fuelled the collaboration between the Indian 
 
63 BHATTACHARYA, 2005, p. 20. 
64 ALATAS, 1977. 
65 The term refers to British nationals working in India, The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. 
66 BHATTACHARYA, 2005, 20-1, 23-4. 
67 Mayo in a letter to Argyll, dated November 9 1870, quoted in BHATTACHARYA, 2005, p. 33. 
68 KOLSKY, 2010, 5, 202-06. 
69 Bartle Frere, British Member of the Legislative Council, March 1860, quoted in METCALF, 1964, p. 91, italics 
in the original. 
70 SISSON, 1993, p. 42. 
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elites and the British rulers.71 At the same time, the interest of colonial capitalism limited the 
capitalist aspirations of Indians. As competing forces, this turned into a conflict over power-
sharing.72 Therefore, in the new Legislative Council, the representation of the worker’s 
interest was hardly to be expected: The members usually had vested interests in business and 
the number of Indian representatives was marginal.73 
 
“Electoral” or Public Arena 
Since there were no elections, there was no electoral arena that could either exercise pressure 
through elections, or make use of a referendum. Therefore, there is no electoral arena that 
Immergut suggests as a potential veto point.74 Until the 1880s there were no political parties 
either, and no representation of them in the political system—the Indian National Congress 
(INC) was founded in 1885 as a political movement.75 But political interest groups began to 
form with the installation of the legislative councils at the centre and in the presidencies. In 
1851 the British Indian Association was formed and requested that Indians have access to the 
councils as well as the civil service.76 And while it might be correct that “[t]he techniques 
used by pressure groups are more limited in range in an authoritarian system than in a 
democratic set-up,”77 pressure groups did form and attempted to influence the political 
process. To a certain extent the Government of India was open to outside influence and 
lobbying efforts after the Indian rebellion, in part because the Government of India was 
concerned with its “public image.”78 Part of this concern was the legitimacy of the colonial 
rule, and to prevent another upheaval that could jeopardise British rule.79 
One way the general population in Great Britain and India could give voice to their 
demands was the venue of petitions. Petitions formed the basis of the legislative procedure in 
Great Britain and people sent their petitions to the Government of India and the British 
Parliament. Petitions and private bills needed a member from within the political system to 
present them in the Legislative Council, and, if voted upon, a majority of the members needed 
 
71 JAYAL, 2013, p. 48–49; DIAMOND, 1993, p. 42–46; WASHBROOK, 1981, p. 689. 
72 WASHBROOK, 1981, p. 689–690. 
73 RENFORD, 1987, p. 61. 
74 IMMERGUT, 1990, p. 397. 
75 SISSON, 1993, p. 40. 
76 KSHIRSAGAR, 1994, p. 52. 
77 BHATTACHARYA, 2005, p. 14. 
78 BHATTACHARYA, 2005, p. 29. 
79 CHAN/WRIGHT/YEO, 2011, p. 54. 
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to approve.80 Rokkan has identified petitions as one of the four locks that constitute the 
thresholds for democratisation. Through them, the undemocratic state gained legitimacy. They 
also offered the possibility to openly criticise the government and therefore extended some 
influence to external actors of the policymaking process, which in turn produced legitimacy of 
the regime.81 But the power of petitions should not be overstated: Formal requirements 
limited the accessibility to potential petitioners, and Drescher argues that “[t]he general record 
of parliamentary responsiveness to non-violent mass requests which also threatened major 
interests was (…) rather poor in the short term.”82 Therefore, the success of anti-slave trade 
and slave emancipation petitions was exceptional in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries,83 but the number of petitions or signatures alone did not guarantee any success.84 
Another venue to express political interests were the publication of periodicals and the 
emission of deputations—a means of communication that was less available and even less 
successful when used by Indians.85 Among the publications vested with political interest was 
the Hindoo Patriot, supported by the British Indian Association, or the Cotton Supply 
Reporter by the Cotton Supply Association. The Englishman and the Pioneer were other 
publications representing commercial interests, as for instance the indigo planters.86 
In the reports produced by the Law Commission, but also in other reports, the needs 
and concerns of the people that were the law’s object, were not the ones to be addressed. 
Their needs needed to be studied and formulated by the state agents. The state and his 
representatives discovered and defined the needs of the labourers and formulated the 
respective measures to satisfy those needs. The state knew better. The self-expressions of the 
slaves and bonded labourers were not necessary, they were to be represented.87 Slaves and 
bonded labourers were therefore (un)suspiciously silent or rather silenced in the political 
discursive processes regarding matters of their own concern—the subaltern cannot speak.88 
But while unheard of in the legislative and executive arena, as well as in the reports on 
slavery, the labourers themselves were not silent. Labourers had different ways of expressing 
 
80 BRADLEY, 1986, p. 17; BHATTACHARYA, 2005, p. 6. 
81 ROKKAN, 1968, p. 180–181. 
82 DRESCHER, 1982, p. 41. 
83 DRESCHER, 1982, p. 42. 
84 DRESCHER, 2009, p. 252. 
85 BHATTACHARYA, 2005, 14, 16. 
86 KLING, 1966, p. 203; BHATTACHARYA, 2005, p. 17. 
87 For a similar observation in reviewing the governmental reports on indentured labour, the trafficking of Indian 
labourers to the British Caribbean, see KALE, 1998, p. 84. 
88 SPIVAK, 1994. 
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their discontent with their labour situation. Among these forms of resistance practiced were 
desertion and walk-out by individual labourers or groups.89 
 
Hypotheses 
In 1843 the characteristics of the institution of the abolition of slavery were weak, with much 
room for discretion of interpretation. The legislative councils did not pose a veto point; actors 
of change were confronted with limited access to the political institutions. With the legal 
status quo of slavery being abolished, but with high discretion of interpretation, proslavery 
actors were likely satisfied with this status quo in the long-run: Ludden for instance showed 
that South Indian landlords relying on bonded labour were not worried that the Act V would 
interfere with their relations with the workers.90 The petitions of the Bihari zamindars shows 
that the potential losers91 of the institutional development reacted to the changes as if the 
institutional characteristics were strong. On the other hand, antislavery actors were probably 
not satisfied: The ownership of people had lost its legal and legitimate basis, but the 
paradigms at that time supporting paternalism, violence, and labour extracted under whatever 
means, as well as the weak provisions against slavery,92 were probably cause to aim at 
improving the legislation.93 Due to the colonial logic—the need for revenue, increasing 
demands for colonial products on the market,94 and racial bias—business interests had better 
access to the political machinery. Proslavery actors were likely to be more successful in 
advancing their interests and bringing forward legislation to undermine antislavery efforts. 
The political context offered weak veto possibilities for the defenders of the status 
quo. The level of discretion of the institution was weak; the level of enforcement was yet 
unknown to the actors at the time. Some actors expected strong enforcement, while other 
actors expected weak enforcement; therefore, two hypotheses should be considered. The 
Zeitgeist at the international level was still proslavery, as argued in the introduction, and the 
Zeitgeist at the national level in India, with the Act V adopted, moved towards the third stage, 
the internalisation of the norm, but was also still proslavery. Hypotheses 4b as well as 6b are 
to be tested. According to H4b, change agents are most probably antislavery actors behaving 
 
89 GHOSH, 1999, p. 35–42. 
90 LUDDEN, 1985, p. 174. 
91 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 14. 
92 JOHNSON, 1843, p. 20. 
93 Commentators observed that the Act V was “defective,” JOHNSON, 1843, p. 20; see also CLARKSON, November 
29 1843, p. 217. 
94 BEHAL, July 2013, p. 3; KUMAR, 2012, p. 18–19; MAJOR, 2010, p. 504. 
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as insurrectionaries causing either displacement or layering. Along hypothesis 6b I expect 
proslavery actors to be the change agents, who behave as subversives causing layering. 
 
Gradual Changes 
The period after 1843 was followed by several developments that contributed to a 
deterioration of the economic situation of a large number of the Indian people that carried pull 
and push factors for forced labour, bonded labour and indentured labour. Famines constituted 
a reoccurring problem: The famine in Orissa in 1866 and 1867; the famine in Bihar between 
1873 and 1874; the famine in Rajputana in 1899; and the two great famines across large areas 
of India between the years 1876–78 and 1896–1902 during which between 12.2 to 29.3 
million people died of hunger.95 The increasing economic activities of the British in India—
namely the establishment of tea plantations,96 the extraction of minerals (such as mica) in 
mines, and an increasing demand for indigo97 came with an increased demand for labour.98 
The British fostered the production of cotton since American independence (1776) and the US 
Civil War (1861-1865).99 And in the shadow of the abolition of slavery in 1833, the British 
began to meet the need for cheap labour by suppling Indians to overseas possessions through 
the indentured labour system.100 After the abolition of slavery, an estimated 1.3 million 
Indians left India as indentured labourers between 1834 and 1922.101 Opium and other raw 
materials began to be produced for an increasing international trade. The construction of the 
railroads in India took off in the 1860s and was carried out under severe conditions, labour 
exploitation at a high cost—the labourers’ physical integrity and often life—clouded under 
the umbrella term of public works.  
The biggest sector in which Indians worked and where probably the largest numbers 
of bonded labourers and slaves could be found, was agriculture.102 In the early nineteenth 
century, the largest population of slaves in the Madras Presidency worked in agriculture. In 
South India agricultural labourers were mostly tied to the land they worked and could be 
transferred with the land. With heavy tax burdens on land, formerly self-sustaining 
 
95 DAVIS, 2001, 7, 21-2, 36,168. 
96 BEHAL/MOHAPATRA, 1992, p. 147. 
97 VAUGHAN, p. 273; KUMAR, 2012, p. 6. 
98 ANDERSON, 2004, p. 424. 
99 BHATTACHARYA, 2005, p. 8; KUMAR, 2012, p. 54. 
100 EMMER, 1986, p. 187; VARMA, 2011, 40, footnote: 82. 
101 NORTHRUP, 1995, p. 60; TINKER, 1974. 
102 Data for other states are not available, CASSELS, 1988, 70, 75. 
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communities needed to collect cash to be able to pay their duties.103 In addition, land grabbing 
dislocated a large amount of people and created a workforce that became available, for 
instance, on the tea plantations, by binding themselves as indentured labourers.104 
 
Political Arena 
The Calcutta Trade Association, formed in 1830, had already complained to the government 
about the relation between labourers and employers in 1846. The association explained that it 
was common in all trades to pay advances and that in many cases labourers defected from the 
agreement and employers had no means to curb this problem. The Association sent a 
memorandum and draft act to the President of the Council of India, but “without effecting any 
beneficial alteration.”105 Apparently the addressed council member ignored their submission. 
Indigo planters were also repeatedly requesting the criminalisation of breaches of contract.106 
Their submission was inspired by an English law from 1823, but left out any protection 
clauses for workers,107 or duties on the side of the employer.108 While it seems that the 
members of the Calcutta Trade Association, or the indigo planters, were not directly affected 
by the delegalisation of slavery by the Act V, their submission concerned the Act V, since 
penal sanctions against a labourer could be instigated and therefore undermined the spirit of 
the abolition of slavery, because people could be forced to work through legal sanction. 
In 1852 the Madras Native Association, and others, Native Inhabitants of the 
Presidency of Madras, founded in the same year, submitted a petition asking for the abolition 
of the revenue system, the so-called ryotwari system. The petitioners described the plight of 
labourers, unable to pay their revenue which left them as ‘beggars and slaves.’109 According 
to the petitioners, the poorer ryots had to incur debts to be able to buy working materials, and 
seeds.110 They represented three to four thousand individuals and their petition was discussed 
in the Lords’ sitting on February 1853.111 The petition was referred to the Select Committee 
 
103 SHARMA, 2009, 1295, 1303; WASHBROOK, 1981, p. 663. 
104 BEHAL, July 2013, p. 2; GHOSH, 1999, 16-18, 30; SHARMA, 2009, p. 1305–1306; GUHA, 1977, p. 14. 
105 Calcutta Trade Association, 1852, p. 26. Petition Letter, reprinted in Calcutta Trade Association, 1852, 
p. 286–287, Draft Act for Master and Workmen, January 1846, reprinted in Calcutta Trade Association, 1852, 
p. 287–298. 
106 NADRI, 2016, p. 187. 
107 ANDERSON, 2004, p. 432; cf. Draft Act for Master and Workmen, January 1846, reprinted in Calcutta Trade 
Association, 1852, p. 287–298. 
108 Cf. Draft Act for Master and Workmen, January 1846, reprinted in Calcutta Trade Association, 1852, p. 287–
298. 
109 Select Committee on Indian Territories/House of Commons, 1853, p. 441. 
110 Select Committee on Indian Territories/House of Commons, 1853, p. 441. 
111 Hansard 1803-2005, February 25 1853, Col. 631-648. 
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on Indian Territories in March 1853.112 The Earl of Ellenborough presented the petition and 
started with the discussion of the ryotwari and zamindari system,113 but it ended without any 
further consequences. While the petitioners probably represented better-off agricultural 
labourers or landowners, their problems also affected the agricultural workers at the bottom, 
who had to take credits for “sheer survival.”114 
 
The WBCA, 1859 
In July 1858, the Calcutta Trade Association again filed its petition to the Legislative Council 
asking, “for the introduction of a legislative measure to check wilful [sic] breaches of contract 
or desertion of service by workmen or servants by a system of summary punishment and 
summary remedies to be enforced by a Magistrate.”115 The petitioners complained again of 
runaway workers whom they had given advances. Apparently, employers often failed to 
recover the advances through civil courts.116 They resubmitted the Draft Act for Master and 
Workmen117 along with their petition. But instead of ignoring the submission, as in earlier 
years, the Legislative Council discussed it in July 1858. Just a month earlier, the Legislative 
Council had debated a petition of the Indigo Planters’ Association, which was “praying (…) 
for further protection and improved means of redress against Ryots to whom they [the indigo 
planters] had made advances and who broke their engagement.”118 The issue of advances 
reappeared repeatedly in the records119 and employers argued that advances were the only 
means upon which the workers could be attracted to work.120 In light of other reports, of the 
railways for instance, or testimonies of plantation owners regarding delayed or withheld 
payment,121 it comes as no surprise that workers asked for advances. This is one example 
where workers were able to exercise agency and control. The contribution of employers to 
 
112 Select Committee on Indian Territories/House of Commons, 1853, 416, 441-42. 
113 Hansard 1803-2005, February 25 1853, Col. 631-648. 
114 HABIB, 2006, p. 75. 
115 Saturday, July 8 1858, Legislative Council of India, 1858, p. 304. 
116 Legislative Council of India, 1858, p. 510. 
117 Draft Act for Master and Workmen, January 1846, reprinted in Calcutta Trade Association, 1852, p. 287–298. 
118 Indigo Planters, Legislative Council of India, 1858, p. 477. 
119 ANDERSON, 2004, p. 426; cf. SHARMA, 2009, p. 1303; cf. Petition Letter of the Calcutta Trade Association, 
reprinted in Calcutta Trade Association, 1852, p. 287; cf. letter from the Chief Secretary to the Government of 
Bihar and Orissa, dated March 26 1926, National Archives of India, 1926 June; letter from Captain A. K. 
Comber, Principal Assistant Commissioner to Darrang to Col. F. Jenkins, Gent, Governor-General, dated 
October 20 1859, Government of Bengal, 1861, p. 21 
120 This was also the case for contracts between indigo planters and the peasants that sowed the indigo; see 
NADRI, 2016, p. 187. 
121 VARMA, 2017, p. 54–55; cf. GUHA, 1977, 15-16, 17; ANDERSON, 2004, p. 438. 
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this situation and also the advantage of giving advances, namely to secure and control 
labour,122 was not acknowledged by the petitioners. 
The association acted as change agent against the Act V as proslavery actor—although, 
they did not request the removal of the Act V or complain of the loss of slaves due to the act. 
Their requests were fully in the spirit of the outlined paradigms: Contracts underlined the 
ideology of work paradigm, as they requested the use of violence and coercive mechanisms to 
be legally legitimised. Still confronted with high veto possibilities that had played out earlier 
in the petition of 1846, these actors behaved like subversives, and their submission constituted 
an example of a layer123 used as a strategy, which did not attack the Act V of 1843, but 
undermined its spirit. 
The Calcutta Trade Association’s submission was debated in the Legislative Council 
in Calcutta in September 1858. The association had approached a member of the Legislative 
Council, E. Currie, on several occasions to present their petitions. Currie seemed sympathetic 
to their cause, arguing in the council that it truly was a fraud to take money in advance and 
“then wilfully [neglect] (…) the work.”124 Currie explained that employers were forced to 
give advances, and added: “It was the universal custom—and any manufacturer who 
attempted to break through it would find it impossible to obtain workmen. But if the workmen 
insisted on the preservation of this custom, it was but reasonable that their employers should 
be protected against its abuse.”125 Therefore, he suggested a reworked version of the draft act 
submitted earlier. 
In October 1858 the Breach of Contract by artificers, &o. was referred to a select 
committee,126 and in April 1859 it was again discussed in the Legislative Council.127 The 
member representing Bombay128 argued in favour of the bill and explained that “[i]f a person 
contracted to do work, and after receiving an advance of money wilfully failed to perform it, 
it was but reasonable to render him liable to punishment for his fraudulent conduct.”129 The 
committee proposed further amendments to the bill, such as extending the reach of the bill to 
contracts that were made orally, and also to contracts where no advances were made. Some of 
the council members argued against including other contracts that had not been based on an 
 
122 ANDERSON, 2004, p. 430–431. 
123 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 28. 
124 Legislative Council of India, 1858, p. 511. 
125 Legislative Council of India, 1858, p. 511. 
126 Legislative Council of India, 1858, 304, 567, 588. 
127 April 3 1859, Legislative Council of India, 1859, p. 298–300. 
128 KERR, 2004, p. 15. 
129 P. W. LeGeyt, April 3 1859, Legislative Council of India, 1859, p. 298. 
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advance payment and described the provided punishments as harsh and disproportionate.130 
The committee’s suggestion did not find a majority in the council and the Breach of Contract 
Act was adopted without further changes.131  
The adopted version of the WBCA of 1859 was in part copied from the submission of 
the Calcutta Trade Association, but did not fulfil its wishes completely: While the original 
submission called for up to twelve months in prison,132 the final version provided for 
imprisonment and hard labour for only up to three months when the worker failed to repay his 
or her debt. The adopted act was limited in its scope to three presidency towns,133 where most 
of the affected European manufacturers were located,134 but it was gradually extended, and 
practically applicable to the whole British Raj by 1865.135  
The WBCA effectively undermined the abolition of slavery.136 It bound individuals to 
their contractual promises, especially in the case of monetary advances.137 Running away 
became criminalised and could be sanctioned by criminal courts. Only in the case of total 
repayment of their debt were labourers free to leave. But criminal sanctions were only 
legitimately enforced when the worker did not follow the magistrate’s orders.138 None of the 
council members entertained the idea that there might be reasons on the side of the workers to 
default from contracts, or to provide respective remedies for the default on the side of the 
employer. The council failed to discuss the bodies that endured punishment and the suffering 
that came along with it, let alone the reasons for default or the actual truth to such allegations. 
The Governor-General assented to the Bill in May 1859.139 
Additional penal contracts were adopted in the following decades, especially in the 
provincial legislatures: In Assam, the Bengal Act III of 1863 allowed for penal sanctions for 
breach of contract. The Assam Contract Act of 1865 allowed for the private arrest of deserted 
 
130 Legislative Council of India, 1859, p. 298–300. 
131 KERR, 2004, p. 17. 
132 Calcutta Trade Association, 1852, p. 289; Legislative Council of India, May 5 1859, para. II. 
133 Madras, Calcutta and Bombay. 
134 Legislative Council of India, 1858, p. 511–512. 
135 MOHAPATRA, 2016, p. 227; ANDERSON, 2004, p. 431. 
136 In the following years, other legislations which I do not address in detail were: The Employers’ and 
Workmen’s (Disputes) Act (Act IX of 1860), practically, this act has not been used, KERR, 2004, 8, 17, 19; The 
Criminal Breach of Contract Act (Regulation I of 1040) of 1865 addressed British as well as Indian employers 
and their workers; The Criminal Tribes Act, 1871, was another back door that allowed the exploitation of 
singled-out groups, such as nomadic people. The Criminal Tribes Act of 1871 allowed for punishment and 
correctional measures by the extraction of forced labour of the so-called criminal tribes, RADHAKRISHNA, 1992, 
p. 193. 
137 ANDERSON, 2004, p. 432. 
138 ANDERSON, 2004, p. 437. 
139 April 3 1859, Legislative Council of India, 1859, p. 298–300; May 14 1859, Legislative Council of India, 
1859, p. 366. 
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coolies.140 The Bengal Council adopted the Act VI of 1865. In 1873 another act was passed 
that limited to the planter’s right to private arrest.141 Running private prisons was legally 
condoned by Section 195 of the Act VI of 1905 (repealed in 1910).142 And the Act I of 1882 
contained more provisions for the penalisation of breaches of contract for migrant labourers 
and provisions for the restoration of run-away coolies;143 the surrounding population became 
complicit in this act, as illustrated by the following quote from a newspaper clipping before 
1907: 
 
DEAR SIR - Two men, one very tall, over six feet, two women, and a child in arms, 
have been caught here, evidently runaways, but appear to be old coolies, if you should 
know of any garden who have lost any people tallying to the above description, kindly 
inform the manager without delay. Yours faithfully.144 
 
The British Indian Association145 met the adoption of this act with some criticism146 
expressing its discontent with the legal developments in Assam and, comparing the right to 
private arrest with slavery laws in the United States.147 The association repeatedly addressed 
the Governor-General of India via memorandum expressing their negative position towards 
the legal changes.148 The international Anti-Slavery Reporter wrote against the coolie labour 
in the Assam tea plantations.149 
Kling suggests that the sepoy mutiny, as well as the ‘blue mutiny’ of the indigo 
farmers, opened the door for the British to enact penal sanctions as punishment for any acts 
that put the British authority, including the authority of employers, into question.150 The 
timing supports this assumption. In the shadow of the indigo rebellion in 1859, the 
Government of India passed a temporary legislation criminalising the breach of contract for 
 
140 VARMA, 2017, p. 49. 
141 MOHAPATRA, 2016, p. 232–233. 
142 VARMA, 2017, p. 1–4; Assam Labour Enquiry Committee, 1906b, p. 1. 
143 VARMA, 2017, p. 85. 
144 Newspaper clippings collected by Reverend Charles Dowding, in IOR (L/PJ/6/832, File 3639), quoted in 
KOLSKY, 2010, p. 19–20. 
145 A representative organisation of Indian nationals to give voice to the Indian interest, founded in Bengal in 
1851, later also in Madras and Bombay, STEIN/ARNOLD, 2010, p. 243. 
146 VARMA, 2017, p. 59. 
147 VARMA, 2017, p. 87. 
148 Extract from the Abstract of the Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Governor-General of India, 
dated July 5 1882, referred to in VARMA, 2017, p. 85. 
149 ‘Flogging of coolies in Assam,’ The Anti-Slavery Reporter and Aborigines’ Friend, August 15 1867, 179, 
referred to in VARMA, 2017, p. 62. 
150 KLING, 1966, p. 66–67. A similar point is brought forward by Kerr, who argues that the resistance of workers 
at the railways, and the death of one officer, opened the door for the adoption of the Employers’ and Workmen’s 
(Disputes) Act (Act IX) of 1860, KERR, 2004, p. 14. 
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peasants tailored to indigo.151 From this perspective the mutiny of the sepoys and indigo 
farmers constituted a juncture—a moment in time that allowed for institutional changes that 
were backed by contemporary paradigms and colonial imperatives to secure the British 
position.152 Since even before India became the crown colony, presidencies experimented 
with penal contracts, the changes enacted by the WBCA were not radical.153 The mutiny had 
been an opportunity for the Calcutta Trade Association to demonstrate its loyalty to the 
EIC,154 and the adoption of the WBCA was possibly an expression of the government’s 
gratitude in return, not meant to alienate the British merchants in India. From the macro 
perspective of the state’s imperative towards the monopoly of violence, the workers’ 
resistance and the rebellion of the sepoys seriously put the claim of this monopoly and the 
legitimacy of colonial government into question. And while mutineers faced death penalty 
and transportation,155 the state restored its power over workers by instituting sanctions under 
master and servant laws. 
The actors of the trade association acted like subversives; although they did not have 
any veto power in the political arenas, their interests were understood in the Legislative 
Council. The adoption of the Breach of Contract Act constituted a form of gradual 
institutional change in the form of layering. This act and later similar acts did not remove the 
existing legislation against slavery, namely the Act V of 1843. By offering employers 
sanctioning mechanisms for the breaches of contract through state agents—the magistrates 
and the courts—the state undermined the potential intent of the abolition of slavery and 
reinvented it as a voluntary contractual relation. How bonded labour fit into the provisions of 
the WBCA and the Act V had yet to be determined in the courts. In theory, advances under 
bonded labour arrangement, could be legally sanctioned with the help of the WBCA. It was 
intended to control “artificers, workmen, and labourers,”156 but which professions were 
included and which not was also open for interpretation.157 
 
 
151 NADRI, 2016, p. 187. 
152 MANN, 2012, p. 193–194. 
153 ANDERSON, 2004, p. 428–429. 
154 DODD, 1859, p. 99. 
155GOPAL, 1965, p. 5. 
156 Legislative Council of India, May 5 1859. 
157 ANDERSON, 2004, p. 440. 
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The Indian Penal Code, 1860 
Shortly after the Workman’s Breach of Contract Act came into force, the IPC was enacted, 
even though it had been initiated almost three decades earlier.158 In 1835 the Indian Law 
Commission under Thomas Babington (T. B.) Macaulay was formed and began to work on 
the IPC, and they submitted the first draft to the British Parliament by 1837.159 Because Indian 
civil law was founded upon Hindu and Muslim law, which, according to British 
interpretation, legally sanctioned slavery,160 the only venue through which the British could 
attack slavery was through criminal law.161 The process of development and adoption of the 
code took a long time, and due to the Indian rebellion in 1857 the final adoption of the IPC 
was postponed. In January 1862, the IPC came into force four years after the British Crown 
had taken over the governing power from the East India Company.162 
Four sections of the IPC, which are fully reprinted in the Appendix, concerned 
slavery: 
 
Sec. 367: “Kidnapping or abducting in order to subject person to grievous hurt, 
slavery, etc. (…)”; 
Sec. 370: “Buying or disposing of any person as a slave (…).” 
Sec. 371: “Habitual dealing in slaves (…).” 
Sec. 374: “Unlawful Compulsory Labour (…).”163 
 
The trade in slaves became a criminal offence on January 1, 1862 and the IPC applied to 
British nationals and to Indian subjects alike. And while the IPC neither emancipated nor 
liberated the victims of enslavement,164 all four IPC sections on slavery offered punishment 
for slavery. Until independence, the IPC was applicable to the British Raj, as well as the 
princely states under suzerainty,165 and is still operational today. 
The institution of the abolition of slavery did not become much stronger with the 
adoption of the IPC. It does not offer a definition of slavery; Sec. 374’s limitation “against the 
will of that person” underlines the interpretation that the IPC did not encompass bonded 
 
158 Two provisions in the Penal Code sanctioned the breaches of contract: Sec. 490, “Breach of contract of 
service during a voyage or journey;” Sec. 492, “Breach of a contract to serve at a distant place to which the 
servant is conveyed at the master’s expense.” The provisions were limited in scope and only for the protection of 
Anglo-Indians; these sections were invoked less often than the WBCA in criminal proceedings and contracts, 
ANDERSON, 2004, 430, 433, 436 
159 RAMAN, 1994, p. 763. 
160 British orientalists identified sanctions of slavery in Hindu and Muslim scriptures, CASSELS, 1988, p. 62–64. 
161 CASSELS, 2010, 198, 236. 
162 HARDGRAVE/KOCHANEK, 2008. 
163 Legislative Council of India, October 6 1860. 
164 MAJOR, 2012, p. 9. 
165 SANKARAN, 2007, 1, footnote 3. 
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labour and practically allowed for slavery as long as it was entered into voluntarily. No 
‘normatively backed rights that needed active enforcement’166 arose from the IPC Sections 
367, 370, 371 and 374.167 But the IPC as a whole designated agents in charge of enforcing the 
new law: the executive, the magistrates,168 the police and the criminal courts.169 Offences 
committed under the four IPC sections were classified as cognisable, could be executed 
without the warrant of a court, and applied to everyone residing in India.170 The IPC did not 
remove but rather reinforced existing rules and changed the enactment of the old rules: The 
institutional logic from desisting to enforce rights of others over slaves was changed towards 
active enforcement. Therefore, the abolition of slavery in India experienced a “course 
correction”171 with the IPC, and clearly became an institution as defined by Streeck and 
Thelen.172 
Theoretically, the adoption of the WBCA of 1859 constituted a layer in the form of an 
additional law on top of the existing Act V, undermining its spirit. The IPC, on the other hand, 
constituted a layer on top of the Act V to support it. Table 8 summarises the two policies and 
indicates whether the institution of the abolition of slavery changed and if there continued to 
be a low or high level of discretion in interpreting the institution. 
Table 8. Characteristics of the formal institution, 1862 
Law Definition Bonded labour Timeline Punishment Rehabilitation 
Competent 
authorities 
Act V, 
1843 
No N.A. No No No No 
IPC, 1862 No No Yes  Yes No Yes 
 
The discretion of interpretation was high, and, as developed above, both laws did 
criminalise slavery, but without emancipating slaves—no rights arose from these legislative 
provisions. The Act V granted a high level of interpretation and implementation of its rules, 
since it basically did not indicate a definition of slavery, nor specify who should execute and 
oversee its implementation. The IPC also did not give a definition of slavery but specified the 
punishment, fine and imprisonment, in the case of a violation. With only three provisions, the 
 
166 STREECK/THELEN, 2005b, p. 12. 
167 DONNELLY, 2013, p. 42–43. 
168 IPC Sec. 369. 
169 MISRA, 1970, p. 538–539. 
170 Legislative Council of India, 1861, Sec. 25. 
171 ROCCO/THURSTON, 2014, p. 45. 
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discretion of interpretation was high, particularly as the question of defining slavery was 
open. The WBCA could be read as to support bonded labour arrangements and offered 
employers a venue to legally enforce contracts. In the following paragraphs I outline how the 
IPC and the WBCA were enforced on the ground. 
 
Enforcement 
The Law Commission Reports of 1841 testified to the existence of bonded labour,173 and other 
authors argued that bonded labour was already wide spread before the EIC reached Indian 
shores.174 Prakash argues that with the adoption of the Act V, the recourse to bonded labour 
increased175—this remains to be empirically and statistically proven.176 The work of Prakash 
is not sufficient to support the causal relationship, since he also concedes that bonded labour 
existed before Act V.177 The yearly reports of the presidencies depict evidence that bonded 
labour existed. But, there has been no systematic research on the reflection of slavery in the 
official reports of the British Raj, probably because these reports were not prepared in a 
uniform manner and therefore do not lend themselves to an easy comparison. Regarding the 
implementation through the judicial system, the criminal reports, with the exception for the 
Punjab, the data collected during 1867 to 1940 on criminal proceedings and convictions are 
not disaggregated.178 Some evidence, however, demonstrates that there were cases of slavery 
and forced labour under the IPC tried in the lower courts: In 1889 the yearly report of the 
Bengal Presidency recorded 569 alleged cases of kidnapping, forcible abduction, slavery or 
forced labour. Of these, 335 had been found true and 291 were brought to trial in the year 
1889. The Census of India on the Punjab and NFP (Northwest Frontier Province) of 1901 
recorded cases of bonded labour in the carpet industry.179 The author of the report did not 
make any reference to bonded labour or slavery but spoke of “the system of advances”180 and 
the debts that were transferred to the new employer, in case the labourer chose to leave. The 
report indicates that the majority of labourers were unable to redeem their debt and remained 
bonded throughout their life.181 
 
173 Indian Law Commission, January 15 1841a, 63-71, 126, 153, 158-59. 
174 STANZIANI, 2018, p. 70. 
175 PRAKASH, 1993, p. 136; KLEIN, 2005, p. 184. 
176 The same applies to the WBCA, TEMPERLEY, 2000b, p. 183. 
177 See the work of Prakash, PRAKASH, 1993, p. 136. 
178 ANDERSON, 2004, p. 450. 
179 ROSE/Census Commissioner, 1902, p. 368–369. 
180 ROSE/Census Commissioner, 1902, p. 369. 
181 ROSE/Census Commissioner, 1902, p. 369. 
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Anderson collected the numbers of prosecutions for violations of the IPC Sections 370 
to 374 by scanning through the Reports on the Administration of Criminal Justice in the 
Lower Provinces of Bengal and Punjab, between the years 1879 and 1902. He found the 
following numbers for the Lower Provinces of Bengal on record: Between the years 1878 and 
1902, there were approximately two to three convictions listed yearly for violations of 
Sections 370 and 371, and altogether 53 conviction for violations of Section 374. In Punjab, 
the criminal records indicated about six convictions under Sections 374, and two to three 
convictions under Sections 370 and 371 per year for the period between 1867 and 1940.182 
Compared to the estimates of slavery or bonded labour given in table 1 in the introductory 
chapter, the numbers of reported cases and convictions above seem to be relatively low. This 
is probably also because most cases would not be decided by the courts, but were dealt with 
by magistrates. But the enforcement situation was also highly contingent on the geographical 
location. In Assam, for instance, labour legislation and respective interpretation and 
implementation were left to the discretion of the tea planters, simply because there were not 
enough magistrates stationed.183 
The WBCA was ultimately used all over India to coerce labourers to work.184 
Employers often gave advances to bring workers under the purview of the WBCA.185 Kerr 
observes that the WBCA was invoked to threaten workers with criminal punishment and 
successfully coerced workers into obedience.186 In the reports of the presidencies there is 
evidence of convictions based on the Act XIII, but the reports do not reveal much detail on the 
specific circumstances of the cases: In 1889 the report of the Bengal presidency indicated that 
96 reports of criminal breaches of contract had been received and 30 had been put on trial.187 
Historians generally finding that the WBCA was used extensively.188 One aspect that later 
became the entry point for criticism of the penal sanctioning of breaches of contract by 
policymakers, commissioners and scholars,189 was the subversion of the Workman’s Breach of 
Contract Act by employers: The act was often used to induce workers to do as they were told, 
 
182 ANDERSON, 2004, p. 450. 
183 VARMA, 2017, p. 61–66, Administration of the Bengal Presidency, 1867, p. 120. 
184 MOHAPATRA, 2016, p. 227–228. 
185 VARMA, 2017, p. 73; SIDDIQI, 1983, p. 369; Emperor v. Namdeo Sakhgaram, Bombay High Court, November 
30 1909. 
186 KERR, 2004, 19, footnote 52. 
187 Government of Bengal, 1890, 541, 543. 
188 KERR, 2004, p. 8; VARMA, 2011, p. 48. 
189 Cf. N. M. Joshi, Central Legislative Assembly, 1921a, p. 229; Government of Assam, 1922, p. 75; KERR, 
2004, p. 23–24.  
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with the sheer threat of the application of the WBCA.190 Indigo farmers’ petitions to the 
Governor of Bengal testified to the collaboration of magistrates with the planters to use the 
Act XIII as means of coercion.191 In a court ruling of 1909 the judge remarked that the 
payment given was “so grossly inadequate as to suggest that the so-called advance was 
merely a device for bringing the contract within the act.”192 In many written contracts, a 
reference to the WPCA was included: Figure 6 shows a template form for a penal contract as 
published in 1909: 
Figure 6. Agreement form under the Workman’s Breach of Contract Act 
 
Figure 6, Agreement form under the Workman’s Breach of Contract Act. Source: BALD, 1908 [1903], 
p. 231–322, originally printed in SINHA/DUTT, 1899. Note: Blank form of agreement under the 
Workman’s Breach of Contract Act. It is unclear how widely these agreements were used. 
 
The case of tea production in Assam is one example that highlights the enforcement of 
the WBCA and its regional variants. By the 1860s, and with the tea boom since 1865,193 the 
plantation owners began to draw the necessary labour force from outside of Assam. The so-
called coolies194 were transported from Bengal, and South and Central India to Assam.195 The 
 
190 Mohapatra refers to an employer who testified to the self-reinforcing power of the WBCA, MOHAPATRA, 
2016, p. 229. 
191 Petitions of 1859, printed in PUNEKAR/VARICKAYIL, 1989, p. 2–6; Government of Bengal, 1860, p. 392–393. 
192 Emperor v. Namdeo Sakhgaram, Bombay High Court, November 30 1909; cf. ANDERSON, 2004, 433, 
footnote 60. 
193 BEHAL/MOHAPATRA, 1992, p. 145. 
194 On the origin of the term coolie, cf. TINKER, 1974, p. 41–43; SHARMA, 2009, p. 1306. 
195 SHARMA, 2009, 1288, 1289, 1293, 1296, 1303. 
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British tea planters and the Government of India cooperated to facilitate the transportation of 
the coolies. The conditions of transport and work were so bad that, between 1863 and 1866, 
35,000 of the 85,000 workers who were transported to Assam had either died or deserted.196 
Wages paid for the work on the tea plantations were generally lower than remuneration paid 
outside the plantation system. The coolies were recruited from other Indian states, given an 
advance and transported to the tea plantations in Assam—following the system of indentured 
labour.197 Conditions on the tea plantations were marked by violence: Coolies were closely 
controlled; when they ran away they were hunted down by the planters’ dogs or the local 
population, and physically punished.198 Coolies were foreign to the Assam hills, did not speak 
the language and had no knowledge of the terrain. With a head money of Rs. 5 in addition, 
desertion of labourers was doomed to fail; or it often ended with death in the jungle.199 The 
dislocation of the individual, which made it so hard to run-away, was an intended feature of 
transporting the labour force to other places.200 Poverty and recurring famines placed 
immense pressure on the population: Destitute people were easy recruits for the plantations. 
Under those conditions, planters could afford the inhumane treatment of the workers which 
continued until the turn of the century.201 
The image reprinted on the title page202 depicts a scene photographed in 1910. In the 
front, dressed in white and equipped with a shikar helmet against the burning sun, are the tea 
planters or their subordinates. They are surrounded by the tea plantation workers, mostly 
women and children,203 but also men. The picture very likely shows workers who were 
transported from other parts of India to Assam to work on the tea plantations.204 Many of 
them probably were bound to the plantation by the WBCA or other penal contracts: By the 
year 1891, 40 percent of the migrant labourers in Assam were bound by the WBCA, 55 
percent of the workers could face penal sanctions under the Labour Districts Emigration Act I 
 
196 MOHAPATRA, 2016, p. 232. 
197 CASTLE/HAGAN/WELLS, 2007, p. 96. 
198 SHARMA, 2009, p. 1308–1309; EDGAR, 1873, xxii. Sharma reiterates anecdotal archival evidence according to 
which workers were whipped, and salt poured on the wounds. Female workers were punished by pepper being 
rubbed into their genitalia. Another anecdotal account testifies that dogs were used to hunt runaway tea 
labourers, SHARMA, 2009, p. 1308–1309.  
199 EDGAR, 1873, xxii; SHARMA, 2009, p. 1308; GHOSH, 1999, p. 39–42. 
200 GHOSH, 1999, p. 39–42. 
201 SHARMA, 2009, p. 1309. 
202 Author unknown/The Graphic, p. 573. 
203 Tea plucking was conducted mostly by women, Labour Investigation Committee, 1946, p. 36; TINKER, 1974, 
p. 30. 
204 Indentured labour contracts were enforced in Assam until 1915, MOHAPATRA, 2004, p. 455. 
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(1882).205 In the case of Reg. v. Gaub Gorah Cacharee & others,206 the court clarified that 
advances made to coolie labourers in Assam fell within the purview of the WBCA of 1859. 
The following table indicates the number of criminal cases against tea plantation workers in 
Assam between the years 1899 and 1926: 
Table 9. Criminal records of breaches of contract, Assam tea gardens, 1899 to 1926 
Year Cases Convictions Imprisonments 
1887 N.A. 87 N.A. 
1899 418 149 34 
1907-1908 1115 523 74 
1913-1914 1192 370 111 
1920-1921 1604 278 63 
1925-1926 67 29 N.A. 
Source: Data based on the Assam Labour Reports, collected by and derived from DAS, 1931, 57, 58. 
Note: The entry ‘Imprisonments’ for 1899 includes fines. 
 
Compared to the number of newly recruited migrants to the Assam tea plantations, 
with a yearly average of 70,000 people between 1909 to 1921,207 the rate of cases, convictions 
and prosecutions appears rather small. This can be explained by underreporting of cases and 
use of force by the planters themselves. Located at the border of the British Raj, and the land 
for the plantations only recently grabbed, between the 1850s and 1860s, there was not a 
sufficient number of magistrates installed on the ground. The interpretation of the WBCA was 
left to the discretion of the tea planters. They stretched the boundaries of available punishment 
and deterrence strategies against their labourers. Practices such as hanging runaway labourers 
from a tree and flogging them, in some cases resulting in death, caused a scandal and public 
debate,208 and were not sanctioned by the law. 
But coolies were also able to turn the provisions of the Act XIII to their advantage, as 
far as it is possible to speak of advantage: Varma describes cases at the tea plantations, where 
workers turned themselves into prison for breaches of contract in order to cease the contracts 
they had committed to. The act provided that if the punishment was executed and 
imprisonment served, labourers were free afterwards to either continue to work under the 
contract or to return to their place of origin.209 Labour conditions were so bad that labourers 
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often chose to serve prison time over continuing to work on the plantations.210 Labourers 
responded to maltreatment by plantation owners with tactics of resistance, among them flight, 
self-mutilation and, even though rare, collective protest and assault against the managers and 
overseers.211 These forms of resistance were met with punishment by physical violence and/or 
internment.212 
In 1906 and 1921 the Government of Assam published the reports of the Labour 
Enquiry Committees on the labour conditions on the tea plantations.213 While reporting on 
and criticising abuses based on the Act XIII of 1859, the report of 1921 does not use any 
terminology that might relate the observed and reported labour exploitations in terms of 
slavery or forced labour—the authors used the term ‘indenture.’214 They showed that 
convictions of labourers based on the Breach of Contract Act declined, but they observed that 
there was still a wide abuse of the WBCA to the disadvantage of the labourers.215 
 
1860-1919 
The British Indian Association submitted memoranda to the Governor-General to complain, 
for instance, about the extension of breaches of contract legislation in Assam.216 Peasants and 
farmers also submitted petitions, but probably only the better-off peasants.217 The Indian press 
demonstrated its concern regarding labour exploitation. There were also expressions of 
superiority of the Assamese elite and disgust towards the imported labour force of the coolies 
in the 1880s.218 Indians were also divided among each other. The revolt of the indigo farmers 
in 1857 was followed by a large resonance in the public, and the plight of the indigo workers 
was re-enacted in public plays, such as Neel Darpan (or Nil Darpan—The Mirror of Indigo), 
written by Dinabandhu Mitra and published in 1860.219 From the 1870s on, the Bengal 
vernacular press reported on the new forms of slavery on the tea plantations220 and 
Dwarkanath Ganguli’s Slavery and British Dominion221 exposed the violence on the tea 
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plantation and the experience of the workers.222 But soon enough British censorship curtailed 
press publications from reporting on forced labour and slavery in India, be it instances of 
slavery or forced labour, or publications expressing the injustice of colonialism in terms of the 
enslavement of the Indian people as a whole. In 1907 the Chief Court of Punjab decided the 
Panjabee Case, a periodical paper that had been prosecuted for two articles, one of them 
addressing the issue of forced labour and begar. The article titled ‘How Misunderstandings 
Occur’ indicated that a case of begar pressed by a British official had led to the death of two 
villagers. The court sentenced the editor K. K. Athvala to imprisonment.223 
Established in 1885, the Indian National Congress adopted its first resolution 
concerning slavery in India in 1893, calling  
 
[t]hat the Government of India be moved, once and for all, to put a stop by new and 
express legislation (the existing provisions of the Penal Code having proved 
inoperative) to the existing oppressive system of forced labour (known as Begar) (…) 
which, despite numerous resolutions of the Government of India, are still prevalent 
through India.224 
 
The INC also discussed the issue of poverty and bonded labour in agriculture, describing 
bonded labourers as “bond slaves.”225 The INC’s focus was on the injustice experienced by 
coolie labourers, in particularly the killing of a coolie by a planter which caused an 
upheaval.226 By the year 1895, the Breach of Contract Act was discussed as a legal tool in 
contravention to the abolition of slavery at the INC, which published on the topic and 
positioned itself towards the issue: The adoption of the abolition of bonded labour became 
one of the goals of a future Indian constitution.227 
But the INC also had trouble representing the interest of the Indian population, 
particularly the poor and lower castes. As an elitist organisation, the founders of the INC had 
all been male, journalists or lawyers, university and Western educated.228 And even in 1917, 
during the visit of Gandhi and other activists in the village Champaran, the distance between 
the nationalist movement and the village population was unsurmountable, as Kripalani 
explained: 
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In those days such was our nationalism that we did not know what was really 
happening in the villages. We, the educated, lived more or less an isolated life. Our 
world was confined to the cities and to our fraternity of the educated. Our contact with 
the masses was confined to our servants, and yet we talked of the masses and were 
anxious to free the country from foreign yoke!229 
 
Gandhi was the first leader of the independence movement who condemned the bonded 
labour system in Gujarat.230 And while labour resistance had independently occurred before 
and after the turn of the century, Gandhi’s satyagraha in Champaran was not only a test drive 
for instigating the non-cooperation movement on a large scale, but also an acknowledgement 
of the vast number of people in the countryside who could be mobilised and their grievances 
channelled through the mass mobilisation against the British colonial power.231 
With changes to the composition of the Legislative Council and the admission of an 
increasing number of Indian representatives, the air around slavery, forced labour, bonded 
labour, and the WBCA began to change: The Government of India Act of 1909 placed 
increasing pressure on the Government of India, and the government adopted some 
adjustments to the WBCA.232 Simultaneously, since the 1860s, the Government of India 
became increasingly disinclined to support indigo planters’ behaviour that would embarrass 
the colonial state in the eyes of the Indian population and international community.233 In 1908 
and 1909 the indigo farmers stood up against the demands of the indigo planters and the 
Government of India backed down. The Lieutenant General E. N. Baker explained in 1909 
that “if indigo cannot subsist without coercion, indigo must perish.”234 He wondered why this 
revolt had not taken place sooner, with the enquiry report showing that the payments to indigo 
farmers were not remunerative.235 This statement depicts the internal conflict between the 
British ruling elite and the British nationals residing and doing business in India. It also 
exemplifies that British colonial rule was not enacted by a monolithic entity, but a dominating 
society that itself was divided along lines of gender and class.236 But Baker’s statement also 
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depicts the different position towards the producers of a cash crop that was doomed to end by 
the time of the revolt,237 and tea that experienced a continuous increase in production.238 
In 1917, the Indian national movement became involved in the indigo conflict, and the 
issue shifted from a struggle of labourers fighting for better working conditions into a struggle 
against the colonial power. As in earlier occasions, the lowest classes were initially absent 
from the revolt; it was the well-to-do indigo farmers who were in conflict with the planters’ 
demands and coercive measures, such as private arrest.239 The conflict rekindled with the 
resistance of indigo farmers and large tenant holders of higher castes, Brahmin, Mahajan and 
Bania, who rose to be the leaders of the movement against the planters.240 In April 1917, 
Gandhi went to Champaran where the indigo disturbances began and initiated the Champaran 
Satyagraha. But the movement managed to integrate the whole peasantry, including poor 
agriculturalists.241 The Government of India adopted a special act for this region, the 
Champaran Agrarian Act of 1918, which prohibited, among others, forcing famers to grow 
indigo. With the end of World War I and after securing the information on the synthetic 
indigo production from defeated Germany, Great Britain was able to produce its own 
synthetic indigo. Eventually, after the war,242 the Government of India dropped the production 
of indigo, since the “Champaran indigo tracts had become the symbol of colonial exploitation 
and a stage for the enactment by Gandhi of erasure of a political and moral wrongdoing.”243 
The increasing number of representatives at the Central Legislative Assembly and 
Council of States allowed for the active involvement of Indians in the legislative process since 
1909. In 1917 M. M. Malaviya, member of the Indian Industrial Commission, and private 
member of the Imperial Legislative Council,244 suggested the removal of the Act XIII of 1859. 
The majority of the provincial governments opposed this proposal,245 which, in the case of 
Assam and Madras, reflected the economic interests of the tea plantation owners.246 Malaviya, 
repeating his request in 1919, hinted at the upcoming International Labour Conference, 
implying that the conflict of the WBCA and penal contracts were expected to be criticised 
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there.247 The continued control of labour by penal contracts, in Malaviya’s argument, would 
draw negative attention to British India.248 He was actively seeking to change the institution 
via displacement. But his request did not effect any further moves from the side of the 
government. Also, at the provincial level, for instance in the Provincial Legislative Council of 
Bihar and Orissa, one member repeatedly pointed at problems regarding the treatment of 
labour.249 At the other end of the political and public arena was the judicial arena, which 
treated cases of bonded labour as well as slavery, and which I discuss in the following 
subchapter. 
 
The Judiciary and Magistrates 
The Indian Hight Courts Act of 1861 established the High Courts at Bombay, Calcutta, 
Madras and the North-Western Provinces (NWP), the latter being established in Agra in 1866 
and moved to Allahabad in 1875. They became the highest courts of appeal and only the Privy 
Council in London could overrule the decisions of the high courts in India.250 It was upon 
them to interpret the meaning of the Act V, the IPC and the WPCA.251 The following cases 
have been referred to in law reports, or were used and referred to as guiding principles for 
judicial decisions. India was, and still is, ruled by common law and judicial precedent, which 
“gave the courts a quasi-legislative power.”252 Precedents were meant to guide future 
decisions within the same jurisdiction, but it was also possible that judgments were not 
collected in the court reports and were not referred to in later cases.253 Case law was limited to 
the jurisdiction of the respective high court, which means that a decision of the High Court at 
Bombay was not binding to the High Court at Calcutta. Nonetheless, the courts referred to 
each other’s decisions.254 
The case law is interesting for this analysis, because the courts occupied a core 
position in producing institutional change or defending the status quo. Since the IPC and the 
Act V were weak, the discretion of interpretation did inherently carry the potential for change. 
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In the following paragraphs, I discuss several selected court cases that are either relevant 
because they were rulings concerning the interpretation of the definition of slavery according 
to the IPC and the Act V, or because they were concerned with clear cases of bonded labour 
and therefore highlight how the courts treated this particular kind of labour exploitation. 
There were many cases under the WBCA and I draw inferences from Anderson’s chapter.255 
 
Case Law  
The first relevant trial was heard in 1863, in which the Calcutta High Court dismissed the case 
Bissonauth Chowdhree v. Bonomally.256 The plaintiff Bissonauth tried to enforce his 
customary rights to services from the family of the accused, as well as the descendants.257 
This claim was declined at the lower judicial level and Bissonauth appealed. The judges 
Kemp and Campbell at the high court rejected the case, arguing that customary rights can be 
treated as contract, and explained that customary rights to service over one person are 
unenforceable since the Act V prohibits slavery.258 The dismissal is interesting, since for the 
court the concept of customary rights of service was sufficient to reject the claim of the 
plaintiff and to bring it into the purview of slavery.  
In 1871 the judges Turner and Turnball sat over the appellate case Queen v. Mirza 
Sikundur Bukhut. Mirza was on trial because he had bought the kidnapped girl Musumat 
Paigya, thirteen years old; she was sexually exploited by Mirza’s son and used as a house 
keeper, without payment of wages.259 After four years Musumat escaped and was found by 
the police, who convicted Mirza under IPC Section 368,260 370 and 373,261 and sentenced him 
to two years prison and a fine of Rs. 250.262 The judges explained that: 
 
It is urged that to constitute a person [as] a slave, not only must liberty of action be 
denied to him, but a right asserted to dispose of his life, his labour and property. It is 
true that a condition of absolute slavery would be so defined, but slavery is a condition 
which admits of degrees. A person is treated as a slave if another asserts an absolute 
right to restrain his personal liberty, and to dispose of his labour against his will, 
unless that right is conferred by law, as in the case of a parent, or guardian, or a jailor 
(…).263 
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In fact, the judges argued that not only the de jure condition, but also the de facto condition 
proved that the situation of Musumat compared to slavery. Furthermore, the judges remarked 
that the working relation of Musumat was a wide spread phenomenon in India; the judges 
were informed that children were sold and used as servants in private households. They 
concluded that “[t]hese children are practically slaves, and it cannot be too widely known that 
their condition is such as will not be tolerated by English law, and that persons who detain 
them in their houses are liable to punishment under the Penal Code.”264 
In the eyes of the judge, the use of children as domestic servants amounted in any case 
to slavery. Thereby they rejected earlier notions of the legality of slavery as long as it was 
‘benign’265 and invalidated the idea that slavery functions as poor law.266 The court upheld the 
conviction of Mirza under the IPC Section 370, by arguing that there was an absence of free 
will, since the person involved was a child. The ruling in this case stands out when compared 
to similar cases; regarding the rulings of the courts on WBCA cases, Anderson observed that 
the judges willingly disregarded the contents of the contracts, arguing that both parties to a 
contract—the employer and the worker—knew of the conditions, and that the worker 
willingly consented to the contract. Therefore, the workers were also liable for breaches of the 
contract, even if they were unfair.267 Consequently, the judges might have decided differently 
in the case of Mirza, if the person had entered the condition of slavery by free will, and was 
not underaged. 
A few months later, the judge Mitter observed in The Queen v. Firman Ali that the IPC 
did not offer a definition of slavery, and he explained in December 1871 that the female 
household slave, called bandhi, did not meet the legal requirements to constitute slavery. He 
suggested that “[t]he definition of slavery according to Blackstone is that “Civil relation in 
which one man possesses absolute power over the life, liberty, and fortune of another.”” He 
interpreted the reach of the anti-slavery sections of the IPC to concern the transportation of 
slaves from other countries. Mitter concluded:  
 
In India itself, although the treatment which some unfortunate receive at the hands of 
their master may well entitle them to be regarded as slaves, there is no such thing as 
slavery proper (…). [T]he position of the woman Abidulnissa is by no means unique, 
and that if Firman Ali is liable under Section 370 (…) for his treatment of her as a 
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slave, every Mussulman in the country who possesses a “Bandhi” is liable to a 
criminal prosecution.268 
 
Judge Gover supported the decision not to apply Section 370 and the order of the Deputy 
Magistrate was reversed. It is noteworthy that the Deputy Magistrate of Perozepore had 
convicted Firman for using his household servant Abidulnissa as slave based on the IPC. The 
judge took recourse to the Blackstone commentary269 to define slavery, as well as his own 
interpretation that the intention of the IPC was actually related to human trafficking across the 
borders of countries. Contrary to Chatterjee’s evaluation of this judgment,270 the session judge 
did not deny that the term bandhi translated as slave, or that the condition of Abidulnissa 
constituted slavery. He agreed that the treatment of Abidulnissa compared to slavery, and that 
the term bandhi translated as “slave girl.”271 But without legal sanction, slavery could not be 
“slavery proper,”272 and, therefore, offered a verdict quite the opposite from Mirza (1871) in 
which the conviction of the appellant was upheld. Contrary to Turner and Turnbull in Mirza 
(1871), he made the argument that this case could not constitute slavery since it was de jure 
not sanctioned. From this angle, the IPC poses an oxymoron: It requires a legal sanction for a 
relation that is deemed illegal and therefore impossible to be punished.273 This case 
demonstrates the trouble of interpretation, but also reveals the political dimension, in that the 
judge decided to refrain from exercising “quasi-legislative power”274 through which every 
Muslim household with a slave girl would have been affected. 
In the case of Empress of India v. Ram Kuar, decided on March 8 1880, the court 
reversed the decision of a lower court that had convicted Ram under the IPC Section 370. 
Ram was accused of having sold the girl Deoki to his brother as a slave. The judges of the 
Allahabad High Court renounced his conviction and explained that the exchange of money 
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and a buffalo was not payment because Ram’s brother intended to marry Deoki.275 The 
Allahabad High Court, referring to Mirza (1871), reiterated the meaning of the Act V of 1843. 
Judge S. J. Stuart defined slavery as follows: 
 
A slave is a creature without any rights or any status whatsoever, who is or may 
become the property of another as a mere chattel, the owner having absolute power of 
disposal by sale, gift, or otherwise, and even of life or death, over the slave, without 
being responsible to any legal authority. Such is the determinate and fixed condition of 
the slave, and it is not, as ruled in the above case [Mirza (1871)], a condition capable 
of degrees.276 
 
The judge followed the definition of chattel slavery and declined to follow the ruling in Mirza 
(1871). Regarding the scope of the IPC Section 370, the judge acceded that “it is exceedingly 
difficult to understand what is meant to be intended by s. 370.”277 He concluded that it only 
applied in cases where a person was forced into the condition of slavery, or in cases where the 
treatment of the labourer was “inconsistent with the idea of the person so treated being free as 
to his property, services, or conduct, in any respect.”278 One of the members of the bench, 
Judge Oldfield, argued that the IPC Sections against slavery  
 
were enacted for the suppression of slavery not only in its strict and proper sense, viz., 
that condition whereby an absolute and unlimited power is given to the master over the 
life, fortune and liberty of another, but in any modified form where an absolute power 
[was] asserted over the liberty of another.279 
 
Judge Stuart, on the other hand, argued that there could not have been a case of slavery 
because slavery in India stood abolished by the Act V of 1843.280 While observing the 
transaction and the exploitation of Deoki, the judges agreed that because Ram’s brother 
intended to marry her, this case did not constitute slavery and the conviction of Ram was 
overturned.281 
In the case Madan Mohan Biswas v. Queen Empress (1892), already referred to in the 
introduction, the bench of judges at the Calcutta High Court was confronted with a case of 
debt bondage on a tea plantation. The defendant was accused of having not payed his 
employees, but instead, were indebted to him, but allowed to live on his premises and also 
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given food. He physically punished the complainants when they refused to work, confined 
them during the night and did not allow the workers to leave the plantation.282 The court 
struggled with the case and sought the opinion of several members of the bench and finally 
decided as follows: The conviction of the appellant by the magistrate and Deputy 
Commissioner based on the IPC Section 374 was upheld, while the conviction by the 
commissioner under Section 370 of the IPC was rejected. The judge reiterated that the 
accused had given the labourers advances which virtually never diminished and thereby 
forced the workers to remain in his debt. These advances also formed the basis for the 
conviction. The accused had kept the labourers under close watch in coolie-lines283 and 
physically assaulted them.284 The fact that most of the plaintiffs were women seemed to 
devalue the victims’ testimony in the eyes of the judges:285 One of the judges ignored their 
statement of the violent means with which Madan had treated them. Disregarding the fact that 
they had inherited the debts of their husbands, he explained that the workers had voluntarily 
entered the bonded labour relation and, therefore, Madan was not guilty of an offence under 
IPC Section 374.286 But with the majority of the judges agreeing that the labourers were 
compelled to work against their will, Madan was convicted under IPC Section 374. He had to 
serve one year of imprisonment and pay a fine of Rs. 500.287 This is one rare case, where a tea 
planter was convicted for the abuses committed against the plantation workers. Since a 
judicial double-standard prevailed in the system, tea planters of British origin, who 
constituted the large majority,288 were usually not prosecuted.289 This case was probably only 
possible, because, as the name of the defendant indicates, the accused was an Indian. 
In 1909 the High Court of Bombay sat over a summary decision in Emperor v. 
Namdeo Sakharam on five differently filed cases under the Breach of Contract Act, submitted 
by one magistrate. The court held that “[i]t is quite plain that the powers conferred on 
Magistrates, and the advantages given to employers by this Act can, unless great care is 
exercised, be used to interfere with the free competition of labour to secure adequate 
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wages.”290 The court even presumed that the rather meagre advances in combination with the 
payment of wages were actually made on purpose for those labour relationships to fall under 
the Breach of Contract Act.291 In the estimation of the court, the act was created to cover 
advances of wages, but in the present case the advances made were “in reality a debt.”292 
Since neither the terms of the contract were known, nor could it be proven that the labourers 
had entered the contract voluntarily, the cases were dismissed.293 Similarly, in 1913, the 
District Magistrate of Shahpur in Punjab, Major O’Brien, explained that contracts under the 
Act XIII constituted “a modified form of slavery.”294 
Some judges did make use of the discretion of interpretation, as the following 
examples demonstrate. Bansi had borrowed Rs. 13 from Ram Sarup and left him without 
repaying the principal. He also failed to repay the interest that was stipulated in the contract 
that would apply if Bansi did not complete the period for which he was bound to work for 
Ram Sarup.295 Subsequently, Ram Sarup filed a suit against Bansi to recover the principal as 
well as interest. The Munsif,296 alarmed by a government report but convinced that Bansi’s 
case did not constitute a “slavery bond,”297 referred the case to the High Court requesting 
guidance on how to evaluate the case before him.298 Judge Coxe explained in Ram Sarup 
Bhagat v. Bansi Mandar (1915):299 
 
It binds down the executant to daily attendance and manual labour until a certain sum 
is repaid in a certain month and penalises default with overwhelming interest. It is 
remarkable that the suit, which is brought on this bond, is not contested, and this, in 
the Munsif’s opinion, is probably due to the fact that the executor is too poor to defend 
himself. Such a condition is indistinguishable from slavery, and such a contract is, in 
our opinion, opposed to public policy and not enforceable.300 
 
With this argument, it was sufficient that the interest rate in effect, as the Munsif observed, 
bound consecutive generations of bonded labourers to the families they served.301 It was not 
an issue whether or not the contract was entered voluntarily. Furthermore, by referring to the 
poverty of the labourer, the judge invoked external factors that contributed to the effect that 
 
290 Emperor v. Namdeo Sakhgaram, Bombay High Court, November 30 1909. 
291 ANDERSON, 2004, p. 433. 
292 Emperor v. Namdeo Sakhgaram, Bombay High Court, November 30 1909. 
293 Emperor v. Namdeo Sakhgaram, Bombay High Court, November 30 1909. 
294 Report on the Administration of Criminal Justice in the Punjab, 1913, quoted in ANDERSON, 2004, p. 447. 
295 Ram Sarup Bhagat v. Bansi Mandar, Calcutta High Court, March 15 1915, p. 742–744. 
296 Judge at the lowest court level. 
297 Ram Sarup Bhagat v. Bansi Mandar, Calcutta High Court, March 15 1915, p. 743. 
298 Ram Sarup Bhagat v. Bansi Mandar, Calcutta High Court, March 15 1915, p. 743. 
299 Ram Sarup Bhagat v. Bansi Mandar, Calcutta High Court, March 15 1915. 
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labourers ended up being bound for indefinite time to their employers. Coxe explained that 
these contracts were not enforceable.302 
Judge Mullick, deciding Satish Chandra Ghosh v. Kashi Sahu (1918), came to a 
similar conclusion as judge Coxe in Ram (1915). Referring to the case of Ram, Mullick 
explained that such contracts were invalid as long as the labourer went unpaid for his work 
and where the terms of agreement were set in a way to make it impossible for the labourer to 
redeem his or her debt. Such conditions, so Mullick, amounted to slavery and often resulted 
also in following generations being trapped in the bond of their ancestors.303 Mullick’s 
enumeration of offences committed under the kamia system underlined the similarity to 
chattel slavery. In his response to the request to share his opinion on the Draft of the Bihar 
and Orissa Kamiauti Agreements Act, the Secretary to the Government of Bihar and Orissa 
Huback wrote: “The contracts almost invariably purport to impose penalties on running away 
from service; and it is reported that kamias are in practice passed from one master to another 
by payment of the advance (…).”304 
Another example of judicial activism was a case decided in 1916. Two men were 
convicted for an offence of the IPC Section 370 for having sold and purchased Vellan. Vellan 
was, like his father, first employed by Edavad Adharam. When he took a credit from Koroth 
Mammad, the two employers settled the ensuing conflict over this labourer by writing a 
transfer contract:305 
 
I execute to you and give you today (…) (this) jenmam deed giving you Velandi’s son 
Pulayan Kurungot parkum Vellan, with his heirs. The sum that I received from you in 
cash today is Rs. 10. For this sum of Rs. 10, you should get work done for you by the 
aforesaid Vellan and his offspring that may come into being as your jenmam and act 
as you please.306 
 
Because Koroth brought a suit against Edavad Adharam, the two ended up being convicted 
under the IPC Section 370, which they appealed. In 1917 the judges of the Bench, Rahim and 
Napier, were of different opinions as to whether this transfer of the debt amounted to slavery 
and therefore an offence of the IPC. Rahim translated the Malayalam term jenman as property 
and pulayan as ‘rice slave,’307 and the question he raised was if Vellan was “sold and bought 
 
302 Ram Sarup Bhagat v. Bansi Mandar, Calcutta High Court, March 15 1915, p. 744. 
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305 Koroth Mammad and Another v. The King-Emperor, Madras High Court, August 27 1917, p. 334. 
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as a slave.”308 If the employers had given him housing and taken care of him during times of 
sickness and not paid him a measure of rice per day, he would have been a slave, according to 
Rahim’s estimate. Furthermore, Rahim argued, Vellan entered a contract with another 
employer, which also removed him from the shadow of slavery.309 Since Vellan had also 
agreed to the transfer, and the whole situation was similar to the practices in domestic services 
to have servants work generation after generation for one family, Rahim explained that “it 
would be an outrage on one’s common sense to suppose that domestic servants of this class 
occupy the position of slaves.”310 That Koroth had tied Vellan to furniture and prevented him 
from leaving did not raise Rahim’s attention; he instead argued that employers detaining their 
servants against their will would not amount to slavery, but wrongful confinement.311 This 
offence provides punishment by imprisonment for up to one month and a fine up to Rs. 500, 
while IPC Section 370 provides imprisonment for up to seven years. Rahim was in favour of 
releasing the plaintiffs. 
Napier, on the other hand, also struggled with the meaning of the term slavery.312 
Looking into the Act V he found it did not actually ban slavery—this was only achieved by the 
IPC.313 In discussing the relation of Vellan to his employer, Napier remarked that the credit 
Vellan had taken from his second employer and the remuneration in paddy he received was 
set in a way to never pay off the debt.314 Napier found additional evidence of slavery, when he 
recounted that Koroth had restrained Vellan by chaining him to a bed.315 While Napier 
repeatedly pointed out that workers in general, and also Vellan, consented to being bought, 
sold or hired out,316 he did not follow the course of using this consent as evidence against 
slavery. Even though this was voluntary bondage, based on custom, Napier closed his 
statement by explaining the situation clearly fell under the purview of Section 370 of the 
IPC.317  
Since judges Rahim and Napier could not agree, the Chief Justice got involved.318 
Chief Justice J. Ayling agreed that it was difficult to arrive at a judgement in absence of a 
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definition of the term ‘slave.’319 Ayling, delivering the final judgment, held that “the 
transaction in question was a sale of Vellan and his offspring as mere chattels and that the 
appellants were guilty of an offence under section 370, Penal Code.”320 Regarding the 
conviction of Edavad and Koroth, Napier suggested that the prison time of two months 
already served was sufficient, as well as a reduction of the fine to Rs. 100. Because the 
accused believed they had acted rightfully, and also acted in conjunction with the “general 
practice”321 of the region—therefore not knowing that they committed a crime—the 
punishment appeared to Napier as “unnecessarily severe.”322 Ayling supported this 
argument.323 
This case exemplifies the fluidity of the concept of bonded labour as defined in the 
introduction: Looking at the contract between the two plaintiffs, Ayling explained that the 
agreement was proof of the fact that Vellan and his descendants had been sold “as mere 
chattels.”324 And while Ayling agreed that up to some point the plaintiff’s treatment of Vellan 
was not suspicious, the situation shifted the moment that Vellan “chose to assert his 
independence”325 by taking another loan with a different employer. Koroth exercised an 
absolute right just like a master over his slave, when he physically punished and constrained 
Vellan to prevent him from leaving.326 Turning to the claim in ownership, Ayling remarked 
vis-à-vis the contract between Koroth and Edavad that it equalled the transaction of 
chattels.327 Therefore, the relevant issue was not just the treatment of Vellan, the exercise of 
“absolute power,”328 but also the claim which was expressed by this contract, despite its 
unenforceability in a court. This judgment diverged from earlier cases in two ways: In the 
cases of Firman (1871) and Madan (1892), the exercise of violence was not taken into 
account in order to ascertain the criminal offences. In earlier cases, the contract was used to 
legitimise the exploitation and violence—in Madan (1892), as well as Mirza (1871), the 
contracts served as proof that labourers had entered the bonded labour relationship as free 
agents and were therefore enforceable. In Koroth the contract served as supporting evidence 
that an offence had been committed. 
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In the cases Ram (1915) and Satish (1918), the judges moved even further from earlier 
judgments by addressing the poverty of the labourers and found their exploitation repugnant. 
At the same time, they made bonded labour arrangements amenable to the definition of chattel 
slavery by identifying features, such as ‘passing on of debts’ or outlining a time frame for 
repayment that often exceeded a worker’s life-time. But they did not define bonded labour as 
a form of slavery in its own right; they followed the definition of chattel slavery, as in the case 
of Koroth (1917).329 These elements of chattel slavery identified in bonded labour contracts 
allowed the judges in Ram (1915) and Satish (1918) to rule within the IPC’s provisions. This 
is also noteworthy since earlier rulings used the definition of slavery to the very opposite end: 
To remove bonded labour from the purview of the IPC, as for instance in Firman (1871). 
The WBCA contained a provision for contracts not to exceed the period of three years. 
Several courts in the years between 1882 and 1919 therefore rejected the applicability of the 
Act XIII because the contracts under consideration exceeded the legal time period. The judges 
argued that the respective contractual agreements of lengthy or indefinite periods amounted to 
slavery.330 But also in cases where the ‘time requirement’ was met, judges found the use of 
the WBCA illegal, explaining that it practically legalized slavery.331 
It is interesting to note how most of the cases discussed above were actually initiated: 
In Bissonauth (1863) the employer sued his worker and ended up being convicted.332 This was 
also the case in Ram (1915)333 and Satish (1918).334 A similar situation occurred in Koroth 
(1917), where one employer accused the other employer over the transfer of a bonded 
labourer and found himself convicted for slavery.335 In all these trials no labourer had initiated 
the case; the employers had brought themselves under the purview of the law. These cases 
appeared to be treated as cases of slavery by lower executing actors, such as magistrates, and 
also at the lower judicial level. Consequently, they prosecuted employers either under the Act 
V or the antislavery sections of the IPC. More conservative rulings of the high courts reversed 
these decisions of the lower judicial instances, as in Madan (1892). A more detailed analysis 
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of archival records of court cases and magisterial reports336 in the different states could reveal 
interesting insights, such as how, in general, cases under the IPC sections on slavery or the 
Act V were initiated.  
One major problem regarding the enforcement of the Act V of 1843 and later the IPC 
was poverty. Bonded labourers simply could not afford to go to court and wage a process 
against their employer.337 One district judge stated in 1920 that  
 
The courts are empowered to deal with bargains which are substantially unfair or 
unconscionable or contrary to public policy. Kamiauti bonds are rarely brought before 
them. In South Bhagalpur, where the system is said to be common, I am unable to 
trace a single suit instituted on such a bond in the Banka Munsifi within the last ten 
years.338 
 
The other problem was the lower judicial mechanisms and the intersection of bonded 
labour relations with caste. Hjejle observes that due to caste and class it was often impossible 
for lower caste members to challenge their exploitation through legal means, which were 
primarily available only to higher caste members.339 Another problem workers faced was the 
fear of retaliation, which prevented labourers from filing a suit against their exploiters.340 It is 
furthermore unclear, how high court decisions influenced the behaviour of lower judicial 
levels and the magistrates;341 Anderson discusses one case of 1894, which “should have 
derailed the enforcement of penal sanctions in Bombay, but it went unreported and had little 
impact.”342 Further studies could reveal in more detail how the act was implemented on the 
ground, by the police and magistrates.  
The case law has already revealed tendencies of judges to decide slavery and bonded 
labour cases which also shed light on the changes the institution of the abolition of slavery in 
India underwent between 1860 and 1919: Around the beginning of the new century, the case 
law depicts a move from interpreting bonded labour and “slavery proper”343 as poor law, to a 
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violation of ‘public policy’344 that thrived on the poverty of the victims and needed to be 
abolished altogether. Bonded labour contracts based on the Breach of Contract Act were 
found unlawful when the nature of work was not clarified.345 Also, when wages were set to be 
too low, the Bombay High Court found no grounds to enforce such contracts within the 
purview of the WBCA.346 And in 1919 a court admitted that the resistance of a labourer 
against his or her exploitation was actually legitimate.347 The judges demonstrated an 
increasingly critical view on the practices related to the WBCA, but also slavery and bonded 
labour, and were increasingly willing to try them under antislavery provisions of the IPC. 
 
Conclusion 
During the period between 1843 and 1920 the institution of the abolition of slavery underwent 
several gradual changes. The institutional rules were weak—slavery only became a criminal 
offence when the IPC came into force in 1862. Just a year before the adoption of the IPC, the 
central government adopted the WBCA, which first was limited to three presidency towns and 
then was increasingly extended to the whole British Raj. Workers became criminally liable 
for breaches of contract and were bound to serve their master; therefore, the WBCA 
essentially constituted the legalisation of coerced labour.348 
The political arena did not offer a veto possibility to the preservers of the status quo, 
and here I suggested treating this as weak veto possibilities, since the Governor-General alone 
throughout this period had the legislative power to adopt or reject legal proposals. I 
considered two hypotheses, H4b and H6b, and proposed that if the dominant change agents 
were antislavery actors they would behave as insurrectionaries, and cause either displacement 
or layering. Along hypothesis 6b, I expect proslavery actors to be the change agents, who 
would behave as subversives and cause layering. Actors in favour of exploiting labour, who 
could only somewhat be defined as proslavery actors, were one of the two principal change 
agents,349 who openly pressed for legislation in their favour, but without attacking the 
abolition of slavery directly. The Government of India first rejected suggestions to adopt 
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legislation towards criminalising breaches of contract. Change became possible because of 
facilitating processes,350 which made the timing of actors pressing for change so important. 
After the struggle over power in the Indian rebellion, the Government of India took measures 
it had earlier rejected, but which constituted a then welcome tool to control Indian subjects: 
The new labour legislation provided for the penalisation of breaches of contracts. 
The actual content of the WBCA is reflective of the prevalent paradigms. The 
ideology of work became manifested in contracts and was reinforced by the courts: In cases 
concerning the WBCA, as well as bonded labour cases tried under the IPC, even exploitative 
relations were justified with the contractual obligation to which the labourers voluntarily had 
committed during the first half of this episode. The voluntary self-enslavement via contract 
became a possibility that stood in contradiction to the idea of freedom. Hay and Craven add 
that “[f]reedom of contract [did] not mean freedom to abandon the contract.”351 The belief in 
the contract and the belief of bonded labourers in their obligation to repay the debt352 
transcended the question of work—the contract did not only bind bodies, but also minds: 
Ahuja describes this link between contractual obligations in which workers challenged their 
maltreatment and working conditions, but not the work they had committed to.353 The 
ideology of work, the paternalist paradigm, and the legitimacy of violence became virtually 
inscribed in WBCA legislation. These paradigms were the breeding ground on which the 
continued existence of coerced labour was possible, and bonded labour was the outcome of 
the inherent logic of the ideology of work, paternalism and violence. 
Pateman observes that “[i]n contract theory universal freedom is always a hypothesis, 
a story, a political fiction. Contract always generates political right in the forms of domination 
and subordination.”354 The court cases show how contracts clouded the asymmetrical, violent 
relationship between unequal parties and legitimised the vertical use of violence. With both 
parties consenting to the contract, it also certified the denial of responsibility of the employer 
and the state towards labour. Regarding a WBCA case in which a worker had agreed to the 
terms of a contract that effectively could lead to starvation,355 the judge put it bluntly: “[H]e 
must be held to do so with his eyes open, and knowing well what he was about.”356 This was a 
similar argument made in the case Madan, also quoted in the introduction of this dissertation, 
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where the judge explained that the IPC Section 374 did not apply, because the workers had 
submitted voluntarily to bonded labour.357 Through the acknowledgement of contracts and 
further legislation providing the legal basis of exploitative contracts, the state removed itself 
from the responsibility to enforce the right to freedom. By contract, labourers themselves 
agreed to and legitimised their exploitation. The labourers made themselves available to 
punishment if defecting from the terms of the contract to which they had voluntarily 
submitted. 
This interpretation of contractual obligations was challenged and experienced 
increasing exposure: At the international level, the Zeitgeist moved towards the ‘norm 
cascade,’358 the second stage of the norms’ development. The opposition of the International 
Labour Conference to criminal sanctions for breaches of contract put pressure on the Indian 
Government from the outside. At the same time, the resistance of labourers and the increasing 
attention of the independence movement on labour issues, as in the Champaran Satyagraha, 
placed the British Raj under pressure from within. The newly admitted Indian members to the 
councils reflected the nationalist movement’s interest in labour, even though their pressure 
through regular requests to remove the WBCA—supported by reference to international 
developments—failed due to the absence of veto possibilities. The question of labour and 
labour exploitation became an issue of legitimacy and at the end of this episode, coerced 
labour developed into one of the sites on which the struggle of the colonial subjects against 
the colonising power was fought. 
The Government of India adopted the IPC in 1860 and thereby added a layer on top of 
the Act V of 1843. This layer did not remove the old rules of the Act V but introduced new 
ones. In contrast to the provisions of the WBCA, the IPC did not undermine the spirit of the 
Act V but changed its enactment: The IPC allowed for active enforcement of the abolition of 
slavery—legal actions and criminal punishments that were not possible under the Act V. And 
even though marginal in numbers,359 the antislavery sections of the IPC were used against 
employers to convict them, as shown in the case law and criminal reports. 
The WBCA constituted another layer, placed on top of to the Act V and the antislavery 
section of the IPC. This layer impacted the abolition of slavery by undermining it. Employers 
profited from weak antislavery legislations that, by lack of definition, did not make breach of 
contract legislation an impossibility. The WBCA developed a life of its own and, as a 
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consequence, change also occurred at the enforcement level: Employers advanced minimal 
sums to bring workers under the breaches of contract legislation or invoked it in contracts as a 
threat against the workers. Acting as parasitic symbionts, they enforced contracts and 
stretched the legal means to their advantage in order to coerce workers—the Indian tea 
plantations or indigo production are instructive examples. These changes can be described as 
drift at the outcome level and affected a large number of workers, even though, effectively, 
many of these arrangements did not necessarily hold up against magisterial or judicial 
scrutiny. But labourers also used the breaches of contract legislation and exercised a degree of 
agency: Rather than returning to work, some chose to go to prison, as the example of the tea 
plantation shows. 
In relation to the WBCA, Anderson observed a trend towards opposition of enforcing 
the WBCA since the 1890s.360 In the case of bonded labour arrangements, the court 
judgments also depict a shift towards evaluating these cases as violations of antislavery 
legislation: In the late nineteenth century, debt bondage was upheld by the courts as 
legitimate. The definition of slavery followed the definition of chattel slavery and was used as 
argument against allowing bonded labour to fall under the IPC. By the beginning of the new 
century, this definition of slavery turned towards a new assessment. By making use of their 
discretion of interpretation, the judges became the second principal change agents,361 
progressively assuming the behaviour of the defenders, protecting the spirit of the abolition of 
slavery. In the beginning of this episode, the actual content of a contract, as well as the 
treatment of labourers, was not considered by the judges to constitute a punishable offence. 
Both elements were reconsidered: While there were already activist decisions in the beginning 
of the episode and also conservative decisions by the end of this episode, in more and more 
cases judges began to interpret contracts made under the Breach of Contract Act as slavery, 
and rejected bonded labour arrangements for the same reason. By adopting an alternate 
interpretation of the available rules, judges caused change through conversion, in which the 
“rules remain[ed] formally the same but [were] interpreted and enacted in new ways.”362 
What remains open in these cases on the antislavery sections of the IPC is the question 
of why the judges shifted their interpretation. Their decisions increasingly turned towards 
including bonded labour relations, as well as those fixed under breaches of contract, 
effectively bringing these offences under the IPC’s section against slavery. While not evident 
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from the court rulings, it appears that judges were not acting in a vacuum: They were aware of 
the political environment in which they worked—in the case of Firman (1871) the judge’s 
decision was explicitly politically motivated. The increasing criticisms against the Raj, 
international developments that indicated the development of an antislavery Zeitgeist, and the 
ideationally widening gap between the norm of abolition and reality, did not go unnoticed by 
the judges. The courts’ changed interpretation of bonded labour and slavery aligned with the 
beginning of a ‘norm cascade’363 that took place at the national level in India, and the 
beginning of the next episode. 
 
 
363 FINNEMORE/SIKKINK, 1998, p. 895. 
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y the beginning of the 1920s, the British crown had ruled over large parts of India 
for more than 60 years. The Indian elite grew increasingly frustrated about their 
limited opportunities to participate in governing the country. Since the year 1906 
swaraj,1 self-rule, became the defined goal of the Indian National Congress (INC), formulated 
in the resolution of the Calcutta session. Other political parties, such as the Muslim League, 
founded in December 1906, followed in formulating this goal.2 Gandhi began the non-
cooperation movement in 1919,3 and Ambedkar, the political leader of the Dalits and a Dalit 
himself, launched campaigns against casteism around 1925. At the beginning of this period, 
World War I had just ended. Millions of Indians had participated in the war and the colonial 
power expected new demands from the nationalist movement.4 The British responded to the 
Indian call for swaraj with reforms of the political and administrative system which allowed 
larger participation of the Indian elite and in the estimation of the British secured 
collaborators for the colonial interest.5 In 1919, the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms formulated 
in the Government of India Act6 partially accommodated several requests of the Indian 
national leaders. 
At the international level, the British fostered the development of the League of 
Nations (LN), of which India became one of the founding members. Grant argues that the 
creation of the LN was a project promoted by the British. It constituted a venue through which 
the declining Empire attempted to construct a world government to maintain its influence. 
After all, the LN was the mediator for territorial redistributions within Africa and the Middle 
East.7 These mechanisms allowed the control over territories through a mandate system; the 
exercise of sovereign power by an international agency influenced by the British 
 
1 The term swaraj was first coined by left wing nationalists Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1905) and Aurobindo Ghose 
(1906); Mohandas Gandhi popularised the term with his publication Hind Swaraj (1909), MYER, 1995, p. 19; 
HARDGRAVE/KOCHANEK, 2008, p. 42–43. 
2 MISRA, 1970, 53, 67. 
3 HARDGRAVE/KOCHANEK, 2008, p. 48. 
4 MISRA, 1970, p. 59. 
5 CHIRIYANKANDATH, 2008, p. 48; MITRA, 2017, 41, 46. 
6 Government of India Act 1919, Parliament of the United Kingdom, 1919. 
7 GRANT, 2005, p. 10. 
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government.8 With the establishment of the LN, international legislation on slavery, as well as 
the situation in India and all the other member states, became part of the international agenda. 
My focus is on the institutional changes at the state level. But the developments at the 
international level and the communication within the colonial administration and between the 
colonial state and the international organisation, also provide an insight into the slavery, 
forced labour and bonded labour situation in India. The communication reflects the perception 
of the British colonial rulers and their attempts to implement the abolition of slavery in India. 
Therefore, next to secondary sources, I rely on primary sources available at the India Office 
Records of the British Library (London), and the National Archives of India (Delhi). Internal 
communication between the India Office, the Government of India and the presidencies and 
native states are sources I use, among others, to trace the communication on labour 
exploitation. Governmental reports on agriculture, and labour, and special reports, such as on 
labour in Assam, are other sources important for this chapter. In 1928 the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) opened its regional office in New-Delhi, with Dr. P. P. Pillai as its 
director. Between 1947 and 1969 the office composed detailed monthly reports on the 
developments in India, relevant to the ILO.9 These reports have been digitised and are 
available online.10 
 
Institutional Characteristics 
In this period, international organisations began to independently assume a rule-making role. 
The ILO, the LN and its successor organisation, the United Nations (UN), developed 
conventions to set international standards which member states are invited to follow. Two 
important conventions, the LN Slavery Convention of 1926 and the ILO Forced Labour 
Convention of 1930, were adopted during this episode. India became a member to all relevant 
conventions,11 which means India had to incorporate these norms into national law. In the 
following I address the changes of the political context and the institutional characteristics of 
the abolition of slavery at the beginning of this episode. 
 
8 Covenant of the League of Nations, Art. 22, League of Nations, June 28 1919; GRANT, 2005, p. 10. 
9 AHUJA, 2012, i. 
10 Georg-August Universität Göttingen/CeMIS. 
11 India signed the UN International Convention with the Object of Security the Abolition of Slavery and the 
Slave Trade (Slavery Convention), League of Nations, 1926, on June 18 1927; the UN Protocol amending the 
LN Slavery Convention, United Nations, 1953, on March 12 1954; India ratified the ILO Forced Labour 
Convention (C29), International Labour Organisation, 1930, on November 30 1954; India ratified the ILO 
Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (Abolition of Forced Labour Convention) (C105), 
International Labour Conference, 1957, on May 18 2000. 
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Discretion of Interpretation 
By 1919, the institution of the abolition of slavery was enshrined by a set of two weak laws: 
The IPC Sections 367, 370, 371 and 374, and the Act V of 1843. The Workman’s Breach of 
Contract Act of 1859 (WBCA) constituted a layer, which undermined the spirit of the 
abolition of slavery. On the other side, judges at the high courts increasingly interpreted 
bonded labour, as well as contracts concluded under the WBCA, as violations of the IPC and 
the Act V.12 
Table 10. Characteristics of the formal institution, 1920 
Law Definition Bonded labour Timeline Punishment Rehabilitation 
Competent 
authorities 
Act V, 
1843 
No N.A. No No No No 
IPC, 1862 No13 No Yes  Yes No Yes 
Case law 
since 
1915 
Yes14 Yes15 N.A. Yes  N.A. N.A. 
 
The case law, which defined bonded labour as slavery, is included in the evaluation. Even 
though the case law was not binding and also not consistently applied, the judges in the high 
courts began to give definitions of slavery explicitly, because the Act V and the IPC did not 
provide a definition.16 
 
Level of Enforcement 
The judges’ statements referred to in the chapter of the first episode on the prevalence of 
bonded labour demonstrate the awareness of the judiciary of the problem of slavery and 
 
12 Cf. Ram Sarup Bhagat v. Bansi Mandar, Calcutta High Court, March 15 1915; Koroth Mammad and Another 
v. The King-Emperor, Madras High Court, August 27 1917; Satish Chandra Ghosh v. Kashi Sahu, Patna High 
Court, April 8 1918. 
13 IPC Sec. 370 punishes the buying and disposing of a person as a slave “against his will” and Section 375 
prohibits unlawful compulsory labour, prescribing punishment for compelling “any person to labour against the 
will of that person.” Beyond these qualifications, there is no definition of what a slave or slavery is. 
14 In Ram (1915), Satish (1918) and Koroth (1917) the judges compared identified elements of chattel slavery in 
the cases of bonded labour and therefore illegal. 
15 Ram Sarup Bhagat v. Bansi Mandar in 1915 found that debt bond contracts amount to slavery; Koroth 
Mammad and Another v. The King-Emperor in 1917 found that the transfer of debt from one creditor to another 
creditor is punishable under legislation prohibiting slavery. 
16 The Queen v. Firman Ali, Calcutta High Court, December 2 1871; Empress of India v. Ram Kuar, Allahabad 
High Court, March 8 1880, p. 727; Koroth Mammad and Another v. The King-Emperor, Madras High Court, 
August 27 1917, p. 349. 
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bonded labour and their estimation of this issue being wide spread.17 The judges were also 
familiar with published work that reported on the continuation of slavery and bonded labour 
after the Act V and the IPC came into force. Judge Napier, for instance, referred in his 
argument18 to the two volumes of William Logan’s Malabar (1887) in which Logan described 
the working conditions of the lower caste members in agriculture as slavery.19 Based on the 
census of 1857, the total slave population comprised 187,812 people in the Malabar district.20 
The Report of the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee of 1906 on the tea plantations 
observed that an increasing number of labourers were bound by the WBCA. In its examples 
of labour exploitation carried out under breach of contract legislation, illegal private arrest, 
excessively low payment, indebtedness of labourers to planters, and “unduly severe 
punishments,”21 serve as testimony to the exploitation of labourers that compared to slavery.22 
But the commissioners declared that the WBCA “is serving its purpose as a stepping stone 
towards free labour.”23 The second report on Assam became available in 1922 and confirmed 
the observation of labour exploitation amounting to slavery and the suggestion to repeal the 
Act XIII of 1859.24 
The reports discussed in the previous episode, such as the Census of India on the 
Punjab and NFP (Northwest Frontier Province) and the Reports on the Administration of 
Criminal Justice in the Lower Provinces of Bengal and Punjab, show that the colonial 
administration was aware of the continued existence of slavery and bonded labour.25 In 1920 
one member of the council explained that “in Palamau the Settlement Officer came to the 
deliberate conclusion (…) that at the time when he reported, there were no less than sixty 
thousand persons, or close upon 9 percent of the whole population of the district, subject to 
this pernicious kamiauti system.”26 Referring to the Bombay Census Report of 1921, Shukla 
writes that 84,302 halis were on record in the census.27 Halis were, like kamias, agricultural 
labourers who bound themselves to a master who gave them an advance; in return they 
 
17 The Queen v. Firman Ali, Calcutta High Court, December 2 1871; Empress of India v. Ram Kuar, Allahabad 
High Court, March 8 1880, p. 728; Koroth Mammad and Another v. The King-Emperor, Madras High Court, 
August 27 1917, p. 339–340. 
18 Koroth Mammad and Another v. The King-Emperor, Madras High Court, August 27 1917, p. 345. 
19 LOGAN, 1951 [1887], p. 146–147. 
20 LOGAN, 1951 [1887], p. 148. 
21 Assam Labour Enquiry Committee, 1906b, 1, 142. 
22 Assam Labour Enquiry Committee, 1906b, 1-2, 105-06. 
23 Assam Labour Enquiry Committee, 1906b, p. 105. 
24 Government of Assam, 1922, 91, para. 177. 
25 ANDERSON, 2004, p. 450. 
26 Sir Walter Maude, extracts from the Proceedings of the Legislative Council of Bihar and Orissa at a Meeting, 
held on July 30 1920, National Archives of India, November 1920. 
27 SHUKLA, 1937, p. 115. 
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pledged their labour. They were not allowed to leave their master until the debt was repaid.28 
Subsistence paid in cash or kind was added to the debt. Thereby the debt never decreased and, 
according to Shukla, who conducted a study in the 1930s, it became impossible for labourers 
to repay their debt and they were therefore tied to their masters permanently.29 According to 
Shukla, landholders were able to secure cheap labourers by binding them as halis. But with 
growing opportunities to find work elsewhere—the mines or railway construction—running 
away became an increasingly viable option for halis to end their bondage.30 
The state was quite aware of grave labour exploitation in the form of bonded labour 
and its potential to qualify as slavery. Since the high court judges began to rule against 
bonded labour by interpreting some of its elements in the terms of chattel slavery, the gap 
between the ideal and the continued existence of bonded labour became more nuanced. These 
reports and references demonstrate the gap between the spirit of the abolition of slavery and 
its actual enforcement, which was also perceived by the judges and commissioners. The 
enforcement of antislavery legislation was weak, ineffective and hampered by contradictory 
legislation, namely the Workman’s Breach of Contract Act of 1859. 
 
Paradigms and Zeitgeist 
By the beginning of the 1920s, the tipping point for the norm of the abolition of slavery 
towards the second stage was reached at the international level. From then on, the ‘norm 
cascade’31 took place. The Peace Conference after World War I laid the foundation for the 
formalisation of the norm of the abolition of slavery with the Constitution of the International 
Labour Organisation.32 The constitution of the ILO also became part of the Treaty of 
Versailles,33 which contained the Covenant of the League of Nations. It explained that its 
members “(a) will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour for 
men, women, and children (…); (b) undertake to secure just treatment of the native 
inhabitants of territories under their control.”34 
This period was crucial for the international formalisation of the abolition of slavery: 
Several member states to the LN participated by signing and ratifying the Slavery Convention 
 
28 SHUKLA, 1937, p. 116. 
29 SHUKLA, 1937, p. 116–119. 
30 SHUKLA, 1937, p. 132; HEMINGWAY, 1906, p. 111; cf. HJEJLE, 1967, p. 125. 
31 FINNEMORE/SIKKINK, 1998, p. 895. 
32 Peace Conference, April 1 1919. 
33 Treaty of Peace with Germany, Allied and Associated Powers/Germany, June 28 1919, Part XIII, 227. 
34 League of Nations, June 28 1919, Art. 23, in Allied and Associated Powers/Germany, June 28 1919, p. 57. 
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of 1926. As discussed in the theoretical chapter, the adoption of the LN’s and ILO’s 
convention against slavery and forced labour, and growing membership to these conventions 
between the 1930s and 1940s, marked the beginning of the third stage of the norms 
internalisation.35 The discussion on the Slavery Convention at the League showed that the 
third stage was not yet reached by the 1920s: The extraction of forced labour by the 
population in general was defended openly by the Portuguese. The Portuguese representative 
explained that the abolition of forced labour “to the native races (…) implies for them a right 
to idleness;” and its abolition interfere[s] with the development of these countries.”36 
The process of writing the Slavery Convention already started in 1922.37 The drafting 
of the convention involved back and forth communication between all the member states and 
the LN. The process which the British Parliament initiated for the abolition of slavery in the 
British Dominions in 1833, reached a culminating point in the 1930s. Gaining the status of 
taken-for-granted-ness,38 this period affected the ideas and behaviour of proslavery actors, as 
well as antislavery actors. Under the forming Zeitgeist at the international level, proslavery 
actors were becoming less likely to openly express their support for slavery in public and less 
likely to resist policy changes towards that effect. At the same time, the international 
legislation provided antislavery actors with ammunition in their fight against slavery. The 
influence of international legislation became visible, as demonstrated further below, when 
actors referred to conventions or copied them in part or in in full when creating national 
legislation. 
At the level of the British Raj, the Zeitgeist had completed the stage of the norm’s 
cascade. With the adoption of the Act V and the antislavery provisions of the IPC, two 
policies, even though weak, abolished the possession in human beings, slavery de jure. The 
WBCA and the continued existence of bonded labour undermined the spirit of the norm, but 
the process of internalisation39—the norms transformation into case law—had begun, even 
though not in a coherent and proactive fashion. 
In the first episode the following ideas or paradigms were crucial in understanding the 
policy output: 1) The non-interference, (2) the protection or paternalist and (3) the ideology of 
work paradigm. With the adoption of the IPC in 1860, the British gave up the non-
 
35 FINNEMORE/SIKKINK, 1998, p. 895. 
36 Note submitted to the first sub-committee of the Sixth Committee by the Portuguese Delegate, General Freire 
d’Andrade, quoted in ALLAIN, 2008, p. 11–12. 
37 ZOGLIN, 1986, p. 308. 
38 FINNEMORE/SIKKINK, 1998, p. 895. 
39 RISSE/SIKKINK, 2008, p. 17. 
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interference paradigm vis-à-vis slavery. The case law on the Workman’s Breach of Contract 
Act of 1859 demonstrated an inclination of judges around the turn of the century to not 
enforce obviously unfair contracts. Some even found these contracts to be similar to slavery 
and observed that the provisions of the WBCA were misused.40 In bonded labour cases judges 
also increasingly tended to reject the enforceability of these contracts after the turn of the 
nineteenth century.41 
The latter two paradigms persisted. The protection or paternalist paradigm received its 
international expression and legitimation in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Even 
though not affecting India, Article 22 justified the continued control of Western states over 
African and Middle Eastern territories, and reflected the imperial paternalist position of 
Western states, which also marked the relation of Britain towards India: 
 
[T]hose colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to 
be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are 
inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous 
conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-
being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that 
securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.42 
 
Therefore, within the protection and paternalist paradigm fell claims over supervising and 
guiding the development of a colony and its people. This in turn justified colonialism itself. 
Maul argues that by the end of the World War, and in light of increasing economic 
exploitation of the colonies, the members of the ILO agreed that different standards applied to 
Western and colonial labour. The colonial powers shared the duty to educate the people under 
their guidance43—an idea that was expressed in the context of the tea plantations, quoted 
earlier.44 What changed within this paradigm was the idea of the protective function of slavery 
in cases of famines as poor relief. In the court cases this idea was increasingly rejected, for 
instance, in the case Ram Kuar (1880)45 or in Ram Sarup (1915).46 But statements such as in 
the report of the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee still depict the paternalist and protection 
paradigm with which governmental commissioners legitimised labour exploitation: 
 
 
40 Emperor v. Namdeo Sakhgaram, Bombay High Court, November 30 1909. 
41 Cf. Bissonauth Chowdhree v. Bonomally, Calcutta High Court, August 14 1863, Satish Chandra Ghosh v. 
Kashi Sahu, Patna High Court, April 8 1918. 
42 Covenant of the League of Nations, League of Nations, June 28 1919, Art. 22. 
43 MAUL, 2007, p. 481. 
44 Governor of Bengal, quoted in MOHAPATRA, 2004, p. 476. 
45 Empress of India v. Ram Kuar, Allahabad High Court, March 8 1880, p. 728. 
46 Ram Sarup Bhagat v. Bansi Mandar, Calcutta High Court, March 15 1915, p. 744. 
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The existence of abuses in the direction of the underpayment and indebtedness of the 
labour force on some estates was acknowledged, but the conclusion was arrived at that 
these were not general, and that ‘more than half a million immigrants drawn from the 
very poorest classes of India are indebted to the industry for a much more liberal 
supply of food and clothing than they could ordinarily have expected to enjoy in their 
homes.’47 
 
This line of argument justified conditions as they were. At the very moment of vulnerability, 
the profiteers of labour gained access to control over labour. Discursively, the win-lose 
situation, in which the labourer lost in any case, turned into a win-win situation: The labourer 
became the benefactor of his or her own exploitation while the profiteers could style 
themselves as the charitable actors. 
The third paradigm—the ideology of work coupled with the acceptance of the use of 
violence—is reflected in the discussion of the LN in the making of the Slavery Convention of 
1926. Discussing the question of forced labour, the Portuguese delegate’s contribution above 
quoted is telling: Banning forced labour “to the native races (…) implies for them a right to 
idleness.”48 Idleness, an indulgence the state had to respond to, with violence if necessary. 
The Portuguese delegate essentially implied that if people did not want to work, then it was 
legitimate to coerce them. The states in the LN successfully claimed the monopoly on 
violence to force people to work. They enshrined this right in the exception clause of the 
Slavery Convention,49 as well as in the ILO Forced Labour Convention, which reserved the 
deployment of forced labour to the state.50 The “classical colonial crime,”51 forced labour, 
became entrenched within the development discourse of the colonial powers since the 
beginning of the twentieth century.52 Development became the goal that justified all means of 
labour extraction and legitimised the use of violence.53 This was also the idea of the British 
administration in India: The statement of the commissioners reporting on Assam in 1906, that 
the WBCA was “serving its purpose as a stepping stone towards free labour,”54 reveals that, 
also for the British, the goal of development legitimized the extraction of forced labour and 
the use of violence. 
 
47 Assam Labour Enquiry Committee, 1906b, p. 2. 
48 Note submitted to the first sub-committee of the Sixth Committee by the Portuguese Delegate, General Freire 
d’Andrade, quoted in ALLAIN, 2008, p. 11. 
49 Art. 5 (1) “(…) compulsory or forced labour may only be exacted for public purposes.” 
50 Work during compulsory military service, moral civic obligations, penal labour (may not be sourced out to 
private entity), work during emergencies, International Labour Organisation, 1930, Art. 2 (2). 
51 MAUL, 2007, p. 490. 
52 And continues in the twenty-first century, MAUL, 2007, 484, 494; on the ideology of development, see ZIAI, 
2004, p. 102–103. 
53 MAUL, 2007, p. 484–485; ZIAI, 2004, p. 102–103. 
54 Assam Labour Enquiry Committee, 1906b, p. 105. 
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The contractual obligation, the idea of the paramountcy of the contract,55 was replaced 
with another idea. This idea squarely fits into the protection paradigm, but can also be 
addressed as a new paradigm: The rights paradigm. The rights paradigm is reflected 
particularly in the INC’s call for the realisation of citizenship rights and political participation. 
This paradigm was developed in the first proposals for an Indian constitution in 1895.56 The 
INC and other parties had begun to formulate proposals for self-government. The Constitution 
of India Bill of 1895 did not provide for the abolition of slavery or the right to freedom, but it 
contained a call for fundamental rights.57 The rights paradigm had gained momentum due to 
developments in India and elsewhere: Namely the growing labour movement and the 
revolution in Russia of 1917.58 While the trade union movement in Great Britain was already 
successful in the 1870s in removing breaches of contract legislation from the metropole,59 the 
first Indian labour union, the Bombay Mill-Hands Association, was formed in 1890; this was 
followed by the founding of the Madras Labour Union in 1918, and the All India Trade Union 
Congress (AITUC) in 1920. 
 
Political Context 
The Government of India proposed reforms to integrate demands of political participation and 
to channel them in such a way, as to slowly as possible move India towards self-
government.60 The Central Government of India enacted the Montagu–Chelmsford reforms—
the Government of India Act of 1919. Another reform of the Government of India Act 
followed in 1935: The Montagu–Chelmsford reforms were intended to appease nationalist 
demands for swaraj. These reforms allowed the Indian educated elite to access the political 
system of the British Raj, but ultimately did not go far enough in the opinion of the nationalist 
leaders.61  
 
 
55 MOHAPATRA, 2016, p. 222. 
56 AUSTIN, 1966, p. 52. 
57 Art. 16; cf. AUSTIN, 1966, p. 53. 
58 MISRA, 1970, p. 59. 
59 HAY/CRAVEN, 2004, p. 8. 
60 METCALF/METCALF, 2006, p. 167–168. 
61 METCALF/METCALF, 2006, p. 167; HARDGRAVE/KOCHANEK, 2008, p. 46–47; MISRA, 1970, p. 80. For more 
detailed historical background of the events that led to these reforms: METCALF/METCALF, 2006, Chapter 6. 
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Executive and Legislative Arena 
Since 1920, the King of England, who was also the Emperor of India, was represented in 
India by the viceroy. The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919, implemented in 1921, had a 
decentralising effect between the central government and the provincial governments. At the 
central level, the reforms introduced two chambers: The former Imperial Legislative Council 
was split into the Council of State (upper house of the legislature) and the Indian Legislative 
Assembly (lower house of the legislature). The majority of the members of the lower house 
were elected, based on male, propertied and age restricted franchise,62 ensuring that “[t]he 
interests represented through special constituencies were those of landholders and Indian 
commerce.”63 The Central Legislative Assembly consisted of 144 members, of which 41 were 
nominated and 103 elected on the basis of community and class (52 General, 30 Muslims, 2 
Sikhs, 20 Special). The Council of State consisted of 60 members, of which 26 were 
nominated and 34 elected based on the same principles (20 General, 10 Muslims, 3 Europeans 
and 1 Sikh).  
The Governor-General—the Executive Government—had the power to certify or veto 
the discussion of bills or accept a bill as passed, even if only one or none of the houses 
adopted it, as it happened for instance in the case of the Rowlatt Act. Among the Central 
Subjects belonged customs, external relations, and defence, as well as a reserved list of 
subjects relating to provincial matters. Relevant in relation to the issue of labour and slavery 
was the domination of the central legislature over criminal and civil law.64 The Central 
Legislative Assembly members and members of the Council of State could ask questions and 
move motions. In case the veto of the executive did not come into play, the two houses of the 
legislatures could veto against submitted bills.65 To pass a bill, the majority of the total 
members present in each house was required.66 Even though conditional on the final assent by 
the Governor-General, the Central Legislative Assembly constituted a potential veto point,67 
because a bill could also fail or succeed, depending on majority within the legislature and 
 
62 MISRA, 1970, 72-3, 75. This meant that of 240 million potential voters, 17,346 were allowed to cast their vote 
for the Imperial Council, and 909,874 for the Legislative Assembly, CHOPRA, 2003, p. 216. 
63 MISRA, 1970, p. 75. 
64 MITRA, 1921, p. 123–125. 
65 MISRA, 1970, p. 75. 
66 Government of India Act of 1919, Parliament of the United Kingdom, 1919, 29, Art. 39. 
67 MISRA, 1970, p. 75–76; IMMERGUT, 1990, p. 397. 
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when the Governor-General did not make use of his veto power. But members of the Central 
Legislative Assembly could not override the decision of the Governor-General.68 
The administrative sub-divisions of British India were the presidencies and provinces: 
Madras, Bombay, Bengal, Assam, the Punjab, the United Provinces (UP), Bihar and Orissa, 
the Central Provinces and Burma.69 The legislatures in the presidencies were elected on male, 
adult, propertied franchise and Indian ministers were accountable to these legislative 
assemblies.70 Each presidency and province had its own government. These administrative 
entities ruled directly over their territories. In the provinces, votes on bills had to earn the 
majority of the present members, and therefore, the provincial legislative assemblies also 
constituted a veto point. But as in the central legislature, the provincial legislature could move 
and adopt bills, but the governor had to assent to the proposal and he could veto or adopt any 
bill without support of the councils or assemblies.71 The provincial legislature had the power 
of “[i]mposition by legislation of punishments by fine, penalty or imprisonment, for: 
enforcing any law of the province relating to any provincial subject.”72 Consequently, at both 
levels, the central as well as at the provincial legislatures, laws could be enacted to deal with 
bonded labour, forced labour or slavery. 
Several elections for the Legislative Assembly were held between 1920 and 1945. The 
INC boycotted the first four elections.73 The following graph summarises the election results 
between 1920 and 1945: 
 
68 IMMERGUT, 1990, p. 397. 
69 These were the nine major provinces. Bihar and Orissa became two separate Provinces in 1936 and Burma 
became a separate colony from India in 1937, HARDGRAVE/KOCHANEK, 2008, p. 46. 
70 METCALF/METCALF, 2006, p. 168; MISRA, 1970, p. 70. 
71 MISRA, 1970, p. 75. 
72 MITRA, 1921, p. 129–130. 
73 SCHWARTZBERG, 1992, p. 222. 
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Figure 7. Central Legislative Assembly seats, 1920-1945 
 
Central Legislative Assembly seats, 1920-1945. Source: Data derived from SCHWARTZBERG, 
1992, p. 73. 
 
Due to the INC’s boycott, the already curtailed representation of the Indian population 
was even more marginal with a huge number of potential voters not participating.74 In all 
Central Legislative Assemblies, usually one party almost achieved the total majority of seats: 
First the Congress Democratic Party, then the Swaraj Party held the majority of seats and 
could only be outvoted if all other parties aligned. In 1926, the Swaraj Party formed a 
coalition with the Nationalist Party.75  
The Swaraj Party and the Congress Democratic Party were committed to the 
protection of workers’ rights.76 The Congress Democratic Party declared the following goals: 
 
(2) Securing for the labouring classes, agricultural and industrial, a fair share of the 
fruits of labour, a fair minimum wage, reasonable hours of work, decent house 
accommodation, and adjustment of relationship between capital and labour on 
equitable basis, and promoting organisations suitable for the purpose. (…) 
(4) Absolute prohibition of Veth, Bigar and Sarbarai.77 
 
In the Swaraj Election Manifesto, the party declared not only to commit to undermining the 
functioning of the British Government in the assembly and council, but also to “protect the 
 
74 GUHA, 1977, 122, 148. 
75 BANERJEE-DUBE, 2015, p. 309. 
76 A minority faction of the Congress that actually did participate despite the INC’s boycott, BANERJEE-DUBE, 
2015, p. 309; CHANDRA/MUKHERJEE/PANIKKAR et al., 1989, p. 224. 
77 Lokmanya Tilak: Manifesto for the Congress Democratic Party, 1920, p. 329, reprinted in SITARAMAYYA, 
1935, p. 327–380. Bigar is another transcription for begar, or a typographical error in the original source. Veth 
and Sarabai are also terms like begar that describe forced labour extracted by the state. 
Democratic 
Swaraj 
Swaraj 
Nationalist 
INC 
INC 
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rights of labour, agricultural and industrial, and adjust the relations between landlords and 
tenants, capitalists and workmen.”78 Furthermore, the Swaraj Party committed to the 
programme of the INC.79 
Among the parties, a strong majority could be expected to vote for stronger bills to 
protect labourers or to remove legislations, such as the WBCA. There was no party 
discipline,80 but the majority towards the issue was very likely to be stable. This means that 
within the legislative arena was no veto point, neither could the legislature overturn executive 
decision.81 Therefore, veto possibilities of the legislature were weak. Potential defenders of 
the status quo could be landholders and members representing Indian commerce, elected into 
the assemblies.82 But since within the Central Legislative Assembly the major parties were 
committed to the cause of labour rights and protection, the success of defenders of the status 
quo in support of proslavery interests in the legislature was unlikely. Potential resistance by 
actors identified with the proslavery cause would fail within the assembly due to majority 
vote—only by lobbying the government beyond the assembly and council could the 
proslavery interest try to prevent change.83 
 
Electoral or Public Arena 
The electorate did not pose a veto point, since referenda were not a feature of policymaking in 
the British Raj.84 And even though in principle members of the two houses were responsible 
to their electorate, this electorate was limited in number and constituted an elite not 
representative of the full Indian population. But the people continued to have the opportunity 
to petition, and to influence the representatives in the legislative assemblies and councils. 
With the growing number of participants in the independence movement, the influence of 
public opinion became increasingly significant for the behaviour of the Government of India. 
This was already the case in the first episode, when the government chose to withdraw from 
 
78 Policy and Programme of the Swarajya Party as Approved by the All-India Party Conference, 16-17 August 
1924, p. 4, Swarajya Party, 1957. 
79 CHANDRA/MUKHERJEE/PANIKKAR et al., 1989, p. 224. 
80 Representatives were not voted into the central and provincial assemblies based on party representation, but 
religion, caste, and profession, MISRA, 1970, p. 79. 
81 IMMERGUT, 1990, p. 397. 
82 SIMON, 1988 [1930], p. 168. 
83 MISRA, 1970, p. 75. 
84 IMMERGUT, 1990, p. 397. 
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supporting economic activities of the indigo planters because it could bring into question 
Britain’s imperial dominance over India.85 
 
Hypothesis 
The level of discretion of the institution appeared high: Slavery and forced labour were only 
defined by case law, but not implemented consistently. The enforcement level was also weak, 
with continuous reports on the existence of bonded labour and awareness among 
policymakers and judges that the law failed the labourers. This included the WBCA, under 
which labour continued to be coerced through the threat of penal sanctions. At both levels, the 
international as well as the national, the Zeitgeist was still proslavery. But it was gradually 
moving towards the next tipping point,86 visibly to actors, towards an antislavery Zeitgeist 
with the government and colonial power submitting to international labour standards and 
growing formulations of rights from the independence movement. 
The institutional discretion for interpretation and implementation were high, with 
weak rules and a low level of enforcement. Antislavery actors were explicitly dissatisfied with 
the conditions, while the proslavery actors profited from the status quo. Proslavery actors 
likely had a resistant disposition towards any change that would better protect labourers. They 
were also presumably the upholders of the status quo, but because of the development of the 
Zeitgeist, they probably could no longer do so as openly as they had fifty or sixty years 
earlier. Consequently, antislavery could be expected to be the actors of change. 
With weak enforcement and weak rules, antislavery actors were likely seeking change 
at the rules level. In the assembly antislavery actors were probably backed by the majority of 
the members since there was a cohesion of the largest parties regarding labour. As elections 
manifestos and draft constitutions demonstrate, they aimed for changes at the rules level, 
acting like insurrectionaries, who were actively seeking change through displacement of the 
institution.87 In this particular case this meant inducing change at the rules level to remove 
policies that undermined the spirit of the abolition of slavery. In this episode Hypotheses 4b is 
also tested: The change agents, antislavery actors, are expected to behave like 
insurrectionaries causing either displacement or layering. 
 
 
85 CHAN/WRIGHT/YEO, 2011, p. 54. 
86 FINNEMORE/SIKKINK, 1998, p. 900. 
87 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 24. 
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Gradual Changes 
The changes that occurred during the second episode were located at three different levels: 
The international level, the state level and the presidency level. I interrogate all three levels, 
but focus mainly on the central legislature and government, addressing the presidency level in 
passing. Since there are several presidencies, I chose one example: The Bihar and Orissa 
Presidency. I include the international level, since the legal framework developed at the 
international organisations was intended to influences the domestic level: States that ratified 
international conventions have to incorporate their provisions into national law. The 
communication back and forth between the state and the international organisation give 
intimate insight into the issue of slavery, bonded labour and forced labour in India. 
 
Presidency Level 
Under the Presidency of Orissa and Bihar, the provincial government proposed an act against 
forms of bonded labour. According to J. A. Huback, the Government of Bengal already 
became engaged with the issue in 1909 when he observed during settlement operations that 
“services of low caste individuals were transferred in the same way as moveable property.”88 
In 1912, the administration found that the kamiauti system of debt bondage prevailed in the 
presidency and a draft bill was in the drawers. But only with more available information 
collected, especially from the Palamau and Hazaribagh districts, did this bill get the necessary 
push forward.89 Furthermore, Huback referred in his arguments to the case law, namely the 
case Ram Sarup (1915) and Satish Chandra (1918), in which the judges ruled that debt 
bondage was “indistinguishable from slavery.”90 
In 1919 the Government of India sent out a request to the Presidencies to submit a 
report on the measures taken to the kamiauti system.91 Within the exchanges upon this 
request, the correspondence of the administration of Orissa and Bihar clearly set the case of 
bonded labour within the context of slavery: 
 
88 Letter to the Government of India from J. A. Huback, Secretary to the Government of Bihar and Orissa, 
Revenue Department, National Archives of India, November 1920, 36, Item No. 1. 
89 Letter to the Government of India from J. A. Huback, Secretary to the Government of Bihar and Orissa, 
Revenue Department, National Archives of India, November 1920, 36, Item No. 1. 
90 Letter to the Government of India from J. A. Huback, Secretary to the Government of Bihar and Orissa, 
Revenue Department, National Archives of India, November 1920, 36, Item No. 1; Ram Sarup Bhagat v. Bansi 
Mandar, Calcutta High Court, March 15 1915, p. 744; Satish Chandra Ghosh v. Kashi Sahu, Patna High Court, 
April 8 1918. 
91 Letter from the Hon’ble Mr. J. A. Huback, Secretary to the Government of Bihar and Orissa, Revenue 
Department, item No. 1, dated September 12 1919, National Archives of India, November 1920, p. 35. 
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The Criminal Law Commission of 187392 reported that the slave population of India 
comprised from one-sixth to two-fifths of the entire population. Although in 1843 an 
Act was passed declaring that rights in slaves would no longer be enforceable in the 
Courts, the Indian Penal Code of 1860 was the first law which provided penalties to 
check the system. Nine years later Mr. L.C. Forbes, the Settlement Officer of the 
Government Estates in Palamau, reported that large numbers of various low castes and 
aboriginals were kamias or “bondmen.”93 
 
Huback also quoted in his correspondence Mr. A. Forbes, Commissioner of Chota Nagpur, 
who wrote on the kamiauti system in 1898 and explained that state intervention was not 
necessary, since the kamia system would “die out of itself.”94 Huback was convinced that 
bonded labour was highly prevalent in several districts in Bihar and Orissa, counting 60,000 
in total, or nine percent of the population in the Palamau district alone. But contrary to the 
expectation that the kamiauti would die out by itself, he believed that it actually increased.95 
Furthermore, Huback reported that there were no records of prosecutions under the IPC 
Section 370 and 374, even though he was convinced that there had been eligible cases.96 
Initially, the bill was titled The Bihar and Orissa Agricultural Labourers Bill and was 
intended to limit the time period of bonded labour arrangements. It also provided for the 
regulation of other terms and conditions of agricultural labourers in Bihar and Orissa, the 
Santal Parganas and the Angul District. The act provided that all bonds—kamia agreements—
were legal, as long as they were written on paper, stamped and officially registered by a 
magistrate. The bill further regulated that such an agreement could not exceed the period of 
one year and the labourer needed to be adequately remunerated (Art. 4. (1)). In Article 5 the 
bill provided that kamia agreements are not hereditary. But even this bill contained a 
provision criminalising the breach of contract: Article 7 (2) provided for a punishment fee if a 
kamia labourer did not fulfil his or her obligation.97 
Dingwaney explains that the adopted act served rather for the regulation of bonded 
labour than for the liberation of bonded labourers.98 Prakash, on the other hand, states that this 
 
92 The report was actually published in 1880. 
93 Letter to the Government of India from J. A. Huback, Secretary to the Government of Bihar and Orissa, 
Revenue Department, dated September 12 1919, National Archives of India, November 1920, 35, item No. 1. 
94 Mr. A. Forbes, Commissioner of Chota Nagpur, 1898, quoted in a letter from the Hon’ble Mr. J. A. Huback, 
Secretary to the Government of Bihar and Orissa, Revenue Department, dated September 12 1919, National 
Archives of India, November 1920, 35, item No. 1. 
95 Letter to the Government of India from J. A. Huback, Secretary to the Government of Bihar and Orissa, 
Revenue Department, dated September 12 1919, National Archives of India, November 1920, 36, item No. 1. 
96 Letter to the Government of India from J. A. Huback, Secretary to the Government of Bihar and Orissa, 
Revenue Department, dated September 12 1919, National Archives of India, November 1920, 35, item No. 1. 
97 National Archives of India, November 1920; the act is copied in the Appendix. 
98 DINGWANEY, 1985, p. 324–325. 
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act was “designed to abolish bonded labour.”99 From reviewing the internal discussions, it 
appears that the intention of the act was somewhere in between: The act did regulate bonded 
labour—it permitted bondage for the period of one year100—but its immediate or complete 
abolition was not intended. The state tried to become a regulatory party within the 
employer/worker relation in the kamiauti system. The government hoped to contribute to the 
decline of these bonded labour arrangements.101 The legislators acted like insurrectionaries: 
They rejected the institutional status quo, seeking instead to change its rules in order to 
improve the working conditions of bonded labourers. 
The authors of the legislation saw clearly that this act did not directly serve to abolish 
slavery: The defined “object of this Bill is to deal with agreements entered into by labourers 
in consideration of advances made to them by their employer.”102 The Statement of Objectives 
addresses the observation that bonded labourers were limited in their physical movement and 
often inherited the debt, and the government deemed such practices to be “contrary to public 
policy.”103 Therefore, the intention was to end such relations in the long run.104 Extracts of the 
Proceedings of the Legislative Council of Bihar and Orissa105 at a meeting held on July 30 
1920 reveal that also some respondents strongly doubted that this law would have any effect. 
While the member Nur, for instance, agreed that there was a need for such an act, he 
explained that this “legislation has not only a legal value of its own from a lawyer’s point of 
view, but it has also a moral value.”106 
The (renamed) Bihar and Orissa Kamiauti Agreements Bill, as well as the ensuing 
discussion in the legislature, demonstrate the despair of the policymakers: They were 
confronted with an implementation gap, as the continued existence of the kamiauti system 
was contrary to ‘public policy’—the Act V as well as the IPC. At the same time, the legislators 
were not convinced that an act would have the intended positive effect and expected the 
implementation gap to continue. But there was no suggestion to confront violators more 
vigorously than with the above enumerated measures. From Nur’s explanation, the symbolic 
 
99 PRAKASH, 2002, p. 160. 
100 DINGWANEY, 1985. 
101 The Bihar and Orissa Kamiauti Agreements Law, 1920: Statement of Objectives, National Archives of India, 
November 1920, p. 20. 
102 National Archives of India, November 1920, p. 20. 
103 National Archives of India, November 1920, p. 20. 
104 Extracts from the Proceedings of the Legislative Council of Bihar and Orissa at a Meeting, held on July 30 
1920, National Archives of India, November 1920. 
105 This council was constituted before the implementation of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms; the first 
reformed council session was held in February and March 1921, Government of India, 1922, ii. 
106 Extracts from the Proceedings of the Legislative Council of Bihar and Orissa at a Meeting, held on July 30 
1920, National Archives of India, November 1920. 
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value of the law appears of importance, as well as the principle of hope, but also a sense of 
realism of what was achievable through only passing a law. The law which the Legislative 
Council adopted was weak: It did not provide penal sanctions for violations and did not bring 
the kamiauti agreements under the purview of the IPC Sections 367, 370, 371 or 374. 
Table 11. Characteristics of the formal institution (Kamiauti Agreements Act, 1920) 
Law Definition Bonded labour Timeline Punishment Rehabilitation 
Competent 
authorities 
Bihar and 
Orissa 
Kamiauti 
Agreements 
Act, 1920 
No Yes Yes No107 No Yes 
 
Other governments and legislative assemblies became also proactive in making 
legislation against bonded labour: Ambedkar introduced A Bill to Abolish the Kothi System in 
Bombay in 1937;108 three years later S. V. Parulekar, also member and worker’s delegate to 
the Bombay Legislative Assembly,109 introduced the Free or Forced or Compulsory Labour 
Punishment Bill on April 13 1939. This bill, which never became a law, was copied in parts 
from the ILO Forced Labour Convention, but aimed at the abolition of bonded labour.110 In 
1947 the Government of Bombay appointed a committee to research the social and economic 
conditions of halis—bonded labourers in the Bombay presidency, and found that 14 percent 
of the total population of the Surat District were halis.111 In Madras the legislature adopted the 
Madras Agency Debt Bondage Abolition Regulation Act in 1940; and the Central Provinces 
and Berar adopted the Kabadi System Regulation in Bastar in Madhya Pradesh in 1943. In 
January of 1939 the Legislative Council of Sindh discussed the Sindh Prevention of Free or 
Forced or Compulsory Labour Bill.112  
The princely states followed with legislation on bonded labour as well: In June 1929 
the All India States Peoples’ Conference (AISPC), which united several political movements 
in the princely states, had adopted a resolution in which it requested the Indian princess to 
 
107 There is no explicit provision in cases of violation beyond deeming contracts void, Art. 4 (1). 
108 Bombay Legislative Assembly Debates, 1937. 
109 The Millowners' Association Bombay, 1939, p. 51. 
110 Bombay Legislative Council, April 13 1939, p. 2796. Bill reprinted in The Millowners' Association Bombay, 
1939, p. 319–321. 
111 ILO Delhi Office, June 1947. 
112 For an overview of the available legislations directly or indirectly concerned with bonded labour see 
DHAMNE/GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, 1956. Unfortunately, in several cases Dhamne only mentions existing 
legislation or ordinances without indicating their titles. 
Chapter 4  
2nd Episode: British Raj,  
1919-1946 
 
 
155 
abolish all forms of compulsory labour.113 In 1931, the AISPC turned also to the LN, 
submitting petitions against the extraction of forced labour in the princely states.114 In 
Hyderabad, the Bhagela Regulation of 1936 and the Hyderabad Bhagela Agreement 
Regulation of 1943 were adopted. The former regulation was reported to the League of 
Nations.115 The LN Advisory Committee of Experts praised Hyderabad’s effort and invited 
other Indian states’ “attention to the detailed information (…) as to the excellent results 
obtained by energetic action.”116 Such praise was received with some embarrassment on the 
side of the British, who explained in internal communication that  
 
it is understood that their [Advisory Committee of Experts] intention was to imply that 
the example of Hyderabad might be followed in British India. In their 1938 Report 
they say that the success (…) of the Hyderabad Government is regarded by the 
Committee as an example to every country in which forms of agricultural debt-slavery 
still prevail.117  
 
The League of Nations’ attention to slavery, as well as the comments by the Advisory 
Committee of Experts on the Slavery Convention, in some cases opened the possibility of 
change, particularly where the conventions served as templates. In the case of the Bihar and 
Orissa Kamiauti Agreements Act, this was already on the way before the LN or ILO took up 
their work, but gained momentum as soon as these organisations began to be operational. 
 
International Level 
I personally have no doubt that, if this Convention is accepted by the nations and carried into 
effect, it will constitute one of the greatest advances towards complete human freedom that 
has ever been made. I believe that it will free tens or hundreds of thousands of unhappy beings 
from conditions which closely resemble slavery and which now exist.118 
—Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, 1925 
 
With the Versailles Treaty, which officially formalised the end of World War I, the 
signatories119 installed the International Labour Organisation120 and the League of Nations.121 
 
113 ILO Delhi Office, June 1929. The AISPC met for the first time in 1927. Soon, the INC became involved and 
in 1939 Nehru became its president. 
114 MCQUADE, 2019, p. 22. 
115 League of Nations, 1937, p. 57–58. 
116 League of Nations, 1937, 13, para. 61. 
117 League of Nations, 1939, p. 9–10. 
118 Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, British Delegate to the League of Nations, 1925, quoted in ALLAIN, 2008, p. 8. 
119 Germany, United States of America, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, 
Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, the Kingdom of Hejaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, das Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Siam, Czechoslovakia, Uruguay. 
120 Peace Conference, April 1 1919; Allied and Associated Powers/Germany, June 28 1919, Part VIII. 
121 Allied and Associated Powers/Germany, June 28 1919, Part I; League of Nations, June 28 1919. 
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The Covenant of the League of Nations, adopted on April 29 1919, already called its members 
to make provisions for fair labour conditions in its Article 23 and to end the slave trade in 
colonial territories. Territories ruled by other nations under B and C Mandates had to abolish 
slavery under the LN Covenant with the exception of public works and services, but for which 
remuneration of labour became mandatory.122 The ILO held its first conference in Washington 
in 1919 and the LN began its operations with its first council meeting on January 16 1920. 
With the LN and the ILO, the participating states installed two permanent governmental 
agencies that also committed to the issue of slavery and forced labour. With those two 
institutions the stage was set: The idea of the norm of the abolition of slavery had taken root, 
and the norm’s cascade was about to take place. 
 
The League of Nations 
On September 21 1922 the League of Nations adopted a resolution in which the Assembly 
decided that the issue of slavery should be on the agenda of the fourth Assembly and 
requested a report to be prepared by the Council.123 In the memorandum sent back to the LN, 
the colonial government outlined the situation in India, explaining as follows: 
 
Slavery in the more civilized parts of India long ago disappeared; predial servitude, 
which continued in a mild form in certain areas, died out more slowly. 
As the frontier of the Empire extended the Act of 1843 was applied to the 
newly acquired regions with the least possible delay. (…) For instance in Chitral State 
on the North West Frontier bondsmen of the type of household servants and field 
labourer had long been regarded as constituting a valuable form of property. (…) 
Reports received from India during the past 10 years show that practices still 
exist in some places on the confines of the Indian Empire which approximate to 
slavery. The measures taken are gradually, but rapidly bringing about their abolition. 
Outside British jurisdiction they will continue; (…). 
(…) [I]t is anticipated that slavery will cease to exist in two or three years, just 
as it had ceased to exist amongst other tribes and in more settled areas since the British 
Government was introduced. (…) 
Meanwhile the so-called slaves are little different from servants. The 
administered districts are close at hand into which they can move if ill treated or 
desirous of leaving their masters. While conditions vary slightly along the border in 
the different tribes with the intensity of the administrative control it can be stated 
without hesitation that even among the tribes most recently brought under political 
control the practice of keeping slaves will soon be a thing of the past.124 
 
 
122 League of Nations, June 28 1919. 
123 National Archives of India, 1923. 
124 Undated memorandum (sent to the India Office approximately between December 1922 and January 1923), 
National Archives of India, 1923, p. 33–35. 
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The quoted parts of this memorandum are interesting for several reasons: The authors limited 
the issue of slavery to the border, tribal and newly acquired areas of the British Raj. These not 
yet fully administered regions were juxtaposed to the British ruled territory. According to the 
correspondents, slavery was successfully banished from British India. The British Empire did 
not reach to the remote border areas, mainly because in the border regions competing forces 
endangered the implementation of the abolition of slavery.  
Through these statements, the idea of the civilising mission shines through: Areas 
where the British did not rule, law and order were in peril and slavery was still not effectively 
abolished. The authors of the memorandum even underlined the necessity of British 
domination over India, if slavery should be abolished, since there can be no trust and reliance 
on the local rulers and regional customs. Other evidence which was already available 
indicated that these statements did not reveal the whole extend of slavery in India: During the 
development of the Bihar and Orissa Kamiauti Agreements Act, the estimates on the 
prevalence of indebted kamias suggested that also directly administered territories were 
affected.125 Additional evidence published shortly after the above quoted correspondence, in 
1928, showed that indebtedness and slave labour126 could be found “far beyond the confines 
of a single province.”127 
This memorandum also fails to define slavery. By refraining from giving the terms of 
reference, the correspondents alleviated the British administration from responsibility and 
disguised their failure to abolish slavery in the form of debt bondage or extraction of coerced 
labour under the WBCA. Interestingly, the memorandum described bonded labour, calling it 
‘predial servitude,’ ‘modified system of servitude,’ or ‘practices which approximate to 
slavery.’128 Effectively it is not at all clear what these terms meant. And while these 
descriptions seemed to deny that these forms of slavery and servitude constitute slavery, the 
very mentioning of these labour relations within this context proved them wrong. The reports 
of the regional administrations and the cases at the courts, or the efforts of the presidencies, 
such as the attempt of the Legislative Council of Bihar and Orissa against the kamiauti 
 
125 Letter to the Government of India from the J. A. Huback, Secretary to the Government of Bihar and Orissa, 
Revenue Department, dated September 12 1919, National Archives of India, November 1920, 36, item No. 1. 
126 Royal Commission on Agriculture in India, 1928, p. 575 [the pagination of this document is inconsistent, 
therefore I refer to the page number of the pdf document]. 
127 Royal Commission on Agriculture in India, 1928, p. 573 [the pagination of this document is inconsistent, 
therefore I refer to the page number of the pdf document]; on debt in agriculture in Punjab, see DARLING, 1925. 
128 Undated memorandum (sent to the India Office approximately between December 1922 and January 1923), 
National Archives of India, 1923, p. 33–35. 
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system,129 were not addressed. The LN was not satisfied with the memorandum, pointed at its 
shortcomings and requested that the India Office provide clarification on what and how 
exactly the abolition of slavery was enforced.130 
The Council of the League of Nations reminded the League members on December 11 
1923 to report on the legislative status as well as the status of implementation of the abolition 
of slavery. The idea was to collect as much information as possible to determine which forms 
of slavery were prevalent in order to achieve “the gradual suppression of all forms of 
slavery.”131 On July 9 1924 the Temporary Slavery Commission met for the first time. Issues 
addressed were, among others, the slave trade, domestic slavery and forced labour.132 The 
draft convention was written by the United Kingdom, which also submitted the draft to the 
UN Supplementary Slavery Convention of 1957.133 The original definition of slavery of the 
convention was quite extensive, and in the discussions bonded labour was also addressed. In 
the first meeting of the Slavery Commission several participants clarified that debt bondage 
should be included,134 and in 1924, the drafting committee defined slavery as “the status of a 
person over whom another person or group of persons exercises the power attaching to 
proprietorship; or is the holding of a pledge or who is complied to serve such other person or 
group of persons for an undetermined time.”135 The participants included explicitly debt 
bondage, child marriage, voluntary or involuntary subjections, and domestic slavery.136 
Within their work on the Slavery Convention, the League also requested information 
of its members on the issue of forced labour. The Government of India forwarded these 
requests to the presidencies and the taluks,137 asking for reports on relevant legislation, 
estimates of prevalence and a description of forms of forced labour. Usually the returned 
reports were rather short, making reference to the IPC being in place, declaring that officials 
occasionally requested forced labour for public works, though remunerated. These responses 
were compiled into a memorandum and sent to the India Office. This time the Bihar and 
Orissa Kamiauti Agreements Act of 1920 was addressed in the internal communications. The 
 
129 The regional denomination for bonded labour. 
130 Letter of the League of Nations, December 22 1922, National Archives of India, 1923. 
131 League of Nations, letter communicated to the Council, 1923 National Archives of India, 1923. 
132 Memorandum by the Secretary-General of the LN, The Question of Slavery, Geneva, August 4 1924 National 
Archives of India, 1923, p. 4. 
133 ALLAIN, 2008, p. 7. 
134 League of Nations, 1924, p. 10. 
135 Definition of slavery in the Draft Convention, 1925, printed in ALLAIN, 2008, p. 52 
136 ALLAIN, 2008, p. 76. 
137 Administrative sub-units. 
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discussants agreed that the act was not effective.138 The Department of Education, Health and 
Lands explained that the government was aware of the problem and also the prevalence of the 
kamiauti system in other regions. The memorandum further explained for the Madras 
Presidency, that the kamiauti system is “dying out with the growth of a healthier public 
opinion and the local Govt. apparently do not consider it necessary to take any special steps to 
combat it.”139 
In the final memorandum sent to the Indian delegation to the League, The practice of 
forced labour so far as it exists in British India of August 1926, the extraction of forced 
labour for public purposes was enumerated and the authors chose to include debt bondage, 
such the kamiauti system in this report: 
 
In theory the system of ‘man-mortgage’ under which a padayal bound himself or his 
son, or both, to work for the same master for a lifetime in consideration of an advance 
of money, is now extinct, but in effect, the system of advances (…) sometimes leads to 
a not dissimilar condition [of forced labour].140 
 
Regarding their success in abolishing the kamiauti system, the authors observed that 
legislations, such as the Bihar and Orissa Kamiauti Agreements Act, 1920, were not effective, 
“mainly owing to the ignorance and inertia of the kamias, whose rescue was intended.”141 
While arguing that these forms of labour exploitation were declining, the Government of 
India reported these forms of labour exploitation as forms of forced labour. 
The members of the Temporary Slavery Commission watered down the wording of the 
convention, and abstained from explicitly naming the different forms of labour exploitation 
which some of the participants deemed to be slavery. The definition adopted by the LN reads: 
“Slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to 
the right of ownership are exercised.”142 Allain has not found any archival traces on the 
discussion and explanations as to why the definition of the earlier Draft Convention was not 
adopted.143 In his report on the Temporary Slavery Commission, Viscount Cecil of Chelwood 
 
138 Internal communication, dated April 16 1926, National Archives of India, 1926 June. 
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clarified that debt bondage was supposed to be covered in Article 1144 of the Slavery 
Convention: 
 
This modification [omission of terms] was made because it was believed that such 
conditions came within the definition of slavery contained in the first Article and that 
no further prohibition of them in expressed terms was necessary. This applies not only 
to domestic slavery but to all those conditions mentioned by the Temporary Slavery 
Commission and to which I referred last year, i.e., “debt slavery,” (…). Even if, as is 
possible, these last practices do not come under the definition of slavery as it is given 
in Article 1, the Commission is unanimously of the opinion that they must be 
combated.145 
 
The terms forced labour and slavery in relation to bonded labour were actually 
conflated: In the very same document, a speech of Sir William Vincent is quoted, in which he 
described debt bondage as a form of private forced labour. He also mentioned the WBCA, 
which just had been repealed in India, and brought the extraction of labour and penal 
sanctions under the provisions of the Slavery Convention.146 And while the draft convention’s 
Article 2 originally contained the words “domestic slavery and similar conditions”147—similar 
conditions were explained to encompass “debt slavery”148—these terms became summarised 
under Article 2 (b) as “slavery in all its forms.”149 The original draft of the Council and the 
debates of the Temporary Slavery Commission on slavery were in strong contrast to the final 
output of the convention. Regarding the final definition of slavery, the participating states 
created a high level of discretion of interpreting the meaning of the convention. Viscount 
Cecil described it as “general principles which might be adopted usefully by all civilized 
nations as a minimum code in the matter of slavery.”150 While bonded labour was not 
enumerated in the adopted convention, the intent was to encompass bonded labour. This was 
 
144 This observation was also made by the successor organisation, the UN, in 1953 when debating the Slavery 
Convention and the question if and how the UN could continue the work of the LN. While observing that debt 
bondage and other forms of labour exploitation were originally supposed to be included in the convention, the 
Secretary-General suggested studying in more detail the current forms of slavery and if they would fall under the 
purview of the Slavery Convention, United Nations Economic and Social Council, January 27 1953, 27, 29.  
145 CECIL, February 5 1927, p. 218. 
146 Report of a Speech by Sir William Vincent in the Assembly, September 25 1926, 244-46, in CECIL, February 
5 1927, p. 246. 
147 ALLAIN, 2008, p. 59. 
148 ALLAIN, 2008, p. 56. 
149 League of Nations, 1926, Art. 2 (b). 
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9 1925, 24-5, quoted in ALLAIN, 2008, p. 8. 
Chapter 4  
2nd Episode: British Raj,  
1919-1946 
 
 
161 
underlined by the requests of the Advisory Committee in the mid-1930s that the British 
colonial power submit follow-up reports on bonded labour.151 
British India became member to the convention with reservations on June 18 1927. 
With reference to the possibility of making such reservation provided in Article 9 of the 
Slavery Convention, British India removed several territories from the purview of Article 
2(b): The princely states under suzerainty152 of the British colonial power, Burma, the Naga 
tracts, the Sadiya and Balipara Frontier Tracts in Assam, the tribal areas of the Naga Hills and 
the Lushai Hills.153 Most of those regions had been identified as the un-administered 
territories, not penetrated by colonial rule, where the British found slavery to be highly 
prevalent in the memorandum quoted above.154 The princely states were protected from 
interference by the British via bilateral contracts.155 At the League, the representative of India, 
Sir William Vincent, who earlier was a member of the Indian Government’s Home 
Department, explained that “[t]he reason for this reservation as regards the Indian States is not 
that slavery is prevalent there, for this is not the case at all.”156 This was a blunt lie, as shown 
by the internal communications between the India Office and the Government of India, which 
clearly wanted to protect itself: Referring to the issue, Mr. Patrick explained: 
 
The reason why it seemed to me desirable to have the word “suzerainty” inserted in 
the Convention was to guard against the possibility of it being contested before the 
Permanent Court of International Justice that the Indian States had not been 
excluded.157 
 
The parties to the convention were requested to report on the situation of slavery in 
their states. The Government of India circulated the final version of the adopted Slavery 
Convention not only to the directly governed presidencies, provinces, and the courts, but also 
to the representing agents at the princely states for their instruction.158 The representative of 
 
151 League of Nations, 1936, p. 24–26, 1937, 12-14, 17. 
152 Territories under suzerainty could legally be exempted from the reach of the Slavery Convention. 
153 League of Nations, 1926, p. 177–178. 
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National Archives of India, 1923, p. 33–35. 
155 MIERS, 2008, p. 28. 
156 Sixth Committee of the League of Nations, 1926, p. 134. 
157 Letter from Patrick to E. J. Turner, India Office, dated June 5 1926, British Library, June 21 1926 - January 8 
1927, p. 33. 
158 Letter of the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department to the 
Chief Secretaries to the Governments, the Presidents at the princely states, the Agents to the Government 
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the Maharaja of Mysore replied to this request his intention to collaborate on that matter.159 
One summary of the impression of the residents at the princely states on their perception of 
what could be achieved was less positive. One officer remarked that the princely states 
accepted the norm of slavery abolition, but that implementation would be achieved only 
slowly. He indicated that the reasons were traditional customs as well as underdeveloped 
administrative system.160 
In light of the interrogations of the League, the Government of India started to collect 
information on the occurrence of slavery in its administrative sub-units, the residencies. 
During this information collection, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bihar and Orissa 
reported in a letter to the Foreign and Political Department on March 26 1926161—probably 
following the definition of chattel slavery. He explained that the slave trade and slavery “in 
the common sense of the term”162 stood abolished. Referring to the Bihar and Orissa 
Kamiauti Agreements Act, he explained that the act failed to end “agricultural bondage, which 
is on the border line of slavery.”163 This letter clearly depicts the problem of the absence of a 
definition of slavery and other terms used. This observer saw bonded labour arrangements and 
noticed their similarity to slavery, when he described them as ‘at the border line of slavery.’164 
He also made clear that this problem was not confined to the border regions or small areas, 
but an Indian-wide problem that needed to be addressed by the central government.165  
The Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras welcomed suggestions to adopt 
provisions to align legislation with the Slavery Convention. He reported in his letter to the 
Foreign and Political Department on March 23 1926: 
 
In theory, the system of “man mortgage” under which a padayal bound himself or his 
son or both to work for the same master for a life time in consideration of an advance 
of money is no [now] extinct. But in effect the pernicious system of advances which 
the ryots (farmers) undoubtedly encourage in order to increase their hold over their 
 
159 Response letter of the Maharaja of Mysore to the letter of the Secretary to the Resident to the Maharaja of 
Mysore, dated September 24 1927, National Archives of India, 1927b. 
160 Letter from K. S. Fritze, Political Agent Baghalkhand, to the Sec. to the Hon’ble Agent to the Gov. Gen in 
Central India, dated June 29 1928, National Archives of India, 1927, p. 159. 
161 Letter from the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bihar and Orissa, dated March 26 1926, National 
Archives of India, 1926 June. 
162 Letter from the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bihar and Orissa, dated March 26 1926, National 
Archives of India, 1926 June. 
163 Letter from the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bihar and Orissa, dated March 26 1926, National 
Archives of India, 1926 June. 
164 Letter from the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bihar and Orissa, dated March 26 1926, National 
Archives of India, 1926 June. 
165 Letter from the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bihar and Orissa, dated March 26 1926, National 
Archives of India, 1926 June. 
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padayals sometimes leads to a condition not dissimilar from “man mortgage.” In the 
Malabar District the Cheruma or Pulaya farm-servant is (…) looked upon as a sort of 
slave and is sometimes even leased out to another landowner as a servant by his own 
master, but, on the whole, he is kindly treated and well-paid and lives in comparative 
comfort.166 
 
The above cited communications demonstrate that political actors knew of the issue of bonded 
labour in the presidencies. The notion that these forms of labour exploitation constituted 
benign forms of slavery persisted. Yet the willingness to comply with international standards 
was expressed and the administrators saw bonded labour as an issue that was covered by the 
Slavery Convention. 
In the following years, the LN Advisory Committee of Experts on Slavery held 
extraordinary meetings between 1934 and 1938, at which they reviewed and commented on 
the submissions regarding slavery made by the governments that were regularly invited to 
report to the committee. Their work continued into the World War II. The committee 
observed that “[t]he civilisation and development of Asia have not (…) been successful in 
abolishing ‘debt slavery’ and ‘serfdom.’”167 The committee explicitly referred to the 
submission of the Government of India, which contained memoranda from Madras, Orissa 
and the princely states of Rajputana and Hyderabad, which reported on their issues with ‘debt 
bondage,’ ‘debt slavery’ and ‘hereditary domestic services.’168 The author of the draft brief on 
the League’s progress regarding slavery observed that the reservations of British India 
regarding the convention’s application, “has created a suspicion in the Slavery Committee and 
generally at Geneva that apart from the admitted survival of certain systems of debt bondage, 
graver abuses exist in the [Princely] States.”169 Sir George Maxwell made a submission on 
India, including the comments to one memorandum provided by Mohandas Gandhi. Maxwell 
reported on the different forms of debt bondage, kamia, rajwar, bhageela, hali, gothi, and 
others.170 The contribution of Gandhi confirmed that bonded labour was prevalent in the 
whole British Raj.171 The Advisory Committee requested that the Government of India submit 
detailed reports on this issue.172 The reports that the Government of India received for the 
committee’s meeting in 1939 were forwarded to the advisory committee, but not without 
 
166 Letter from the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bihar and Orissa, dated March 26 1926, National 
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omissions: “The Madras and Orissa Report were passed on to Geneva, although in the former 
case without certain annexures which seemed to present so bad a picture that it was 
considered desirable to withhold them.”173 The committee observed that the memoranda did 
not contain information on measures taken against bonded labour—an observation that the 
Government of India transmitted to the local governments.174 This international supervision 
and criticism apparently was met with discomfort by the representatives of British India. 
 
International Labour Organisation 
Already laid down in the founding document of the ILO, slavery and forced labour were the 
core mandates of the ILO. The increasing exploitation of the colonies “required a level of 
manpower that was simply not to be had on a voluntary basis.”175 In 1926 the ILO took up its 
work on the issue of forced labour, which would ultimately lead to the adoption of the Forced 
Labour Convention of 1930. The League of Nations’ Temporary Commission on Slavery had 
made references to forced labour and argued that it was the prime matter of the ILO, and, 
therefore, the League would not concern itself with this issue.176 In a resolution, the Assembly 
of the LN asked the Council of the League to inform the ILO on the progress made and to 
caution the ILO’s work on forced labour to ensure to formulate provisions that prevent 
“forced or compulsory labour from developing into conditions analogous to slavery.”177 In 
May 1926 an expert commission, the Committee of Experts on Native Labour, was 
established.178 In 1929 the ILO Governing Body invited the member states to submit 
comments on the draft convention via circulation of a questionnaire. This was the first time 
so-called native-labour, or labour in the colonies, became a topic of the International Labour 
Conference.179 
Based on the submissions of the member states, the commission concluded that there 
are three forms of forced labour: Forced labour extracted for general public purposes, forced 
labour for local public purposes, and forced labour for private purposes.180 Regarding the first, 
the committee found that exceptions would be possible in cases of emergencies, such as 
natural disasters. Where the most abuses were found and where the committee argued forced 
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labour should be strictly controlled was the realm of public works, such as the construction of 
railways. Here the committee suggested provisions regulating the age and gender of the work 
force and the length of time the worker should be compelled to work, as well as making 
remuneration of forced labourers mandatory.181 While the French, Belgian, Dutch, Portuguese 
and South African colonial powers were against a formalisation of the difference between 
private and public forced labour, the British were in favour of abolishing forced labour by 
private agents and managed to correct this distinction.182 
In Article 2 the ILO Forced Labour Convention defines forced labour as “all work or 
service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the 
said person has not offered himself voluntarily.”183 Being entered ‘voluntarily,’ bonded labour 
does not fall under this definition. The Supplementary Slavery Convention of 1957 along with 
the discussion of the Temporary Slavery Commission of the LN, again make clear: Bonded 
labour was considered a form of slavery and therefore no issue to concern the ILO. This 
separation of terms and mandates became only blurred in the 1970s.184 India ratified the ILO 
convention after independence on November 30 1954. 
 
Conclusion 
Looking at the provisions of the LN Slavery Convention, bonded labour seems to not fall 
under the definition of slavery given in Article 1 (1). The discussion at the LN and the 
comments of Cecil make clear that bonded labour was supposed to fall under the definition, 
but then got summarised under the provisions of Article 2. Describing the kamiauti system as 
forced labour, for instance, would not be correct within the terminology of the LN and ILO—
also because voluntarily entered forced labour arrangements were excluded by the ILO 
Forced Labour Convention. But why did administrative and political actors describe bonded 
labour as forced labour? In the consulted sources, I have not found an explicit explanation for 
this terminological conflation. On the one hand, there was clearly no agreement on how to 
name bonded labour arrangements. The ILO’s Forced Labour Convention required that 
forced labourers be remunerated, state sanctioned and supervised. Therefore, it was maybe 
considered as less problematic and not as evil as slavery, an explanation that would also fit the 
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earlier evaluations of slavery in India being a ‘mild’185 version of slavery. This is also 
reflected in the previously quoted statement of the League of Nations, in which they caution 
the ILO to prevent forced labour to merge into conditions that resemble slavery.186 The British 
behaviour towards reporting on bonded labour or slavery in India shows that with the 
incidence of slavery came a bad reputation of the state; the term ‘forced labour’ could 
overcome, to a certain extent, the negative connotation of slavery. 
 
Central Level 
If I were viceroy of India (...) I would abolish the system of forced labour which prevails, 
contrary to law, in all parts of India.187 
—Lajpat Rai, 1909 
 
In 1919 Malaviya reminded the Imperial Council of his request of 1917188 to repeal the Act 
XIII, hinting again at the upcoming International Labour Conference.189 But the matter was 
not discussed again until four years later.190 Narayan Malhar (N. M.) Joshi, founder of the All 
India Trade Union Congress (AITUC, founded on October 31 1920), and recently nominated 
labour representative to the assembly in 1921,191 moved a resolution in which he requested the 
removal of the WBCA and the respective provisions of the IPC in September 1921.192 He 
pointed out that these provisions were “putting all sorts of liabilities upon the poorer 
classes”193 and that the government was “always kind to the higher classes and not the lower 
classes.”194 If the act served only the purpose to recover lost advances, he would agree with it. 
The provisions to criminalise breaching contracts, Joshi argued, resulted in conditions 
comparable to slavery.195 By seeking the displacement of the Act XIII, he and the members of 
the assembly acted like insurrectionaries. 
B. S. Kamant opposed the repeal, speaking as a representative of employers.196 He 
explained that the WBCA served in a variety of ways—Joshi only spoke of very extreme 
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cases.197 Kamant argued that the workers themselves requested the advances and only because 
of the advances was it possible to secure the necessary labour. As an example, he referred to 
the labour conditions on the tea plantations in Assam, and during the construction of the very 
building in which the assembly had its session. Civil action against runaway labourers would 
be ineffective and the WBCA functioned as a safeguard.198 He responded by trivialising the 
relationship between the obligation to fulfil a contract and the limitation of the movement of 
the labourer due to the outstanding debt, claiming that “[t]here is absolutely no question of 
coercing or torturing (…) [the workmen].”199 Kamant acted as defender of the status quo. 
While not explicitly speaking in favour of slavery he also did not deny that these ‘extreme 
cases’ occurred; yet, he found coercion in fraudulent cases legitimate. In his defence of the 
continuation of the WBCA, Kamant relied on the idea of the contractual obligation and the 
need to uphold this obligation. 
Member Barua also expressed his opposition to the repeal of the Breach of Contract 
Act, explaining that the act mostly served to the advantage of the labourer who, especially 
under strenuous economic conditions, could secure a credit through these advances.200 Barua 
contented that 
 
in the case of advances received in a contract (…) the labourer is never required to 
concern himself with any thought of paying interest, but (…) the advance itself, is 
automatically repaid if the labourer is an honest persona and performs the contract as 
stipulated originally. Then, even if the labourer should prove to be dishonest (…) to 
perform the contract he is not punished at once.201 
 
This representative also expressed his deep trust in the employers and distrust towards 
the workers. Simultaneously, the paternalist paradigm was the underlying idea—the poor 
were depicted as being charitably supported by advances, a line of argument that put the 
burden of responsibility on the victim. The numbers of convictions of labourers for defecting 
from contractual agreements was officially low, which indicates that the act was a successful 
tool of coercion.202 In effect the labourers barely had any legal means at hand to defend 
themselves against abuses. Furthermore, a labourer’s resistance to a magistrate’s order within 
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the provisions of the WBCA was highly unlikely due to the financial burden that would come 
along with the instigation of a legal case.203 
Sir William Vincent, member of the government, Home Department, who also became 
a representative of India at the League of Nations,204 commented on the discussion and 
summarised that the Government of India was against the repeal of the WBCA:205 
 
[T]he Government are in some difficulty. It is realised, that there is great deal of 
sympathy with the principle of complete repeal. Such an idea is in accordance with 
modern feeling. It is in accordance with the practice in European countries. (…) [W]e 
found that the majority of authorities were opposed to the course. (…) and it cannot be 
said with any reason that it [the WBCA] results in slavery or anything like it.206 
 
A few years later, this open resistance to the repeal of the WBCA did not prevent Sir William 
Vincent to explain to the LN that “the Government of India has made (…) every effort to get 
rid of the evils [of penal contract law] against which this Convention is directed.207 
Sir William Vincent suggested consulting the local governments and public opinion 
regarding the repeal of the WBCA and the respective sections of the IPC. Das explained at a 
later discussion that the circulations of bills were a strategy to delay the adoption of bills.208 
Vincent envisioned eighteen months209 until the final decision could be made by the house. 
He explained that if the majority was in favour of the repeal, the Government of India would 
not veto against it.210 Representing the government, Vincent made no use of the veto, but he 
used his power to stall institutional change. Thereby the government tried to preserve the 
status quo, while at the same time it appeared ambiguous about its own preferences. Referring 
to ‘public opinion,’ Vincent made clear that the government was not acting in a black box and 
willing to remove the WBCA if the opinions collected favoured this move. Upon this 
promise, Joshi withdrew his resolution under protest—“Cries of ‘No, No.’”211 
On October 1 1921 the Government of India’s Home Department asked for the 
opinion of the governments of the Indian states on the repeal of the WBCA.212 In the 
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meantime, the members of the assembly kept the topic on the agenda: The Central Legislative 
Assembly adopted a resolution to abolish impressed labour on January 24 1922, and N. M. 
Joshi reminded the government of its task to investigate this matter.213 This was followed by 
another resolution to remove the repeal of the WBCA and the Sections 490 and 492 of the 
IPC.214 
In early 1923, before the eighteen months had passed, K. C. Neogy moved the 
Workman's Breach of Contract Repealing Bill, asking for the repeal by April 1 of 1923.215 
Neogy reminded the Assembly and the government of the discussion held in September 1921. 
He substantiated the urgency of the matter based on the report of the Labour Enquiry 
conducted in Assam, published in late 1922.216 The committee reported that contracts were 
extending the eligible duration of one year and that the tea garden employers and the 
magistrates cooperated in punishing and imprisoning labourers. Furthermore, children under 
the age of eight years were found to be employed under penal contracts.217 The Committee 
expressed its favour of repealing the WBCA, considering “it an anachronism that there should 
be any penal contract at all,” arguing “that the freedom of the coolie is considerably restricted 
under present system.”218 The Labour Enquiry Committee explained in its report that several 
tea plantation owners condemned the abuse of the act,219 but they were against the repeal of 
the Act XIII, which gave them a tool to control labour.220 Others favoured the repeal of the Act 
XIII of 1859, with one proponent arguing that under these changed conditions, employers had 
to improve the working conditions.221 
Based on the insights from the Assam report, Neogy concluded that the act was “an 
anomaly”222 that needed to be undone. Representing the opinion of the government, Mr. A. C. 
Chatterjee summarised the responses to the enquiry of the local governments: With the 
exception of Bengal and Madras, all governments rejected to repeal the WBCA.223 
Commentators on the Report of the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee suggested that 
employers would not suffer from a lack of labourers on the plantations if they payed decent 
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wages to the workers.224 Chatterjee continued to argue in favour of the provisions of the 
WBCA, explaining that for big projects labour had to be transported, and without substantial 
advanced payment, no labour would be secured.225 Referring to the submission of the 
Government of Bombay, he explained that the employers needed security, since they invested 
with advances into the labourers which they could never recover if the worker deserted.226 
Chatterjee did not reject the repeal of the WBCA right away and conceded that a repeal would 
be possible, but that a time frame until 1926 should be granted to employers and industrialists 
to adjust to the changed conditions.227 While he was concerned with the needs of employers, 
he made no mention of the needs of labourers.228 
The members of the assembly seemed to use any possible chance to raise the issue: On 
March 8 1924, N. M. Joshi again tabled the repeal of the WBCA during the Questions and 
Answers.229 The renewed discussion took place during the budget session, and some members 
and the President of the Assembly cautioned Joshi that the repeal of the WBCA was not 
within the scope of that session.230 A few days later the issue was raised again but in much 
more detail. Within the debate on internal labour migration, particularly to Assam, the 
members of the assembly discussed the continued existence of the WBCA.231 B. 
Venkatapatiraju compared the advances to labourers on the Assamese tea plantations to the 
indentured labour system exercised by the British in the colonies outside of India.232 Joshi 
took the chance once more to ask for the repeal of the WBCA and the respective IPC 
Sections. He also reminded the government again that Neogy had withdrawn his bill and that 
he expected the Government of India to draft a bill.233 Using the example of the tea 
plantations and coolie labour, he specified his observation and compared the practices 
exercised under the WBCA to chattel slavery: Tea planters exchanged workers and paid each 
other out while claiming ownership rights over their labourers and when coolies refused to 
work, they were punished.234 B. C. Allen argued against Joshi that the WBCA was barely in 
use, and implied that a repeal was not necessary.235 In addition, Allen relativised the idea that 
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labour conditions under the WBCA resembled slavery by mocking Joshi, explaining that he 
was a “slave to his party.”236 
Finally, on September 13 1924 the Workman’s Breach of Contract (Repealing) Bill 
was discussed. Sir Alexander Muddiman, member of the Home Ministry, presented the bill.237 
He explained that the WBCA “has been considered for some time to be out of place (…), 
although it is possible that it may be wanted in some out of the way places.”238 While the 
representatives of the government had been arguing that the WBCA was hardly used, the bill 
provided for the repeal by April 1 1926. The delay of two years until enforcement was granted 
to allow the administration and employers to adjust to the new circumstances.239 Because the 
act was created by the government, its veto was unlikely. On February 2 1925 the Central 
Legislative Assembly adopted the Workmen’s Breach of Contract (Repealing) Bill.240 
Three days later, the Council of States discussed the submission by the Government of 
India that proposed the repeal of the WBCA. One member of the Council of State explained 
that only the Governments of the Madras and Bengal Presidency had agreed to the repeal, 
while all other governments rejected it.241 Manckji Dadabhoy expressed his frustration about 
the intentions of the government. While still supporting the repeal,242 he explained also that 
employers needed protection from unreliable labourers whom they granted large advance 
payments. He remarked also upon the changed treatment of WBCA cases in the courts and 
complained: “The Courts sometimes in their zeal in interpreting the Statute have dispensed 
with the necessity of requiring independent proof and have accepted the mere fact of an 
advance having been made and of the subsequent bolting of the workman as evidence of guilt 
and have convicted the parties.”243 Similarly he observed a changed attitude in the Legislative 
Assembly which depicted a “general spirit of opposition to capitalism.”244 
From the discussions and contributions of members in the assembly and the council, it 
does not explicitly become clear as to why the government chose to finally move this bill, 
especially after stalling every move in that direction in the previous years. The government 
finally let the Central Legislative Assembly repeal the WBCA, even though most of the 
consulted governments were against the repeal—thereby breaking its promise not to repeal it 
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if the majority of states were against it. The interpretation of the members participating in the 
assembly debates on this change of heart was that the Government of India saw it as “an 
anachronism or an anomaly.”245 
Due to the persistence of assembly members like N. M. Joshi who were strongly 
committed to the representation of labour interests, the repeal of the WBCA was brought 
about. As a member of the first Indian delegation to the International Labour Conference in 
Washington in 1919246 he was probably quite aware of the developments at the international 
level, even though in the debates, the making of international legislation was not invoked. 
After all, the Slavery Convention was underway and the Government of India had been 
communicating with the LN about the situation in India for a few years. Consequently, the 
repeal of the WBCA was not a question of if but when. With the formalisation of the abolition 
of slavery also at the international level, the idea of the abolition of slavery progressed 
towards the third stage, the internalisation of the norm and its acquiring of a taken-for-granted 
quality.247 
The members of the Council of States took notice of the developments at the 
international level and reminded the Government of India about the Slavery Convention, 
questioning its commitment.248 When member Jaffer posed a question on the abolition of 
forced labour in India and the status of the Slavery Convention, the respondent S. R. Das in 
the council explained that in certain sectors, forced labour was legally sanctioned, such as in 
forestry and irrigation, while the extraction of forced labour by private agents was illegal. He 
conceded that its private use was still ongoing in Madras, Bihar and Orissa, but that measures 
were taken to end forced labour249—as for instance by the Bihar and Orissa Kamiauti 
Agreements Act of 1920. Responding to queries of members of the assembly who referred to 
newspaper reports on slavery and the slave trade, the government representative explained 
that slavery was extinct and only a matter of the un-administered areas.250 Within the 
discussion of the League, bonded labour was defined as slavery and the Government of India 
reported on it to the League. But, as shown in the quote above, bonded labour was often 
referred to as forced labour.251  
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The repeal of the WBCA was a significant step, since with it a tool to coerce labour 
was removed and bonded labour relations, for instance, could no longer hold under the 
WBCA in the courts. But with one exception, there were no other attempts at the central level 
to go beyond repealing the WBCA and to mend the weak provisions of existent slavery 
legislation, which the high courts had repeatedly addressed.252 The government actually 
explained in 1921 that it would not take any steps at the central level, as long as the provincial 
legislatures took charge of that matter.253 The discussion of the Bihar and Orissa Kamiauti 
Agreements Act of 1920 showed that this act in fact controlled rather than abolished bonded 
labour. The only additional policy adopted at the central level was a law prohibiting bonded 
child labour: After the Royal Commission on Labour had observed this issue and 
recommended legislation, the government introduced the Children (Pledging of Labour) Bill 
on September 5 of 1932.254 The Legislative Assembly passed the Act to prohibit the pledging 
of the Labour of Children (Act No. II of 1933) on February 6 of 1933, the Council of State 
passed it on February 20 of 1933, and the Governor-General assented on February 24. The 
act, which criminalises turning in children as bonded labourers with punishment for parents, 
guardians, as well as employers, is still in force.255 
 
Formulation of Rights 
While at the central level no further steps were discussed or taken to change the institution of 
the abolition of slavery, the political movements and parties began to explicitly express their 
position towards the issue of bonded labour, forced labour and slavery, as well as labour 
rights. In 1927 the Simon Commission, sent from Britain to India to develop suggestions for 
constitutional reforms,256 was seen as illegitimate by the Indian population and political 
leaders: In February 1928, the All Parties’ Conference established a committee chaired by 
Motilal Nehru to propose a constitutional framework developed for Indians by Indians. 
Among the participating parties and organisations to the conference were the All India 
Muslim League, the All India Trade Union Congress, the Indian National Congress and many 
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more.257 Several of them had developed their proposals for an Indian constitution and the 
committee’s report was the result of bringing those proposals, as well as the work of earlier 
committees of the All Parties’ Conference, together.258 Members of the committee were 
among others N. M. Joshi, who represented the interest of labour, and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, 
who represented the liberal interest.259 The committee was instructed to report on different 
subjects—the structure of parliament, franchise, as well as the “declaration of rights; rights of 
labour and peasantry and [sic] Indian States.”260 The committee suggested a Draft 
Constitution, published in the Nehru Report of 1928. 
The committee stressed particularly the protection of fundamental rights, because the 
colonial government had denied these rights to the Indian people.261 The report showed also 
the struggle between the nationalist movement and the colonial government over providing 
better policies to the marginalised population: 
 
The problem of the ‘depressed’ or ‘suppressed’ classes has come to the front in recent 
years and their present condition is put forward as an argument against the political 
advancement of India. We are certainly of opinion that the Hindus are chiefly 
responsible for this suppression of a large class, but we are equally clear that the 
solicitude for this class which the British government has endeavoured to show has its 
basis on reasons other than humanity or love for this class.262 
 
Among the fundamental rights provisions suggested by the committee263 was the right to 
freedom: “No person shall be deprived of his liberty”264 and “[n]o breach of contract of 
service or abetment thereof shall be made a criminal offence.”265 The report concluded that 
fundamental rights should be secured under any circumstances and be non-derogable.266 This 
conception of inalienable rights could be translated to mean that a person cannot even 
voluntarily sell him- or herself into slavery. The liberty of voluntary submission to 
enslavement has been formulated by a few case laws.267 This possibility renders the right to 
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liberty meaningless, when it can be given up ‘voluntarily’—and the provision in this text 
would mean to forestall this possibility, while a prohibition of bonded labour was not 
explicitly stated.268 
In the Karachi Session of 1931, the INC laid out its proposals for the content of an 
Indian constitution, the Swaraj Resolution. According to Basu, this document contained the 
first constitutive formulations of social policy provisions.269 A constitution supported by the 
INC should include fundamental rights, including labour rights and freedom “from serfdom or 
conditions bordering on serfdom.”270 The intent clearly aimed at removing debt bondage and 
the Sapru Committee suggested in its constitutional outlines of 1945 that “[n]o form of forced 
labour shall be permitted.”271 For the framework of a constitution, the committee also 
suggested the criminalisation of begar.272 These rights provisions constituted first suggestions 
for legal provisions that would be adopted for the independent Indian state. But these rights 
were not only formulations of the prospective constitution, these provisions also intended to 
mark the difference between colonial rule and the aspiring democratic state. 
 
Enforcement 
The public debate on bonded labour and worker conditions reflects the perception of a gap 
between the ideal of the abolition of slavery and the reality: A. V. Thakkar, social worker and 
politician who later became a member of the Constituent Assembly, argued that in some 
Indian states 80-90 percent of the agrarian population were bonded labourers.273 An open 
letter of the Servants of India Society received by Mohandas Gandhi was published in the 
Hindustan Times on July 1 1931. The society described, in the name of 100,000 people from 
Bihar and Orissa, the destitute situation of the low caste members and exposure to begar.274 In 
his additional note to the open letter, Gandhi explained that bonded labourer was “not an 
isolated phenomenon of Bihar. Almost all the provinces have the backward, suppressed, slave 
communities. They are no heritage from the British. We have had them for ages, and all the 
greater shame on us for that.”275 In 1937 the economist Shukla confirmed this observation, 
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stating in his research that the hali “has been called an indentured labourer, a free man de jure 
but serf or slave de facto.”276 
Reliable information on the enforcement status of the abolition of slavery and also 
bonded labour was hardly available. In November 1945 the Government of India appointed a 
Committee of Enquiry to research the issue of forced labour chaired by Varahagiri Venkata 
Giri, who became India’s President from 1969 to 1974. Commenting on the committee, the 
daily newspaper the Hindu noted that “[i]t is pointed out that forms of forced labour are still 
found in certain areas in British India, including some Zamindaries, and in the Indian States, 
where agricultural labourers are generally compelled to work often without payment of 
wages.”277 But the committee never came into being, and, according to Giri, this was because 
the rulers of the princely states resisted this initiative.278 
Evidence regarding slavery and forced labour can be found in the submissions of the 
Indian States and the presidencies to the Advisory Committee on Slavery of the LN during the 
1930s. As discussed earlier, these submissions suggested that in the directly ruled British Raj 
and in the princely states, bonded labour and forced labour were prevalent and not only a 
matter of border regions. Follow-up reports to the LN and the Advisory Committee of Experts 
on Slavery’s evaluation of the performance of British India during the reporting period 
between 1934 and 1938 were negative.279 Due to the beginning of World War II, the Advisory 
Committee ceased to exist,280 and only in the next episode was the issue again brought to life 
at the international level. 
In the communication with the League the Government of India initially styled the 
issue of slavery as a problem of the border areas and un-administered territories. But with 
later reports on the kamiauti system, for instance, it was clear that the labour exploitation 
which the Slavery Convention aimed to abolish, were an all-India problem. But the 
government mobilised against slavery at the border regions: In 1927 the government 
representative Deny Bray reported in the Central Legislative Assembly that military 
expeditions had been conducted at the Burma Frontier in 1926 and 1927. During these 
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expeditions more than 4000 slaves were freed.281 Similar actions for the liberation of bonded 
labourers do not appear in the records and probably did not take place. 
The most comprehensive attempts to investigate labour conditions, which also touched 
upon the issue of bonded labour, were conducted in 1928, 1931 and 1944 by the Royal 
Commission on Agriculture,282 the Royal Commission on Labour, also known as the Whitley 
Commission,283 and the Labour Investigation Committee, also referred to as the Rege 
Committee.284 Since 1946 the Ministry of Labour published the series of the Indian Labour 
Year Book compiled by the Indian Labour Bureau. The bureau was established in October 
1946 and it addressed the issue of forced and bonded labour in the Indian Labour Year 
Book.285 
Referring to the Census of India of 1921, the Royal Commission on Agriculture 
highlighted the importance of its report, because 73.9 percent of the Indian population 
depended on labour in agriculture.286 Among other topics, such as the improvement of soils or 
animal husbandry, the commission dealt with the issue of labour, as well as indebtedness of 
agricultural labourers. The commissioners observed that landless farmers took up credits and 
often became indebted for life, while also binding their offspring. Based on an earlier report 
of Sifton,287 they described the kamiauti system of Bihar and Orissa,288 as well as the similar 
vetti and khambar system, as “vicious system[s] of bond-service.”289 Because labourers were 
unable to ever repay their debt, the commissioners remarked that bonded labour under the 
kamiauti system lasted for life290 and concluded that “the kamia [was] nothing better than a 
slave.”291 The report explained that farmers took credits to buy cattle, tools, or other 
necessities for the agricultural undertaking, also for daily expenses, and ceremonies which the 
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commissioners explained to be “often extravagant,”292 and thereby blaming the labourers for 
their enslavement. 
Regarding the Bihar and Orissa Kamiauti Agreements Act of 1920, the report 
observed that the labourers’ poverty prevented them from making use of the law that was 
supposed to protect them.293 The solution drawn out by the commission went along the lines 
of addressing bonded labour through the debt: Mortgaging of agricultural land as well as 
moneylenders should be strictly controlled; state banks should give out credits.294 The 
committee requested more statistical studies, since there was not sufficient information on the 
problem of indebtedness.295 
The report of the Royal Commission of 1931 also dedicated a chapter to indebtedness 
of workers and advances from employers. It concluded that “the majority of industrial 
workers are in debt for the greater part of their working lives. Many, indeed, are born in debt 
(…) commonly a son assumes responsibility for his father’s debt.”296 Altogether the 
commission estimated that about 66 percent of all workers in India were indebted.297 
According to the report most cases of debt were incurred with money lenders. These money 
lenders charged sky rocketing interest rates298 that kept the debtor in “his own enslavement 
for years.”299 Labourers took credits because their wages did not meet daily needs.300 The 
commissioners explained that indebtedness was a great problem, since the labourers were 
never able to free themselves from the debt and, as a consequence, labourers were 
discouraged to put any effort into their labour.301 They observed that “[t]he debt tends to 
increase rather than to diminish, and the man, and sometimes his family, is bound for life. 
Serfs are even sold and mortgaged.”302 Obviously some of the debt relations observed were 
descriptions of bonded labour. Not all debt-relations were necessarily bonded labour relations, 
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and one question is how many bonded labour relations vanished from sight and became 
subsumed under indebtedness. 
The Commission on Labour also referred to the report of the Commission on 
Agriculture and their description of the bonded labour systems in Bihar and Madras.303 One 
commissioner concluded that “conditions in parts of Bihar and Madras, for example, from 
which recruits [for the Assam tea plantations] are drawn are not far removed from slavery.”304 
In the report’s section on factories and mills, the commissioners observed the pledging of 
children—bonded child labour.305 They compared the phenomenon to indentured labour, but 
they described the adult labourer as entering these contracts of indenture as ‘free agents,’306 
while children did not possess this agency. The report recommended the prohibition of the 
mortgaging of the child’s labour. Implicitly, the commissioners still argued in the line of the 
contractual obligation and the ideology of work: The labourer could give up his freedom and 
submit to an exploitative contract. The authors of the report explained in the chapter on 
Disabilities that poverty was one of the driving forces that pushed the workers to the factories. 
Another reason was the labourers attempt to evade caste-based discrimination and bonded 
labour: “There are traces of feudalism to be found in many parts of the country; and in a few 
areas there is still a system of bond-service which is not far removed from slavery.”307 
In a dedicated paragraph the report addressed the practice of advances by employers 
which served the purpose of binding the labourers to the factory308 or the plantation.309 The 
commissioners found this practice less prevalent than indebtedness, but admitted that the 
practice of advance payments, which they described as a form of unproductive debt, was 
misused by employers.310 They suggested continuing to allow this practice of advance 
payment under certain conditions.311 The report also commented on the effect of the repeal of 
the WBCA: While repealed, employers reportedly still invoked the Act XIII as a threat. 
Labourers continued to file their complaints with magistrates and convictions under the 
WBCA continued to be registered.312  
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The commissioners concluded that labour conditions had improved. Yet, the report 
reiterated “evidence that workers who wanted to leave even a good garden without permission 
found it advisable to do so by night,”313 since the overseer at the plantation would probably 
try to stop him from leaving. This observation did not prevent them from suggesting that 
places, such as Assam, could function as a safe haven for bonded labourers: The 
commissioners explained that labour opportunities in distant places such as Assam offered a 
great chance to escape from “depressed conditions (…) and perhaps the most effective means 
of breaking down the vicious systems of bond-service.”314 This argument implied a contrast 
that virtually did not exist: The bonded labourer is described as the victim of caste and 
tradition. By going to Assam the labourer would free him- or herself by escaping to the tea 
plantations, the British run, civilized location, where the labourer would find work and end his 
economically destitute situation. 
There was no mention of bonded labour in in the Main Report of the Rege Committee. 
Even though investigators looked into the plantations and agriculture, there were no explicit 
references to labour exploitation in the form of debt bondage.315 Only the Children (Pledging 
of Labour) Act of 1933 was discussed. The commission found that the act was effective: No 
violations were reported for the carpet factories and cotton mills in Amritsar and Ahmedabad, 
in which many children had been bonded. Only in the bidi (small cigarettes) production in 
Madras City, Vellore and Mysore State were children found to be working as bonded 
labourers.316  
Also in this report indebtedness received its own small chapter.317 The commissioners 
referred to the chapter in the report of the Royal Commission on Labour of 1931, but left out 
the exploitative dimension and treated debt relations of labourers simply as an issue of 
indebtedness.318 In all industries in rural and urban areas investigated—carpet production, 
leather works, shellac, bidi, jute, and sugar production, rice and cotton processing, mining for 
mica, manganese, iron, salt and gold, as well as the railways—between 50-100 percent of the 
workers were found to be indebted, either to a money lender or their employer.319 In the case 
of the carpet weaving industry, the commissioners observed that the system of advance 
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payments led “to perpetual indebtedness.”320 The average amount given ranged between Rs. 
40 and 390.321 
As in the report of 1931, this report also blamed the workers for their own misery, 
which was created by “the extravagant habits and vices of the workers themselves,”322 when it 
came to weddings, funerals, or the consumption of drugs. That in Balrampur the interest rate 
for debts was around 600 percent, is listed at the end of given reasons.323 While this report 
does not mention any exploitation of labourers, the numbers themselves are indicative of a 
large number of people vulnerable to exploitation. The report once again repeated the vices 
and extravagances of the workers in its conclusion on the issue, but also mentioned “that in 
the majority of cases indebtedness has a great deal to do with the low earnings of workers.”324 
And while caste is also mentioned in the other reports,325 it was not interrogated on its role in 
establishing labour relations. The report on labour from 1931 was the only report which 
highlighted a link between exploitation in “a system of bond-service”326 and caste. 
Pouchepadass argues that relations between the employer and worker went beyond pure 
economics: Particularly the ritual in handing over of the wages, the bowing of the agricultural 
labourer, signified the social difference and “symbolic domination of the master.”327 
The Indian Labour Year Book was compiled in order to publish collected statistical 
data on labour issues. Already in the first volume the authors discussed the Forced Labour 
Convention of the ILO (C29).328 They also reported the existence of “serf labour” or 
“serfdom,” which “mostly [took] the form of debt bondage.”329 But also this 
labourer/employer relationship was addressed from the angle of indebtedness. Relying on the 
report of the Labour Investigation Committee of 1946, the Year Book concluded that “the low 
wage level cannot be the only cause of indebtedness.”330 The second report was published by 
the end of this episode, and only contained short legal discussions and descriptions of bonded 
labour,331 but not an estimate of the number of people trapped in debt bondage. 
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Concluding from the available evidence, bonded labour was not an isolated 
phenomenon, neither limited to particular geographical locations nor restricted to particular 
sectors or communities. Bonded labour could be found everywhere in India. The references to 
bonded labour varied and were either subsumed under forced labour or slavery; the 
development of international legislation rather proliferated the terminological confusion. The 
reports discussed above addressed bonded labour separately, but beyond adding original 
research results, they relied on a report published in 1917.332 The commissions’ own findings 
were on indebtedness of workers and the question is, how many cases of bonded labour 
relations were subsumed and disguised under the umbrella of indebtedness. Since 
indebtedness was found to be a widespread problem, bonded labour was probably equally 
rampant. 
 
The Judiciary and Magistrates 
The unenforceability of bonded labour was taught to law students at least since 1916:333 
Prosanto Kumar Sen, professor of law at Calcutta, addressed bonded labour in his lectures, 
which were published in 1922.334 Regarding the issue of ‘slavery bond cases,’ he explained: 
 
There is a class of cases in which (…) the contract (…) is in restraint of personal 
freedom. In such cases it has been held that the courts will not enforce a contract 
fettering a man’s liberty of action as being contrary to public policy (…). It was 
observed that such a contract—in which a labourer engages to work without any 
payment whatsoever under conditions that make it practically impossible for him to 
discharge the debt until some other capitalist redeems him—is indistinguishable from 
slavery and in practice compels the debtor and his descendants to a perpetual 
serfdom.335 
 
While indicating that bonded labour amounted to slavery, Sen also took note of case law, in 
which bonded labour arrangements were found to be legal. Referring to Ponnusami v. 
Palayathan (1919), he noted “that a stipulation in a bond to work for a specified term in lieu 
 
332 The report of the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India of 1928 relied on Sifton (SIFTON/Government of 
Bihar and Orissa/Department of Land Records and Surveys, 1917), Royal Commission on Agriculture in India, 
1928, p. 575–576 [the pagination of this document is inconsistent, therefore I refer to the page number of the pdf 
document]. The report of the Royal Commission on Labour of 1931 drew its information on bonded labour from 
the report of the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India of 1928, WHITLEY/Royal Commission on Labour in 
India/Government of India, 1931, p. 362. And the Labour Investigation Committee’s information on the issue of 
debt was based on the report of the Royal Commission on Labour of 1931, Labour Investigation 
Committee/Government of India, 1946, p. 281. 
333 SEN, 1922, v. 
334 SEN, 1922, his Lecture IX on Contracts in Restraint of Trade, which was published in his book, was held in 
1916. 
335 SEN, 1922, p. 379–380. 
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of payment of interest is enforceable.”336 In this case, the judge Phillips sitting on the Bench 
of the Madras High Court referred to Ram Sarup (1915, debt bondage amounts to slavery). 
Phillips decided in the case Ponnusami that the bonded labour contract, set to last for five 
years, was enforceable, since it was limited in time. He concluded that the labour completed 
was in lieu of interest to the debt and therefore legal.337  
In Sundara Reddi v. Jagannathan And Anr. (1926) an employer’s appeal was 
discussed. Sundara had filed a case against his two bonded labourers in order to get back the 
principal. Concluding from the little information in the report, the District Munsif had either 
convicted Sundara Reddi for executing a ‘slavery bond,’ or simply rejected the case for being 
unenforceable. The judge dismissed the appeal, since the meagre wages were contrary to 
‘public policy,’ and even though the father of Jagannathan was free to work somewhere else, 
he had to support his son. The judge noted in addition that Sundara had set the interest rate of 
the bond to “afford the appellant handsome remuneration.”338 In light of the minimal wage 
paid to the labourer, the court found the question whether the relation constituted slavery or 
not irrelevant:  
 
The lower Courts have found that the contract was opposed to public policy and I 
agree. Whether the bond in question is exactly of the nature of a slavery bond, or is 
something closely approaching that nature does not affect the matter, for in either case 
it is equally opposed to public policy.339 
 
In May 1927 the Madras High Court dealt with the appeal of a creditor in Rama 
Sastriar v. Pakkiri Ambalakaran. The Munsif had dismissed Rama’s claim against his bonded 
labourer, since the wages he paid were too low. He argued that the relationship constituted a 
“slavery bond.”340 Judge Phillips, who had also ruled the case Ponnusami (1919, debt bond 
enforceable because limited to five years), sitting on the case, followed the Munsif’s decision 
arguing that the provisions of the contract were set in such a way as to perpetuate the relation 
for an unlimited time; he also criticised that not only the debtor, but also his wife were made 
to work. The judge followed the Munsif and dismissed the creditor’s appeal.341 
A similar case was ruled in October 1944: Govinda Kandyian received a cash advance 
of Rs. 86 and signed a bonded labour contract, while his son-in-law, Vayira Padayachi was 
 
336 SEN, 1922, p. 380. 
337 Ponnusami v. Palayathan, Madras High Court, March 7 1919. 
338 Sundara Reddi v. Jagannathan And Anr., Madras High Court, November 15 1926. 
339 Sundara Reddi v. Jagannathan And Anr., Madras High Court, November 15 1926. 
340 Rama Sastriar v. Pakkiri Ambalakaran, Madras High Court, May 4 1927. 
341 Rama Sastriar v. Pakkiri Ambalakaran, Madras High Court, May 4 1927. 
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the one to undertake the work. Vayira Padayachi left the work place and also the bond 
contract in May 1942. As a consequence, the creditor Sreenwasa Iyer requested the repayment 
of the advance including interest. The creditor filed a case in the court but the Munsif rejected 
it on the ground that it was a ‘slavery bond.’ In the appeal, the high court reversed this 
judgment. The judge argued that the debtor was allowed to work somewhere else and would 
only be charged to pay the two percent interest. Judge Leach ruled in favour of the creditor. 
He explained that “[t]he system of granting advances to agricultural laborers on these terms 
may be a very bad one; but it is quite a different thing to say that they bind persons entering 
into such bonds as slaves to their masters.”342 The lower court had made use of the discretion 
of interpretation, but the higher court reversed the decision and explained that bonded labour 
did not constitute slavery. 
In the cases presented above, the judges invoked the following offences in attempting 
to define slavery in the judicial processes: (1) Payment of wages, that are either very low or 
make it impossible to end the debt relation,343 (2) the time frame provided for the bonded 
labour relation (legal if it is indicated and maximally set to last for five years),344 (3) the 
labourer may work somewhere else,345 and (4) penal provisions for defections.346 The 
repayment of a debt by labour was found to be legal.347 In several cases judges overruled 
decisions at the lower level of Munsifs or magistrates who used their discretion of 
interpretation in a manner to effectively criminalise bonded labour under antislavery 
legislation. The judges overruled the Munsifs’ or magistrates’ decisions to reject claims over 
debts and advances.  
During this period international legislation was adopted, as well as regional law 
regulating bonded labour. But the judges in the cited cases did not refer to international 
conventions. Since most of the cases were based on rejections to prosecute employer’s claims, 
but not convictions of employers violating the IPC or the Act V, the courts dealt with the 
question of the enforceability of bonded labour contracts. As a consequence, they were not 
concerned with the question of defining slavery, as it was the case in the previous episode. 
 
 
342 Madras High Court, October 9 1944. 
343 Sundara Reddi v. Jagannathan And Anr., Madras High Court, November 15 1926; SEN, 1922, p. 379–380; 
Rama Sastriar v. Pakkiri Ambalakaran, Madras High Court, May 4 1927. 
344 Ponnusami v. Palayathan, Madras High Court, March 7 1919; Rama Sastriar v. Pakkiri Ambalakaran, 
Madras High Court, May 4 1927. 
345 Sreenivasa Iyer v. Govinda Kandiyar and Anr., Madras High Court, October 9 1944. 
346 Karuppannan (Minor) by Mother and Next Friend Kannakkal v. Pambayan Alias Karuppan Samban, Madras 
High Court, September 8 1925. 
347 Sundara Reddi v. Jagannathan And Anr., Madras High Court, November 15 1926; SEN, 1922, p. 380. 
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Conclusion 
During the period between 1920 and 1946, the definition of slavery and its relevance towards 
coping with bonded labour gained new qualities. Bonded labour in the previous episode was 
not encompassed in legal provisions, and the definition of slavery primarily evolved around 
the definition of chattel slavery; the judges of the discussed court cases attempted to fit 
bonded labour into this definition. This episode is marked by attempts to explicitly address 
bonded labour. At the international level, the League of Nations found debt bondage to be one 
form of labour exploitation abolished by the Slavery Convention. At the national level, the 
WBCA and its abuse were brought into the realm of violations of the abolition of slavery, and 
at the presidency level, several laws were adopted that addressed bonded labour. While debt 
bondage was not explicitly defined as slavery but described as such in the internal 
communications with the India Office on the Slavery Convention, the British colonial power 
and the Indian representatives in the Legislative Councils attempted to change the institution 
of the abolition of slavery in order to also include forms of debt bondage. 
Chatterjee’s argument that the abolition of slavery was consequential for the 
eradication of the term ‘slavery’ from the official record348 could not be substantiated. In this 
episode, as in the previous episode, civil servants describe forms of slavery, namely debt 
bondage, and the difficulty to abolish it. Only with the reports of the royal commissions did 
the lines become blurred by treating bonded labour relations rather as an issue of 
indebtedness. It was not mentioned in these reports that these relations could be criminal 
offences punishable under the IPC. In this episode, the court cases’ treatment of bonded 
labour relations also showed a tendency to look at them as debt relations. Interestingly, in the 
internal communications on the Bihar and Orissa Kamiauti Agreements Act, the 
administrators referred to case law— Ram Sarup (1915) and Satish Chandra (1918)349—
which found bonded labour cases to constitute a criminal offence, but the Bihar and Orissa 
Kamiauti Agreements Act itself did not provide criminal charges for offences. 
Already before, but vigorously since the 1920s, actors in the legislative arena acted 
towards change of the institution of the abolition of slavery. The gap between the spirit of the 
abolition of slavery and high discretion of interpretation, and particularly the existence of 
undermining legislation inspired actors to actively induce change. They were acting as 
 
348 CHATTERJEE, 2005, p. 139. 
349 Letter to the Government of India from J. A. Huback, Secretary to the Government of Bihar and Orissa, 
Revenue Department, National Archives of India, November 1920, 36, Item No. 1. 
Chapter 4  
2nd Episode: British Raj,  
1919-1946 
 
 
186 
defenders, who were not in favour of preserving the status quo as it was but rather in 
advancing and protecting the spirit of the abolition of slavery. The antislavery actors tried to 
induce change by displacement of rules that undermined the spirit of the abolition of 
slavery—the WBCA. These changes, I suggested, can be explained by hypothesis 4b): The 
institutional discretion for interpretation and implementation was high, with a combination of 
weak laws and low level of enforcement, as well as weak veto possibilities for the preservers 
of the status quo. Simultaneously, additional layers were added on top of existing legislation 
at the presidency level, which were intended to support the spirit of the abolition of slavery, 
including bonded labour.  
All antislavery actors behaved like insurrectionaries, who first failed to induce change 
due to the resistance of the government. The government appeared as opportunist, undecided 
on whether to support employers’ expressions to maintain the status quo or to follow the 
request of the assembly to support change. It only became active and their actions meaningful 
with the change of the political environment as well due to international developments: The 
increasing number of Indian participants, the inclusion of members representing the interest of 
labour and the actual possibility of the legislative assemblies to make laws, became possible 
with the implementation of the Montagu-Chelmsford-Reforms. But only after several years 
and debates in the assembly, the government proposed a bill for the repeal and the members 
of the Legislative Assembly voted in favour. The reforms of the political system were one of 
the crucial changes that enabled change at the rules level. It allowed anti-slavery actors to 
access the legislative arena and to actively press for change. Compared to other colonial 
variants of breach of contract legislation, India was one of the first colonies to remove it. In 
other colonies it prevailed up until the 1940s when the ILO adopted a convention350 
specifically targeting penal law on contract violations.351 
From the interrogated sources it is not explicitly clear what contributed to the 
Government of India changing its position—resisting the removal of the Act XIII for years 
and then ‘suddenly’ exposing it to the vote of the Central Legislative Assembly. This move 
coincides with the compilation of reports on labour in India, and the communication between 
the agencies of the British Raj and the League of Nations, the ILO and the adoption of the 
Slavery Convention. Consequently, I argue that the changing Zeitgeist towards being 
 
350 The Penal Sanctions (Indigenous Workers) Convention (C65), adopted 1939, abrogated 2018, International 
Labour Conference, 1939. 
351 BANTON, 2004. 
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antislavery and gaining a ‘taken-for-grantedness’352 quality is one causal factor. It appears that 
the repeal, already requested in 1917, was only a question of time and it is no coincidence that 
the Government of India chose to put the vote on the repeal of the Act XIII of 1859 just a year 
before the adoption of the Slavery Convention. Removing this layer of legislation some sixty-
six years after its adoption constitutes change in the form of displacement. 
After modifying the original hypothesis of Mahoney and Thelen, who suggest the 
change agents would be opportunists who cause change via conversion, I assumed that the 
antislavery actors would be the change agents who are interested in actively changing the 
institution towards aligning with the spirit of the abolition of slavery. While, as predicted by 
Mahoney and Thelen, opportunists appeared, they were the preservers of the status quo. Here 
the Government of India was not an active supporter of laws penalising breaches of contract, 
nor a defendant of the antislavery project. The government succeed in stalling motions of 
repeal by members of the Central Legislative Council for some time, making requests to other 
political entities to provide their opinion on the issue. When the Legislative Council finally 
voted, the majority of the members were in favour of repealing the Breach of Contract Act 
and the Sections 490 and 492 of the IPC. The government was leaving the veto power to the 
majority of the legislature. The change was, as predicted, displacement of the removal of the 
penal legislation for breaches of contracts.  
The outcome at the presidency merits a closer look. As observed, the Orissa and Bihar 
Kamiauti Agreement Act was a compromise that allowed for the temporal bonding of 
labourers in agriculture and other sectors. This act allowed for administrative control of the 
labourer/employer relationship, reasserting the state’s claim to the monopoly of violence, and 
simultaneously supporting the assumption that the complete abolition of bonded labour was 
probably impossible. It still adhered to the principle of upholding contractual obligations but 
limited them to one year and requested fair remuneration. Future research can reveal in more 
detail of the coming about of the regional provisions regulating bonded labour and explain for 
instance, the absence of criminal provisions against employers. 
The paradigm of the ideology of work and the protection/paternalist paradigm were 
still prevalent in the second episode. With international developments, the legitimacy of 
coercing labour on a large scale or exposing the general population to forced labour became 
targeted. Instead, the international community removed private actors and secured pockets of 
forced labour for the state, where slavery or forced labour could still be morally defendable—
 
352 FINNEMORE/SIKKINK, 1998, p. 895. 
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the workhouses, the prison, the army, and public works.353 To expose large groups of people 
to slavery became unacceptable, as the increasingly pronounced antislavery policy proposals 
of Indian political parties demonstrate: The rights paradigm took a clear shape and the aim of 
the independence movement was the promise to liberate not just the Indian nation from 
colonial power, but also a significant number of the population from labour exploitation and 
bonded labour. The INC moved from rough circumscriptions of fundamental rights, discussed 
in the previous episode, to the effective call for the abolition of bonded labour in this episode. 
The acceptance of slavery or practices which “approximate to slavery”354 as a necessary 
evil—a tool to provide security for the poor, at the expense of the integrity of the poor—was 
slowly replaced by the idea of justiciable rights. As a consequence, this entailed a changed 
role of the state and how it should behave towards its future citizens. While the British 
colonial government expressed a passive sit-and-wait strategy—reflected in explanations that 
slavery and bonded labour would ‘die out by itself,’355 or sending out questionnaires to the 
presidencies requesting their opinion on the repeal of the WBCA—the changing normative 
goal to formulate rights also involved a call for an active state. 
 
353 International Labour Organisation, 1930, Art. 4; cf. O'CONNELL DAVIDSON, 2015, 20, 50, 187. 
354 Undated Memo (sent to the India Office approximately between December 1922 and January 1923), National 
Archives of India, 1923, p. 33–35. 
355 Mr. A. Forbes, Commissioner of Chota Nagpur, 1898, quoted in a letter from the Hon’ble Mr. J. A. Huback, 
Secretary to the Government of Bihar and Orissa, Revenue Department, item No. 1, dated September 12 1919, 
National Archives of India, November 1920, p. 35. 
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3rd Episode: 1946-1990s 
That future is not one of ease or resting but of incessant striving so that we may fulfil the 
pledges we have so often taken and the one we shall take today. The service of India means the 
service of the millions who suffer. It means the ending of poverty, ignorance, disease and 
inequality of opportunity. The ambition of the greatest man of our generation has been to wipe 
every tear from every eye. That may be beyond us, but as long as there are tears and suffering, 
so long our work will not be over. 
—Jawaharlal Nehru: Speech: Freedom at Midnight (Tryst with Destiny), August 14 19481 
 
n August 15 1947 India gained its independence, and the new Constitution became 
effective on January 26 1950. During the first years of this episode, between 1946 
and 1949, the Constituent Assembly, which also constituted the interim 
government and interim legislature, occupied the core role in policymaking for India—they 
developed the constitutional and legal foundations of the future independent Indian state. The 
phase of drafting the constitution was a critical juncture for the political system of India. This 
phase was important since it opened the window of opportunity to diverge from the path the 
British had set in terms of dealing with bonded labour. It was an opportunity to adopt new 
laws and the question is, whether this was also a critical juncture for the abolition of bonded 
labour in India.  
The third episode begins shortly before independence. India’s future outlook was not 
yet fully determined. I follow up on the outcome and consequences of this period’s 
constitutional changes and political decisions on bonded labour including emergency rule 
between 1975 and 1977 and its aftermath until the 1990s. The whole chapter on this episode is 
split into two parts: The first part is dedicated to the years from 1946 to 1952, when the 
Constituent Assembly and the Provisional Parliament were operative. The second part begins 
with the first sitting of the newly elected parliament, the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha, and 
ends with the appointment of the National Human Rights Commission to monitor the 
implementation of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act in 1976. 
 
 
1 NEHRU, August 14 1947. 
O 
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he Constituent Assembly (CA) held its first session on December 9 1946 and 
functioned in two ways: As a constitution making body1 and as the Provisional 
Parliament, also referred to as Dominion Legislature.2 On November 11 1947 the 
Dominion Legislature had its first session. A few months into their work, the members of the 
CA decided to make a clear distinction between the two tasks, the constitution making and the 
daily legislative functions: The members decided that the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) 
would work in the mornings, and in the afternoon the same people would sit in the 
Constituent Assembly to discuss the making of the Constitution.3 The ministers of the Interim 
Government were also members of the Constituent Assembly.4 On September 2 1946, the 
Interim Government was formed, headed by Jawaharlal Nehru. This government was replaced 
with the Dominion Government on August 15 1947. The Dominion Government remained 
operative until India became a republic on January 16 1950. Since both, Interim and 
Dominion Government constituted the provisional government and the provisional 
parliament, I refer to them as provisional government and the provisional parliament. 
The first part of this chapter relies on the debates of the Constituent Assembly and the 
Constituent Assembly (Legislative). All debates are available online on the website of India’s 
Parliament.5 Additional sources discussed in this chapter are the Draft Constitution, and the 
Constitution of India, as it was adopted. The Minutes of the Sub-Committee on Fundamental 
Rights, the Advisory Committee, as well as submissions of committee members have been 
collected and edited by Rao in four volumes of The Framing of India's Constitution: Select 
 
1 In the publications of the debates referred to as ‘Constituent Assembly (Debates).’ 
2 Indian Independence Act of 1947, Parliament of the United Kingdom, 1947, Chapter 30, Art. 6, 8. The 
documentation of the parliamentary sessions of the CA are entitled ‘Constituent Assembly (Legislative).’ 
3 AUSTIN, 2012, 9, 15. 
4 AUSTIN, 2012, p. 15. 
5 Available at: CLPR. 
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Documents (1966-1968) and accompanying volume—The Framing of India’s Constitution: A 
Study (1968).6 These source books provide detailed insight into the work of the committees of 
the Constituent Assembly. This work has been made available digitally by the Internet 
Archive.7 The secondary literature on which I rely includes a publication by Austin (1966), 
who contributed a tremendously detailed work on the writing of the Constitution. Among his 
sources were private papers, such as the Prasad Papers, the Munshi Papers, and the Ayyar 
Papers, as well as minutes and letters produced and exchanged between the members of the 
Constituent Assembly.8 For the second part, the debates of the Lok Sabha, as well as the 
Rajya Sabha, are made available online by the Parliament of India, Lok Sabha Digital 
Library.9 Several governmental reports on agriculture, Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled 
Tribes (STs) are available at the South Asia Institute Library, at the University of Heidelberg. 
The discussion of court cases was possible thanks to the online sources already enumerated in 
episode 1. Further sources are the ILO Delhi Office records, made available online by the 
Georg-August University at Göttingen, Germany, as well as the National Archives of India 
and the Parliament Library, both in Delhi, India,10 and the India Office Records at the British 
Library in London, Great Britain. 
 
Institutional Characteristics 
Between the two parts of this episode are only a few years. While the discretion of 
interpretation varies between these two parts because the Constitution of India came into force 
in January 1950, this and the following chapter have their own discussion.  
 
Discretion of Interpretation 
The point of departure of the Constituent Assembly and the provisional parliament was the 
Indian Penal Code and the Act V of 1843, as well as the Slavery Convention of the League of 
Nations of 1926. Since the policies of the presidencies were not applicable to the whole of 
India, I do not include them here. The following table visualises whether the rules provided in 
the existing legislations in 1946 were ambiguous or not: 
 
6 Vol. 1, RAO, 1968d, Vol. 2, RAO, 1968b, Vol. 3, RAO, 1968c, Vol. 4, RAO, 1968a. 
7 Available at: The Internet Archive. 
8 AUSTIN, 1966, p. 6–7. 
9 Available at: Lok Sabha Secretariat. 
10 Georg-August Universität Göttingen/CeMIS. 
Chapter 5  
3rd Episode Part 1:  
Constituent Assembly,  
1946-1952 
 
 
192 
Table 12. Characteristics of the formal institution, 1946 
Law Definition Bonded labour Timeline Punishment Rehabilitation 
Competent 
authorities 
Act V, 1843 No N.A. No No No No 
IPC, 1862 No11 No Yes12 Yes No No 
Slavery 
Convention, 
1926 
Yes Yes
13 No14 Yes15 No No 
Case law 
since 1915 
Yes16 
Conditional 
yes17 
N.A. Yes18 N.A. N.A. 
 
The IPC makes the absence of free will part of the defining element of “unlawful compulsory 
labour;”19 it does not refer to the different denominations of bonded labour and it offers no 
definition of what slavery is.20 The requirement of the absence of free will could mean that the 
IPC does not criminalise the use of bonded labour, since labourers enter ‘freely’ into debt 
bondage. In the first and second episodes I demonstrate in the discussion of the case laws how 
the judges were not unanimous in their evaluation of the provisions of the Act V or the IPC, or 
 
11 IPC Sec. 370 punishes the buying and disposing of a person as a slave “against his will;” Sec. 375 prohibits 
unlawful compulsory labour, prescribing punishment for compelling “any person to labour against the will of 
that person.” Beyond these qualifications, there is no definition of what a slave or slavery is. 
12 With coming into force of the act. 
13 But not explicitly. Art. 1 holds that “[s]lavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the 
powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.” Bonded labour would fall under Art. 2 (b) (“[t]o bring 
about (…) the complete abolition of slavery in all its forms.”) 
14 Art. 2 (b): “progressively and as soon as possible.” 
15 Art. 6. 
16 In Ram (1915), Satish (1918) and Koroth (1917) the judges identified elements of chattel slavery in the cases 
of bonded labour and found them therefore illegal. 
17 Following cases considered: Ram Sarup Bhagat v. Bansi Mandar (1915), debt bond contracts amount to 
slavery; Koroth Mammad and Another v. The King-Emperor (1917), the transfer of debt from one creditor to 
another creditor, falls within the legislation prohibiting slavery; Ram Sarup Bhagat v. Bansi Mandar (1915), debt 
bond contracts amount to slavery; bonded labour contracts are criminal under slavery offences of the IPC if, (1) 
payment of wages are either very low or the interest rate make it impossible to end the debt relation (Sundara 
Reddi v. Jagannathan And Anr., Madras High Court, November 15 1926), SEN, 1922, p. 379–380, Rama 
Sastriar v. Pakkiri Ambalakaran, Madras High Court, May 4 1927); (2) the time frame indicated for the bonded 
labour relation exceeds five years (Ponnusami v. Palayathan, Madras High Court, March 7 1919; Rama Sastriar 
v. Pakkiri Ambalakaran, Madras High Court, May 4 1927); (3) the labourer may not work somewhere else 
(Sreenivasa Iyer v. Govinda Kandiyar and Anr., Madras High Court, October 9 1944); (4) the contract contains 
penal provisions for defections (Karuppannan (Minor) by Mother and Next Friend Kannakkal v. Pambayan 
Alias Karuppan Samban, Madras High Court, September 8 1925). The repayment of a debt by labour was legal 
(Sundara Reddi v. Jagannathan And Anr., Madras High Court, November 15 1926). 
18 Based on the IPC. 
19 IPC Sec. 374. 
20 Empress of India v. Ram Kuar, Allahabad High Court, March 8 1880, p. 726; Koroth Mammad and Another v. 
The King-Emperor, Madras High Court, August 27 1917. 
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how to treat bonded labour cases.21 And while by the end of the first episode we saw a 
proactive interpretation of the IPC to include bonded labour contracts in the provisions of the 
IPC, the judges in the second episode tended to treat bonded labour arrangements as issues of 
debt, which did not entail criminal sanction and was even found legal, as long as it did not 
bind labourers over longer periods of time or for life, including their offspring.22 
At the international level, several conventions were developed and adopted that were 
also relevant to the institution of the abolition of slavery in India. The ILO Forced Labour 
Convention (C29) had come into force in 1932, but since the Indian government ratified it on 
November 30 in 1954, it did not apply earlier to India. Nonetheless, the Forced Labour 
Convention constituted a reference point for policymakers, as the example of the submission 
of Parulekar in the Bombay Presidency showed.23 According to a special officer nominated by 
the Dominion Government in 1948, bonded labour did not fulfil the definition of forced 
labour as provided by the orced Labour Convention, because the convention’s definition 
excludes situations in which a person has offered him- or herself voluntarily into bondage.24 
The members of the Temporary Commission on Slavery intended to include debt bondage 
within the purview of the Slavery Convention. The Advisory Committee of Experts on 
Slavery addressed the issue of bonded labour in India explicitly and requested reports on this 
issue.25 During the CA debates, the United Nations General Assembly in Paris proclaimed the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) on December 10 1948. Article 4 of the 
UDHR formulates the right to be free from slavery: “No one shall be held in slavery or 
servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.”26 This was the first 
time that slavery became enshrined in terms of a positive right at the international level, but 
only as a declaration, not a binding obligation for states. 
The institution of the abolition of slavery in India was still weak at the beginning of 
this period and left a high degree of discretion of interpretation. Particularly the absence of a 
 
21 For instance, in the case Madan Mohan Biswas v. Queen Empress the plaintiff was found not guilty of treating 
his bonded labourers as slaves, Calcutta High Court, April 20 1892, while in Koroth Mammad and Another v. 
The King-Emperor, the final decision was in favour of the bonded labourer whose employer labour relationship 
was found to fall under the IPC Sec. 370, Madras High Court, August 27 1917, p. 351. 
22 Ponnusami v. Palayathan (1919), bonded labour is legal since contract is set to last for five years, SEN, 1922, 
p. 380; Rama Sastriar v. Pakkiri Ambalakaran (1927), the interest was set to never end the employer/labour 
relationship, Madras High Court, May 4 1927. 
23 The Free or Forced or Compulsory Labour Punishment Bill was in part copied from the ILO Forced Labour 
Convention, Bombay Legislative Council, April 13 1939, p. 2796. 
24 DHAMNE/GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, 1956, p. 13. 
25 League of Nations, 1937, p. 12. 
26 United Nations, 1948. 
Chapter 5  
3rd Episode Part 1:  
Constituent Assembly,  
1946-1952 
 
 
194 
definition of what constitutes slavery and the question of where to locate bonded labour have 
concerned the courts in the first two episodes,27 and were still not solved. 
 
Enforcement  
The evaluation of the performance of the British Raj in abolishing slavery and all its forms by 
the League of Nation’s Advisory Committee of Experts on Slavery was negative during the 
reporting period between 1934 and 1938.28 Regional legislation against bonded labour was 
found ineffective by the Royal Commission on Agriculture,29 and this and other reports on 
labour published in 1931 and 1946 found that indebtedness of workers was a widespread 
problem.30 This can be read as an indicator for a high prevalence of bonded labour, since some 
bonded labour relations were established by debt, and one of the reports, for instance, treated 
bonded labour as a pure issue of indebtedness.31 In addition, several court cases dealt with 
bonded labour as an issue of indebtedness. Governmental reports referred to bonded labour 
and observed instances of abuse,32 bonded child labour,33 and that debts were used to bind 
workers to their employer, with interest rates so high that workers were often bound for life 
and generations.34 Particularly prominent political figures like Mohandas Gandhi35 expressed 
their concern that bonded labour was a problem affecting thousands of people—Thakkar 
believed that in some regions up to 80-90 percent of the people working in agriculture, a 
sector in which about 70 percent36 of the Indian population were employed,37 were bonded.38 
 
27 Cf. G. G.Morris, Sessions Judge of Backerganj, in a letter to the Registrar of the High Court, dated November 
14 1871, referred to in CHATTERJEE, 2005, p. 139; The Queen v. Firman Ali, Calcutta High Court, December 2 
1871; Ram Kuar (1880), Empress of India v. Ram Kuar, Allahabad High Court, March 8 1880, p. 727; Koroth 
Mammad and Another v. The King-Emperor, Madras High Court, August 27 1917, p. 349. 
28 League of Nations, 1936; League of Nations, 1937. 
29 Royal Commission on Agriculture in India, 1928, p. 576 [the pagination of this document is inconsistent, 
therefore I refer to the page number of the pdf document]. 
30 Royal Commission on Agriculture in India, 1928, p. 764 [the pagination of this document is inconsistent, 
therefore I refer to the page number of the pdf document]; WHITLEY/Royal Commission on Labour in 
India/Government of India, 1931, p. 224; Labour Investigation Committee/Government of India, 1946, p. 281–
293; Government of India/Ministry of Labour: Indian Labour Bureau, 1946, p. 244. 
31 Government of India/Ministry of Labour: Indian Labour Bureau, 1946, p. 244. 
32 WHITLEY/Royal Commission on Labour in India/Government of India, 1931, p. 236. 
33 WHITLEY/Royal Commission on Labour in India/Government of India, 1931, p. 102. 
34 WHITLEY/Royal Commission on Labour in India/Government of India, 1931, 226, 236, 355. 
35 Mohandas Gandhi, in the Hindustan Times, July 1 1931, reprinted in ILO Delhi Office, July 1931, p. 19. 
36 The Census of India of 1931 came to a similar number with 68 percent, HUTTON/Census Commissioner, 1933, 
p. 276.  
37 Royal Commission on Agriculture in India, 1928, p. 83 [the pagination of this document is inconsistent, 
therefore I refer to the page number of the pdf document]; Census of India, 1921, MARTEN/Census 
Commissioner, 1924, 239, 241. 
38 A. V. Thakkar: Presidential address to the Servants of India Society, July 24 1931, reprinted in ILO Delhi 
Office, July 1931, p. 17. 
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The level of enforcement appeared inefficient from the reports and also in the perception of 
political actors enforcement of the abolition of forced labour was not satisfying. 
 
Paradigms and Zeitgeist 
I do not suggest that the Greek City States were perfect; they had their own short-comings and 
blemishes. Who can defend their system of slavery, for example? 
—Shriman Narayan Agarwal, 194639 
 
In the second episode the norm cascade entered its tipping point and merged into the third 
stage of the norms cycle.40 The internalisation of the norm of the abolition of slavery was in 
full progress during the third episode and had acquired “a taken-for-granted quality”41 at the 
international as well as the national level in India during the previous episode. This is 
exemplified by the above given quote of S. N. Agarwal, who expressed the notion that, at the 
time when he was writing, no one would defend slavery anymore. As I show in the 
discussions of the CA debates, the question of whether slavery, bonded labour, forced labour 
or begar should be abolished or not, was no longer contested. During the ‘norm cascade’42 in 
the previous episode “a fundamental shift in the perception of long-term national interests”43 
could also be observed: Around the 1920s political parties and political actors began to 
explicitly formulate the goal to abolish bonded labour in draft constitutions44 and political 
manifestos.45 
The paradigms discussed earlier were: (1) non-interference, (2) protection or 
paternalist, (3) ideology of work, and (4) rights paradigm. The first paradigm lost its 
significance during the first episode. The rights paradigm gained momentum in the second 
episode. In this third episode, the protection and paternalist paradigm, the ideology of work 
and the rights paradigm, continued to constitute the sets of ideas that influenced the political 
outcomes. The paternalist paradigm remained strong in the previous episode, but underwent 
some changes. With increasing demands for political participation and endeavours towards a 
 
39 Agarwal, Shriman Narayan, 1946. 
40 FINNEMORE/SIKKINK, 1998, p. 895. 
41 FINNEMORE/SIKKINK, 1998, p. 895. 
42 FINNEMORE/SIKKINK, 1998, p. 895. 
43 SIKKINK, 1998, p. 519. 
44 National Convention India, 1925, p. 3; The Committee Appointed by The All Parties' Conference, 1928, 
p. 101. 
45 Compare for instance: Lokmanya Tilak: Manifesto for the Congress Democratic Party, 1920, reprinted in 
SITARAMAYYA, 1935, p. 327–380; Policy and Programme of the Swarajya Party as Approved by the All-India 
Party Conference, 16-17 August 1924, reprinted in APPADORAI/GWYER, 1957, p. 4. 
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democratic polity, the questions of presentation and representation became salient topics. This 
issue continued to stand in tension with the protection or paternalist paradigm. Within the 
discussion of the All India Parties’ Conference committee, the question of political 
participation and electoral franchise was addressed in the Nehru Report in 1928. The authors 
trusted that democracy would mend bad electoral decisions by trial and error. But they also 
trusted that uneducated voters would know what their interests were when casting their vote.46  
But even though the Nehru Report expressed the trust of the political elite in the 
Indian people, the elite were not free of ambivalence towards the lower classes, the poor, and 
uneducated. The example of the Champaran agitation and the indigo disturbances in the 
1910s, discussed in the second episode, showed that the political actors were not in touch with 
the rural population and shared their doubts of political agency of the poor and uneducated 
with the British.47 The following quote highlights the paternalist approach: 
 
We feel strongly however that the ‘depressed’ classes must be abolished or rather that 
they should be raised socially and economically so that they may take their proper 
place in the community. The only effective way to do this is to give them educational 
and other facilities for this advance and to remove all obstacles in the way of this 
advance.48 
 
This quote gives the impression that the elite perceived the poor as apart from society, 
something to be ‘abolished.’ ‘They should be raised’ and ‘they should be given,’ are 
expressions of othering: It is ‘them, not us,’ ‘they’ have to change, not ‘us.’ And it is ‘we’ 
who know what ‘the proper place’ is and how to get there. 
The rights paradigm is the new paradigm that has its roots in the independence 
movement. The idea to enshrine fundamental rights in an Indian Constitution was already set 
forth by the Indian National Congress in 1918.49 The INC adopted a resolution, the 
Declaration of Indian Rights.50 Among these rights the INC enumerated “(b) [t]hat no Indian 
subject of His Majesty shall be liable to suffer in liberty, of life, property, or of association 
(…), except under sentence by an ordinary Court of Justice, and as a result of lawful open 
trial.”51 Other suggestions for constitutional provisions for the assurance of fundamental 
 
46 Nehru Report, The Committee Appointed by The All Parties' Conference, 1928, p. 164–165; Swaraj 
Resolution, SIDHWA/LALWANI, 1932, p. 140. 
47 For examples and judgment of the elite view on the rural population, cf. POUCHEPADASS, 1999, 192-94, 205-
08. 
48 The Committee Appointed by The All Parties' Conference, 1928, p. 60. 
49 JAYAL, 2013, p. 137; ZAIDI, 1979, p. 322. 
50 ZAIDI, 1979, p. 322. 
51 ZAIDI, 1979, p. 322. 
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rights reappeared in the constitutional bill, the Commonwealth of India Bill, of Annie Besant, 
member of the Swaraj Party: “7. (a) No person shall be deprived of his liberty, nor shall his 
dwelling or property be entered, sequestered, confiscated, save in accordance with law and by 
duly constituted Courts of Law.”52 In the 1930s policymakers clearly spelled out the abolition 
of bonded labour as a policy goal: In the Karachi Session of 1931, the INC adopted the 
Swaraj Resolution, in which the INC explained that labour should “be freed from serfdom or 
conditions bordering on serfdom.”53 And in 1945 the Sapru Committee, initiated by Tej 
Bahadur Sapru after the Non-Party Conference,54 suggested a constitutional provision that 
“[n]o form of forced labour shall be permitted,”55 and “Begar should be made a crime.”56  
The Working Committee of the All-India Scheduled Castes Federation had requested 
Ambedkar “to prepare a Memorandum on the Safeguards for the Scheduled Castes for being 
submitted to the CA on behalf of the Federation.”57 In his The State of Minorities, published 
during the work of the CA in 1947, Ambedkar suggested provisions for fundamental rights. 
He explained many workers had “to relinquish their constitutional rights in order to gain their 
living,”58 and asked “[h]ow many have to subject themselves to be governed by private 
employers?”59 The liberty that would arise from a privately run market economy with 
employers and workers acting freely, would result in the liberty of the capitalists and the 
landlords but not the workers.60 One of Ambedkar’s suggestions to realise and secure 
fundamental rights was to turn agriculture into a state-owned sector as a form of state 
socialism. He was determined that this was the only way to secure the rights of agricultural 
labourers. It would remove the labourers from the capitalist mechanisms, which, according to 
his insights, always resulted in the exploitation of the labourers.61 Regarding forced labour, he 
offered a provision in his publication’s list of Fundamental Rights of Citizens: “Subjecting a 
person to forced labour or to involuntary servitude shall be an offence.”62 
But while the right to liberty and freedom from slavery or begar featured prominently 
in these constitutional drafts, the ideology of work still remained a strong influential idea. In 
 
52 National Convention India, 1925, p. 3. 
53 SIDHWA/LALWANI, 1932, p. 140. 
54 THILAKAVATHY/MAYA, 2019, p. 154. 
55 SAPRU, 1945, p. 219. 
56 SAPRU, 1945, Appendices: xxvii, bold in the original. 
57 AMBEDKAR, 1947, Preface. 
58 AMBEDKAR, 1947, p. 32. 
59 AMBEDKAR, 1947, p. 32. 
60 AMBEDKAR, 1947, p. 33. 
61 AMBEDKAR, 1947, 31, Art. II, Sec. II. 
62 AMBEDKAR, 1947, 11, Art. I, Section II, Art. 9. 
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the report of the National Planning Committee of which Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose and 
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru were members, the authors made suggestions for a general use of the 
labour of the population in terms of forced labour. The goal was the development of India, 
and “it was suggested that all citizens should be conscripted for some social service (...) no 
student should be awarded his academic degree unless and until he puts in six months or a 
year of some kind of social service.”63 For the development of the whole nation, the extraction 
of forced labour was legitimated. 
 
Political Context 
The Cabinet Mission Plan laid the foundational rules for the transition of India towards 
independence. The 299 members of the Assembly were indirectly elected in the provincial 
assemblies; 290 of them were men. Franchise was conditional on different qualifications, such 
as education and taxation,64 and elections were based on community membership: Moslem, 
Sikh, and General, which comprised Hindus and all other communities.65 The seats afforded 
to the assembly also included representatives of the not yet formed new state of Pakistan (East 
and West Pakistan), who resigned after the decision to partition India. From the beginning, the 
Muslim League boycotted the CA and did not participate in the sessions.66  
The decision to divide India into two separate states was made on June 3 1947.67 
During three to four months following the decision, about fifteen million people crossed the 
new borders between India and Pakistan. About eight million Hindus and Sikhs left the 
territory of the newly founded Pakistan and moved to India; approximately seven million 
Muslims left the Indian territory to move to West or East Pakistan. This massive movement of 
people was accompanied by mass violence and massacres, and about one million people died 
during this short period.68 Because of the formation of the independent state of Pakistan, the 
number of participating members of the CA changed. The accession of the princely states 
 
63 Constituent Assembly Debates, December 3 1948. 
64 Franchise was based on residency, taxation (i.e. income tax), property (i.e. landholders or ryotwars), literacy; 
women were franchised when they or their (deceased) husbands fulfilled certain qualifications. Sixth Schedule of 
the Government of India Act of 1935, Parliament of the United Kingdom, 1935, p. 251–298. 
65 AUSTIN, 1966, 5, 332. 
66 AUSTIN, 1966, p. 6–7. 
67 AUSTIN, 1966, p. 8. 
68 METCALF/METCALF, 2006, p. 222; WAGNER, 2006, p. 14. 
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contributed to another change in numbers of the Constituent Assembly.69 The populations of 
the colonial territories of Portugal and France in India, were not represented in the CA.70 
 
Executive and Legislative Arena 
The members of the CA were elected representatives of the provincial assemblies, therefore 
indirectly elected. Initially, by December 1946, 389 people were expected to represent the 
Indian population, with 296 representatives from the British Indian provinces, and 93 from the 
princely states.71 The members were organised in political parties, and earlier elections of the 
provincial legislatures had taken place already with an eye on the formation of the CA. The 
INC won 69 percent of the seats in the provincial legislatures, and, after partition, Congress 
occupied 82 percent of the seats in the CA.72 Austin explains that “[t]he Constituent Assembly 
was, in effect, a one-party assembly, in the hands of the mass party, the INC. Yet it was 
representative of India.73 The INC also exercised the party whip with designated members 
functioning as Chief Whip, who required party members in the assembly to vote according to 
party line.74 Austin adds that “[t]he Congress Party Assembly was the unofficial private forum 
that debated every provision of the Constitution, and, in most cases, decided its fate before it 
reached the floor of the House.”75 This forum was constituted by Nehru, Patel, Prasad and 
Azad which is also known as the “oligarchy within the Assembly.”76 
From these depictions it appears that there was no veto point at the executive arena: 
Party cohesion was required, and decisions of the inner circle within the INC were unlikely to 
be overturned by other representatives in the Constituent Assembly. This translates into strong 
veto possibilities for actors within the CA to block attempts of change within this arena. 
Without any veto options outside of the assembly, the members of the assembly, and 
particularly those with access to the inner circle of the INC, were privileged.77 This is also the 
 
69 WAGNER, 2006, p. 13. 
70 Portuguese Dadra and Nagar Haveli became part of the Indian Union in 1954; Goa, Daman and Diu followed 
in 1961. Among the last colonial possessions of France in India that became part of the Indian Union in 1954 
were Pondichéry, Karikal, and Mahé, HARDGRAVE/KOCHANEK, 2008, 160, 481; WAGNER, 2006, p. 190–191. 
71 WAGNER, 2006, p. 13. 
72 AUSTIN, 1966, p. 10. 
73 AUSTIN, 1966, p. 2. 
74 AUSTIN, 1966, p. 24. 
75 AUSTIN, 1966, p. 22. See also: BRANDT/COTTRELL/GHAI et al., 2011, p. 337–338. 
76 AUSTIN, 1966, p. 21; cf. TINKER, 1967, p. 250. 
77 IMMERGUT, 1990, p. 396. 
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case for the provisional government and its relation to the interim parliament, which was 
constituted by the very same representatives of the CA.78 
Under those circumstances, changing the substance of legislative proposals from 
outside and against the INC and against the provisional government was difficult or 
impossible to achieve. Deducing from earlier policy suggestions,79 the INC favoured a strong 
institution against slavery and was interested in preventing attacks on the legislative 
provisions against the abolition of slavery. Therefore, if the INC or the provisional 
government were striving for change of the institution of the abolition of slavery, the political 
context afforded proslavery actors acting as defenders of the status quo only weak veto 
possibilities. There were several notable members in the assembly who were active in the 
labour movement and dedicated to and familiar with the grievances of agricultural labourers. 
Among them were N. M. Joshi, who had pushed for the removal of the WBCA in the 1920s; 
and Prasad and Patel, who were active in the indigo disturbances which the INC and Gandhi 
supported in the 1920s with satyagrahas in Champaran and Bardoli.80 Austin concludes that 
even though they were not unanimous on how to improve the conditions of labour, the 
members of the cabinet and the INC oligarchy agreed that “[i]f the good of the many 
demanded the sacrifice of the few—as in zamindari-abolition81—it would be done.”82 
 
Electoral & Public Arena 
One quarter of the Indian population was eligible to vote for the legislative assemblies in the 
presidencies. The regional assemblies then indirectly elected the CA and the interim 
parliament. The majority of the Indian people were not able to express their interest by vote. 
The population had no other means of influencing the constitution making or legislative 
process beyond the elections of 1947.83 The final version of the Draft Constitution was 
published and opened for public debate—the whole population was able to express its 
opinion, but not to influence the outcome: Indian citizens could not overturn the decisions of 
the CA or the interim parliament. Without the electorate overturning the assemblies’ 
 
78 AUSTIN, 1966, p. 17. 
79 Swaraj Resolution, SIDHWA/LALWANI, 1932, p. 140. 
80 AUSTIN, 1966, p. 42. 
81 Zamindari is the right of landlords to collect taxes, MITRA, 2017, 49, footnote 40. 
82 AUSTIN, 1966, p. 43. 
83 AUSTIN, 1966, p. 10. 
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decisions, nor exercising influence with shifting votes or a referendum, the electoral arena 
constituted no veto point.84 
 
Hypothesis 
Scholars have pointed out that regime change and constitution making periods often pose 
moments in time in which a “dramatic reorientation”85 takes place. In Latin American states, 
for instance, periods of reform and constitution making posed critical junctures during which 
autocratic regimes were replaced by democratic ones.86 The constitution making for the 
independent Indian state was such a critical juncture. Regime changes are “hypothesized to 
produce distinct legacies.”87 But as discussed earlier, a critical juncture may also turn out not 
to be critical.88 Consequently, the evaluation of the significance of a certain change can only 
be made in retrospect. How critical the changes turned out for the abolition of slavery and 
particularly bonded labour is the question guiding the following pages. 
Formulations of rights, such as in the Commonwealth of India Bill, or the Nehru 
Report, rendered the status quo within which bonded labour prevailed untenable. Political 
actors could seize this opportunity of regime transformation as a chance to change the 
institution of the abolition of slavery. In the discussion on the discretion of interpretation of 
the institution, it becomes clear that policymakers also evaluated the existing policy as weak. 
The rights provisions discussed above were usually one-liners that stated the goal of the 
abolition of slavery and begar or bonded labour, and in some cases requested the 
criminalisation of violations.89 More stringent policy suggestions that went beyond already 
existing policy provisions were not formulated. 
By 1946 the characteristics of the formal institution of the abolition of slavery were 
weak: The discretion of interpreting the rules was high; the enforcement level was ineffective 
and not satisfactory to political actors. Proslavery actors were probably content with the weak 
rules and their low level of implementation. But within a political environment—an 
antislavery Zeitgeist and an independence movement in support of the rights of workers, and 
 
84 IMMERGUT, 1990, p. 397. 
85 COLLIER/COLLIER, 1991, p. 745; cf. CAPOCCIA/KELEMEN, 2007, p. 348. 
86 COLLIER/COLLIER, 1991, p. 6–8. 
87 COLLIER/COLLIER, 1991, p. 29. 
88 COLLIER/COLLIER, 1991, p. 44. 
89 Compare for instance: Swaraj Resolution, SIDHWA/LALWANI, 1932, p. 140; Sapru Committee, SAPRU, 1945, 
Appendices: xxvii. 
Chapter 5  
3rd Episode Part 1:  
Constituent Assembly,  
1946-1952 
 
 
202 
rights to freedom and equality—proslavery actors were unlikely to voice their interests and 
act in direct resistance towards legislative measures abolishing slavery or bonded labour. 
Having gained a status of ‘taken-for-grantedness,’90 at the international and the national level, 
slavery as a legitimate labour relation was completely out of discussion—at least as long as its 
definition required legal ownership claimed by private actors. The use of forced labour for the 
state was not off the table. Consequently, in the opening window for radical change, the 
question of defining slavery and where to place bonded labour, as well as identifying the 
bodies and mechanisms to enforce the rules, were the important issues that needed to be 
addressed and solved.  
The rules were weak, enforcement was ineffective, and the veto possibilities for the 
defenders of the status quo were weak as well. The Zeitgeist was antislavery; therefore, I test 
hypothesis 4a) in the first part of the third episode. Proslavery actors were the preservers of 
the status quo, endowed with weak veto possibilities to block change; antislavery actors were 
the actors of change, acting towards change at the rules level,91 who behaved either as 
insurrectionaries, causing displacement of rules,92 or, sought to improve existing legislation 
and thereby behaved like subversives, adding layers on top of existing rules. 
 
Gradual Changes 
The CA met for the first time on Monday, December 9 1946 at 11 am at the Constitution Hall 
in New Delhi. The last session was on January 24 1950.93 The Cabinet Mission Plan 
suggested the installation of an Advisory Committee to develop a list of fundamental rights 
which should be protected by the future Indian constitution. On January 24 1947 the CA 
voted in favour of the installation of such a committee—the Advisory Committee on 
Fundamental Rights, Minorities and Tribal and Excluded Areas. This committee 
commissioned four sub-committees, of which one was the Fundamental Rights Sub-
Committee.94 The submissions of the sub-committees were then discussed by the Constituent 
Assembly. The CA of India also established the Interim Government, which was in place 
 
90 FINNEMORE/SIKKINK, 1998, p. 895. 
91 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 29. 
92 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 24. 
93 Parliament of India. 
94 The other three committees were: (1) the Minorities Sub-Committee, (2) the North-East Frontier Tribal Areas 
and Assam Excluded & Partially Excluded Areas Sub-Committee, and (3) the Excluded and Partially Excluded 
Areas (Other than those in Assam) Sub-Committee. 
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from September 2 1946 until the proclamation of independence on August 15 1947. After 
independence the Dominion Government was formed: The so-called First Nehru ministry, 
with Nehru as Prime Minister and fifteen ministers, of which several were members of the 
CA. The CA continued to function parallelly as interim parliament. In the following chapter I 
describe and discuss the work of these different political bodies regarding the issue of bonded 
labour, forced labour and slavery. 
 
Advisory Committee & Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee 
Altogether, seventeen sub-committees for the drafting of the constitution were formed. 
Members of these committees were the members of the CA—some of them occupied several 
functions since they were also members of the government, as for instance Ambedkar, who 
served as minister for the Department of Law, or Jagjivan Ram, who served as Labour 
Minister. The committees’ reports formed the basis on which the Draft Committee formulated 
the final version of the Draft Constitution, which was then debated by the CA. The 
Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee, with J. B. Kripalani as chair,95 was concerned with the 
question of which rights were to be enshrined as fundamental rights in the Indian 
constitution.96 Ambedkar, who was never a Congress member,97 worked in the Advisory 
Committee, the Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee and chaired the Draft Committee. 
In harmony with the idea of equal representation of minorities, the Congress decided 
to reflect the diversity of Indian society in the Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee.98 The 
members99 of the sub-committee represented Hindus, Scheduled Castes, Christians, Parsi, 
Sikhs and Muslims.100 Austin asserts that there was no correlation between community 
 
95 AUSTIN, 1966, p. 341. 
96 Parliament of India. 
97 AUSTIN, 1966, p. 19. 
98 AUSTIN, 1966, p. 62. 
99 The members were M. R. Masani, K. T. Shah, Rajkumari Amri Kaur, Mrs Hansa Mehta, A. K. Ayyar, K. M. 
Munshi, Harnam Singh, Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, B. R. Ambedkar, Jairmandas Daulatram, K. M. Panikkar, 
see AUSTIN, 1966, p. 334. 
100 The background of the members of the Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee collected by Austin: A. K. Ayyar 
(Dewan Bahadur (Sir) Alladi Krishnaswami) (Hindu, Brahmin): General. The Congress (Madras) elected him in 
the CA. He was a Standing Counsel for Zamindars of Madras Presidency; Azad, Maulana Abdul Kalam 
(Muslim): Muslim, elected by Congress (NWFP and UP); B. R. Ambedkar (Hindu, Scheduled Caste—Mahar): 
General. The Scheduled Castes Federation (Bengal) and then Congress (Bombay) elected him to sit in the CA. 
He was in opposition of Gandhi and the Congress; Daulatram, Jairmandas (Hindu, Amil—near Brahmin): 
General, Congress (Sind, E. Punjab); Kaur, Mrs Rajkumari Amri (Christian): General, Congress (CP, Berar); 
Kripalani, Archya J. B. (Hindu, Amil—near Brahmin): General, Congress (UP); Masani, Minoo R. (Parsi): 
General, Congress (Bombay); Mehta, Mrs Hansa (Hindu, Brahmin) : General, Congress (Bombay); Munshi, K. 
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membership and the actors’ behaviour in representing the respective communities’ interest.101 
But he asserts “because the Congress and its candidates covered a broad ideological spectrum, 
those elected to the assemblies did represent the diverse viewpoints of voters and non-voters 
alike.”102 But nominating minorities explicitly, Congress attempted to achieve exactly that: 
Community representation and the protection and integration of their interests in the 
Constitution.103 Explaining his participation in government, Ambedkar, for instance, wrote 
that he “joined the Government because he did not believe in opposition for opposition’s sake 
and because ‘(1) The offer was without any conditions, and (2) one could serve the interests 
of the Scheduled Castes better from within the government.’”104 This statement shows: His 
participation in the legislative processes was inspired by community representation and his 
motivation was to safeguard the interests of the Dalits. 
The Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee met for the first time on February 27 1947. 
The discussion on forced labour and slavery took place during the second and third sitting, 
between March 24-31 and April 14-16 1947. Among others, the groundwork for the 
discussions of the fundamental rights were the submissions of the members B. N. Rau,105 K. 
T. Shah,106 Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar,107 K. M. Munshi,108 Ambedkar,109 and Harnam 
Singh.110 Their contributions were inspired by different sources, for instance, constitutions of 
other states, the Government of India Act of 1935, and case law, such as of the United 
States.111 The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights was also a source of 
inspiration.112 Rau’s submission to the committee, the Constitutional Precedents, contains a 
list of fundamental rights including the abolition of slavery and forced labour,113 as could be 
 
M. (Hindu, Brahmin): General, Congress (Bombay); Panikkar, K. M. (Hindu, non-Brahmin): Princely States 
(Bikaner); Shah, K. T. (Hindu, Brahmin): General, Congress (Bombay); Singh, Harnam (Sikh): Sikh, Akali (East 
Punjab). AUSTIN, 1966, p. 337–338. 
101 AUSTIN, 1966, xvi. 
102 AUSTIN, 1966, p. 10. 
103 Govind Ballabh Pant’s Speech, Constituent Assembly, setting up the Resolution for the installation of the 
Advisory Committee, January 24 1947, reprinted in RAO, 1968b, p. 60. 
104 AUSTIN, 1966, p. 19; quotation in single quotation marks are from Ambedkar, in a letter from Ambedkar to 
Nehru, April 28 1948, quoted in AUSTIN, 1966, p. 20. 
105 Notes on Fundamental Rights by B. N. Rau, September 2 1946, in RAO, 1968b, p. 21–36. 
106 A Note on Fundamental Rights by K. T. Shah, December 23, 1946, in RAO, 1968b, p. 36–55. 
107 A Note on Fundamental Rights by Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar, March 14 1947, in RAO, 1968b, p. 67–69. 
108 Munshi’s Note and Draft Articles on Fundamental Rights, March 17 1947, in RAO, 1968b, p. 69–80. 
109 Ambedkar’s Memorandum and Draft Articles on the Rights of States and Minorities, March 24 1947, in RAO, 
1968b, p. 84–114. 
110 Harnam Singh’s Draft on Fundamental Rights, March 18 1947, in RAO, 1968b, p. 81–84, AUSTIN, 1966, 
p. 62. 
111 AUSTIN, 1966, p. 78–79. 
112 A Note on Fundamental Rights by K. T. Shah, December 23 1946, in RAO, 1968b, p. 36–55. 
113 RAU, 1947, 95, 100. 
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found in the US Constitution, namely the Thirteenth Amendment,114 and the Constitution of 
Czechoslovakia.115 
Shah suggested the protection of the right to be free from enslavement in his Note on 
Fundamental Rights: 
 
39. Slavery of any kind is forbidden. No rights which would amount to 
property of any kind in human beings, or enslavement of one individual by another, or 
by groups or corporations, shall be recognized. All human beings in the Union of India 
are and shall be free and equal before the law. 
40. All labourers attached to land and working thereon in any degree of servile 
condition shall be deemed to be free workers, remunerated for this toil by wages at 
prescribed or agreed rates. All forced labour or begar of any kind is forbidden.116 
 
And K. M. Munshi’s Draft also contained provisions for the Rights of Workers, in Article 
VII:117 
 
(3) Every form of slavery or traffic in human beings or compulsory labour other than 
public service equally incumbent upon all or as part of the punishment pronounced by 
a court of law is abolished and if such form of traffic or labour is enforced it shall be 
punishable by the law of the Union.118 
 
These examples show that there was an agreement among the assembly members to explicitly 
abolish slavery. Several of them made use of the term slavery, but none contained a definition 
and only Shah’s suggestion indicated that slavery was understood as the right to ownership in 
a person. Shah also addressed regionally specific labour conditions, such as the granting of 
freedom to workers attached to the land, and also used an Indian term: begar. 
Instead of discussing all the different documents at once, the members of the sub-
committee used Munshi’s draft as basis for discussion.119 As quoted above, Munshi’s draft 
contained an article prohibiting slavery. In the discussion of the articles on Rights to Freedom, 
the members of the committee agreed that “the right to maintain his person secure by the law 
of the Union from exploitation in any manner contrary to law or public morality” should be 
 
114 RAU, 1947, 32, 44, 49; Congress of the United States of America, December 18 1865. 
115 RAU, 1947, 34, 53. 
116 A Note on Fundamental Rights by K. T. Shah, December 23 1946, in RAO, 1968b, p. 53. 
117 Munshi’s Note and Draft Articles on Fundamental Rights, March 17 1947, in RAO, 1968b, p. 69–80. 
118 Munshi’s Note and Draft Articles on Fundamental Rights, March 17 1947, in RAO, 1968b, p. 77. 
119 Minutes of the Meeting of the Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee February 27-March 31 1947, March 24 
1947, in RAO, 1968b, p. 116. 
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moved to the provision prohibiting “begar or other forms of forced labour”120—begar being 
defined as “a form of forced labour.”121  
On March 27 Munshi’s prohibition of slavery article 7 (3) was discussed.122 The 
members agreed on the part that “[e]very form of slavery or traffic in human beings” should 
be abolished and added that a “contravention of this prohibition shall be an offence.”123 
Disagreement among the members surfaced on the issue of forced labour for public works and 
conscription. The members agreed that private actors should never have the right to use slave 
labour, but some members intended to save the state’s right to require forced labour. The 
removal of military service from the purview of the abolition of forced labour was negated by 
majority vote.124 The revision of the sub-committee then read: 
 
VII. Clause (3).—(a) Every form of slavery or traffic in human beings is hereby 
prohibited and any contravention of this prohibition shall be an offence. 
(b) No begar (a form of forced labour) shall be permitted within the Union. 
(c) No involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the 
party shall be duly convicted, or as a compulsory service under any general scheme of 
education shall exist within the Union or any place subject to its jurisdiction. 
(d) Conscription for military service or training or for any work in aid of 
military operations is hereby prohibited.125 
 
After reworking the wording of this passage, the members of the committee accepted the 
criminalisation of slavery.126 The Final Draft Report127 and the completed Report of the Sub-
Committee on Fundamental Rights128 with which the Advisory Committee continued its work 
contained the provisions under Rights to Freedom quoted above, including the prohibition of 
child labour in hazardous occupations.129 With the addition of the Indian term begar,130 the 
 
120 Minutes of the Meeting of the Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee February 27-March 31 1947, March 26 
1947, in RAO, 1968b, p. 121. 
121 Minutes of the Meeting of the Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee February 27-March 31 1947, March 27 
1947, in RAO, 1968b, p. 125. 
122 Minutes of the Meeting of the Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee February 27-March 31 1947, March 27 
1947, RAO, 1968b, p. 125–126. 
123 Minutes of the Meeting of the Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee February 27-March 31 1947, March 27 
1947, in RAO, 1968b, p. 125. 
124 Minutes of the Meeting of the Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee February 27-March 31 1947, March 27 
1947, in RAO, 1968b, p. 126. 
125 RAO, 1968b, p. 126–127. 
126 Minutes of the Meeting of the Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee, April 14-15 1947, in RAO, 1968b, p. 165. 
127 Draft Report of the Sub-Committee to the Advisory Committee, and Annexure Fundamental Rights, submitted 
April 3 1947, in RAO, 1968b, p. 137–143. 
128 Report of the Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights to the Advisory Committee, and Annexure Fundamental 
Rights, submitted April 16 1947, in RAO, 1968b, p. 169–176. 
129 Annexure to the Draft Report to the Advisory Committee on Minorities, Fundamental Rights, etc., April 3 
1947, in RAO, 1968b, p. 140. 
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sub-committee “kept in view the complexity of Indian conditions and the peculiarities of the 
Indian situation.”131 
The members of the sub-committee submitted comments on this draft article to the 
Advisory Committee.132 Two members of the sub-committee, Amrit Kaur and Hansa Mehta, 
expressed in their Minutes of Dissent their dissatisfaction with the explanatory note to Clause 
15, which provides for compulsory service for educational purposes.133 They argued that they 
“look upon compulsion as against all tenets of democracy and would point to the danger of 
giving the State power of compulsion in any sphere of life.”134 They suggested that any 
activities should be paid, since in a populous country like India, compulsion would not be 
necessary by any means.135 Ayyar, on the other hand, explicitly asked for a provision that 
would allow the state to coerce labour in times of emergency in his notes of dissent. He 
probably had the recent end of World War II in mind, because he pointed out that in times of 
war the right to conscription should be retained for the state—even though, he admitted, such 
a provision would be in contravention to the ideal of non-violence.136 K. T. Shah137 and 
Ambedkar also expressed their reservation against the prohibition of compulsory military 
service. They argued that a state needed to secure its defence—prohibiting military service 
would amount to “wilful self-immolation.”138 
The Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee also addressed the question of enforcing 
fundamental rights. Following the British example, the members of the committee suggested 
the method of the prerogative writ, now enshrined in the Constitution of India in Article 32 
(2) and Article 226.139 It would allow the Supreme Court and the high courts to issue orders, 
for instance habeas corpus—the release of individuals from state or private detention; and 
mandamus—the order to the administration and executive to exercise their duty in protecting 
fundamental rights. But pleading for the issuance of a writ was limited to persons affected by 
 
130 B. N. Rau’s Notes on the Draft Report, April 8 1947, in RAO, 1968b, p. 149. 
131 Report of the Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights, April 16 1947, in RAO, 1968b, p. 169. 
132 Notes and Comments on the Draft Report, April 4-15 1947, in RAO, 1968b, p. 143–163. 
133 Annexure to the Draft Report to the Advisory Committee on Minorities, Fundamental Rights, etc., April 3 
1947, in RAO, 1968b, p. 140. 
134 Amrit Maur & Hansa Mehta: Minutes of Dissent to the Report, April 17-20 1947, IV, in RAO, 1968b, p. 178. 
135 Amrit Maur & Hansa Mehta: Minutes of Dissent to the Report, April 17-20 1947, IV, in RAO, 1968b, p. 178. 
136 Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar: Minutes of Dissent to the Report, April 17-20 1947, VI, in RAO, 1968b, p. 180–
181. 
137 K. T. Shah: Minutes of Dissent to the Report, April 17-20 1947, X, in RAO, 1968b, p. 193–194. 
138 B. R. Ambedkar: Minutes of Dissent to the Report, April 17-20 1947, VIII, in RAO, 1968b, p. 183. 
139 Art. 226 was substituted by the Constitution of India (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976. 
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the rights violation.140 The policymakers clearly saw that fundamental rights needed 
protection from state agents and private actors, but victims also needed active assistance. 
Ambedkar, Ayyar and Munshi supported the empowerment of courts to issue writs and the 
other members agreed. N. G. Ranga, with an eye on poor people who could not afford a 
lawyer, suggested that the state should bear the costs for cases in which fundamental rights 
were affected.141 This suggestion has not been adopted. Austin offers an explanation: Such a 
provision would have been impossible to implement, because of the amount of administrative 
paperwork and the immense costs.142 
The Advisory Committee discussed the report of the Fundamental Rights Committee 
on April 21 1947;143 Clause 15 was discussed in two sessions.144 The discussion continued as 
to whether the state should be able to make use of forced labour or not. Ambedkar and 
Rajagopalachari spoke in favour, while Ambedkar insisted that even though it might be forced 
labour it must be paid. Amrit Kaur repeatedly spoke against any right of the state to extract 
compulsory labour.145 Upon the request of Rajagopalachari, the term ‘slavery’ was dropped 
from the clause. He remarked that the term slavery was outdated and explained: “[W]e need 
not adopt the laws of America as enacted at the time of slavery. What is intended is that 
forced labour and any form of involuntary servitude except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted are prohibited.”146 Within this line of 
reasoning, the CA members apparently defined slavery as chattel slavery, the legal ownership 
over persons. The way Rajagopalachari used the term ‘forced labour’ indicates that he also 
meant bonded labour. Within the minutes of the discussion are barely any recorded attempts 
to define these terms. Responding to the question of whether Clause 15 included bonded 
labour, Rajagopalachari affirmed. He specified that bonded labour “is involuntary labour.”147 
This was the most explicit statement regarding bonded labour in all of the discussions so far. 
 
140 “A person is not entitled to file a writ petition until any of his rights have been infringed,” Allahabad High 
Court, May 26 1958. 
141 Constituent Assembly Debates, April 29 1947. 
142 AUSTIN, 1966, 68, footnote n. 72. 
143 Proceedings of the Meeting of the Advisory Committee, April 21 1947, in RAO, 1968b, p. 213–289. 
144 Proceedings of the Meeting of the Advisory Committee, April 21 1947, in RAO, 1968b, 255-56, 263-64. 
145 Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Minorities, Fundamental Rights, etc., April 21 1947, in RAO, 1968b, 
255-56, 263-64. 
146 C. Rajagopalachari: Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Minorities, Fundamental Rights, etc., April 21 
1947, in RAO, 1968b, p. 255. 
147 C. Rajagopalachari: Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Minorities, Fundamental Rights, etc., April 21 
1947, in RAO, 1968b, p. 256. 
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The issue of defining ‘voluntary’ had already played a role in the previous episodes. 
The British had described forms of bonded labour as ‘voluntary enslavement,’148 and the IPC 
specifies that slavery is committed ‘against the will’ of the person (Sec. 370, 374). The 
League of Nations Temporary Committee on Slavery intended to include “voluntary or 
involuntary subjections,”149 as well as debt bondage as forms of slavery prohibited by the 
Slavery Convention. The members of the Advisory Committee did not attempt to define 
‘voluntary’—this question was later specified in the Constituent Assembly debates, which I 
discuss in the following sub-chapter. Rajagopalachari avoided the discussion by simply 
stating that bonded labour was involuntary. 
Because of deletions and rearrangements, the clause concerning slavery became 
Clause 11. The protection of children, as well as compulsory services under educational 
schemes, were moved into separate clauses.150 The final version on which the Advisory 
Committee agreed reads as follows:151 
 
11 (a) Traffic in human beings, and 
(b) forced labour in any form including begar, and involuntary servitude except 
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted are 
hereby prohibited, and any contravention of this prohibition shall be an 
offence. 
Explanation.—Nothing in this sub-clause shall prevent the State from imposing 
compulsory service for public purposes without any discrimination on the 
ground of race, religion, case or class.152 
 
Forced labour appeared as the umbrella term of which slavery was one form. Since the 
members of the committees seemed to agree that slavery described the ownership right and 
particularly an outdated form of labour exploitation specific to the US, the term slavery was 
removed from the draft article. While none of the terms were clearly defined, the CA 
members intended to enclose the abolition of bonded labour by the provision against forced 
 
148 Indian Law Commission, January 15 1841a, 194, 281. 
149 ALLAIN, 2008, p. 76. 
150 Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Minorities, Fundamental Rights, etc., April 21 1947, in RAO, 1968b, 
p. 256. 
151 Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Minorities, Fundamental Rights, etc., April 22 1947, in RAO, 1968b, 
p. 290. 
152 Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Minorities, Fundamental Rights, etc., April 21 1947, in RAO, 1968b, 
p. 288; Interim Report of the Advisory Committee on the Subject of Fundamental Rights, April 23, 1947, 
Annexure, in RAO, 1968b, p. 297–298. 
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labour. The version of Clause 11 quoted above was submitted by the Advisory Committee in 
the form of an Interim Report to the CA by the end of April 1947.153 
 
Constituent Assembly 
The members of the Assembly debated Clause 11 for the first time during the sessions in May 
1947, and then again as Article 17 on December 3 1948. The participants of the Indian 
Constituent Assembly welcomed the proposition to protect the right to freedom from slavery. 
But even here, the debate on the ban of forced labour was less concerned with bonded labour, 
but centred primarily on the question of compulsory labour in prisons, during emergencies, 
and in the form of prostitution, as well as the question of whether conscription would qualify 
as forced labour.154 Karimuddin wanted to make sure that forced labour for penal purposes 
was in place—the article as suggested would not allow forced prison labour.155 Since the CA 
members were still divided on the question of conscription, they decided to commission an ad 
hoc committee156 to resolve the issue.157 The members of the ad hoc committee, among them 
Munshi and Ambedkar, submitted that “Clause 11 (b) does not, in our opinion, include 
conscription for military service. But the expression ‘forced labour’ being very 
comprehensive, we think that the Explanation should be retained in order to make an 
exception in the case of compulsory service for public purposes.”158 
While there was no disagreement expressed in the CA on what forced labour or begar 
could mean, there was no agreement on the use of terminology either. Ambedkar noted that 
“‘begar’ is (…) something which is imposed by the State.”159 In light of this, the members of 
the assembly discussed whether military service or conscription could be outlawed by this 
clause.160 K. T. Shah defined begar in a way that also included forms of labour extraction 
committed by private agents: “Forced labour is no doubt an evil; and the peculiar form of it, 
which is known by the word ‘begar,’ that is to say of compulsory work without payment, and 
 
153 RAO, 1968b, p. 293. 
154 Constituent Assembly Debates, May 1 1947, December 3 1948. 
155 Kazi Syed Karimuddin, Constituent Assembly Debates, May 1 1947, December 3 1948. 
156 RAO, 1968b, p. 293. 
157 Report of the ad hoc committee on Clause 11 of the Annexure to the Interim Report of the Advisory 
Committee on the Subject of Fundamental Rights, submitted May 1 1947, in RAO, 1968b, 299, 302. 
158 Report of the ad hoc committee on Clause 11 of the Annexure to the Interim Report of the Advisory 
Committee on the Subject of Fundamental Rights, submitted May 1 1947, in RAO, 1968b, p. 299. 
159 B. R. Ambedkar, Constituent Assembly Debates, May 1 1947. 
160 Constituent Assembly Debates, May 1 1947. 
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work at command, should also be stopped.”161 Dakshayani Velayudan expressed her 
endorsement of Clause 11. She explained that particularly agricultural workers but also all 
those workers who were not remunerated for their labour and exposed to penal sanctions, 
would profit from this provision, indicating that her understanding of trafficking and begar 
included bonded labour.162 
Raj Bahadur’s contribution highlights the terminological disagreement as well: 
“[B]egar, that is, forced labour, not only for ordinary purposes of agriculture but even for 
menial and humiliating jobs.”163 He referred not only to bonded labour, but also to unpaid 
labour extracted on the ground of caste. This assessment seemed to also be shared by T. T. 
Krishnamachari. He addressed bonded labour when he explained “call it ‘begar’ or anything 
like that and in my part of the country, the tenant oftentimes is more or less a helot attached to 
the land and he has certain rights and those are contingent on his continuing to be a slave.”164 
The terms ‘begar’ and ‘forced labour’ were used in the discussion interchangeably and 
seemingly without an attempt to clearly define what was meant by those terms. The 
discussants appeared to share a notion of labour exploitation they wanted to address but used 
the terms to describe what they meant at random. Based on this shared understanding, the 
members of the CA and sub-committee saw no need to define either slavery or forced labour, 
begar or bonded labour. They agreed that all of these forms of exploitation, with the 
exception of forced labour reserved for the state, should end. The term ‘slavery’ was used 
indiscriminately, but numerous mentions indicate that several speakers understood slavery in 
terms of chattel slavery: Shah referred again to slavery meaning “the right to own human 
beings.”165 Earlier he included trafficking when he pointed “out that by ‘Traffic in human 
beings’ I understand the possibility of buying and selling as if these human beings were 
chattels, and as such ought to be prohibited. The common understanding interprets these 
words to mean slavery as it was practised in olden countries.”166 Nehru referred also to 
slavery as “property in human beings.”167 These examples depict a definition of slavery tied to 
the concept of ownerships rights in humans, and the nomenclature to refer to bonded labour 
was the term forced labour. 
 
161 K. T. Shah, Constituent Assembly Debates, December 3 1948. 
162 Dakshayani Velayudan, Constituent Assembly Debates, May 1 1947, italics in the original. 
163 Raj Bahadur, Constituent Assembly Debates, November 22 1948. 
164 T. T. Krishnamachari, Constituent Assembly Debates, December 3 1948. 
165 K. T. Shah, Constituent Assembly Debates, September 10 1949. 
166 K. T. Shah, Constituent Assembly Debates, December 3 1948, italics in the original. 
167 Jawaharlal Nehru, Constituent Assembly Debates, September 10 1949. 
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Another issue was the gravity and prevalence of forced labour, but there was no 
agreement among the discussants in the CA upon this question. Das asserted that the “practice 
[of forced labour] does not exist among the major States.”168 Patel explained during the debate 
on fundamental rights that people in India were exposed to “slavery”169 in the past, but that 
this condition had ended completely. On the other side, Krishnamachari explained that he 
believed that “forced labour”170 was prevalent everywhere in India. This disagreement on the 
prevalence of forced labour or slavery reflects the issue of having not defined those terms. For 
instance, Krishnamachari referred to bonded labour in agriculture,171 while Das referred to 
forced labour or begar exercised by the state.172 Therefore, Krishnamachari was able to see 
forced labour everywhere in India, while Das, focusing only on forced labour extracted by the 
state, detected its extraction only in the princely states. 
Das worried about the implementation of the constitutional right to be free from begar 
and pointed at the problem of this very provision: He insisted that this right needed to be 
monitored and enforced—the police or labour inspectors would be necessary to conduct 
fieldwork, identify individuals working under the condition, and liberate the workers. Das 
already anticipated implementation problems of the right to be free from forced labour and 
begar and requested “further assurance from the representatives of the Indian States173 (…) 
whether they will persuade their colleagues in the less advanced States to abolish forced 
labour.”174 
Other members were more optimistic. Speaking in favour of the constitutional article, 
Dakshayani Velayudan explained that “this clause will have a great effect on the underdogs of 
this land who will have a voice when India gets her independence. This clause will bring 
about an economic revolution in the fascist social structure existing in India.”175 T. T. 
Krishnamachari expressed his optimism that begar and forced labour would disappear, but 
spoke against the adoption of the article: 
 
[I]f public opinion is sufficiently mobilised against those abuses, I do not think we 
ought to put a blot on the fair name of India, possibly, by enacting in our constitution a 
ban on such abuses. Abuses which will disappear in course of time cannot disappear 
 
168 Biswanath Das, Constituent Assembly Debates, May 1 1947. 
169 Vallabhbhai J. Patel, Constituent Assembly Debates, April 29 1947. 
170 T. T. Krishnamachari, Constituent Assembly Debates, December 3 1948. 
171 T. T. Krishnamachari, Constituent Assembly Debates, December 3 1948. 
172 Biswanath Das, Constituent Assembly Debates, May 1 1947. 
173 The Indian States were also called the Princely States or Native States, which were governed by Indian rulers. 
174 Biswanath Das, Constituent Assembly Debates, May 1 1947. 
175 Dakshayani Velayudan, Constituent Assembly Debates, May 1 1947, italics in the original. 
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all at once by our putting a ban on them in the constitution. (…) [A]ge-old 
peculiarities of ours that still persist, bad as they are in particular parts of society 
which can be made to disappear by suitable legislation in due course, perhaps in two, 
three or four years.176 
 
In his eyes, fixing the term ‘forced labour’ or ‘begar’ in the Constitution of India would 
reflect badly on India’s reputation. This incrimination could be avoided by simply not 
mentioning these practices in the Constitution, since Krishnamachari hoped that they would 
vanish soon anyway—British administrators had expressed the same hope five decades 
earlier.177 
The Draft Constitution was published in February 1948 and open for comments and 
suggestions by the public. The Socialist Party published its own version of a constitutional 
draft, but its provision for the abolition of forced labour was rather similar to what the 
Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee had produced, including references to trafficking, forced 
labour, and begar and no mentioning of bonded labour.178 The submitted suggestions by the 
public were again examined by the Drafting Committee. For the then Article 17 on the 
prohibition of traffic in human beings and forced labour no suggestions or comments were 
considered.179 
All versions of the prohibition of slavery, begar, bonded labour, trafficking and forced 
labour discussed above, did not formulate a right. Instead, they offer what Donnelly describes 
as a negative right180—a prohibition requiring an abstention from certain behaviour. By 
formulating a negative right, the constitution makers focused on the perpetrators rather than 
on the empowerment of the victims. They did not offer a state machinery to secure the right to 
be free from enslavement181 and Article 23 could only “be enforced by legal action.”182 Such 
a provision was therefore likely ineffective, since affected individuals could not afford a court 
case.183 
 
176 T. T. Krishnamachari, Constituent Assembly Debates, December 3 1948. 
177 Mr. A. Forbes, Commissioner of Chota Nagpur, 1898, quoted in a letter from the Hon’ble Mr. J. A. Huback, 
Secretary to the Government of Bihar and Orissa, Revenue Department, dated September 12 1919, National 
Archives of India, November 1920, 35, item No. 1. 
178 Socialist Party, 1948. 
179 RAO, 1968a, 3, 39-40. 
180 DONNELLY, 2013, p. 42–43, Art. 21 which provides for the right to freedom is also framed in terms of a 
negative right: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure 
established by law,” Constitution of India, 1950. 
181 Jayal argues that this difference between positive and negative rights cannot be upheld, since negative rights 
also require state action, such as, for instance, surveillance by the police, JAYAL, 2013, p. 156. 
182 AGGARAWALA/AIYAR, 1950, p. 23. 
183 Law Commission of India/Government of India/Ministry of Law, 1958, p. 587. 
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The authors of the Indian Constitution did not define begar or forced labour, and a 
recourse to the minutes of the debates does not give a finite answer to the definitional 
question either. Earlier, several judges at the high courts remarked upon the absence of a 
definition of slave or slavery in the IPC—the new constitutional provision did not fill this 
gap.184 The members of the CA acknowledged international legislation and referred to it. 
Biswanath Das, for instance, who had represented India at the ILO during the making of the 
Forced Labour Convention, made a reference to this convention.185 The CA members did not 
incorporate international provisions into the Constitution. Furthermore, they diverged from 
international terminological convention: While the LN included bonded labour within its 
definition of ‘similar forms of slavery,’186 and supervised the abolition of bonded labour 
under the Slavery Convention, the members of the CA used the term ‘forced labour’ for 
bonded labour. With Rajagopalachari’s explanation that bonded labour was “involuntary 
labour,”187 the CA moved around the exclusion for bonded labour from the purview of the 
ILO Forced Labour Convention, which requires that the working condition has not been 
entered voluntarily.188 Despite a new legal provision, the rules of the institution of the 
abolition of slavery remained ambiguous. 
 
Provisional Parliament & Government 
Like the Constituent Assembly, the provisional parliament and government were concerned 
with the issue of forced labour and bonded labour. As Labour Member of the Viceroy’s 
Executive Council between 1942 and 1946, Ambedkar studied the phenomenon of forced 
labour in India for several months. He explained to the provisional parliament in 1949, that 
“[t]he subject appeared to me to be assuming so many different forms in different parts of 
India that I could not come to the conclusion that a simple measure applying generally to all 
parts of the country would solve this problem.”189 He argued that more information on the 
forms of forced labour in India was needed, in order to frame “a proper legislation.”190 He had 
 
184 The Queen v. Firman Ali, Calcutta High Court, December 2 1871; Empress of India v. Ram Kuar, Allahabad 
High Court, March 8 1880; Koroth Mammad and Another v. The King-Emperor, Madras High Court, August 27 
1917. 
185 Biswanath Das, Constituent Assembly Debates, May 1 1947. 
186 CECIL, February 5 1927, p. 218. 
187 C. Rajagopalachari: Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Minorities, Fundamental Rights, etc., April 21 
1947, in RAO, 1968b, p. 256. 
188 International Labour Organisation, 1930, Art. 2 (1). 
189 B. R. Ambedkar, Law Minister, Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative), February 11 1949, p. 400. 
190 B. R. Ambedkar, Law Minister, Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative), February 11 1949, p. 401. 
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intended to study all of these forms with the help of an Enquiry Committee that would tour 
the country, but these and other proposals,191 according to Ambedkar, had been rejected at the 
governmental level by individuals who had an interest in begar.192 
Figure 8. The first Union Cabinet, 1950 
 
Figure 8, the first Union Cabinet, 1950. Source: Author unknown/Wikimedia Commons. The first 
Union Cabinet, at the Government House in New Delhi, on January 31 1950. From left to right, front: 
Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, Sardar Baldev Singh, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Sardar Patel, Dr. John Mathai, Jagjivan Ram, Rajkumari 
Amrit Kaur, Dr. S. P. Mukerjee. In the back, left to right: Khurshed Lal, R. R. Diwakar, Mohanlal 
Saxena, Gopalaswami Ayyangar, N. V. Gadgil, K. C. Neogi, Jairamdas Daulatram, K. Santhanam, 
Satya Narayan Sinha and Dr. B. V. Keskar. 
 
Ram, who became head of the Department of Labour in 1946, followed up on 
Ambedkar’s suggestion, but Partition made the work of such a committee impossible. Instead 
of conducting an enquiry into the situation of slavery and forced labour in India, Ram decided 
to address the question from the legal perspective.193 In August 1948, the Ministry of Labour 
commissioned Dhamne as the Officer on Special Duty to carry out research and to draft 
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recommendations to reform the laws on forced labour.194 The provisional parliament 
discussed his Summary of the Report on Forced Labour in December 1949.195 
Dhamne identified three different forms of forced or compulsory labour in India. The 
first form, agrestic serfdom, included “personal services […] arising out of tenure.”196 
Ultimately agrestic serfdom was a term used by Dhamne that in fact described forms of 
bonded labour in agriculture: Agricultural labourers were forced to offer their labour to their 
tenant in return for low or no tenancy. The second form which Dhamne described was debt 
bondage;197 the third form concerned forced labour carried out because of the workers’ caste 
and the occupation that came along with it. Pottery or leather works belonged to the category 
of labour carried out by lower caste members. Upper caste members profited from these 
services and products and remunerated the worker only in kind. If the labourer did not deliver 
the service or product, she or he could be punished.198 Dhamne discussed the extent of forced 
labour without giving any numbers. He summarised that all three forms of forced labour were 
‘prevalent’ in India.199 He identified the provisions of the ILO Convention on Forced Labour 
of 1930 and constitutional Article 23 against forced labour and begar as the relevant legal 
foundations and concluded: “No new Legislation considered necessary.”200 This conclusion is 
noteworthy since he stated a few pages earlier in the report that the ILO Forced Labour 
Convention does not cover bonded labour and that the Constitution of India does not define 
forced labour or begar.201 In no instance did he mention the Slavery Convention. 
Even though Dhamne had not found any further legislation necessary, R. K. Sidhva 
had already introduced a private bill called Prevention of Free or Forced or Compulsory 
Labour Bill (see Appendix) to the provisional parliament on February 29 in 1948, before the 
appointment of Dhamne as Special Officer.202 The bill was discussed in two sessions, on 
February 11 1949 and December 16 1949. Dhamne submitted his report before the session in 
December 1949, after the CA adopted Article 17, which later became Article 23.203 During 
the first discussion of the bill, the members of the assembly decided to send out the bill to 
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solicit the opinion of the Indian states. The states were requested to submit their comments by 
June 30 1949 and to publish the bill in their respective regional Gazettes. This was done to 
inform and enable the public and relevant bodies to submit their comments. Then in 
December 1949 the bill was discussed again.204 
The bill consists of two pages. It gives a definition of free (unpaid) labour as any work 
“without providing remuneration in cash at the prevailing market rates in the locality for that 
kind of Labour.”205 The idea of force in the definition of forced or compulsory labour is tied 
to “the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself 
voluntarily.”206 A labour relation qualified as forced labour when wages were too low or not 
paid at all. In the statement of objectives of the bill, the author explains that “[t]he mischief 
does not lie in compulsion alone, but in non-payment of wages and often inadequate 
payments.”207 This bill also seems to rest on the assumption that forced labour was only 
forced when the labourer had not submitted him- or herself ‘voluntarily.’208 At the League of 
Nations, the discussants of the Slavery Convention found that workers submitted to bonded 
labour or debt bondage voluntarily. But nonetheless, this labour relation amounted to a form 
of slavery that the League intended to abolish, and the League monitored the British Raj on 
the issue of bonded labour. The bill of the provisional parliament provides that if the 
remuneration of bonded labour did not meet the “prevailing market rates”209 the employer 
should be prosecuted. The bill also applied if “the menace of any penalty”210 could be proven. 
But the disqualification of forced or compulsory labour “for which the said person has not 
offered himself voluntarily”211 would exclude bonded labour or debt bondage as long as 
remuneration was high enough. 
In the interim parliament’s discussion, the members gave examples and delineated the 
aim of the bill in a way that shed some light on the intention of the bill: One central goal was 
the eradication of the extraction of forced labour by private actors. This, according to Sidhva, 
would also fulfil the requirement of the ILO Forced Labour Convention.212 But neither in the 
discussion nor in the bill was a single reference made to the Slavery Convention of 1926. 
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Sidhva described the use of forced labour by zamindars to cultivate the land or construct 
canals without cash payment. He explained that this extraction of forced labour would be a 
violation of the IPC Section 374, but he also explained that this section was never used 
against perpetrators.213 He also mentioned the hill tribes and the working conditions which he 
wanted to address with this bill. Yet he did not give a description of these working 
conditions.214 Instead, Kamath explained “that the spirit of the Bill is absolutely in conformity 
with and not a whit at variance with Article 17 of the Constitution.”215 In the discussion of the 
sub-committee the members had clarified that Article 17 would encompass bonded labour, 
therefore, also this bill intended to address it. Tyagi, member of the assembly, gave an 
explanation that moved in this direction: Where historical obligations were used to render 
forced labour and where the affected individuals or groups were not able to leave, this bill 
would protect the labourers.216 
Tyagi also highlighted the question of what constituted ‘force:’ A person was forced to 
submit to forced labour when the “economic conditions” left no other option.217 Force was at 
play, according to Tyagi, when labourers did not have housing and could be evicted by their 
landlords.218 He explained: “It is not by force of weapon or by physical force that a man is put 
to forced labour or has to work against his will.”219 Tyagi’s explanation moves the possibility 
of choice and compulsion beyond the individual and into the realm of economic 
circumstances. While, as described in the first episode, British administrators also made the 
observation that economic conditions forced people into self-enslavement during famines,220 
the members of the CA were willing to move these conditions into the realm of forced labour 
legislation. This constituted a redefinition of forced labour and voluntary submission to forced 
labour. 
Contrary to some participants in the debate on forced labour in the CA,221 the author of 
the Prevention of Free or Forced or Compulsory Labour Bill, as well as several participants 
of the discussion in the Dominion Parliament, opined that free, forced and compulsory labour 
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were highly prevalent and a serious problem in India, particularly in rural areas where feudal 
structures perpetuated these labour conditions.222 The discussants in the provisional 
parliament found that the issue of forced labour, free labour or compulsory labour were 
rampant. Sidhva pointed at the distinction between the behaviour of the government under the 
British and of the new regime that was just about to come. He reminded his audience of the 
ILO and the Forced Labour Convention and the inertia of the colonial power to implement the 
convention.223 Referring to the tribal population in Orissa and Bihar, Sidhva argued that the 
Constitution offered general provisions for their protection, only a specific law could end 
rampant labour exploitation in the form of forced labour.224 He supported his judgment on the 
prevalence of forced labour with the work of Thakkar, who had presided over the Excluded 
and Partially Excluded Areas (Other than those in Assam) Sub-Committee of the Constituent 
Assembly. Tyagi added, also based on Thakkar’s report, that thousands of workers were 
exposed to “this sort of slavery.”225 Minister of Labour Ram remained more general and 
remarked with reference to Dhamne’s report “that forced labour is prevalent in the 
country.”226 Sidhva concluded that the adoption of the bill would be a contribution to the 
realisation of the fundamental right formulated in the constitutional Article 23.227 
Sidhva enumerated several reasons to move this bill: On the one hand it served the 
fulfilment of international obligations.228 On the other hand, the author and members of the 
assembly found existing legislation, as well as the adopted constitutional article, insufficient: 
The IPC Section 374 “is so vague that it has failed to root out this evil.”229 Similarly, Thakkar 
explained that the IPC had been “a dead letter”230 throughout the past nine decades. Sidhva 
furthermore suggested that a specific law that ensured that the constitutional provisions 
against forced labour were implemented.231 In order to give the courts a direction on how to 
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rule in cases of violations of Article 23, the law would make sure that provisions for 
punishments were in place.232 
The abolition of forced labour and slavery also carried metaphorical weight. The 
adoption of the bill, to some actors, marked a significant step towards independence and a 
clear demarcation between the Indian democratic regime and despotic colonial rule. CA 
member Kamath stressed the role of the members of the Dominion Parliament as the 
representatives of the Indian people. The bill would signify “the direction of the social and 
economic emancipation of the vast masses.”233 He added that “[i]t is high time, now when we 
have emerged from the night of slavery into the light of freedom, that we put an end to all the 
vestiges of slavery which may still exist in our social structure.”234 Not only had workers been 
enslaved, it was the whole Indian nation that had endured “centuries of slavery.”235 Now with 
independence, India was “able to break the shackles of slavery and to secure freedom for this 
country.”236 Saxena even suggested a change of the preamble to the Constitution, which 
would have read: “In the name of God the Almighty, under whose inspiration and guidance, 
the Father of our Nation, Mahatma Gandhi, led the Nation from slavery into Freedom.”237 If 
accepted, this would have been the only instance where the word slavery had appeared in the 
Constitution of India. 
Jagjivan Ram argued against the bill, stating that a simple legislative provision would 
not end forced labour.238 Only with a change in the mentality of the victims as well as the 
perpetrators bonded labour would end.239 He confirmed that there were also legal provisions 
in the provinces banning forced labour, but in general, these provisions were ineffective and 
forced labour widespread, particularly in rural India.240 Labour Minister Ram clarified the 
issue in his statement, explaining that forced labourers were not even able to turn to the 
police, let alone to afford appealing to the Supreme Court.241 Sidhva countered this 
observation by explaining that “[t]heir consciousness has now risen,”242 indicating that 
labourers were more likely to turn to the police than they were before independence. Ram 
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expressed his hope that Sidhva would withdraw the bill because no law could solve this 
problem, only the awareness of worker and their resistance to become forced labourers.243 
Therefore, one solution proposed to solve the issue was education, to increase literacy, since 
with education affected labourers would know their rights.244 
Tyagi supported Ambedkar’s point on the lack of information regarding the forms of 
forced labour prevalent in India. He explicitly requested officers who were not ‘England-
returnees,’ to constitute an enquiry committee with members who were familiar with rural 
life.245 The one officer—Dhamne—whom Ram had appointed, was not enough in his view, 
since particularly in rural India the issue was pressing.246 Tyagi also implied that a non-
official bill, such as this one submitted by Sidhva, and one which has not been drafted by the 
government, was reflective of public opinion but lacked the necessary statistical information 
and was therefore not formulated adequately.247 He expressed the expectation that if a 
committee was installed and a sufficient bill was produced, the Dominion Parliament would 
support it without hesitation.248 Tyagi also argued, similarly to Ram’s reasoning, that the 
submitted bill would not be effective.249 Since the affected individuals had no alternative, 
practically nowhere to go to evade their enslavement, “drastic action”250 of the state was 
required. These actions, he envisioned, were the development of cottage industries by the 
government and the withdrawal of governmental attention from urban development to rural 
development.251 He added that next to legal provisions, additional measures were necessary to 
offer the landless population, so that they “have something to fall back upon which they may 
call their own.”252 
Satyanarayan Sinha successfully stalled votes on the bill and requested repeated 
circulations of the bill for comments by the people and public institutions.253 In his short 
biographical entrance, Austin notes: Sinha “[h]as spent life as a Congressman and a legislator, 
although maintaining his agricultural and zamindari interests; he came from a family of minor 
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zamindars.”254 Sidhva found the circulation unnecessary, and wondered “who is going to state 
that this condition [of forced labour] should remain.”255 As the Chief Whip, Sinha was 
representing the government’s position. One member, Ahmad, questioned whether this bill 
was in the interest of the government, and also found Sinha’s request at odds. Sinha 
explained: 
 
It is a common joke in the country that whenever a certain thing is not wanted it is 
relegated to a committee, and whenever a Bill is not wanted it is sent for circulation. 
(…) Perhaps it is to revolve round its own axis and then come to a dead stop.256 
 
The Chief Whip rejected this accusation by pointing at the government’s intention to form a 
committee to investigate the issue.257 Sinha’s contribution and attempts to stall the 
development of the bill was the only instance that could be identified as a defence of the 
proslavery interest during the CA debates. 
Yet, another actor speaking against the adoption of the bill was Ambedkar. He was 
convinced that there was not sufficient information gathered to formulate a proper law. He 
argued that “it is much better if this legislation came after the Constitution was passed 
because we could then get the power to administer the law that we make.”258 Knowing the 
different forms of forced labour would allow the government “to frame a measure which may 
be fool-proof and knave-proof,”259 since Ambedkar was convinced that a rather general 
provision would constitute the solution to eradicate forced labour.260 Ahmad spoke strongly 
against the suggestions to postpone the adoption of the bill in order to gather more 
information. He argued that such an endeavour was not necessary since any kind of forced 
labour was to be ended, not matter in which transfiguration.261 Like Das in the CA sessions,262 
Ambedkar mistrusted the provinces in implementing the law and expressed his satisfaction 
that the new constitution would allow the central government to enact and implement labour 
laws for the whole of India.263 
 
254 AUSTIN, 1966, p. 346. 
255 Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative), February 11 1949, p. 397. 
256 Naziruddin Ahmad, Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative), February 11 1949, p. 404. 
257 Satyanarayan Sinha, Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative), February 11 1949, p. 407. 
258 B. R. Ambedkar, Law Minister, Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative), February 11 1949, p. 401. 
259 B. R. Ambedkar, Law Minister, Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative), February 11 1949, p. 400. 
260 B. R. Ambedkar, Law Minister, Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative), February 11 1949, p. 400. 
261 Naziruddin Ahmad, Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative), February 11 1949, p. 404. 
262 Biswanath Das, Constituent Assembly Debates, May 1 1947. 
263 B. R. Ambedkar, Law Minister, Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative), February 11 1949, p. 401. 
Chapter 5  
3rd Episode Part 1:  
Constituent Assembly,  
1946-1952 
 
 
223 
The Labour Minister promised that the government would take measures to abolish 
and penalise forced labour in India after receiving and reviewing the Agricultural Labour 
Inquiry Report. Ram also explained that steps were already taken: The provinces had been 
contacted with a request to remove legislation that permitted forced labour. Indicating that he 
trusted Labour Minister Ram’s assurance to adopt legislation, Sidhva withdrew his bill.264 
In August 1950 Sidhva followed up on Ram’s word. He asked the government what it 
had done to fulfil the promise it had made when he repealed the Prevention of Free or Forced 
or Compulsory Labour Bill. Ram informed the MP that the All India Agricultural Labour 
Enquiry would also include information on forced labour; suggestions, as well as further 
action to deal with forced labour, were under consideration.265 Almost exactly a year later, 
another MP, Deshmukh, followed up on this statement and requested to know what the 
government intended to do against forced labour.266 Ram responded that regarding the 
constitutional articles against forded labour, “it is the opinion of the experts [Dhamne] that 
further legislation may not be necessary. But the question, as I said, is being examined and if 
it is found that legislation is necessary, to prevent forced labour, it will be undertaken.”267 
 
Conclusion 
This episode began with a critical juncture. The hypothetical expectation for changes of the 
institution of the abolition of slavery was either displacement or layering. To briefly 
conclude—change occurred via layering, but not in a substantial manner: The Constituent 
Assembly adopted a constitutional provision against slavery, but left the term ‘slavery’ out, 
since one member insisted that it referred to a form of labour exploitation that applied to the 
US and no longer existed. Other terms that have been addressed in other documents or 
regional legislation, like kamiauti,268 gothi,269 bethi,270 dasa,271 or devadasis,272 were not used 
in the discussions of the Constituent Assembly, nor found entry into the Constitution of India. 
But most importantly: The CA did not provide a definition, neither of forced labour and 
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slavery, nor of begar. A recourse to the debates does not shed light on the question of the 
definition. Clearly, the intention was to end bonded labour, but even this term was barely used 
and not defined. The provisional parliament discussed legislation against forced labour, which 
would have addressed bonded labour. But this bill did not contain a clear definition of its 
subject matter or enumerate competent authorities to ensure enforcement. Furthermore, the 
bill does not contain any provision for compensations for the victims of a violation—even if 
enacted, the Prevention of Free or Forced or Compulsory Labour Bill would have been a 
weak law. 
As in the constitutional article, the bill used the term ‘forced labour’, but did not 
follow the definition of the ILO Forced Labour Convention since the convention excludes 
labour exploitation that has been entered voluntarily.273 The discussants in the assembly 
overcame the exclusion of bonded labour by extending their interpretation of ‘not voluntary’ 
to the economic circumstances within which the workers found themselves. According to 
them, poverty left the workers without choice; therefore, their commitment to a debt was not 
incurred voluntarily and, subsequently, the labour extracted qualified as forced labour. 
The bill Sidhva submitted in the provisional parliament was an almost complete copy 
of the Prevention of Free or Forced or Compulsory Labour Bill274 that S. V. Parulekar had 
submitted to the Legislative Assembly of the Bombay Presidency ten years earlier.275 It 
remains open, why Sidhva chose to copy most parts of the text and not to improve it 
substantially. The provisional parliament did not adopt the bill and the introducing member 
withdrew it, and the question is why this critical juncture was not used to enact a change 
through layering. From the debates in the assemblies and committees it appears that the 
reasons are mainly due to “cognitive limits.”276 Several members during the CA debates 
expressed their belief that bonded labour and forced labour were not rampant,277 an 
assumption that was contradicted in the debates in the provisional parliament. While not in 
agreement regarding the magnitude of the issue, all actors in the assembly, committee and 
parliament agreed that forced labour or slavery had to end, and many hoped that these forms 
of labour exploitation would vanish by themselves with independence. 
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Another argument the members of the CA brought forward was that with a 
democratised society, bonded labour would have no place any longer, and the bill would be 
obsolete. Interestingly, some of the assembly members pointed at the mental change which 
had already developed in the victims of bonded labour since the freedom struggle, and which 
grew with the democratisation of India since independence. Some members in the assembly 
argued that this mental change allowed labourers not to commit to debt bondage relations any 
longer, or, if they had, they would now, in increasing numbers, turn to the police. But the 
mental change of the exploiters was not addressed or only addressed through the legal limits 
of the criminalisation of caste discrimination. On the other side, there was the promise made 
by Labour Minister Ram to Sidhva and the assembly to gather information on the matter in 
order to devise a better law, and to submit it to parliament as soon as possible. Ram, a Dalit 
himself, expressed strong doubts that a law would bring any change to the situation of bonded 
labourers. He asked for social change and seemed rather reluctant to adopt any law in the 
direction of criminalising bonded labour; this position appears strange, since a governmental 
actor, in this case, apparently did not assign a significant role to the purpose to which he had 
committed: policymaking. 
The deliberations and the output of the Constituent Assembly are reflective of the 
ideas actors held: They expressed their hope that with regime change would come economic 
growth, the equality of all citizens, and the abolition of caste discrimination.278 In 1928 the 
Committee of the All India Parties’ Conference explained that “[t]he seat of autocracy, as far 
as we are concerned, has been Whitehall (…) whatever else may happen it is clear that no 
kind of autocracy is going to be tolerated in India.”279 Similar radical changes were expected 
for the conditions of workers: The end of slavery and bonded labour appeared as the self-
evident outcome of regime change and the new law, as expressed by Dakshayani 
Velayudan,280 or T. T. Krishnamachari.281 The members of the CA trusted that the 
Constitution would be followed by a social revolution, which “would bring about fundamental 
changes in the structure of Indian society.”282 The liberation from colonial power was 
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281 Constituent Assembly Debates, December 3 1948. 
282 AUSTIN, 1966, xi; cf. BAJPAI, 2000, May 27 - Jun. 2, p. 1839. 
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recurrently interpreted as the end of the enslavement of the Indian nation283—its liberation 
would translate into the liberation of all and also mean the end of the enslavement of Dalits 
and tribal people.284 But not all members of the CA shared the trust in this self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Thakkar urged the government not to delay the adoption of the bill any longer and 
explained: “We are now independent. Let even the poorest and humblest people in the country 
feel independence.”285 Consequently, some actors expected that the bill would be effective in 
a short period, particularly since the colonial administration had been inactive regarding the 
eradication of forced labour.286 
The political environment was influenced by the fact that members of the INC 
occupied prime positions and antislavery actors were visible. While not strong, the 
Constitution did have a prohibition clause against forced labour. Proslavery voices were 
virtually absent in the debate. The strongest counter position, taken by Ambedkar and Ram, 
was to delay the adoption until more information was gathered to be able to develop a strong 
policy. Ultimately, it was Jagjivan Ram, who has been described as the key defender of Dalit 
rights,287 who asked for the withdrawal of the Prevention of Free or Forced or Compulsory 
Labour Bill. As a member of the government, he occupied the core veto position. He made 
use of his power to effectively prevent further changes to the institution of the abolition of 
slavery, and he promised to lay the foundations for the development of a law against forced 
labour.  
Without a definition, compensation for victims, or the installation of a machinery to 
supervise and enforce the rules, the additional layer of the Constitution had rather symbolic 
value. The CA succeeded in including the abolition of forced labour, begar, and free labour in 
the Constitution of India, and even though bonded labour was not explicitly mentioned, this 
provision was intended for its abolition. The members of the CA wrote a law that was 
applicable to the whole of India and the Indian people. But it should not go unmentioned that 
the right to extract forced labour was secured for the state: Conscription was included in the 
abolition of forced labour, but the state retained the power to extract forced labour for public 
 
283 See for instance the following contributions in the CA: H. V. Kamath, Constituent Assembly of India 
(Legislative), February 11 1949, p. 398; Jaspat Roy Kapoor, Constituent Assembly Debates, November 21 1949; 
Arun Chandra Guha, Constituent Assembly Debates, November 21 1949. 
284 See the comments of: H. V. Kamath, Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative), February 11 1949, p. 398; 
Arun Chandra Guha, Constituent Assembly Debates, November 21 1949; Jaspat Roy Kapoor, Constituent 
Assembly Debates, November 21 1949. 
285 A. V. Thakkar, Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative), February 11 1949, p. 399. 
286 R. K. Sidhva, Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative), February 11 1949, p. 396. 
287 Lok Sabha Secretariat, 2005. 
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works and penal purposes.288 Only two members spoke strictly against any legalised 
extractions of forced labour, but they were not successful. 
On January 26 1950 the Constitution of India came into force. With its adoption the 
Constituent Assembly was dissolved, and the interim parliament became the Provisional 
Parliament in November 1949, which was then replaced by the new parliament after the first 
general elections held between 1951 and 1952, based on universal adult suffrage. The first 
Indian Parliament, consisting of the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha, took over the functions 
of the Dominion Parliament on April 17 1952 as the first democratically elected parliament of 
independent India.289 In the following chapter I follow up on the promise Ram gave and 
discuss how the high courts interpreted the constitutional provision in bonded labour cases. 
 
288 AUSTIN, 1966, p. 65–66. 
289 The Office of Speaker Lok Sabha. 
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ith the coming into force of the Constitution of India, the political context 
changed from colonial rule to democracy. In 1951 the first round of elections 
began. 173.2 million citizens were franchised, of which around 46 percent cast 
their vote. During four months between the years 1951 and 1952 elections were held. 1,874 
candidates competed for 489 seats in the Lok Sabha (lower house) elections.1 Between the 
dissolution of the Constituent Assembly (CA) and the first general elections, the Dominion 
Parliament continued its work until 1952. After the elections the first Lok Sabha was 
constituted in April 1952. In the same month, the Raja Sabha (upper house) also formed and 
held its first sitting on May 3 1952. The two houses constitute the bicameral parliament of 
India. Representatives of the Lok Sabha, which holds three sessions per year—the Budget, 
Monsoon and Winter Sessions—are elected to five-year terms.2 
Before I address the changes of the political context in greater detail, I first discuss the 
institutional characteristics of the abolition of slavery and bonded labour in India. This 
chapter relies mainly on the discussions of the Lok Sabha. All debates are available online at 
the website of the Parliament of India.3 Most of the governmental reports are available online, 
as well as at the South Asia Institute Library in Heidelberg. 
 
Institutional Characteristics 
The spirit of ideas carved out in the beginning of this episode’s chapter, remain substantially 
the same, as well as the level of enforcement, which I will therefore address only briefly.  
 
 
1 HARDGRAVE/KOCHANEK, 2008, 372, 374-75. 
2 WAGNER, 2006, p. 46–48; MITRA, 2017, p. 130–131. 
3 Available at: Lok Sabha Secretariat. 
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Discretion of Interpretation 
The authors of the Constitution of India provided that existing legislations, such as the IPC or 
the Act V, would continue to be in force after independence, except the government or 
legislature of independent India decided to repeal them.4 In case of conflict, the Constitution 
would trump older legislation.5 Therefore, the Act V of 1843, the IPC, and the Slavery 
Convention of 1926 continued to stand as the rules of the institution of the abolition of slavery 
and bonded labour in India. The Constitution of India contained, and continues to contain, the 
prohibition of slavery in Article 23; the only provision for the enforcement of the 
constitutional ban on slavery was its quality as a fundamental principle. The Fundamental 
Principles are justiciable, which means that they can only “be enforced by legal action”6 in a 
court. In addition, the Directive Principles in Part IV of the Indian constitution define the 
nature of work relations that the state should be aiming at. The Directive Principles of the 
Indian constitution provide a set of moral guidelines, “for just and humane conditions of work 
and maternity relief.”7 The states should align their laws and policies with these provisions. 
They are meant as guidelines, but they do not “confer (…) legal rights and create[d] no legal 
remedies.”8 The implementation and interpretation of what “just and humane conditions”9 
means was left open,10 but the courts do not have the ability to make use of the Directive 
Principles.11 
Did the institution of the abolition of slavery in India change with the adoption of the 
constitutional Article 23? The following table compares the different policies that were 
applicable to the new independent Indian state. I also consider the Prevention of Free or 
Forced or Compulsory Labour Bill and earlier legislation. Even though the CA had not 
adopted the bill, the same draft was submitted again in 1954.12 
 
4 Constituent Assembly of India, January 26 1950, Art. 372. 
5 JAIN, 2016, 578-79, footnote 22.  
6 AGGARAWALA/AIYAR, 1950, p. 23. 
7 Constituent Assembly of India, January 26 1950, Part IV, Art. 42. 
8 AGGARAWALA/AIYAR, 1950; STEIN/ARNOLD, 2010, p. 360. 
9 Constituent Assembly of India, January 26 1950, Part IV, Art. 42. 
10 JAYAL, 2013, 154, 222. 
11 Constituent Assembly of India, January 26 1950, Part IV, Art. 37. 
12 Lok Sabha, April 9 1954, p. 4527; Government of India, April 9 1954, p. 223–224. 
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Table 13. Characteristics of the formal institution, 1950 
Law Definition Bonded labour Timeline Punishment Rehabilitation 
Competent 
authorities 
Act V, 1843 No N.A. No No No No 
IPC, 1862 No13 No Yes14 Yes No No 
Slavery 
Convention, 
1926 
Yes Yes No15 Yes16 No No 
Article. 23 No17 Yes No Yes18 No No19 
Prevention of 
Free or Forced 
or Compulsory 
Labour Bill, 
1948 
Yes20 Yes
21 Yes22  Yes No No23 
Case law since 
1915 
Yes24 
Conditional 
yes25 
N.A. Yes26 N.A. N.A. 
 
 
13 IPC Section 370 punishes the buying and disposing of a person as a slave “against his will” and Section 375 
prohibits unlawful compulsory labour, prescribing punishment for compelling “any person to labour against the 
will of that person.” Beyond these qualifications, there is no definition of what a slave or slavery is. 
14 With coming into force. 
15 Art. 2 (b): “[P]rogressively and as soon as possible.” 
16 Art. 6. 
17 The definition of slavery can only be derived from reading the minutes and debates of the Fundamental Rights 
Sub-Committees and the Constituent Assembly, not from the article itself. 
18 With Art. 17, Art. 23 is the only fundamental right which contains an offence clause, GALANTER, 1961, p. 230. 
But it is left to the Parliament (Art. 35 of the Constitution) or existing legislation to provide for punishment. 
19 By endowing the courts with the powers of writs, enforcement provisions against violations of fundamental 
rights were set in place, Constituent Assembly of India, January 26 1950, Art. 32, Art. 226. 
20 It defines free (unpaid) labour, forced labour and compulsory labour. 
21 The bill does not explicitly include bonded labour, but from the Statement of Objects and Reasons’ reference 
to ‘feudalism’ and ‘rural areas’ in which forced labour “survive[s] and thrive[s],” it can be safely deduced that 
bonded labour was one of the problems addressed, Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative), April 5 1949, 
137, 141-42. 
22 Immediately. 
23 It is a cognisable offence, but only an aggrieved person can file a complaint after the violation of his or her 
fundamental right. 
24 Defined in the terms of chattel slavery: In Ram (1915), Satish (1918) and Koroth (1917) the judges compared 
identified elements of chattel slavery in the cases of bonded labour and therefore found bonded labour illegal. 
25 Bonded labour contracts are criminal under slavery offences of the IPC if, (1) payment of wages are either 
very low or the interest rate makes it impossible to end the debt relation, see Sundara Reddi v. Jagannathan And 
Anr., Madras High Court, November 15 1926, SEN, 1922, p. 379–380, Rama Sastriar v. Pakkiri Ambalakaran, 
Madras High Court, May 4 1927; (2) the time frame indicated for the bonded labour relation exceeds five years, 
see Ponnusami v. Palayathan, Madras High Court, March 7 1919, Rama Sastriar v. Pakkiri Ambalakaran, 
Madras High Court, May 4 1927; (3) the labourer may not work somewhere else, see Sreenivasa Iyer v. Govinda 
Kandiyar and Anr., Madras High Court, October 9 1944; (4) the contract contains penal provisions for 
defections, see Karuppannan (Minor) by Mother and Next Friend Kannakkal v. Pambayan Alias Karuppan 
Samban, Madras High Court, September 8 1925; the repayment of a debt by labour is legal, see Sundara Reddi v. 
Jagannathan And Anr., Madras High Court, November 15 1926. 
26 Based on the IPC. 
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The table highlights visually that the adoption of the Prevention of Free or Forced or 
Compulsory Labour Bill would not have constituted a vital change to the already existing 
institution of the abolition of slavery. The Statement of Objects and Reasons’ reference to 
‘feudalism’ and ‘rural areas’ in which forced labour “survive[s] and thrive[s]” indicates that 
bonded labour was one of the problems addressed.27 Until the end of the last episode, the 
courts continued to struggle in terms of how to treat bonded labour28—because the IPC left 
the terms ‘slave’ and ‘slavery’ undefined, and this issue was not resolved by the adoption of 
the constitutional Article 23. This definitional gap can be expected to cause continued debates 
regarding if and under what conditions bonded labour constitutes a criminal offence under the 
IPC, or now under the new provision of the Constitution of India. The rules of the institution 
of the abolition of slavery remained weak: The only provision that actually defined slavery 
and included bonded labour was the Slavery Convention of the League of Nations (LN). But 
the LN had been dissolved since April 1946 and the UN was just about to discuss the destiny 
of the Slavery Convention of 1926. 
 
Enforcement 
The chapter on the level of enforcement showed that bonded labour and forced labour were 
still prevalent in India. Obviously, employers still believed in this form of labour extraction. 
But, at the same time, I did not come across any statement or observation in the records that 
zamindars or other employers openly contested the adoption of the Article 23. In the CA not 
one member spoke of the advantages of bonded labour. A hundred years earlier administrators 
of the colonial government defended “self-sale”29 “as the Indian Poor Law,”30 and in the 
1840s zamindars had sent thousands of petitions to the Government of India.31 Neither the 
records, nor the secondary sources indicate that there was a similarly open contestation of the 
new rules for the institution of the abolition of slavery in the late 1940s. The governmental 
reports implied that bonded labour was probably a highly prevalent issue—great attention was 
given to the indebtedness of workers and to the treatment of potential bonded labour cases; 
 
27 Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative), April 5 1949, 137, 141-42. 
28 Cf. Ram Sarup Bhagat v. Bansi Mandar, Calcutta High Court, March 15 1915; Koroth Mammad and Another 
v. The King-Emperor, Madras High Court, August 27 1917; Empress of India v. Ram Kuar, Allahabad High 
Court, March 8 1880. 
29 Indian Law Commission, January 15 1841a, p. 12. 
30 Mr. Cameron’s Minute, Indian Law Commission, January 15 1841a, 340-43: 13. 
31 GUHA, 1977, p. 11; CASSELS, 2010, 206, footnote no. 129; BANAJI, 1933, p. 402. 
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the attention to the debt and treating cases of bonded labour could also be observed in the high 
court cases. 
Continuing its publications, which began in 1947, the Indian Labour Bureau discussed 
the Article 23 of the Constitution in its third report, as well as the issue of debt bondage, 
which the authors brought into the purview of the constitutional article.32 By the time this 
third report was written, the first test investigations for the Agricultural Labour Enquiry of the 
Government of India were completed. Among other aspects, the committee collected data on 
the “earnings from forced labour (…) and indebtedness.”33 But none of the reports gave an 
estimate on the extent of forced labour. Basing its insights on Dhamne’s report, the Indian 
Labour Bureau agreed with Jagjivan Ram’s conclusion “that forced labour is prevalent in the 
country.”34 
 
Paradigms and Zeitgeist 
The Zeitgeist outlined in the previous chapter for the beginning of this episode was 
reconfirmed by the constitutional Article 23. The debates of the CA clarified that the abolition 
of slavery, including bonded labour, was a norm that stood unquestioned. But only two 
members explicitly spoke for a complete prohibition of forced labour in any case for any 
actors, including the state. Still, the extraction of forced labour in the service of the 
community and the state was upheld by several members of the assembly.35 Within this 
debate, the ideology of work element reappeared in the CA debates: Some members 
suggested the conditionality of rights by tying rights to duties. Member Shah listed in his 
collection of rights the “duty to work as ‘an inescapable obligation of citizenship.’”36 The 
educational value of labour was upheld in the discussion on forced labour.37 Shah portrayed 
the attending of schools as the fulfilment of the duty to work, since education already 
constituted one stage that prepared one for work. And he described those who did not work 
without a valid reason, such as old age or maternity, as ‘parasites.’38 This type of language 
dehumanised people and opened the door to treat them accordingly; in this case, it allowed for 
the use of force to compel those to work who do not want to work. 
 
32 Government of India/Ministry of Labour: Indian Labour Bureau, 1949, p. 124. 
33 Government of India/Ministry of Labour: Indian Labour Bureau, 1949, p. 266. 
34 Jagjivan Ram, Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative), December 16 1949, p. 675; cf. 
DHAMNE/GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, 1956, 1, 13, 40-5. 
35 Amrit Maur & Hansa Mehta: Minutes of Dissent to the Report, April 17-20 1947, IV, in RAO, 1968b, p. 178. 
36 K. T. Shah, in RAO, 1968b, p. 193. 
37 K. M. Munshi, Constituent Assembly Debates, May 1 1947. 
38 K. T. Shah, in RAO, 1968b, p. 196–197. 
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But normatively the abolition of slavery and bonded labour gained the ‘taken-for-
grantedness’39 status—in India and at the national level. The nomenclature vis-à-vis bonded 
labour was also fixed: Rather than follow the League of Nations convention of referring to 
‘slavery,’ of which bonded labour was defined as one form,40 Indian policymakers instead 
used the term ‘forced labour’ of which bonded labour constituted one form.41 
 
Political Context 
The new polity reorganised power arrangements as well as veto possibilities in the political 
arena. In the following pages I present the new veto possibilities in the context of the election 
results after the first and following elections since the early 1950s. Based on the British 
administrative organisation the former presidencies and the princely states became the new 
Indian States with bicameral parliaments and elected chief ministers.42 In 1950, the 
Constitution provided bicameral legislatures for eight states43 and provided for the creation of 
29 states all together.44 This number changed with the formation of new states due to 
decolonisation of the French and Portuguese territories and reorganisation of existing states.45 
In this last episode, I focus again on the central state, but also mention the Indian States in 
passing. 
 
Executive and Legislative Arena 
The Lok Sabha is one of the two legislative bodies with the main function to adopt laws and 
to control the government. 10 percent of the members of the Lok Sabha are required to be 
present in the house to pass new legislation. The Lok Sabha can pass laws, and the Prime 
Minister and his or her cabinet are responsible to Parliament. But the members of parliament 
have limited power over changing governmental decisions. As “premier institution of 
representative democracy,”46 one of the procedural control mechanisms of parliament over the 
government is the Question Hour, where the Prime Minister and his or her ministers have to 
 
39 FINNEMORE/SIKKINK, 1998, p. 895. 
40 League of Nations, 1926, Art. 2 (b), for a more detailed discussion refer to Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
41 Cf. Prevention of Free or Forced or Compulsory Labour Bill, 1949, Constituent Assembly of India 
(Legislative), April 5 1949. 
42 WAGNER, 2006, 88, 94. 
43 AGGARAWALA/AIYAR, 1950, Art. 168.  
44 First Schedule, the States and the Territories of India, Constitution of India, AGGARAWALA/AIYAR, 1950, 
p. 318–320.  
45 WAGNER, 2006, p. 88–90. 
46 KAPUR/METHA, 2006, p. 1. 
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respond to questions from MPs.47 Standing committees are the forums for discussing and 
finding compromise in the policymaking process. The parliamentary forum was and is 
primarily used to debate and to present the positions of parties, the government and the 
ministers on political issues.48 Usually, the government proposes bills, but also members of 
the Lok Sabha or the Rajya Sabha can submit bills, so-called private bills. 
The Rajya Sabha is elected indirectly by an electoral college of the Indian States. 
Every two years, one third of the members of the Rajya Sabha seats are open for election. 
Both houses have to support a bill, which finally becomes a law when the president also 
ascents to the bill. The Seventh Schedule of the Indian Constitution provides for the 
distribution of the powers between the Central State and the states. The concurrent list 
enumerates the shared power over policymaking—two of them concern criminal law and 
labour. This means the Union State can pass legislation, but it must be implemented by the 
states of India.49 In the case of bills related to labour, two thirds of both houses are needed to 
vote in favour of the bill.50 
The ratification of international legislation is within the power of Parliament, provided 
by Article 246 of the Constitution. The Government of India can decide whether to ratify an 
international convention or not without the approval of Parliament.51 Therefore, the 
ratification of conventions, such as the Supplementary Slavery Convention of 1956, needed no 
approval by the Lok Sabha or Rajya Sabha. But since international conventions do not 
automatically become domestic law, as the Monist system provides for instance in France or 
the Netherlands, national legislation needs to be adjusted either by amendments or by new 
laws in India. Within this process of integration of international legislation into national law, 
the Indian parliament can exercise its influence.52 
Regarding the question of veto possibilities, Parliament can only overturn executive 
decisions if the opposition possesses the party majority. But the historical context of the 
struggle for independence and the strength of the Congress Party contributed to a particular 
feature of policymaking and governance in independent India: Potential veto possibilities 
were virtually annihilated by the strength of the Congress Party, also at the federal level.53 
The INC consecutively occupied the majority of Parliament’s both houses and constituted the 
 
47 WAGNER, 2006, p. 46–48. 
48 WAGNER, 2006, p. 47. 
49 Constituent Assembly of India, January 26 1950, Seventh Schedule, List III, 1, 24. 
50 WAGNER, 2006, p. 51–52. 
51 KAPUR/METHA, 2006, p. 26–29. 
52 KAPUR/METHA, 2006, p. 23; HANNUM, 1995/1996, p. 298. 
53 WAGNER, 2006, p. 95. 
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government.54 The so-called Congress system55 described the ability of the Congress Party to 
incorporate internal fractions and internal as well as external opposition. Thereby, the INC 
managed within a multi-party system to maintain the majority within parliament’s both 
houses during the first four decades of India’s independence.56 The following diagram (Figure 
9) illustrates the INC occupied the majority of seats in the Lok Sabha between 1952 1967: 
Figure 9. Lok Sabha seats, 1952-1975 
 
Figure 9, Lok Sabha seats, 1952-1975. Source: Data derived from HARDGRAVE/KOCHANEK, 2008, 
375, 398-399. In 1952, 1957 and 1962 the second largest party was the Communist Party of India, in 
1967 the Swaraj Party and in 1971 the Communist Party of India (Marxist). 
 
Because opposition from outside the INC did not possess enough power to challenge 
governmental proposals between 1952 and 1989,57 Jain concludes: “The role of the legislature 
in policy-making in India has mostly been ex-post facto, that is, a post-performance review of 
the policies of the government and their execution.”58 Similarly, Kapur and Mehta summarise 
that the respective elections up until the 1980s “were no more than a means to rubber 
stamping the dominance of a single party, the Congress, or even the dominance of a single 
family, the Nehrus.”59 
 
54 WAGNER, 2006, p. 47–48. 
55 KOTHARI, 1964. 
56 KOTHARI, 1964, p. 1162–1163. 
57 Only interrupted between 1977 and 1980, when the Janata Party won the majority after India Gandhi’s 
Emergency Rule, HARDGRAVE/KOCHANEK, 2008, p. 260–261. 
58 JAIN, 1984, p. 144, italics in original. 
59 KAPUR/METHA, 2006, p. 4. 
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The executive is constituted by the president who has to approve of legislative 
proposals of the Prime Minister, and who effectively has withheld his assent in the past.60 The 
Prime Minister occupies the central role in the political process and can make decisions over 
ministries and ministers. Backed by a majority in parliament, the function of the Prime 
Minister as head of government was so powerful in the first decades of independent India that 
he was barely in need of compromise with the opposition.61 In some instances, such as the 
decision to perform atomic bomb tests, or the conclusion of bilateral treaties with the Soviet 
Union, not even the cabinet was involved in Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s 
policymaking.62 In terms of veto points, the executive can overturn parliamentary decisions, 
while the legislative cannot overturn executive decisions. With the Congress system in place 
and a party majority of the INC in parliament, which was probably backing governmental 
decisions, the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha did not constitute a veto point. The MPs could 
suggest bills or question the government but not overturn executive decisions.63 
 
Electoral or Public Arena  
The first general elections were conducted in several rounds during 1951 and 1952. The 
whole Indian population aged 2164 or above was franchised and called to vote for the first 
time. Because this gave citizens the possibility to express themselves politically by vote, 
particularly lower class and low caste citizens participated in the elections.65 In principle, 
shifting voters could have constituted a veto point in this episode, which would have allowed 
for political actors from the electoral arena to influence behaviour of actors in the legislative 
and executive arena.66 But the particularities of the Congress system balanced the problem of 
swing voters. By offering a platform within its ranks to major opposition to its politics,67 the 
INC “was the party of consensus, pinned down to a centrist position because of the pressure 
exerted on it by the parties of the opposition, acting in unofficial collusion with factions 
within the Congress Party sympathetic to their ideological inclinations.”68 Therefore, the 
 
60 WAGNER, 2006, p. 64–65. 
61 WAGNER, 2006, p. 60–70. 
62 WAGNER, 2006, p. 55; KOTHARI, 1964, p. 1171. 
63 IMMERGUT, 1990, p. 397. 
64 HARDGRAVE/KOCHANEK, 2008, p. 371. 
65 In 1988 the age for suffrage was lowered to 18 years, Constitution (Sixty-first Amendment) Act, 1988: 
HARDGRAVE/KOCHANEK, 2008, p. 371.  
66 IMMERGUT, 1990, p. 393. 
67 KOTHARI, 1964, p. 1162; MITRA, 2017, p. 151. 
68 MITRA, 2017, p. 151. 
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electoral arena constituted no veto point,69 also because the Indian political system does not 
allow voters to control legislative outcomes via referendum.70 As under British rule, citizens 
continued to have the opportunity to express their grievances through petitions, as well as 
through political activism of the civil society.  
 
Hypothesis 
At the starting point of this episode the characteristics of the institution of the abolition of 
slavery were weak. The rules were ambiguous and implementation appeared ineffective. 
During the beginning of the new democratic regime, veto points in the legislative and 
electoral arena were weak—neither parliament nor the electorate could overturn executive 
decisions, with the Congress Party dominating parliament and the executive; the Zeitgeist was 
antislavery. Within this context, the preservers of the status quo were likely actors interested 
in bonded labour. They profited from weak laws, and the low level of enforcement allowed 
them to continue their business undisturbed. Because of the antislavery Zeitgeist, proslavery 
actors probably did not directly or openly defend their position and behaved like opportunists 
who neither tried to preserve nor change the institution, but undermined its spirit by violating 
its rules.71  
Antislavery actors’ dispositions towards the institution of the abolition of slavery were 
potentially ambiguous: The constitutional provision did not fundamentally change the rules; 
some actors were alarmed by the weakness of the rules and worried particularly about its 
implementation.72 At the same time, several members of the Constituent Assembly had 
expressed their satisfaction with the adoption of the Article 23 and were optimistic regarding 
its effective implementation. They believed that with the democratisation of the polity, a 
democratisation of society would come along and bonded labour and forced labour would 
vanish by themselves.73 Antislavery actors were probably seeking change at the rules 
level74—the abolition of bonded labour and forced labour being the defined goals of the 
Constitution and an explicit goal of the Congress Party, the costs to induce change at the rules 
level were low because Congress occupied the majority in parliament and did not need to 
 
69 IMMERGUT, 1990, p. 397. 
70 WAGNER, 2006, p. 75. 
71 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, 23, 26. 
72 Biswanath Das, Constituent Assembly Debates, May 1 1947. 
73 Dakshayani Velayudan, Constituent Assembly Debates, May 1 1947, T. T. Krishnamachari, Constituent 
Assembly Debates, December 3 1948. 
74 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 29. 
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search for a supporting majority.75 The executive had strong veto possibilities, which means 
that if Congress turned out to be the agent of change, the defenders of the status quo were 
afforded with weak veto possibilities, the scenario described in hypothesis 4a. But if Congress 
chose to preserve the status quo, actors interested in inducing change were confronted with 
strong veto possibilities, which is the scenario described in hypothesis 3a. If Congress chose 
to be the dominant change agent as antislavery actor, it might have behaved like an 
insurrectionary, actively seeking change through displacement of legislation,76 or like 
subversives, adding layers to the existing rules (H4a). If Congress chose to preserve the status 
quo, antislavery actors were probably either trying to induce change by conversion and 
behave like defenders or they probably acted like subversives trying to induce displacement 
(H3a). 
 
Gradual Changes 
In the following chapters I describe and analyse the changes that took place between 1952 and 
1975. I follow the discussion of the Lok Sabha and also interrogate the developments at the 
international level, particularly the work of the United Nations (UN) and the adoption of the 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery of 1956, with which I begin. 
 
International Level 
In 1945, after the end of World War II, fifty states met in San Francisco for a conference that 
laid the foundation of the United Nations Organisation, the successor organisation of the 
League of Nations. The ILO continued to operate as specialised organisation of the UN. The 
foundational document of the UN, the Charter of the United Nations, already contained a 
commitment to the principles of human rights. The request of several Latin American states to 
include human rights beyond simply mentioning them in the charter of the UN had not been 
accepted. But early on the UN focused on human rights. The United Nations Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC) installed the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) in 
1946. The UNHCR drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which the General 
 
75 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 19. 
76 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 24. 
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Assembly of the UN adopted on December 10 1948, with India being one of the states voting 
for its adoption.77 
The cold war set the stage for the discussion and formulations of rights and respective 
institutions at the international level. But it did not completely paralyse78 the work of the UN 
on slavery.79 The United Nations began to continue the work of the League in 1949. The 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) appointed the Ad Hoc Committee on Slavery in 
December 1949.80 This committee was commissioned to work on the question of how the UN 
should divide its work on slavery and also whether the Slavery Convention of 1926 was 
sufficient or if a new convention should be drafted.81 The ECOSOC also appointed the Ad 
Hoc Committee on Forced Labour, with the agreement of the Governing Body of the ILO in 
March 1951.82 In 1952 the ILO and the UN expressed their intention to collaborate on the 
matter of forced labour, but they also clarified that they would uphold the distinction between 
forced labour and slavery and would not infringe upon each other’s domain of authority.83 
Within this collaboration the joint Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labour clarified, that debt 
bondage would fall under the authority of the Ad Hoc Committee on Slavery:84 
 
The Committee found that this practice [of keeping workers in perpetual debt] would 
be very similar to debt bondage as investigated by the Ad Hoc Committee on Slavery 
(…). The Committee came to the conclusion that, in these circumstances, payment in 
kind involves hardships, but does not constitute a system of forced labour within the 
meaning of its terms of reference.85 
 
The committee split into subcommittees in order to work on slavery by regions and 
began its work by sending out questionnaires to the member states asking for reports on the 
legal status and prevalence of slavery. Completing its work in April 1951 the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Slavery submitted its report. The Government of India had not yet responded to 
 
77 FORSYTHE, 2006, p. 37–38. 
78 MCCORMICK, 1997, p. 730–732; MATHEW, 2012, p. 15. 
79 MIERS, 2003, p. 318. The Eastern bloc favoured the protection of social and economic rights, while the 
Western bloc advocated for provisions of civil and political rights. This division found its legal reflection in the 
adoption of two different covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966) and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966). Within the work of the 
UN the two blocs tried to expose each other’s weak spots: The Eastern bloc pointed at colonial labour 
exploitation, and the Western bloc at the labour camps in the UDSSR, MIERS, 2003, p. 318–322. 
80 MIERS, 2003, p. 324. 
81 ALLAIN, 2008, p. 207. 
82 The Governing Body of the ILO is the executive organ of the ILO, meeting three times per year and has the 
power to decide ILO policies and agenda of the ILO tripartite conference.  
83 International Labour Office, 1952, p. 29. 
84 United Nations/International Labour Office, 1953, p. 54. 
85 United Nations/International Labour Office, 1953, p. 54. 
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the invitation to fill out the questionnaire.86 The Home Ministry sent the questionnaire to the 
individual states, and all of the states’ responses to the questions on slavery were “No.”87 The 
internal communications within the Indian ministries highlighted, though, that forms of 
bonded labour were prevalent.88 India’s submission was eventually included in the later report 
of the rapporteur Hans Engen on slavery.89 Engen made use of several sources: The official 
Indian commission reports, submissions by missionaries, the reports of the commissioner of 
the Ad Hoc Committee on Slavery, and information provided by the ILO.90 The report 
concluded: 
 
Not only do old tribal practices akin to slavery survive, but in some districts the 
position of certain ‘depressed classes’ was even in recent times almost 
indistinguishable from that of community-owned slaves. This status has now 
disappeared in law; but the Governments concerned realize that it will take long and 
comprehensive programmes on many social and economic fronts to provide the basis 
for a society of free men and women.91 
 
On the question of serfdom and traditional and unpaid labour, Engen referred to scavenging 
and other caste-related labour conducted as free labour, as well as share cropping-
arrangements.92 He mentioned begar and the extraction of bonded labour in agriculture.93 
Debt bondage received the greatest attention, and Engen estimated that it constituted the 
gravest problem. Contrary to the findings of the Report of the Commissioner for Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes,94 the Indian government reported to the Ad Hoc Committee on 
Slavery that “the Kamiauti system has practically ceased to exist except in a few isolated 
places.”95 To the contrary, Lasker, the commissioner responsible for Asia in the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Slavery, observed that forms of debt bondage prevailed everywhere in India, 
 
86 Ad Hoc Committee on Slavery/United Nations, May 4 1951, p. 12. 
87 “1. Does slavery as defined in Article 1 of the International Slavery Convention of 1926 exist in any territory 
subject to the control of your Government? 2. Does the slave trade (…) exist in any territory subject to the 
control of your Government? 3. Does any practice exist (…) which are restrictive of the liberty of the person and 
which tend to subject that person to a state of servitude, as for instance (a) Serfdom (compulsory and hereditary 
attachment to the land accompanied by obligations to render service to the landlord); (b) Traditional forms of 
involuntary unpaid service exacted by land owners and other employers of labour; (c) Debt bondage; (d) 
Pledging and pawning of third persons as security for debt; (…).”National Archives of India, 1950. 
88 National Archives of India, 1950, p. 1–4. 
89 Hans Engen was appointed in April 1954. 
90 United Nations Economic and Social Council, February 9 1955, 7, 21, 38-9, 57-8, 71-2. 
91 United Nations Economic and Social Council, February 9 1955, p. 21. 
92 United Nations Economic and Social Council, February 9 1955, p. 37–39. 
93 United Nations Economic and Social Council, February 9 1955, p. 59–60. 
94 SHRIKANT, 1952, p. 22–27. 
95 United Nations Economic and Social Council, February 9 1955, p. 72. 
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and concluded that this form of slavery “found its largest and socially most devastating 
development”96 in Pakistan and India. 
Discussing the governmental reports produced and published between the 1920s and 
the 1940s,97 I noted that bonded labour relations were potentially addressed as indebtedness. 
Observing that millions were affected, Lasker, and Engen’s references to Lasker, made the 
connection between the government’s observations on indebtedness and its potential relation 
to slavery: Lasker noted in this respect that the action of the state against indebtedness “shows 
that the existence of such indebtedness in itself (…) is not regarded as a form of servitude,”98 
and remarked in addition that the conditions under which debt bondage was carried out meant 
that labourers agreed to “terms of service little short of slavery.”99 
The Ad Hoc Committee came to the conclusion “that slavery, even in its crudest form, 
still exists in the world today.”100 The committee suggested that the UN should take over the 
role formerly covered by the LN vis-à-vis slavery and formulate a supplementary 
convention101 to ensure that all forms of slavery were addressed and ended.102 The Ad Hoc 
Committee on Slavery decided not to change the definition of slavery given in the Slavery 
Convention of 1926,103 but instead described the servile statuses it recommended explicitly 
addressing: The first was debt bondage. The committee added that one of three conditions 
needed to be met in order for debt bondage to become servitude: The labour done was not 
factored into the down payment of the debt, the time of services was undefined, and along 
with the bond came infringements on the enjoyment of rights of the bonded person as 
compared to other citizens.104 The practice where a labourer was tied to the land and could not 
“freely dispose of the produce of his labour”105 was also mentioned. Yet the committee was 
not only concerned with the question of abolishing slavery, but also with how to assist the 
 
96 Lasker, quoted in the report of Engen: United Nations Economic and Social Council, February 9 1955, p. 72. 
97 Cf. Royal Commission on Agriculture in India, 1928, p. 764 [the pagination of this document is inconsistent, 
therefore I refer to the page number of the pdf document], WHITLEY/Royal Commission on Labour in 
India/Government of India, 1931, p. 226; Labour Investigation Committee/Government of India, 1946, p. 281. 
98 Report submitted by Lasker, quoted in United Nations Economic and Social Council, February 9 1955, p. 74. 
99 Report submitted by Lasker, quoted in United Nations Economic and Social Council, February 9 1955, p. 74. 
100 Ad Hoc Committee on Slavery/United Nations, May 4 1951, p. 13. 
101 Summary Report of the Twenty-Seventh Meeting, UN Doc. E/AC.33/SR.27, 21 March 1950GREEN, 1978 
[1956], p. 767. 
102 Ad Hoc Committee on Slavery/United Nations, May 4 1951, p. 8. 
103 Ad Hoc Committee on Slavery/United Nations, May 4 1951, p. 7. 
104 Ad Hoc Committee on Slavery/United Nations, May 4 1951, p. 9. 
105 Ad Hoc Committee on Slavery/United Nations, May 4 1951, p. 11. 
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victims; they suggested, for instance, that states should make funds available to assist slaves 
in buying their freedom.106 
In October 1953, the General Assembly adopted a resolution that transferred the LN 
Slavery Convention into the powers of the UN.107 The next task was to follow up on the 
suggestion of the committee to adopt an additional convention. In January 1956, the drafting 
committee met for the first time,108 and on September 7 1956, the General Assembly adopted 
the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions 
and Practices Similar to Slavery.109 The original title, Draft Supplementary Convention on 
Slavery and Servitude, based on the draft convention submitted by the British, was changed. 
Allain indicates two different reasons: The term ‘servitude’ was difficult to translate into 
certain languages in which there existed just one word for both;110 and due to the influence of 
the Russian representative who, for unexplained reasons, wanted to have the term ‘servitude’ 
removed from the convention.111 The articles clarify which other forms of labour relations 
were similar to slavery: The article 1 a) and b) cover debt bondage and the extraction of slave 
labour based on either caste or the tying of labourers to the soil.112 With the provisions for 
punishment in Article 6, the convention also clarified that slavery and practices similar to 
slavery still constituted an offence, even if submitted to voluntarily.113 The suggestion to 
implement a monitoring system114 was not realised with the Supplementary Convention. 
While the UN debated the Slavery Convention, the joint ILO/UN committee on forced 
labour discussed the issue of forced labour. Only a year after the adoption of the 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery the ILO adopted the Abolition of 
Forced Labour Convention on June 25 1957. The ILO/UN committee wondered whether the 
definition of forced labour given in the ILO convention of 1930 was still applicable and 
decided to put forth a new definition after reviewing all submissions on the question of forced 
labour.115 The focus of the ILO was on two particular forms of forced labour: Political 
 
106 Ad Hoc Committee on Slavery/United Nations, May 4 1951, p. 21–24. 
107 United Nations General Assembly, October 23 1953, p. 50. 
108 MIERS, 2003, p. 328. 
109 Supplementary Slavery Convention, United Nations Economic and Social Council, 1956. 
110 ALLAIN, 2008, p. 220–221; cf. United Nations/International Labour Office, 1953, p. 229. 
111 ALLAIN, 2015, p. 26. 
112 Supplementary Slavery Convention, United Nations Economic and Social Council, 1956. 
113 Supplementary Slavery Convention, United Nations Economic and Social Council, 1956, Art. 6; ALLAIN, 
2008, p. 490. 
114 Ad Hoc Committee on Slavery/United Nations, May 4 1951, p. 24–25. 
115 United Nations Economic and Social Council/International Labour Organisation, October 30 1951, p. 4–5. 
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prisoners, who are held in camps and are forced to work, and the extraction of forced labour 
for the development of the economy of a state.116 
Regarding India’s submission, the committee summarised that forced labour was used 
as punishment for sedition, convict labour, and the legal extraction of forced labour during 
emergencies.117 The Government of India not only reported on bonded labour to the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Slavery, but also to the Ad Hoc Committee on Force Labour.118 Effectively, 
bonded labour or debt bondage were not the domain of the ILO. India signed the Forced 
Labour Convention of 1930 in 1954, and joined the Forced Labour Convention of 1957 in 
2000; therefore, since 1954, India has been obliged to report on forced labour on a regular 
basis under the convention of 1930.119 The division of labour between the ILO and the UN 
changed in 1976 when the ILO took note of bonded labour as an issue that would fall under 
the provisions of the convention of 1930.120 
 
Lok Sabha 1952-1969 
Several members of the Constituent Assembly believed that the constitutional change would 
go hand in hand with a change in society—that the freedom of the nation would also mean the 
liberation of the workers; inequalities would be overcome, lower caste members and Dalits 
would be empowered to turn to the police, and the new economic structure would raise the 
poor out of poverty and bonded labour would end without direct intervention by the state.121 
The members of the provisional parliament supported a bill against forced labour. But 
Ambedkar wanted to first gather information on forced labour and its forms in India, to be 
able to write a good policy.122 Ram followed the same reasoning but in addition did not 
believe that such a law would contribute to the improvement of the bonded labour situation.123 
The members of the Constituent Assembly had pointed out also that it would be the duty of 
the new legislature to pass a specific legislation to interpret the Constitution and to realise the 
 
116 United Nations Economic and Social Council/International Labour Organisation, October 30 1951, p. 4. 
117 United Nations/International Labour Office, 1953, 164, 167, 172. 
118 United Nations/International Labour Office, 1953, p. 170. 
119 Until 1959 states had to report on ratified convention on a yearly basis; between 1960 and 1977 the intervals 
were extended to two years, THOMANN, 2011, p. 70. 
120 SWEPSTON/International Labour Organisation, p. 10; THOMANN, 2011, p. 221. 
121 Cf. T. T. Krishnamachari, Constituent Assembly Debates, December 3 1948; Dakshayani Velayudan, 
Constituent Assembly Debates, May 1 1947. 
122 B. R. Ambedkar, Law Minister, Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative), February 11 1949, p. 401. 
123 Jagjivan Ram, Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative), December 16 1949, p. 675; Lok Sabha, August 4 
1950, p. 274. 
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abolition of forced labour and begar.124 This promise, along with the constitutional Article 35, 
explicitly obliged the Parliament of India to adopt legislation: 
 
Parliament shall have, and the Legislature of a State shall not have, power to make 
laws for prescribing punishment for those acts (…) 
(ii) which are declared to be offences [Art. 17 and Art. 23] under this Part [III 
on Fundamental Rights] and Parliament shall, as soon as may be after the 
commencement of this Constitution, make laws for prescribing punishment for the acts 
referred to in sub-clause (ii) (…).125 
 
As promised, the Government of India conducted several enquiries on agricultural 
labour and the situation of Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) between 1950 
and 1977. The reports highlighted the gap between the constitutional rule and the lived 
experience of many people in India who were exposed to bonded labour. I discuss these 
reports in conjunction with the debates in the Lok Sabha. 
The First Agricultural Labour Enquiry conducted between 1950 and 1951 in the 
different states of India found that the working conditions of the agricultural labourers were 
destitute. The report, a compilation of several reports based on field research in the Indian 
states, did not use the terms ‘bonded labour’ or ‘forced labour.’ The authors of the reports 
used the term ‘attached.’126 To this group of ‘attached labourers’ belonged the “less skilled 
indigent worker who gets himself attached often for reasons of debt and other forms of 
obligation.”127 The attached workers constituted the majority of interviewed agricultural 
labourers, with about 45 percent or 7.8 million agricultural labour families.128 The description 
of workers being ‘attached’ by debt suggests that bonded labour relations were concealed in 
this category, but this is not necessarily the case, since the report mentions employers, 
shopkeepers, as well as co-operative societies, but also friends as sources of borrowing.129 As 
in the earlier reports, for instance the Report of the Royal Commission on Agriculture,130 the 
angle from which bonded labour was addressed was indebtedness. Within the different 
reports, the definition of attached labourers varied and was not coherent and the investigators 
used different variables to determine attachment.131 This result is rather frustrating, 
 
124 Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative), December 16 1949, 675: 674, 677. 
125 Constituent Assembly of India, January 26 1950. 
126 Government of India/Ministry of Labour, 1955b, p. 70. 
127 Government of India/Ministry of Labour, 1955b, p. 70. 
128 Government of India/Ministry of Labour, 1955b, 155, 157. 
129 Government of India/Ministry of Labour, 1955b, p. 158. 
130 Royal Commission on Agriculture in India, 1928, p. 575 [the pagination of this document is inconsistent, 
therefore I refer to the page number of the pdf document]. 
131 THORNER, 1956, 762, 760. 
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particularly in light of the promise of the Labour Minister: The categories bonded labour, 
slavery, or forced labour were not defined and not explicitly addressed in this report and 
based on these results, a legislative provision that would address all forms of coercive labour 
relations in India could not be completed, since there was simply no information gathered on 
this issue.132 
The Report of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes was the 
first report that initiated a discussion in the Lok Sabha on begar, slavery and forced labour 
since the inauguration of the first parliament.133 In December 1952, the Special Officer 
Shrikant reported on the situation of Harijans134 and the tribal people in the Indian states. For 
several communities and regions, he found that the lower caste and tribal communities were 
exposed to grave working conditions. Regarding Madras for instance, he wrote: “About 
60.000 Scheduled Castes people in Malabar are doing agricultural labour under semi-slavish 
conditions, in the fields of the landlords to whom they are indebted and have no house sites of 
their own.”135 In a complete chapter on forced labour and the Article 23 of the Constitution, 
Shrikant pointed out that forced labour still existed in India on a large scale.136 Also referring 
to the First Agricultural Labour Enquiry for the years 1950 to 1951,137 he suggested “that the 
Government should issue very clear instructions to the authorities concerned to deal with the 
cases of forced labour in a very strict manner and give exemplary punishments to the 
offenders—whether Government servants or private individuals and bodies.”138 
On December 13 1952 the Lok Sabha debated the abolition of untouchability and also 
covered the issue of bonded labour in this context. The Deputy-Minister Abid Ali referred to 
the Agricultural Labourer Enquiry Committee Report, which showed that bonded labour 
existed in several states.139 Ali explained that 
 
[s]uch forced labour in some cases took the form of contractual obligations to continue 
to service of the same employer till the loan advanced was cleared. In some other 
cases, it took the shape of depressed wages for attached workers who were not free to 
work with other employers, or of work by family members without separate 
remuneration or at a nominal wage. Since these facts came to light, the State 
 
132 Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative), December 16 1949, 674-75, 677. 
133 SHRIKANT, 1952; Motion Re. Report of Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Lok 
Sabha, December 13 1952, p. 2231. 
134 Hindi: Children of the God Hari Vishnu, used by Mohandas K. Gandhi as denomination for Dalits or 
‘untouchables.’ 
135 SHRIKANT, 1952, p. 19. 
136 SHRIKANT, 1952, p. 22–27. 
137 Government of India/Ministry of Labour, 1955a, 1955b. 
138 SHRIKANT, 1952, p. 27. 
139 Deputy Minister of Labour Abid Ali, Lok Sabha, December 18 1952, p. 1805. 
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Governments concerned have taken appropriate measures to eradicate forced labour 
and have reported that there is no longer any forced labour in existence as defined in 
the I.L.O. Convention.140 
 
Later reports on agricultural labour and the situation of the SCs and STs showed that 
this evaluation was premature and the states had not succeeded in ending bonded labour. Ali’s 
statement was also contradicted by other MPs: Thimmaiah requested “that forced labour 
prevalent in all Indian villages should be abolished at once considering it as ultra vires of the 
provision of the Constitution and be declared as cognizable offence.”141 Thereby, he reminded 
the government to propose legislation against forced labour. Nanadas, drawing his 
information from the Bihar Harijan Enquiry Committee, constituted by the Government of 
Bihar, added that 
 
forced labour exists in many parts of Bihar. The majority of Harijans are Kamias and 
though the past practice of selling themselves and their heirs into bondage has 
ostensibly disappeared, the Kamia continues to be in a state of slavery, which has 
assumed an even more different and more spacious form and exists in the shape of 
what is euphemistically called ‘voluntary assistance.’142 
 
Nanadas explained that in Bihar about five million people lived in a state of agrestic 
serfdom.143 
In this discussion, forced labour was addressed as one of the hardships the Dalit 
community was exposed to. The discussants at Parliament offered different suggestions on 
how to deal with the exploitation of Dalits: Education, quotas in the administration and 
political positions, distribution of land, the installation of a specialised ministry, and special 
district committees dedicated to the issues of STs and SCs, and particularly the abolition of 
untouchability and effective implementation thereof. At least two members expressed their 
expectation that untouchability would be overcome in the next seven to ten years.144 Several 
members of the Lok Sabha made reference to the value of education and the ‘psychological 
development’ that would contribute to the abolition of untouchability—they did not mean the 
education of the exploiters, absent was the suggestion to transform their attitudes.145 
Shortly after the discussion, one MP submitted a written question to the government, 
which was one tool at his disposal. In December 1952, Morarta asked the Minister of Labour 
 
140 Deputy Minister of Labour Abid Ali, Lok Sabha, December 18 1952, p. 1805. 
141 Thimmaiah, Lok Sabha, December 13 1952, p. 2223. 
142 Nanadas, Lok Sabha, December 13 1952, p. 2232. 
143 Nanadas, Lok Sabha, December 13 1952, p. 2232. 
144 Nanadas and P.N. Rajabhoj, Lok Sabha, December 13 1952, 2218, 2223, 2230, 2339, 2244, 2253. 
145 Lok Sabha, December 13 1952, p. 2341–2342. 
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why the government had not yet ratified the Forced Labour Convention. He requested 
information on the existence of and measures undertaken by the government against forced 
labour, as provided for by the ILO Forced Labour Convention (C29).146 The Deputy-Minister 
Abid Ali explained that the government had not yet ratified the convention because of 
legislation in contravention to the C29. This was namely the Criminal Tribes’ Act of 1924,147 
which the interim parliament had just repealed on February 28 1952. With those changes in 
place, the Deputy Labour Minister promised that the government would now consider the 
ratification of the convention.148 On November 30 1954 the Government of India finally 
ratified the convention. 
The next Report of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for 
the Year 1953 was published in 1954. The commissioner found begar in Madhya Pradesh,149 
forced labour in Madras and Hyderabad,150 and debt bondage in Travancore-Cochin. D. C. 
Sharma introduced the Bill to Provide Punishment for Free, Forced or Compulsory Labour151 
as a private bill in the Lok Sabha on April 9 1954.152 Compared to the earlier versions, this 
bill, with the exception of some words, was a complete copy of the bill submitted to the 
interim parliament in 1948.153 Sharma explained in his introduction that he thought the bill 
was extraordinarily short and simple but in “conformity with the spirit of the times in which 
we are living.”154 Speaking of the village population, which still made up the majority of the 
people in India, he drew the connection between caste relations and the extraction of forced 
labour, which he also described as slavery.155 The major solutions he focused on were policy 
change as well as education. Sharma also evaluated the IPC Section 374 as “so vague that it 
has failed to root out the evil.”156 He explained that, in addition, the victims of forced and free 
(unpaid) labour were not aware of their legal rights and requested that every person in those 
areas should be informed of their rights.157 In defining forced labour, he followed the ILO 
Forced Labour Convention, which excludes voluntarily entered forced labour relations.158 But 
 
146 Lok Sabha, December 18 1952, p. 1804–1805. 
147 Act No. VI; first adopted as The Criminal Tribes' Act of 1871 (Act XXVII of 1871). 
148 Deputy Minister of Labour Abid Ali, Lok Sabha, December 18 1952, p. 1805. 
149 SHRIKANT, 1954, p. 81. 
150 SHRIKANT, 1954, 41, 413. 
151 Government of India, April 9 1954, p. 223–224. 
152 Lok Sabha, April 9 1954, p. 4527. 
153 Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative), July 1 1948, p. 155, April 5 1949, 137, 141-42. 
154 Lok Sabha, December 24 1954, p. 4117–4118.  
155 Lok Sabha, December 24 1954, p. 4118–4119.  
156 Lok Sabha, December 24 1954, p. 4120.  
157 Lok Sabha, December 24 1954, p. 4119.  
158 Lok Sabha, December 24 1954, p. 4124.  
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he added that the bill covered also free labour, which means work that “a man is required to 
give without expectation of any wages of remuneration.”159 His definitions did not necessarily 
support the case of the abolition of bonded labour. 
The Minister of Labour Khandubhai Desai expressed his discontent with the bill. He 
opposed it and pointed out that the government intended to suggest an amendment to the IPC 
and also to consider amending the IPC Section 374. After having observed that the situation 
of the labourers had improved, and in the light of the existing legislation as well as some 
states adopting regional legislation, he hoped D. C. Sharma would withdraw the bill.160 
Deeming the bill “clumsy,”161 the Minister of Labour was particularly disappointed with the 
bill’s provisions for the payment of labourers, limitations to hours of work and making 
violations of these provisions cognisable, which would allow the police to act without a 
warrant or court order.162 Despite the Minister of Labour’s objection, the bill was sent out to 
the states and remained open for suggestions until the end of March of 1955.163  
In the next discussion in March 1955 the present members of the Lok Sabha supported 
the bill.164 The major focus of the discussion was on forced labour, free labour and begar 
extracted by state agents. According to the testimonies of some members of the Lok Sabha, 
state agents used the Indian Forests Act of 1927 and the Bombay Irrigation Act of 1879 to 
extract forced labour for clearing forests and to coerce workers to till the land.165 But also the 
extraction of forced labour by private actors in Assam and the evidence of the 1953 Report of 
the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes were referred to.166 The 
Minister of Labour Khandubhai Desai again explained that the bill was redundant, since with 
the Minimum Wages Act of 1948, wages, as well as the working hours, were covered. The 
goal to make forced labour cognisable was a concern of the government, but the bill Sharma 
had proposed “would mean the setting up of a very huge machinery to enforce it.”167 The 
Minister of Labour wished Sharma would withdraw the bill. Sharma expressed his concerns 
that the question of implementation was not ensured.168 But upon the promise that the 
 
159 Lok Sabha, December 24 1954, p. 4126.  
160 Lok Sabha, December 24 1954, p. 4122.  
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government would “take every step, by legislation and otherwise, to implement the principles 
underlying this Bill,”169 Sharma withdrew the bill. 
In the following two decades, from the 1950s until the 1970s, the issue of forced 
labour, slavery, and begar or bonded labour was mostly addressed only briefly in other 
contexts in the Lok Sabha debates.170 For instance, during the discussion on the Five-Year-
Plan one MP explained that “begar or forced labour was abolished after the police action 
there, but in many parts of the Hyderabad State begar is still in practice.”171 On a yearly basis 
the issue resurfaced during the discussions of the latest yearly report of the commissioner for 
SCs and STs.172 On December 6 1961 an MP in the Lok Sabha questioned the government 
again whether it still intended to adopt additional legislation against debt bondage. The 
Deputy Minister of Labour Abid Ali responded: “The Central Government do not propose to 
take any such action since the State Governments concerned have already done the needful 
wherever necessary to abolish or check undesirable practices connected with the grant of 
loans.”173 The following table lists some of the regional legislations to which the Deputy 
Minister referred: 
 
 
169 D. C. Sharma, Lok Sabha, March 4 1955, p. 1137. 
170 Between 1952 and1972, the Lok Sabha discussed directly or within other contexts, the issue of begar, bonded 
labour, forced labour and slavery in 99 sessions, or on average four to five times per year. 
171 Lok Sabha, May 26 1956, p. 9686. 
172 Cf. Lok Sabha sessions on December 13 1952; December 20 1957; April 27 1959; September 6-7 1962; 
August 27 1963; September 3-4 1963; December 14 1964; August 18 1966; March 28 1968; August 11 and 18 
1970; May 24 1972. 
173 Lok Sabha, December 6 1961, p. 3480–3481. 
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Table 14. Regional legislation against bonded labour 
Title 
Bihar and Orissa Kamiauti Agreements Act of 1920 
Madras Agency Debt Bondage Abolition Regulation of 1940174 
Madras and Orissa Debt Bondage Abolition Regulations of 1940175 
Hyderabad Bhagela Agreement Act of 1943 
Kabadi System Regulation in Bastar in Madhya Pradesh of 1943 (Cent. Provinces 
& Berar) 
The Orissa Debt Bondage Abolition Regulation of 1948176 
Sagri System Abolition Act of 1961 (Rajasthan) 
 
In the second episode I discussed the Bihar and Orissa Kamiauti Agreements Act of 1920, 
which regulated rather than abolished bonded labour. Similarly, the Madras Agency Debt 
Bondage Abolition Regulation of 1940 regulated bonded labour, insofar as it required that a 
gothi agreement be made in writing, that a minimum amount of prepayment be fulfilled, and 
that it could not be longer than a year. And while an employer was able to seek legal redress 
against his labourer, the option was not provided for the worker; furthermore, it was limited in 
application, since it only applied to the tribal areas.177 The Government of Rajasthan adopted 
the Sagri System Abolition Act in November 1961 which criminalised money lending under 
the regional systems of debt bondage called sagri and hali.178 This was a first act that clearly 
addressed bonded labour and criminalised the giving of advances in return for labour. The 
other provisions, particularly the Bihar and Orissa Kamiauti Agreements Act of 1920 and the 
Madras Agency Debt Bondage Abolition Regulation of 1940 were not sufficient to abolish 
bonded labour. 
The following reports of the Commissioner for SCs and STs recurrently provided 
evidence of the existence of bonded labour, begar and forced labour. Shrikant explained in 
the repot that bonded labour continued to prevail.179 While Shrikant referred to the 
Constitution of India and used the terms forced labour, bonded labour, as well as begar, he 
 
174 Regulated bonded labour: Gothi agreements had to be made in writing; required a minimum amount of 
advance payment; could not last longer than a year; only the employer could to seek legal redress. It only applied 
to the tribal areas, DINGWANEY, 1985, 326-28, 330. 
175 DINGWANEY, 1985, p. 342 
176 Government of Orissa, 1948; similar to the provisions of the Madras Agency Debt Bondage Abolition 
Regulation, DINGWANEY, 1985, 326-28, 330. 
177 Government of Orissa, 1948; DINGWANEY, 1985, 326-28, 330 
178 Rajasthan, 1961, p. 22–24. 
179 SHRIKANT, 1962b, p. 47–49. 
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did not indicate how he defined these terms in his report. According to him, employers 
extracted forced labour in different ways. Some forced the worker to comply through the 
moral obligation to pay back his or her debt. In other regions employers threatened to arrest 
their workers with the help of the local police when the labourers searched for alternative 
workplaces or wanted to run away. The duration of enslavement was different: Some 
individuals inherited their enslavement, while others were bound by temporary arrangements. 
The report also revealed differences on the question of forced labour and compensation; for 
instance, some arrangements granted loans or remuneration in cash or kind to the workers, but 
others did not provide for any compensation; some were based on contracts, while others were 
agreed upon without a contract.180 In a separate chapter Shrikant spoke of the indebtedness of 
tribal people and referred to instances of private money lending where lenders requested up to 
75 percent interest.181 The Commissioner for SCs and STs observed in the Twelfth Report 
(1962-1963) and Fifteenth Report (1965-1966) that these regional acts and their provisions, 
such as for instance, keeping registers of the written gothi-agreements, had not been 
implemented. The Rajasthan Sagri System Abolition Act of 1961 seemed to also be 
ineffective.182 The sagri system in Rajasthan continued according to the Twentieth Report of 
the Commissioner of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (1970-1971). 
Looking at the parliamentary discussions between 1952 and 1972, several 
observations can be made: The topic of bonded labour was regularly addressed. Particularly in 
light of new reports, either on SCs and STs, or the Agricultural Labour Reports, labour 
exploitation drew the attention of Parliament.183 But also individual incidences of forced 
labour, begar, slavery and bonded labour were addressed in parliament, as for instance 
reported cases of slavery in the NEFA (North-East Frontier Agency).184 Coerced labour was 
also mentioned in contexts such as the Essential Services Maintenance Bill185 or land 
reforms,186 as well as in debates on the lives and working conditions of Dalits (referred to in 
the debates as Harijans) and the SCs and STs.187 No member in those discussions suggested 
 
180 SHRIKANT, 1962b, p. 47–49. 
181 SHRIKANT, 1962b, p. 54; SHRIKANT, 1962a, p. 15. 
182 DINGWANEY, 1985, p. 331. 
183 See for instance Lok Sabha Debates, December 14 1964, August 18 1966, August 5 1969, August 11 and 18 
1970, and November 15 1972. 
184 Lok Sabha Debates, September 9 and 16 1963. 
185 Lok Sabha Debates, December 5, 12, 16, and 17 1968. 
186 Lok Sabha Debates, March 6 1964, April 11 1969. 
187 Lok Sabha Debates, November 25 and December 14 1957 (debate on Nagas and ST); March 29 1965 (debate 
on social security); March 28 1968, May 8 1968, March 18 1969 (debate on Dalits); March 25 1969 (debate on 
Adivasis and ST). 
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that bonded labour was on the verge of self-extinction, as some British administrators did.188 
The debates about and references to the situation of the workers in bonded labour were 
marked by a general understanding of bonded labour being a common problem that needed to 
be addressed.  
In the early 1960s the members of the Lok Sabha began to use the term bonded labour 
or debt bondage in conjunction with the term slavery. From then on, the terms slavery or 
forced labour were used interchangeably when MPs described debt bondage. It was also since 
the 1960s that MPs began to actually look more closely at the issue of bonded labour, and 
members of the SCs and STs in particular drew attention to the prevalence of bonded labour 
and other forms of labour exploitation prohibited under the constitutional Article 23. Also 
noteworthy is that in the Lok Sabha the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of 
Slavery was neither discussed nor even mentioned. The Government of India signed the 
convention on the date of its adoption, September 7 1956, and ratified it in June 1960,189 but 
there was no debate in parliament. 
As Union Minister and Member of the Indian government, Jagjivan Ram was an 
important actor to move a policy190 against bonded labour, and he had promised to do so 
before the first general election. He had not believed in the force of the law, but rather in the 
change of attitudes.191 Then, in 1969,192 Jagjivan Ram addressed the Congress Party in its 
Bombay session as the INC President; he explained: 
 
It was to be expected that when the condition of these communities improved they 
would aspire to live as decent human beings. It was equally to be expected that with 
the growth of consciousness and an understanding of their rights, they would refuse to 
be treated as before. But wherever this trend has manifested itself, particularly in the 
rural areas, oppression and harassment have been renewed. It is an indication of the 
fact that upper caste psychology has not undergone any real change, there has only 
been some kind of grudging adjustment.193 
 
Ram explained that the system of exploitation and inequality continued between the lower and 
upper castes because the zamindars, landholders of big estates, continue to dominate the 
village community. He added that the administrative and governmental structures were 
 
188 Cf. Letter to the Government of India from J. A. Huback, Secretary to the Government of Bihar and Orissa, 
Revenue Department, dated September 12 1919, National Archives of India, November 1920, 35, item No. 1; 
Letter from the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bihar and Orissa, dated March 26 1926, National Archives 
of India, 1926 June. 
189 United Nations, India. 
190 WAGNER, 2006, p. 51; HARDGRAVE/KOCHANEK, 2008, p. 94. 
191 Jagjivan Ram, Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative), December 16 1949, p. 675. 
192 All India Congress Committee. 
193 Lok Sabha Secretariat, 2005, p. 55. 
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stratified also along caste lines, which supported the continuance of labour exploitation in the 
villages.194 
 
The Judiciary 
Since the Constitution of India came into force on January 26 1950, the courts of independent 
India had the constitutional Article 23 at their disposal. After the ratification of international 
conventions and non-binding declarations, such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), the Indian Courts also referred to them in their decisions.195 But already in a 
1957 case, the Orissa High Court clarified that in a case of conflict between national and 
international legislation the primary source for rulings is the Constitution of India.196 
The first high court case which concerned Article 23 was State Through Gokul Chand 
v. Banwari and Others (1951). But rather than invoking the article to protect themselves from 
exploitation, this case described an impertinence of the defence: Encouraged by the abolition 
of discrimination on the basis of caste, the Chamars197 of a village requested the local 
dhobis198 to wash their clothes. Chamars being below the caste of the dhobis, the washer men 
refused to do this service for them. The dhobis were prosecuted for having acted in violation 
of Article 17, the abolition of untouchability. The defence of the applicants argued that asking 
the dhobis to offer their service to the Chamars would amount to begar. The court rejected 
this allegation. The judge clarified that refusing to do a service on the basis of caste does not 
constitute forced labour.199 
The next case was the first lawsuit against the state of India based on the Article 23. In 
Dubar Goala And Anr. v. Union of India (Uoi) Representing (1951), porters at the Railway 
requested a writ of mandamus, because the contract they had entered with the state-owned 
railway allegedly forced them to do begar. The Railway gave the porters a licence allowing 
them to offer their service at the station. In return the porters were requested to pay three 
Rupees for the licence and also to offer at least two hours of free porterage. The contract 
indicated that this was in “consideration of your not charging a higher licence fee.”200 The 
judge ruled against the alleged extraction of begar that “[t]he petitioners have voluntarily 
 
194 All India Congress Committee, italics in the original. 
195 HANNUM, 1995/1996, p. 299–300; in a bonded labour case decided in 1961 the court referred to the UDHR: 
Kadar v. Muthukoya Thangal, Kerala High Court, July 17 1961. 
196 Orissa High Court, April 25 1957; Supreme Court of India, April 24 1973; cf. HANNUM, 1995/1996, p. 299–
300. 
197 Members of a low caste. 
198 Clothes washers. 
199 Allahabad High Court, January 24 1951. 
200 Dubar Goala And Anr. v. Union of India (Uoi) Representing, Calcutta High Court, August 13 1951. 
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entered into the contract. There is no suggestion that at the initial stage when they first came 
into contact with the Railway Contractor (…) they were compelled to enter into the agreement 
under threat or duress.”201 While the judge explained that the contract allowed the porters to 
remove themselves from the contract, he interestingly added: “The very idea of a contract or 
agreement negates any suggestion of forced labour.”202 He thereby submitted to the concept 
of the previously held court decision in Madan203 that, if voluntarily entered, these relations 
are neither forced labour nor slavery—but in the present case, the judge also noted the exit 
option, which in the earlier case of Madan was non-existent. The judge additionally explained 
that since the porters were paid, the two hours of extra work did not amount to forced labour 
or begar: 
 
The petitioners are paid some remuneration, however insignificant it may be, for their 
two hours’ labour. Further- they get the benefit of a reduced licence fee and in addition 
they are allowed the privilege of free user [sic] of the Railway premises for earning 
their livelihood. In the circumstances the petitioners cannot be said to be doing Begar 
or forced labour within the meaning of Article 23(1) of the Constitution of India.204 
 
The porters received remuneration between 1/4/- and 2/8/- per month.205 
‘Insignificant’ is an accurate observation that unfortunately did not result in a different 
judgment. Earlier judges clarified that minimal payment does amount to forced labour and 
this insignificant remuneration could have merited another decision. Cleaners, for instance 
were paid 2/1/10 daily;206 the difference cannot even be balanced by the reduced licence fee. 
In 1961 the advocate general in Kerala suggested that the Kerala High Court should 
not accept the judgment in Dubar. He argued in Kadar v. Muthukoya Thangal that: 
 
whether the party has entered voluntarily into a contract to do personal service and 
whether remuneration is paid for such personal service do not really matter. If a party 
is not willing to do personal service, the remedy of the other party to the contract may 
be by way of damages or to this case, to take proceedings for resumption of the lands 
from the defendant.207 
 
 
201 Dubar Goala And Anr. v. Union of India (Uoi) Representing, Calcutta High Court, August 13 1951. 
202 Dubar Goala And Anr. v. Union of India (Uoi) Representing, Calcutta High Court, August 13 1951. 
203 Madan Mohan Biswas v. Queen Empress, Calcutta High Court, April 20 1892. 
204 Dubar Goala And Anr. v. Union of India (Uoi) Representing, Calcutta High Court, August 13 1951. 
205 Rupee/Anna/Paisa, Dubar Goala And Anr. v. Union of India (Uoi) Representing, Calcutta High Court, 
August 13 1951. 
206 Rate for Bengal, fixed for the years 1948-1957, Government of India/Ministry of Labour: Indian Labour 
Bureau, 1959, p. 128. 
207 Judge Vaidialingam quoting the advocate general, Kadar v. Muthukoya Thangal, Kerala High Court, July 17 
1961. 
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In 1952, another case against the state was discussed at the High Court of Himachal 
Pradesh. A local officer of Churah had imposed a fine on Jorawar and convicted him for 
declining to do begar, carrying material for the government. The judge argued that the 
extraction of begar when there was no emergency was in violation of the constitutional 
Article 23. Jorawar was to be acquitted and refunded the fine. The available documentation of 
the case does not highlight if the government official had been convicted for violating Article 
23.208 
In January 1958, the Calcutta High Court decided Dulal Samanta v. the District 
Magistrate, Howrah. The District Magistrate had forced Dulal to conduct the night watch for 
the railway station without pay for several months. When Dulal did not show up for work, the 
magistrate ordered his imprisonment, where he was held for seven days as punishment. While 
questioning the legality of the deployment of Dulal for the night watch, the judge rejected 
Dulal’s petition for a writ mandamus arguing:  
 
Conscription for police or military service cannot in my opinion be considered as 
either (1) traffic in human beings or (2) begar. (…). I cannot persuade myself to come 
to the conclusion that the conscription for police service or military service can come 
under either. (…) I would then hold that this forced labour of conscription is permitted 
by Sub-article (2) of Article 23, of the Constitution.209 
 
In 1960, the Madhya Pradesh High Court Suraj Narain v. State of Madhya Pradesh 
and Ors. decided a petition for the issue of a writ mandamus submitted by a teacher. The 
Education Department had discontinued paying the salary of a teacher on the grounds that his 
work had not been satisfactory. The judge Khan issued the writ mandamus explaining that: 
“To ask a man to work and then not to pay him any salary or wages savours of Begar. It is a 
fundamental right of a citizen of India not to be compelled to work without wages.”210 The 
judge added: “[T]he petitioner’s salary is high handed, arbitrary and without jurisdiction. This 
is, therefore, a clear case for the issue of mandamus.”211 
Another case that involved a public servant was decided in the same year at the 
Bombay High Court. Several public servants had been on strike and they found that an 
ordinance that prohibited them to strike would constitute forced labour. The judge clarified 
why prohibiting strikes for employees in essential services did not amount to forced labour:  
 
 
208 The State v. Jorawar, Himachal Pradesh High Court, September 13 1952. 
209 Dulal Samanta v. the District Magistrate, Howrah, Calcutta High Court, January 13 1958. 
210 Suraj Narain v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors., Madhya Pradesh High Court, March 1 1960. 
211 Suraj Narain v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors., Madhya Pradesh High Court, March 1 1960. 
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It would be seen that every form of forced labour is not prohibited by the clause [1 of 
Art. 23]. In fact, clause (2) of Article 23 permits the State to impose on the citizens 
compulsory service for public purposes. What is prohibited by the first clause is 
imposing on the citizens forced labour which is similar in form to begar. It is true that 
begar is not defined but it is a well understood term which means making a person 
work against his will and without paying any remuneration therefor [sic]. Molesworth 
at page 580 gives the meaning of begar as ‘Labour or service exacted by a 
Government or a person in power without giving remuneration for it.’ In Wilsons [sic] 
Glossary the meaning of the word is given as ‘Forced labour, one pressed to carry 
burden for individuals or to public; under old system when pressed for public service, 
no pay was given.”212 
 
The judge pointed out that a definition of forced labour or begar was missing. Therefore, he 
referred to common sense (“it is a well understood term”213), explaining that the attributes 
necessary for Article 23 to apply are that there was no payment and that the labourer did work 
against his or her will. 
The first bonded labour case since the Constitution of India came into force was 
decided at the High Court in Kerala. On an island north of the Maldives, the landowner Kadar 
allowed Muthukoya Thangal and his family to live on his land and use his coconut trees on 
the condition that Muthukoya and his family were at his disposal for services for free (unpaid) 
labour, based on a regional custom and form of bonded labour called nadappu.214 Muthukoya 
and his family did not comply as requested. Kadar sued Muthukoya to secure the labour he 
owed him and payment as compensation for the damages Muthukoya had allegedly caused.215 
Based on the regional provisions regulating nadappu, Muthukoya was found guilty and 
sentenced to render the service and pay for the damage; furthermore, the Special Court of 
Karnavans, as well as the Collector of Malabar threatened to hold him criminally liable if he 
continued to default on fulfilling his obligation.  
Referring to some of the above cases, the high court judge did not find them 
enlightening in the case before him.216 He concluded that payment was not a necessary 
condition to disqualify a labour/employer relationship as forced labour. The relevant issue 
was if a person had voluntarily agreed to do the service. Her argued that as “long as a person 
is not willing, to do personal services voluntarily and is compelled to do it at risk of a criminal 
 
212 S. Vasudevan and Others v. S. D. Mital and Others, Bombay High Court, January 18 1961. 
213 S. Vasudevan and Others v. S. D. Mital and Others, Bombay High Court, January 18 1961. 
214 Kadar v. Muthukoya Thangal, Kerala High Court, July 17 1961. For a description of nadappu as bonded 
labour see PANDHE, 1976, p. LII–LV. 
215 This case was also referred to in the United Nations publication Yearbook on Human Rights, United Nations, 
1964, p. 112. 
216 Among others, he referred to State Through Gokul Chand v. Banwari and Others, (1951), Dubar Goala And 
Anr. v. Union of India (Uoi), (1951), The State v. Jorawar, (1952), Kadar v. Muthukoya Thangal, Kerala High 
Court, July 17 1961. 
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punishment (…) it will amount to ‘forced labour.’”217 He supported his interpretation of 
Article 23 with reference to other states’ constitutions, the UDHR Article 4, and particularly 
the Thirteenth Amendment of the American constitution. Referring to the US Supreme Court 
Case Bailey v. Alabama (1911),218 he rejected the criminal prosecution of Muthukoya as a 
violation of the prohibition of forced labour and begar.219 According his interpretation, 
bonded labour fell under the prohibition of forced labour. As a response to the legal 
uncertainty persisting despite the Article 23, the judge referred to US case law to support his 
decision. 
The criminal reports Crime in India of the Ministry of Home Affairs, unfortunately 
published only aggregate numbers. From these numbers it is impossible to deduce convictions 
for crimes committed against the IPC’s slavery sections or for violations of the constitutional 
Article 23.220 Regarding the article’s use, Verma summarises that the Article 23 “lay dormant 
for almost thirty-two years and [was] hardly ever invoked by any litigant.”221 
 
Lok Sabha and Emergency Rule 1970-1977 
After independence, the Indian economy still relied largely on agriculture. By 1939 India had 
become self-sufficient, producing its own cotton, iron and other materials and consuming 
these goods within its own market.222 Several of these industries relied, and rely until today, 
on bonded labour: For instance, bidi (small cigarettes) production or brick kilns, where bricks 
are made by hand, or mining and other sectors.223 The early economic reforms after 
independence focused on industrialisation and heavy industry.224 Reforms that would have 
profited bonded labourers, particularly in agriculture, were largely neglected under Nehru and 
the economic five-year plans. Of the public spending of Rs. 163 billion distributed by the first 
 
217 Kadar v. Muthukoya Thangal, Kerala High Court, July 17 1961. 
218 Judge Vaidialingam referred to the passage of the judgment, which reads as follows: “The fact that the debtor 
contracted to perform the labour which is sought to be compelled does not withdraw the attempted enforcement 
from the condemnation of the statute. The full intent of the constitutional provision could be defeated with 
obvious facility if through the guise of contracts under which advances had been made, debtors could be held to 
compulsory service. It is the compulsion of the service that the statute inhibits, for when that occurs, the 
condition of servitude is created which would be not less involuntary because of the original agreement to work 
out the indebtedness. The contract exposes the debtor to liability for the loss due to the breach, but not to 
enforced labour,” Bailey v. Alabama, United States Supreme Court, January 3 1911, p. 242, Kadar v. Muthukoya 
Thangal, Kerala High Court, July 17 1961. 
219 Kadar v. Muthukoya Thangal, Kerala High Court, July 17 1961. 
220 For all publications of the Crime in India, refer to National Crime Records Bureau/Ministry of Home 
Affairs/Government of India. 
221 VERMA/KUSUM, 2000, p. 17. 
222 MUKHERJEE/MUKHERJEE, 1988, p. 532. 
223 SRIVASTAVA/International Labour Office, 2005, p. 12–18; MUKHERJEE/MUKHERJEE, 1988. 
224 BASU, 2012, p. 365; ROTHERMUND, 2003, p. 131. 
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three five-year plans, Rs. 19 billion were invested in agriculture.225 Prime profiteers of these 
measures were rich peasants.226 
Economically poor and disadvantaged people do not automatically profit from 
economic development. An example are Adivasis.227 They live in regions all over India, 
mostly in the Northern areas and the central Indian states. Already under British rule, but also 
after independence, land acquisition, deforestation, dam projects, and forest conservation laws 
drove Adivasis out of their living areas.228 These circumstances contributed to the creation of 
a growing impoverished and landless population among Adivasis, who are, as a result, 
vulnerable to labour exploitation.229 Evaluating the development efforts of the newly 
independent state, scholars conclude that the initial five-year plans, as well as the ‘green 
revolution’230 of the early 1970s, the technological advances in agriculture and the focus on 
industrial development, have mainly served the rich peasantry.231 Breman even concludes that 
“because of the green revolution, the economic and social gap between landowners and 
landless labourers in the rural areas has widened further.”232 
India successfully bolstered economic growth and advanced its industries, and also 
became self-reliant in food production. But the issue of continuing poverty became apparent 
during the drought of 1965.233 In some states this led to violent outbursts by left-wing actors, 
as for instance state-citizen confrontations with the Naxalite movement, which challenged the 
central state because it failed to accommodate the needs of the people in these regions. Indira 
Gandhi, leader of the INC and Prime Minister after L. B. Shastri had passed away in 1966, 
decided to reorient the INC’s attention on another constituency: Focused previously on local, 
better-off elites, Gandhi tried to attract the support of the lowest castes and classes. In the 
general elections held during February of 1967, the Congress again won the majority of seats, 
but reached the lowest result since independence, with 54 percent of the seats.234 In March 
1971 Indira Gandhi again ran for the office of the Indian Prime Minister. The election slogan 
 
225 ROTHERMUND, 2003, p. 131–132Cf. BASU, 2012, p. 371. 
226 CHANDRA, 2003, p. 26. 
227 Adivasi is a term that refers to a heterogeneous group of tribal and indigenous people in India. 
228 BAVISKAR, 1995, vii, 58, 70, 73, 80-2, 177-79, 184-87, 199-219; SHRIKANT, 1962a, p. 346–365; MEHER, 
2010a, 2010b. 
229 SRIVASTAVA/International Labour Office, 2005, p. 17–18; Human Rights Watch, January 2003, p. 10; 
BAVISKAR, 1994, p. 2493; NILSEN, 2013, p. 615–616; BATES, 1995, 109, 116-17. 
230 The governmental programme that supported the industrialisation of agricultural production in India began in 
the 1960s, MITRA, 2017, p. 182.  
231 ROTHERMUND, 2003, p. 143–144. 
232 BREMAN, 1974, p. 229. 
233 ROTHERMUND, 2003; MITRA, 2017, p. 181–184. 
234 BOSE/JALAL, 2003, p. 175–176. 
Chapter 6  
3rd Episode Part 2: Independent India,  
1952-1990 
 
 
259 
garibi hatao—remove poverty—stood as a promise of her political programme.235 The 
strategy to formulate a populist programme in which she demanded land reforms, or the 
nationalisation of banks, for instance, paid off:236 Her INC (R)237 won 44 percent of the Lok 
Sabha seats and became the strongest party, but did not have the majority of the house 
anymore.238 
The 1970 reports of the Commissioner for SC and ST and the Committee on 
Untouchability were discussed at length in the Lok Sabha in August 1970. Dinkar Desai 
expressed his embarrassment and explained:  
 
Many foreign countries will be surprised to learn that there is some kind of slavery in 
this country even today; I will call it serfdom. In the report it is called bonded labour. 
But it is not labour, it is slavery or serfdom. (…) It is a matter of shame for us that in 
free India we have not [sic] lakhs of person’s [sic] who are slaves in this way. The 
Government of India and the state Governments should take stringent measures. They 
must see to it that this slavery system is abolished in this country.239  
 
MPs criticised the inaction of the government despite its promise to ‘abolish 
poverty.’240 In August 1970, the Minister of Labour responded to the question of what action 
the government had taken against forced labour by stating that forced labour was not 
prevalent. Yet, he could not deny that there were occasional incidents of forced and bonded 
labour.241 He indicated that the government intended to mitigate “the economic 
backwardness”242 which he identified as the cause of bonded labour, and he maintained that 
the government had no intention to propose further legislation against forced labour.243 
After the elections of early 1972, Gandhi’s INC had again profited from promises to 
promote social justice. In the shadow of the report of the Commissioner for SC and ST and a 
report of the Committee on Untouchability, the Lok Sabha again discussed the issue of 
bonded labour for several days in November 1972.244 Nurul Hasan, Minister of Education, 
Social Welfare and Culture, indicated that if a central act was found to be necessary—by 
whom, the government or parliament, he did not specify—the government would propose 
 
235 HARDGRAVE/KOCHANEK, 2008, p. 281–286; RAJAGOPAL, 2011, p. 1011. 
236 BOSE/JALAL, 2003, p. 184; HARDGRAVE/KOCHANEK, 2008, p. 279. 
237 The INC had split into two factions, INC (R) under Gandhi, and INC (O) in 1969, HARDGRAVE/KOCHANEK, 
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such a legislative measure. Furthermore, Hasan pointed out that Prime Minister Gandhi 
followed up on the matter by contacting the Chief Ministers in the states.245 In 1973 the Union 
Minister of Labour sent inquiries to the Chief Ministers of the states suggesting the 
development of a national act to ban bonded labour. Kerala, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat and West 
Bengal were among the states that agreed to adopt central legislation in India, while Madhya 
Pradesh, Assam and Rajasthan did not respond.246 But neither the government nor members of 
parliament submitted a bill to abolish bonded labour. 
On March 6 1975, another member of the Lok Sabha requested to know what steps the 
government had taken to abolish slavery. The Minister of Labour Raghunatha Reddy 
explained that the states adopted regional legislation, the IPC Section 374 and constitutional 
Article 23 were in place, and, therefore, no further legislation was considered necessary.247 
About two months after this session, on June 25, Gandhi proclaimed emergency rule, which 
became effective the following day. 
Gandhi was accused of election fraud and in 1974, the Allahabad High Court ruled 
that Gandhi had abused state institutions while running her election campaign. Among other 
issues, the court found that a gazette officer had assisted Gandhi during her election campaign 
to promote her election prospects.248 The court declared her election void and requested her 
resignation. As she was also under increasing pressure from other political leaders, Gandhi 
declared the state of emergency, and the majority of the INC supported her. Political 
opponents were arrested,249 parliament was unable to use its control of a no-confidence 
motion,250 and the president could pass laws by ordinance which meant that the Indian 
Parliament’s approval was not necessary. Ordinances were valid for six months and could 
only become permanent when adopted by Parliament at a later point in time.251 By declaring 
emergency, which lasted until March 1977, Gandhi saved her position as Prime Minister of 
India.252  
Gandhi made clear that the fight against bonded labour would be one of several 
economic and social policies to be implemented: In her Broadcast to the Nation on July 1 
1975, she announced, “[t]he practice of bonded labour is barbarous and will be abolished. All 
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contracts or other arrangements under which services such as bonded labour, are now secured 
will be declared illegal.”253 She also announced an economic 20-Point Programme, which 
addressed the issue of bonded labour, as well as other social and economic matters, and she 
explained that emergency provided India with “a new opportunity to go ahead with our 
economic tasks.”254 In point four of the programme,255 Gandhi proposed to implement the 
abolition of bonded labour, which had been stalled by the earlier governments. She sent letters 
to the Indian Chiefs in the states asking for their support on July 4 1975. She explained three 
general objectives she wanted to achieve: The realisation of equality in society, act against 
economic offences, increase production and thereby employment.256 In the letter she referred 
to the benefactors of her reforms and legitimised the reforms she intended by explained that 
“[i]t is only through our sincere efforts in the sphere of agrarian reforms that we can establish 
the credibility of our political and administrative structure in the eyes of the under-privileged 
sections of our society.”257 
In the following months, the topic of bonded labour was discussed in the Lok Sabha 
and the promise was welcomed in general by the MPs. The programme as such was portrayed 
as a move to overcome administrative problems in implementing the abolition of forced 
labour. One MP explained: “The programme has brought forward new hopes in the minds of 
the people and the people think that the sluggishness the tardiness and the inefficiency that 
have plagued this land, especially the bureaucracy and other sectors, will be eliminated once 
for all.”258 It appears that Parliament would have adopted the Bonded Labour System 
Abolition Bill, but the Lok Sabha was not in session, and, therefore, Gandhi decided to move 
ahead with promulgating the bill as an ordinance that would then be adopted by parliament.259 
On October 15 1975, the Government of India promulgated the Bonded Labour System 
(Abolition) Ordinance.260 
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The Rajya Sabha (upper house) debated the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Bill in 
1976 (introduced to the Rajya Sabha January 6 1976, debated on January 12 1976). During 
the Rajya Sabha debates of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Bill in 1976, Saroar Amjad 
Ali remarked that it had taken 26 years since independence until parliament finally debated a 
law on bonded labour.261 About two weeks later, on January 23 and 27 1976 the Lok Sabha 
debated the bill.262 Raghunatha Reddy, Minister of Labour, introduced the bill and although 
all contributing members of the Lok Sabha endorsed the bill across party lines, this was not 
without criticism towards the government. Biren Dutta reminded the government that it had 
failed to take action, despite the last 20 reports of the Commissioner for SCs and STs, that had 
shown that bonded labour existed, the government failed to implement the Article 23.263 Dutta 
appreciated the bill but criticised the government’s inaction and described the adoption of the 
Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Ordinance as a populist move.264 
Yet, according to Dutta, the government’s behaviour had also contributed to the 
continued problem of bonded labour: He noted that the Congress’s reliance on so-called vote-
banks265 impeded the implementation of Article 23: “The most difficult problem is that the 
members of the Congress Party are the landlords and (…) they form the vote catching 
machinery of the Congress Party. That is why this thing is still persisting. Even if you pass 
this Bill this practice will continue.”266 While supportive of the bill without a single member 
speaking against its adoption, several members expressed their doubt that the bill would 
succeed in abolishing bonded labour. One member pointed out the problem of unemployment 
and lack of alternatives.267 Kathamuthu explained that the states denied the existence of 
bonded labour because they were not interested in stemming the administrative and financial 
burden; additionally, the ties of landlords to the state government had undermined the 
implementation of the abolition of bonded labour, and would presumably continue to do so in 
the future.268 
During the following session, the Lok Sabha again discussed the bill, and worked in 
some amendments; the majority of the members adopted the bill. The act replaced the 
ordinance, and the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, adopted in 1976, immediately 
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came into force and stood as enforced since October 25 1975, the date when the ordinance 
was promulgated.269 
This new layer to the constitutional provision explicitly abolishes bonded labour in 
India. The BLSA provides a definition of what constitutes bonded labour and clarifies that 
“‘bonded labour system’ means the system of forced, or partly forced, labour under which a 
debtor enters, or has, or is presumed to have, entered, into an agreement with the creditor.”270 
It provides a list of the names of the different systems of bonded labour, among them the hali 
and sagri systems, terms used for bonded labour arrangements in agriculture prevalent in 
Bihar and Gujarat. The Labour Minister explained that this enumeration of bonded labour 
systems was not exhaustive and prepared to clarify what the intention of the act was, so that 
the courts could apply it to the respective cases.271 The BLSA, still effective today, prescribes 
how the Indian states should give effect to this act. It provides for the establishment of 
vigilance committees by the states of India, the assignment of Magistrates to implement the 
act,272 the punishment of perpetrators, the prohibition of accepting advances, and the payment 
for rehabilitation of liberated bonded labourers—half funded by the central state, half by the 
Indian states. In short, the BLSA clearly formulates a policy with the aim to abolish bonded 
labour. By prescribing that “[t]he existence of an agreement between the debtor and creditor is 
ordinarily presumed, under the social custom, in relation to the following forms of forced 
labour,”273 the act shifts the burden of proof from the bonded labourer to the creditor.274 With 
all those provisions, the BLSA offers a low level of discretion to interpret this act and 
constitutes until today a strong law against bonded labour. 
Table 15. Characteristics of the formal institution, 1976 
Law Definition Bonded labour Timeline Punishment Rehabilitation 
Competent 
authorities 
BLSA, 
1976 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Aftermath of Emergency Rule 1977-1990s 
In an internal evaluation of the progress of implementing the BLSA in June 1976, the report 
summarised that bonded labour was prevalent in nine states.275 So far, only Kerala had 
completed a survey and had identified and released 42,769 bonded labourers and highlighted 
that liberations were only “symbolic”276 if not supported by rehabilitation. The author of the 
report added that this task was “clearly the most difficult and time consuming and involve[d] 
some financial expenditure.”277 The report also noted that not all released bonded labourers 
received their rehabilitation package.278 The states offered different items to bonded labourers 
for their rehabilitation. In Andhra Pradesh for instance, released bonded labourers received 
Rs. 200, housing, as well as agricultural tools or livestock.279 But the 1981 report of the 
Commission for SCs and STs indicated that not all bonded labourers received 
rehabilitation,280 and that there were differences between states and regions regarding making 
efforts to implement the BLSA.281 
By June 1976, 75,337 bonded labourers were identified; in the following four years, 
until November 1980, an additional 45,224 identifications followed.282 Despite those actions, 
a governmental committee of the Ministry of Labour declared in November 1979 that “in 
practice, the system [of bonded labour] is still prevailing.”283 The first Indian national survey 
on bonded labour conducted by the Gandhi Peace Foundation, published in 1981, estimated 
that 2,617,000 bonded labourers were living in India by 1978.284 The study even observed an 
increase of bonded labour in agriculture, brick-kilns and quarries, and showed that bonded 
labour remained prevalent in many Indian states.285 The Gandhi Peace Foundation identified 
the main causes of debt bondage as debt and land allotment, but also social, customary and 
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traditional obligations were reasons why people were trapped in bonded labour.286 This also 
included inherited bonded labour relations.287 
Almost all Indian states, both before and after the Gandhi Peace Foundation’s report, 
denied288 having a bonded labour problem. Tamil Nadu reported having a negligible number 
of bonded labour cases, yet, the Gandhi Peace Foundation suggested that about six percent of 
Tamil Nadu’s agricultural workers were in debt bondage.289 In 1995, two commissioners 
appointed by the Supreme Court to investigate bonded labour in Tamil Nadu found that in 
over 20 districts more than one million people worked as bonded labourers, of which 10 
percent were children.290 In 2000, the Government of India offered special financial assistance 
to “13 bonded labour prone States.”291 The Gandhi Peace Foundation estimated that there 
were 2,617,000 bonded labourers for the year 1978, but the government recorded only a total 
of 120,561 recorded releases as of November 1980. The state governments contested the 
accuracy of the Foundation’s estimate and suggested that the number of identified and 
released labourers were accurate. Assuming that the Gandhi Peace Foundation’s numbers 
were correct, the state efforts reached about five percent of all bonded labourers. During the 
period between 1977 and 2008, the judiciary and police had prosecuted 5,893 cases of bonded 
labour, 1,289 of which led to the conviction of the perpetrators.292 The gap between officially 
counted bonded labourers and subsequent convictions is quite disparate and demonstrates that 
implementation was still weak. 
As stated above, the institution of the abolition of slavery and bonded labour had 
become strong, but the enforcement level continued to lag behind. According to my 
theoretical framework, further institutional changes were to be expected at the enforcement 
level, as suggested in chapter 2. Within an anti-slavery Zeitgeist, two hypotheses, H7a and 
H8a, indicate that antislavery actors are likely to appear as the dominant change agents, acting 
as defenders of the spirit of the institution and thereby causing change through layering at the 
implementation level, regardless of whether the political context afforded strong or weak veto 
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possibilities. In the following paragraphs on the events after emergency rule, I test these two 
hypotheses. 
 
Figure 10. Format for bonded labour release certificates, 2016 
 
Figure 10, Format for bonded labour release certificates, 2016. Source: Ministry of Labour and 
Employment, May 18 2016, p. 13. 
 
In the aftermath of the state of emergency, the Supreme Court (SC) of India developed 
a new notion of judicial activism. The initial concern of the SC was the issue of imprisonment 
of political dissidents and the earlier support of human rights infringements by the courts 
under Gandhi’s emergency rule.293 By reinterpreting the constitutional powers granted to the 
judiciary, the states’ high courts and the Indian Supreme Court assumed the special capacity 
to act suo motu—on their own behalf. This allowed the courts to become active without 
another party requesting the action. A bonded labour case, which I discuss further below, was 
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in fact one contributing case for the extension of powers which the SC assumed as well: 
Accepting cases through public interest litigation (PIL), allowed the SC to rule on cases 
initiated by individuals or organisations who were not directly affected by the crime.294 The 
SC also interpreted this power so as to intervene in certain rights violations, such as bonded 
labour, when they were only reported in the newspaper or received as letters or postcards by a 
judge.295 The legal justification to approach bonded labour this way was the fact that the 
Article 23 was a fundamental right.296  
The adoption of PIL and the simplified accessibility to the courts brought another 
actor to the fore: Non-governmental organisations (NGOs). A large number of regional NGOs 
that were founded in response to the Court’s powers in the early 1980s297 have become crucial 
actors in filing court cases and actively freeing bonded labourers. The National Human Rights 
Commission (NHRC) concluded in 2010 that “a small number of bonded labourers are 
actually identified, almost always due to the persistent efforts of NGOs.”298 According to 
Mishra the number of people liberated by NGOs was around 30,000 between the 1970s and 
2011.299 Under the governmental Centrally Sponsored Plan Scheme for the identification, 
release and rehabilitation of bonded labourers funded by the state, 300,175 bonded labourers 
were recorded between 1978 and 2015.300 
From the 1980s on, the Supreme Court became involved in enforcing the abolition of 
bonded labour. Reading those cases, it appears that the definitional question continued to be 
contested despite the BLSA’s clarity: The question of voluntariness was reopened in a 1982 
judgment of the Supreme Court. In People’s Union for Democratic Rights and Others v. 
Union of India & Others (also known as Asiad case), Judge Bhagwati explained that those 
who became bonded labourers, even though they offered themselves voluntarily, did not have 
a choice. He specified: 
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Where a person is suffering from hunger or starvation, when he has no resources at all 
to fight disease or to feed his wife and children (...) he would have no choice but to 
accept any work that comes his way (...). He would be in no position to bargain with 
the employer; he would have to accept what is offered to him. And in doing so he 
would be acting not as a free agent with a choice between alternatives but under the 
compulsion of economic circumstances and the labour of service provided by him 
would be clearly ‘forced labour.’301 
 
By defining the term ‘force’ judge Bhagwati referred not only to physical compulsion, but 
explicitly included external factors that contributed to workers accepting debt bondage. He 
also explained that the non-payment of wages or remuneration below the minimum wage 
amounted to forced labour. This line of reasoning was not entirely new: In Rama Sastriar v. 
Pakkiri Ambalakaran (1927), the judge argued that the low wages constituted a ‘slavery 
bond’ and was therefore not enforceable.302 But contrary to the high court cases, the rulings of 
the Supreme Court were, and are as of today, binding to all judicial levels.  
In Sanjit Roy v. State of Rajasthan (1983), the SC reminded the State of Rajasthan that 
also in the case of relief work during famines the minimum wages needed to be paid. When 
the Public Works Department had engaged a number of people for the construction of roads, 
payment was conditional on performance and could end up below the minimum wages. If 
minimum wages were declined, the extraction of labour in return for famine relief would 
constitute a violation of Article 23.303  
The probably best-known bonded labour case in India304 was initiated by an NGO. In 
1981, the NGO named Bandhua Mukti Morcha (Bonded Labour Liberation Front) sent a letter 
to justice Bhagwati at the Supreme Court, complaining about the occurrence of bonded labour 
in state-owned stone quarries in Haryana that had leased out licences to private contractors. 
The SC accepted the letter as writ petition and thereby overruled the objections of the 
Government of Haryana. The judge explained that the “State is under a constitutional 
obligation to see that there is no violation of the fundamental right of any person.”305 The 
Court sent a commission to enquire on the conditions, and this commission found the working 
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conditions in the mines to be in violation of several laws, among them the BLSA and 
constitutional Article 23.306 
Dissatisfied with the performance of the states’ implementation efforts of the BLSA, 
the Supreme Court issued an order to the NHRC of India in June 1997. The NHRC had been 
created four years earlier, in 1993.307 The Court requested that the NHRC monitor the 
implementation of the BLSA.308 The NHRC set up an Expert Group to supervise the 
identification of “bonded labour prone Districts”309 in 2000. By bringing in the NHRC as an 
additional actor, the Supreme Court was able to circumvent the failing implementation 
structure of magistrates, the police and vigilance committees provided by the BLSA.310 The 
action of the Supreme Court reflects a global trend of the “justice cascade,”311 as part of the 
norm cascade at the national level, and through the appearances of additional actors—the 
Supreme Court, the NHRC and NGOs—the institution of the abolition of bonded labour was 
fundamentally changed at the implementation level. While the framers of the Constitution 
envisioned that the Supreme Court would become an actor in the implementation of the 
Constitution of India, the role of NGOs could not have been foreseen. The Supreme Court, the 
NHRC and the NGOs constitute an additional institutional layer to the institution of the 
abolition of slavery and bonded labour in India. The state of emergency was the facilitating 
process for the appearance of these actors. But only the new role of the SC constituted a 
critical juncture, since it set the path of a new way of implementing the abolition of bonded 
labour. 
 
Conclusion 
This second part of the third episode on the institution of abolition of bonded labour is 
dedicated to the independent Indian state, encompassing the first democratically elected 
parliament, emergency rule under Indira Gandhi, and its aftermath. Starting off with weak 
provisions against bonded labour that included the Act V, the IPC antislavery sections and the 
constitutional Article 23, the Lok Sabha tried to initiate layering by promoting private bills, as 
well as putting pressure on the government to make use of the Question Hour. Particularly 
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around the release of the reports of the Commissioner for SC and ST, the issue of bonded 
labour was brought regularly on the agenda of the Lok Sabha. But the government made use 
of its veto power, and it never even came to a vote on any bill against bonded labour. The 
governmental ministers either referenced the state governments and the action that was taken 
in the states, or stated that because of the legislation already in place, no further policies were 
necessary. The government was the preserver of the status quo. Members of parliament tried 
to induce change, but were not successful given the veto position of the government. This is 
also highlighted by the fact that the Government of India became party to the Supplementary 
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery in 1956 and ratified the convention on June 23 1960, 
but this convention was not addressed once in Parliament between 1952 and 1975. Only the 
ILO Forced Labour Convention (C105) was mentioned. 
The initial institutional characteristics were weak and the MPs as well as the 
Commissioner of SCs and STs regularly pointed to the weakness and failure of the state 
governments to implement Article 23. As expected according to my evaluation of the Article 
23, the court cases show that the definitional question was still contested—dictionaries and a 
United States Supreme Court case supported the definition found in Kadar (1961). Particular 
to this case is that the lower court actually wanted to enforce the local form of bonded labour, 
nadappu.312  
Several MPs tried to induce change as defenders, attempting to strengthen the 
institution by adding a stronger policy, but did not succeed. Beyond the government’s 
resistance to adopt another legislation, the actual reasons for this behaviour are hardly 
highlighted through the parliamentary discussions. One recurring element were the expected 
expenses which would come along with vigorous enforcement, and which the Constituent 
Assembly was already unwilling to shoulder.313 The first two decades still seemed carried by 
the enthusiasm about independence, the democratisation of the political system, economic 
plans and the development of the country. Only with time did it become visible, that these 
changes did not facilitate the vanishing of bonded labour. The Commissioner of SCs and STs 
reports highlighted this regularly. Indira Gandhi’s success can be explained by her move to 
speak to the poor and low caste members of the constituency, thereby abandoning previous 
well-established connections of the Congress Party to the high caste and better-off landed 
society. These were crucial in securing votes through vote-banks and the strong majority of 
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the Congress314 but which were also part of the structure that prevented access of the poor to 
the political and judicial system.315 
Gandhi’s decision and also political and economic reorientation316 came after two 
decades of independent India. From the comments of the Lok Sabha members it appears that, 
in their estimation, the BLSA was overdue. As some MPs noted, 20 years of reports of the 
Commissioner on SCs and STs highlighted the continued labour exploitation in the form of 
bonded labour, yet not much had changed, and this situation seemed not feasible anymore. 
Until the very last moment before emergency rule, the then Labour Minister explained that no 
additional legislation was necessary;317 two months later, Indira Gandhi removed all obstacles 
to adopt legislation against bonded labour. Emergency constituted a strong facilitating 
moment which allowed the government to adopt a strong legislation. But the resistance to act 
on bonded labour would not have come from parliament; its veto possibility was strong since 
the late 1960s, when Congress did not occupy the majority of the Lok Sabha seats anymore. 
There was cohesion on the question of abolishing bonded labour: During the debates, the Lok 
Sabha and Raja Sabha endorsed the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Bill, and the bill was 
adopted without any opposition, aside from criticism that the government had waited so long. 
With emergency, Gandhi secured her political position and pre-empted obstacles from within 
the government’s own ranks against adopting a policy that provided for vigorous enforcement 
of the abolition of bonded labour. In this chapter I could not find explicit explanations beyond 
the Lok Sabha debates that explain the resistance within the government to adopt the Bill to 
Provide Punishment for Free, Forced or Compulsory Labour or to come forward with other 
policies. Other authors, as well as one MP,318 indicate that the ties of the INC at the regional 
level were strongly related to vested interests which prevented action against bonded 
labour.319 
During this episode, both initially proposed hypotheses, H4a and H3a, as well as two 
additional ones, H7a and H8a, came to the test. First the INC constituted the government and 
occupied the majority of seats in parliament, endowed with strong vetoes blocking any 
attempts to change the institutional status quo at the central level. During emergency, the veto 
position remained virtually the same compared to the 1950s and 1960s, but this time with 
 
314 MITRA, 2017, p. 152–153. 
315 CHANDRA, 2003, 12, 24, 28 
316 MITRA, 2017, p. 197. 
317 Minister of Labour, Raghunatha Reddy, Lok Sabha, March 6 1975, p. 49. 
318 Biren Dutta, Lok Sabha, January 23 1976, p. 164. 
319 DHAR, 2001, p. 266; KOHLI, 1988, p. 7. 
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Congress becoming the actor of change. Gandhi and the Congress Party added layers to the 
existing institution and thereby induced meaningful change at the rules level: The new policy 
explicitly addressed and defined bonded labour and its abolition as the policy issue, and 
provided clear instructions for implementation, rehabilitation and punishment for perpetrators. 
By 1975 the legal abolition of bonded labour in India was realised. The final layer constituted 
by the SC, NGOs and the NHRC happened outside of the political arena, in the judicial arena 
at the enforcement level. This ultimately changed the enforcement of the abolition of bonded 
labour in India.  
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Discussion and Conclusion 
n this concluding chapter I briefly reiterate the findings of the prior case descriptions and 
analysis and bring the three episodes together. The structure of the discussion follows the 
variables which I used to understand institutional change. At times I insert suggestions 
for future research. I end with a final conclusion and highlight further research enquiries on 
the abolition of bonded labour in India and South Asia. 
 
Discussion 
Treating the abolition of slavery as an institution allowed me to follow its formal changes 
between the delegalisation of slavery in 1843 and the adoption of the Bonded Labour System 
(Abolition) Act in 1976. I argue that neither the Act V nor the IPC clearly abolished bonded 
labour and that this ambiguity, the open question of whether these two provisions covered 
bonded labour or not, caused changes at the formal as well as the enforcement level, 
represented also by the judicial treatment of bonded labour and slavery cases at the high 
courts. Thereby I diverged from scholarly evaluations of the abolition of slavery as policy 
failure. Instead, by applying Thelen and Mahoney’s theoretical framework, the 
implementation gap turned into an independent variable that helped to make visible and 
explain changes of the abolition of slavery in India. 
I suggested a few modifications to the theoretical framework of Mahoney and Thelen: 
By splitting one of the variables—the discretion in interpretation and enforcement—into 
two—the quality of the institutional rules and the actual enforcement level—I could account 
more realistically for the characteristics of the institution. In addition, I explicitly considered 
ideas in the form of the Zeitgeist and paradigms related to bonded labour, forced labour and 
slavery, namely the non-interference paradigm, the paternalist paradigm, the ideology of work 
paradigm and the rights paradigm. Altogether, I considered six variables: (V5) The Zeitgeist 
and (V6) prevailing paradigms; actors’ predisposition towards the institution and (V4) 
expected actor behaviour in light of the political context; the institutional characteristics—
(V1) the quality of the institution and (V2) its actual implementation status—as well as (V3) 
the political context. Based on these variables I formulated a set of hypotheses to describe and 
explain how the abolition of slavery in India changed over time. 
For my purpose, I adjusted the parameters of the theory of gradual institutional change 
to fit the theoretical assumption more closely to the particular case of a human right. Such an 
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adaptation included considering beforehand the ideational environment, or Zeitgeist, within 
which actors would behave, as well as their predisposition towards the institution, depending 
on them either being proslavery or antislavery actors. These specific considerations resulted in 
an extensive set of hypotheses, of which I tested only a few, but this allowed for a refined 
description and analysis of the changes the institution underwent. 
The hypotheses proved useful and accurate for the analysis and explanation of the 
changes of the institution abolishing bonded labour in India. By assuming that proslavery and 
antislavery actors would occupy particular dispositions towards the institution depending on 
the institutional characteristics, I was able to make fairly accurate predictions about which 
actors would be the ones inducing change. This approach allowed me to model actors’ 
behaviour for the particular case of the abolition of slavery. And while my approach appears 
highly specific to the case of the abolition of slavery and bonded labour, I suggest that it is 
transferable to other human rights or sets of cases that study the abolition of coerced labour. 
The Zeitgeist changed during the period I considered. The first two episodes were 
marked by a proslavery Zeitgeist at the international level, but the norm of the abolition of 
slavery gained a status of ‘taken-for-grantedness.’1 At the national level, the Zeitgeist in India 
began to turn antislavery with the adoption of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Consequently, 
open resistance to the abolition of bonded labour, forced labour or slavery could be observed 
in the 1840s when the abolition of slavery was instituted. Later, open resistance of employers 
to the abolition of slavery or begar, as by the Constitution of India for instance, did not occur. 
This absence does not mean that proslavery actors vanished, which they apparently did not. 
But they did not express their discontent in the public sphere. 
The identification of sets of ideas that both contradicted and supported the realisation 
of the abolition of slavery allowed me to develop a framework, within which progress towards 
the abolition of slavery, but also drawbacks, were possible. The ideas subsumed under the 
paternalist paradigm, or the ideology of work and ideas related to the ‘sanctity of the 
contract,’2 explain the adoption of the Workman’s Breach of Contract Act (WBCA). The 
formulation of citizenship rights brought forward by the Indian National Congress (INC) and 
other Indian political organisations undermined the legitimacy of the WBCA and also formed 
the basis for the rights enshrined in the Constitution of India. 
 
1 FINNEMORE/SIKKINK, 1998, p. 895. 
2 WHITLEY/Royal Commission on Labour in India/Government of India, 1931, p. 230. 
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The abolition of slavery underwent several changes at the formal and the enforcement 
level: In the first two episodes it transformed from a weak provision that merely delegalised3 
slavery and was undermined by a layer of contradicting rules, the WBCA, into a weak norm 
enshrined in the constitutional Article 23. Furthermore, during this time the rules did not 
establish whether bonded labour was criminalised by antislavery legislation. The courts were 
unanimous regarding the treatment of bonded labour cases under abolition of slavery 
legislation, but depicted a tendency to treat bonded labour under the IPC antislavery sections 
from the 1910s on. To make things worse, the WBCA undermined the abolition of slavery by 
criminalising breaches of contract, which in effect legalised bonded labour and which was 
also used by employers to enforce bonded labour. By displacement—the removal of the 
WBCA—the spirit of the abolition of slavery was strengthened, and through additional layers 
at the presidency level, policymakers tried to regulate bonded labour. 
The changes at the rules level are first and foremost explained by the continued failure 
of the colonial state, as well as the independent Indian state, to implement the abolition of 
slavery, which in this case included bonded labour. Throughout the three episodes, 
governmental and non-governmental reports showed that bonded labour remained a problem. 
This recurrent confrontation with the implementation gap kept the issue on the agenda and 
gave impetus to policymakers and antislavery activists to strive for change. This statement 
seems trivial—the law does not work, therefore policymakers change it—but it becomes 
nuanced when considering the timing of those changes. The first layer on top of the Act V was 
the WBCA. Earlier lobbying efforts failed, but after the Indian rebellion and large-scale 
labour resistance, the Government of India adopted this legislation which in practice 
undermined the abolition of slavery. These political events were facilitating processes. The 
changes enacted through the WBCA were in line with the current paradigms and also already 
present in regional legislations on contract law.4 Since neither the Act V nor the IPC defined 
slavery and were silent on debt bondage, the WBCA did not constitute an aberration from 
these legal provisions, but effectively undermined them. 
The removal of the WBCA was not a question of ‘if,’ but ‘when.’ The timing of the 
displacement of the WBCA can only be explained in conjunction with other variables: The 
change of the political context set by the Montague-Chelmsford reforms adopted in 1919 
allowed for an increase of Indian nationals to the legislatures. While the veto power was fully 
occupied by the government, the changing Zeitgeist towards antislavery and the pressure 
 
3 CHATTERJEE, 2005, p. 139. 
4 CRAVEN/HAY, 1994, p. 71–73; AVINS, 1967, p. 33. 
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exercised by MPs in the legislature to realise the rights of labourers created the necessary 
environment to remove the WBCA. The Government of India’s stalling might have 
continued—and did, according to Hay, in other places until after the 1930s and 1960s5—if the 
Indian members in the Legislative Assembly had not repeatedly requested the removal of 
criminal sanctions for breaches of contract. The tipping point6 appears to be the enacting of 
the Slavery Convention, which cast its shadow over the recurrent debates in the Central 
Legislative Assembly. 
Additionally, the question of labour exploitation became entrenched in the discourse 
between the independence movement and the colonial power. Then the removal of the WBCA 
served not only to improve the situation of labourers, but it also became a site in the struggle 
between the independence movement and the colonial power in which both tried to style 
themselves as the better suited protectors of the interests of the poor. Having won this 
struggle, the newly independent state and its governing policymakers failed to adopt a strong 
policy for the abolition of bonded labour for two reasons. The adoption of the Article 23 and 
the withdrawal of the Prevention of Free or Forced or Compulsory Labour Bill can only be 
understood when considering the political context, as well as the ideas of the policymakers in 
the Constituent Assembly (CA): There was a clear understanding that bonded labour had to be 
addressed, also by additional laws. At the same time, several members of the CA believed that 
with regime change and the end of colonialism, the rights of citizens would automatically be 
realised, economic development could be fostered, and bonded labour would vanish. Some 
members were less enthusiastic, but were appeased upon the promise that the new 
government would investigate bonded labour in India and formulate a strong law. Yet both, 
the independent state and the colonial state resisted from building an infrastructure that would 
enforce actively the abolition of slavery and bonded labour. The unwillingness of the 
government after independence to make bonded labour a cognisable offence is not fully 
explained by the sources I could access. The ministers of the central government either argued 
that existing national or regional law was sufficient, or that a law providing for a vigorous 
enforcement would be too costly to actually enforce.7 Future research could highlight in more 
detail what in fact the motives of the government were to resist the adoption of such a policy. 
MPs wanted legal change, and the support of the BLSA 26 years after India’s 
independence confirmed the position of the Indian Parliament regarding this issue. But due to 
the political context, with the governing party occupying the veto power, change initiated by 
 
5 HAY/CRAVEN, 2004, p. 26. 
6 MUKHERJI, 2014, p. 24. 
7 Cf. statements of Desai, Minister of Labour, Lok Sabha, March 4 1955, p. 1131. 
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the Lok Sabha could not succeed, as evidenced by another submission of the Bill to Provide 
for Free, Forced or Compulsory Labour in 1954. This governmental inertia was only 
overcome by Gandhi’s seizure of power under emergency rule. Gandhi’s INC moved towards 
accommodating the interests of the lower castes, Dalits and the poor. Gandhi’s economic 
programme tailored to realise the promises of independence and the Constitution, and the fact 
that more than 20 years had passed without visible changes for bonded labourers, explains 
why it took emergency rule to finally adopt a strong law against bonded labour. Up to the last 
moment the Minister of Labour argued that new legislation regarding bonded labour was not 
necessary. With emergency rule, Gandhi removed any veto possibilities and enacted a 
programme of economic policies already outlined before emergency. This included the 
abolition of bonded labour. 
The ambiguity of the legal provisions played out markedly in the court cases: Bonded 
labour was not addressed in the legal provisions, but magistrates and judges were confronted 
with bonded labour cases and resorted to antislavery legislation to handle these cases. Over 
the course of the first two episodes, judges increasingly interpreted antislavery provisions of 
the IPC in such a way as to criminalise bonded labour; tracing how these cases came about 
revealed that several magistrates also interpreted the Act V and the IPC in such a way that 
allowed them to prosecute employers of bonded labourers under antislavery legislation. The 
changes at the judicial level constituted conversion: Judges expanded their interpretation of 
antislavery laws to include bonded labour. Simultaneously, there were also instances of drift: 
Several cases instigated under the WBCA were dismissed on the basis that these actually 
constituted slavery. The courts suggested neglecting the given rules in instances where the 
WPCA was to coerce labour by employers only making minimal advances of payment. The 
prevalence of bonded labour throughout all episodes, as well as the low conviction rate 
indicated by the criminal records of Punjab and Bengal suggest that most magistrates did not 
interpret bonded labour as a violation of the antislavery section of the IPC. Future research 
could reveal how magistrates generally treated bonded labour cases.8 
The adoption of the Constitution of India and its provision against begar and forced 
labour constituted a clear, even though still weak, change by layering: Added on top of the 
existing rules, the intention of the constitutional provision was to prohibit bonded labour. 
Contrary to earlier provisions regarding bonded labour at the presidency level, this rule 
applied to the whole of India. But the few court cases on the Article 23 derived for the 
 
8 Kerr remarks that if records survived at all, magistrates’ decisions would have been collected as aggregated 
tables revealing only little about the cases they dealt with, KERR, 2004, p. 19; see also HAY/CRAVEN, 2004, p. 2. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 
278 
discussion of the judicial treatment of bonded labour in the third episode show that employers 
continued to attempt to use the administrative and judicial machinery to enforce bonded 
labour. The rules of Article 23 still lacked a definition; consequently, the courts still referred 
to other sources of inspiration to argue that bonded labour constituted an offence against 
Article 23. By 1975 India abolished bonded labour, clearly formulated in a policy providing 
guidance on how to implement the norm with the BLSA.9 This change also constituted a layer 
on top of the existing rules that strengthened the spirit of the institution of the abolition of 
slavery: For the first time an Indian policy defined explicitly bonded labour as forced labour 
and therefore as a criminal offence. The Bihar and Orissa Kamiauti Agreements Act for 
instance does not suggest a potential criminal offence and does not mention forced labour, 
begar or slavery to describe the kamiauti system.10 The characteristics of the institution 
became strong, but enforcement was still weak. The reaction of the Supreme Court to 
Gandhi’s emergency rule—the assumption of the power to act suo motu and a reformed 
application of legal standing under PIL, legally justified by Article 23’s quality as a 
fundamental right—paved the ground for new actors proactive in implementing the BLSA: 
The courts and the NHRC. These changes constituted another layer that transformed the 
enactment of the rules and allowed the courts to become proactive without a litigant, and 
NGOs could file court cases on behalf of bonded labourers. 
One of the most prominent elements which was missing in all considered policies was 
a definition of slavery. All the episodes I compared reveal two constant elements: The rules of 
the institution of the abolition of slavery were weak, as well as the level of implementation. 
The courts repeatedly remarked upon the lack of definitions and made use of their discretion 
of interpretation. But the observed tendency to support antislavery charges in bonded labour 
cases only becomes tangible when considering the Zeitgeist and the prevalent paradigms. 
Before the turn of the nineteenth century, the non-interference paradigm, the paternalist 
paradigm and the ideology of work paradigm, the latter upholding contractual obligations, can 
explain the reluctance of several judges to apply the antislavery sections of the IPC on bonded 
labour: In the case of Madan for instance, contractual obligations trumped the working 
conditions, and in Firman, the judge feared that if he convicted Firman under the IPC Section 
370, a large number of people could be charged with the same offence. At the international 
level the League of Nations, and at the national level the swaraj movement, pushed the rights 
paradigm, which gained momentum after the 1920s. This coincided with an increasing 
 
9 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 1. 
10 Government of Bihar and Orissa, 1920. 
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number of judgments recommending convictions under the IPC for the extraction of bonded 
labour by defining bonded labour as slavery. Unfortunately, the judges did not discuss in 
detail why they diverged from earlier judgments and found bonded labour relations to 
constitute offences under the antislavery sections of the IPC. One judge explained that bonded 
labour was “opposed to public policy.”11 Furthermore, the idea that a labourer could 
voluntarily submit to his own enslavement lost ground, and other factors, such as poverty, 
were invoked to argue that bonded labour was not voluntarily entered or continued.12 After 
independence, the rights paradigm is clearly referred to in Muthukoya when the judge invoked 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.13 
The legitimisation of bonded labour as a poor law disappeared with the emergence of 
the rights paradigm. By the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century, a number of courts 
acknowledged that bonded labourers had not submitted voluntarily to exploitative 
arrangements, but that the economic circumstances warranted their decisions—bonded labour 
was no longer interpreted as a voluntarily entered condition. Within the court system this 
resulted in convictions of employers under antislavery legislation; in the political arenas, the 
turn to the formulation of rights implicitly took the economic situation into account. 
Policymakers described bonded labour as slavery or forced labour which was not voluntary, 
even if the labourers had entered their bondage by free will. 
International legislation was a reference point for policymakers, as well as for the 
courts. They mentioned the Forced Labour Convention and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in the context of following up on the government’s actions against forced 
labour, as it happened in the Central Legislative Assembly; and as inspiration for legislative 
provisions, such as the Free or Forced or Compulsory Labour Bill. In the case of the British 
Raj, the attention of the League of Nations on bonded labour in India put pressure on the 
Government of India, which administrators remarked upon. The League’s comparison of the 
good example of the princely state Hyderabad, to the comparatively weak accomplishments of 
the British Raj, were responded to with some embarrassment on the side of the British 
administration and certainly motivated the colonial government to enable policy change 
against bonded labour. 
Acknowledging forced labour and begar as a prevalent problem in India, the authors 
of the Indian Constitution did not concede to international pressure to comply with 
 
11 Ram Sarup Bhagat v. Bansi Mandar, Calcutta High Court, March 15 1915, p. 744. 
12 Ram Sarup Bhagat v. Bansi Mandar, Calcutta High Court, March 15 1915, p. 744; Satish Chandra Ghosh v. 
Kashi Sahu, Patna High Court, April 8 1918. 
13 Kadar v. Muthukoya Thangal, Kerala High Court, July 17 1961. 
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international labour law. Although they made a reference to their obligation and used 
international conventions as tools to exercise pressure, the discussions on the fundamental 
rights and the abolition of slavery would not have been much different without these 
legislative developments at the international level. To a certain extent, the members of the CA 
and earlier in the Central Legislative Assembly seemed immune towards some of the 
discourses at the international arena, such as the League’s choice to include bonded labour 
within the definitional framework of slavery, and the ILO’s exclusion of voluntarily entered 
forced labour relations. The CA and the Lok Sabha, as well as the BLSA, described bonded 
labour as a form of forced labour, while even the Indian commissioner Dhamne found that 
bonded labour was not covered by the ILO Forced Labour Convention of 1930 and probably 
due to the terminological confusion completely ignored the applicability of the Slavery 
Convention of 1926. 
In this history, bonded labourers remained largely silent. Part of this observation is 
owed to the focus of this dissertation on the political arenas. One might expect the voice of 
the people to be marginalised within autocratic system, while democracies have higher stakes 
when failing to serve their population.14 Grievances of labourers at the bottom of the social 
hierarchy were structurally excluded and treated as irrelevant to the policymaking process. 
Commissioners ignored workers’ voices in the knowledge gathering processes that informed 
the legislative development—the workers were often presented without representation.15 For 
the Reports of the Indian Law Commission upon Slavery in India of 1841, not a single worker 
was interviewed. Their grievances, political claims or visions of a better life and better 
working conditions were not reflected in the sources between the 1840s and 1920s. This is 
one expression of the paternalist paradigm: The state discovered and defined the needs of its 
subject citizens and formulated the respective measure to satisfy those needs.16 Slaves and 
bonded labourers were therefore (un)suspiciously silent or rather silenced in the political 
discursive processes regarding matters of their own concern. Policy developments, the 
formulation of problems and solutions were elite centred.17 Particularly in the first episodes, 
the fact that the main actors concerned with bonded labour remained silent is reflective of the 
power matrix in which the policymaking was embedded.18 One of these issues was addressing 
 
14 DAHL, 1991, p. 283–284. 
15 For a similar observation in the case of the abolition of the slave trade, see QUIRK, 2008, p. 537. 
16 For a similar observation in reviewing the governmental reports on indentured labour, the trafficking of Indian 
labourers to the British Caribbean, see KALE, 1998, p. 84. 
17 See also, for instance, on the case of the white slave traffic in the United States: RODRÍGUEZ GARCÍA, 2016, 
p. 28–29. 
18 See also for the case on the debate and abolition of sati, the burning of widows on the funeral pyre, MANI, 
1987, p. 1. 
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the behaviour of employers. While the CA, for instance, as well as the policymakers of the 
new independent Indian state, spoke of lifting up the lower castes and improving their mental 
state, the behaviour of the upper castes towards their underlings was not seen as an issue. A 
closer interrogation of the discourse on caste could reveal a clearer picture on the integration 
of people affected by the policy issue in the policymaking process. 
 
Conclusion 
The test of orderliness of a country is not the number of millionaires it owns, but the absence 
of starvation among its masses.19 
—Mohandas Gandhi, 1916 
 
Colonial policymaking and enforcement cannot be treated as a monolithic exercise that either 
failed or succeeded to abolish slavery, forced labour and bonded labour. Colonial policies 
were applied, contested and interpreted in relation to bonded labour by different actors, the 
judiciary, magistrates, policymakers and employers, and underwent several changes. The 
WBCA and the non-implementation of the antislavery law and its application on bonded 
labour served interests that were in part colonial in that they were consequential for the 
extraction of revenue and the maintenance of colonial power.20 But the initial aim of the 
abolition of slavery was not to make a large and cheap labour force available. The state tried 
to abolish slavery, but also tried to gain control over its subjects by attempting to regulate 
bonded labour and the masters; but the colonial state, as well as the independent state, shied 
away from stemming the costs that would have grown out of active manumission and 
liberation of labourers.21 Justifying slavery and bonded labour as poor laws, as it happened in 
the nineteenth century, was the dishonest acknowledgement for failing to offer remedies 
developed at the political level. Without offering rehabilitative measures, policymakers of the 
colonial as well as the independent state knew that labourers’ alternatives were either to 
submit to coercive labour relations or to starve. This non-treatment of slavery and bonded 
labour was therefore highly political, since it maintained the power relations as they were, 
while at the same time depoliticised the issue of bonded labour, by treating it as mere 
individual cases of indebtedness or exploitation—the judgment in the slavery case of Firman 
is the most explicit example in this direction, where the judge decided not to apply antislavery 
legislation because of its political consequences. 
 
19 GANDHI, 1997, p. 158. 
20 Cf. KOLSKY, 2010, p. 5. 
21 The Queen v. Firman Ali, Calcutta High Court, December 2 1871. 
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In this dissertation I argue that the abolition of slavery and bonded labour in India 
changed gradually over time. Conceiving of bonded labour as one form of slavery, this 
dissertation expands our knowledge of the history after the abolition of slavery in Britain in 
1833, and after the abolition of slavery in India after 1843. The process of this development of 
the abolition of slavery in conjunction with bonded labour has hardly been appreciated; 
instead, it is commonly viewed negatively as attesting to the failure of respective policies to 
abolish slavery vis-à-vis continued labour exploitation in the form of bonded labour. Beyond 
the implementation gap, the abolition of slavery and bonded labour in India offers rich insight 
into the changes of an institution and the development of a human right. I also show that 
institutional change took place simultaneously at the rules level and the implementation level. 
The theoretical framework of gradual institutional change and respective modifications helped 
to depict and explain the transformation of a weak policy into one of the strongest bonded 
labour abolition laws in South Asia. 
In 1892, the judge of the case of Madan22 had only weak legal tools to interpret a 
situation in which labourers allegedly submitted to bonded labour voluntarily. More than a 
hundred years after the delegalisation of slavery, judges could rule along legislation that 
explicitly abolished bonded labour and could resort to powers that allowed the court to 
become active on its own behalf. By the 1990s Madan would have been convicted for 
employing bonded labourers; his guilt would have been established by the evidence that the 
labourers were indebted to him, regardless of the fact that the labourers had agreed to serve as 
bonded labourers voluntarily. He could have faced up to three years of prison time instead of 
one. The workers Honto Lahang, Hoibori Lahingani and Bagi Musulmani would have 
received release certificates and ideally received assistance for their rehabilitation. 
 
Future research 
The case of the abolition of bonded labour in India merits future historical research. One 
research gap is the treatment of bonded labour cases at the lower judicial levels before and 
after India’s independence. I relied on case law that is not necessarily reflective of the general 
interpretation of the law by magistrates and the lower courts. While the earlier years are 
probably impossible to reconstruct, later periods might be fruitful topics to research regarding 
the implementation of the Act V and the IPC at the lower judicial levels. 
 
22 Madan Mohan Biswas v. Queen Empress, Calcutta High Court, April 20 1892. 
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Another research gap already highlighted in the first chapters are publications on the 
abolition of slavery and bonded labour in the princely states. The example of Travancore, or 
Hyderabad, which was praised for its exemplary legislation by the League of Nations, could 
be one case to study more closely. Such studies could also serve as foundational work for 
comparisons within India: Beer and Mitchell observed that cross national comparisons—of 
which the figures for the estimated prevalence of bonded labour and slavery in India are one 
example—fail to account for inner state variations.23 The identification of “bonded labour 
prone states”24 in India by the NHRC indicates that there might be variations in the 
occurrence and treatment of bonded labour among and within the Indian states and which 
could be interrogated regarding historical legacies.  
In some recorded instances, the Indian media has played an important role in 
highlighting the issue of slavery and informing the public, such as on the conditions of the 
coolies on the tea plantations. No systematic work has yet been undertaken, particularly on 
the vernacular press, analysing the reporting of the press in India on bonded labour and 
slavery. Related questions would be how the media actually presented the issue of slavery, 
bonded labour and forced labour, as well as the issue of the political context within which this 
media presentation took place, for instance during the freedom struggle and anti-British 
agitation.25 
Treating the abolition of bonded labour as a phenomenon in its own right and the 
fluidity of its features sets bonded labour apart from slavery. As such, it poses a challenging 
academic but also judicial problem that merits further research. Thinking about the 
definitional problem and the policymakers’, jurists’ and academia’s struggle over defining 
bonded labour and its boundaries highlights an important point: Ultimately, this discussion is 
about defining labour conditions that are morally repugnant, unacceptable and worth ending. 
Which qualifications fall under this judgement is historical and changes over time—the 
British colonial power could justify slavery or bonded labour as poor law, but today we reject 
such ideas as a violation of human rights. Notwithstanding the elite’s evaluation, the history 
of slavery and bonded labour is replete with examples of violence that was necessary to keep 
labourers, servants and slaves ‘in their place.’ The full spectrum of labour resistance—ranging 
from running away, violent attacks against exploiters or self-mutilation—shows that people 
exposed to these forms of labour exploitation did not want to be treated the way they 
experienced. It is time to create social, economic and legal conditions in which people are not 
 
23 BEER/MITCHELL, 2006, p. 998. 
24 National Human Rights Commission India, 2002, p. 115. 
25 VARMA, 2011, 174, footnote 439; PIERSON, 2016, p. 127. 
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left with the alternatives of either starving or being bonded, but have real choices that allow 
each individual to live a life of dignity. 
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Appendices 
Hypotheses 
Table 16. Hypotheses, expected institutional change under antislavery Zeitgeist 
Antislavery 
Zeitgeist 
Characteristics of the Targeted Institution 
Unambiguous rules, strong law/  
Effective Enforcement 
Ambiguous rules, weak law/ 
Ineffective Enforcement 
C
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s 
o
f 
th
e 
P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
C
o
n
te
x
t 
S
tr
o
n
g
 V
et
o
 P
o
ss
ib
il
it
ie
s 
Proslavery actors: 
Insurrectionaries/ 
opportunists  
→ drift 
 (H1a) 
Strong law/ 
ineffective enforcement  
antislavery actors: 
Defenders 
→ layering 
(H7a) 
Antislavery actors: 
Subversives 
→ displacement/ 
defenders 
→ conversion 
(H3a) 
Weak law/strong enforcement 
proslavery actors:  
Insurrectionaries/  
opportunists  
→ layering 
 (H5a) 
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Proslavery actors: 
Subversives 
→ layering 
(H2a) 
Strong law/ 
ineffective enforcement 
antislavery actors: 
Defenders 
→ layering 
(H8a) 
Antislavery actors: 
Insurrectionaries  
→ displacement/ 
subversives 
→ layering 
 (H4a) 
Weak law/strong enforcement 
 
→ stability 
 (H6a) 
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Table 17. Hypotheses, expected institutional change under proslavery Zeitgeist 
Proslavery  
Zeitgeist 
Characteristics of the Targeted Institution 
Unambiguous rules, strong law/  
Effective Enforcement 
Ambiguous rules, weak law/ 
Ineffective Enforcement 
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Proslavery actors: 
Insurrectionaries  
→ layering 
symbionts 
→ drift 
 (H1b) 
Strong law/ 
ineffective enforcement  
antislavery actors: 
Defenders 
→ stability 
 (H7b) 
Proslavery actors:  
Parasitic symbionts 
→ drift 
(H3b) 
Weak law/strong enforcement 
proslavery actors:  
Insurrectionaries/  
opportunists  
→ drift 
 (H5b) 
W
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o
ss
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il
it
ie
s Proslavery actors: 
Insurrectionaries/ 
opportunists 
→ displacement 
(H2b) 
Strong law/ 
ineffective enforcement 
proslavery: 
Insurrectionaries 
→ displacement 
 (H8b) 
Antislavery actors: 
Insurrectionaries 
→ displacement/ 
→ layering 
(H4b) 
Weak law/strong enforcement 
proslavery actors:  
Subversives 
→ layering 
 (H6b) 
 
Based on the work of Mahoney and Thelen and taking into account expectations of the output 
depending on the prevalent Zeitgeist, I formulate the following eight hypotheses, each of 
which is split into version a) antislavery Zeitgeist and b) proslavery Zeitgeist. The formulation 
of the first four hypotheses a) and b) rest strongly on the relationships provided by Mahoney 
and Thelen.26 The explanation and arguments regarding how I arrived at the hypotheses is 
given below. 
If antislavery law is strong and enforcement is effective and… 
Hypothesis 1: preservers of the status quo have strong veto possibilities… 
 H1a proslavery actors are insurrectionaries/opportunists causing drift.27 
 H1b proslavery actors behave like insurrectionaries causing layering, or, on the 
enforcement level, cause drift as symbionts. 
Hypothesis 2: if preservers of the status quo have weak veto possibilities… 
 H2a proslavery actors act like subversives causing layering. 
 H2b proslavery actors behave like insurrectionaries or opportunists and cause 
displacement. 
If antislavery rules are weak and enforcement ineffective and…  
Hypothesis 3: preservers of the status quo have strong veto possibilities… 
 
26 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b. 
27 Thelen and Mahoney suggest for the combination of these variables that change agents are subversives, 
MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 28.  
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 H3a  
 
antislavery actors behave like subversives causing displacement to remove 
contravening legislation or28 like defenders causing conversion. 
 H3b proslavery actors cause drift as parasitic symbionts. 
Hypothesis 4: if veto possibilities of the preservers of the status quo are weak… 
 H4a antislavery actors are the change agents and induce change by layering as 
subversives, or displace contravening legislation as insurrectionaries.29 
 H4b antislavery actors act like insurrectionaries causing displacement or layers. 
 
If the institutional characteristics are mixed, with weak antislavery law and effective level 
of enforcement… 
Hypothesis 5: and veto possibilities are strong… 
 H5a proslavery actors covertly try to undermine effective implementation. As 
insurrectionaries or opportunists they cause change through layers at the 
implementation level through illegal behaviour. 
 H5b proslavery actors seek change and behave like insurrectionaries or opportunists, 
trying to induce change at the enforcement level causing drift. 
 
If the rules are weak but enforcement is effective…  
Hypothesis 6: and veto possibilities are weak… 
 H6a both actors might appear as change agents, but none is likely to induce change; 
the result is stability of the status quo. 
 H6b proslavery actors acting like subversives cause change by layering. 
 
If rules are strong and enforcement ineffective… 
Hypothesis 7: and veto possibilities are strong… 
 H7a antislavery actors change the institution as defenders by layering (i.e. new 
actors). 
 H7b both actors might appear as change agents; likely outcome is stability of the 
status quo. 
 
If the institution has a strong policy but enforcement is ineffective… 
Hypothesis 8: and veto possibilities are weak… 
 H8a antislavery actors are likely to be the actors of change as defenders causing 
layering. 
 H8b proslavery actors acting like insurrectionaries induce change by displacement. 
 
Hypothesis 1: If the institutional discretion for interpretation and implementation is altogether 
low (strong antislavery law and strong level of enforcement) and if veto possibilities are 
strong from the side of those who want to preserve the status quo, antislavery actors are 
satisfied with implementation being effective and the law sufficient. They aim to preserve the 
status quo and block change. For proslavery actors, the existing antislavery policy grants them 
no discretion to interpret the law and they have difficulties practicing any forms of slavery. 
 
28 Thelen and Mahoney suggest for the combination of these variables that change agents will be parasitic 
symbionts, MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 28.  
29 Under those conditions Thelen and Mahoney suggest the mode of change to be conversion, 
MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, 17, 18, 27. 
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H1a: If the Zeitgeist is antislavery, actors favouring slavery might not behave as 
proslavery actors but undermine it by secretly violating it. Their proslavery behaviour is 
disguised and they covertly try to change the status quo. Proslavery actors can induce change 
only at the enforcement level. With the institutional characteristics and veto possibilities, 
Thelen and Mahony suggest that actors behave like subversives, but I suggest proslavery 
actors behave rather like insurrectionaries or opportunists. Change most likely occurs through 
drift. An example might be human trafficking and forced prostitution in contemporary 
Europe. Profiteers of forced prostitution exercise their businesses illegally. They clearly 
violate and undermine the institution of the abolition of slavery. Due to other provisions, such 
as immigration laws, traffickers are able to threaten victims who fear deportation, causing 
drift at the enforcement level.30 If antislavery actors are actively interfering in the business of 
proslavery actors, changes could also occur in the form of layering, additional refinements of 
the rules to adjust the existing institution to new challenges. For instance, with the increased 
number of asylum seekers and migrants coming to Europe, drift was the potential change. But 
antislavery actors adapted the rules to these changed circumstances: German antitrafficking 
legislation, for instance, was altered to provide better victim protection and a clearer 
definition of additional offences.31 
H1b: Under the same conditions, but proslavery Zeitgeist, proslavery actors are also 
the agents of change as insurrectionaries. They speak in public in favour of slavery and act 
openly against antislavery laws. But confronted with strong veto possibilities, the only 
changes at the rules level are layering, in the form of legal provisions that allow for slavery. 
An example for layering is the adoption of indenture legislation after the abolition of slavery 
and the slave trade.32 On the implementation level, proslavery actors may cause drift as 
symbionts, when acting covertly against the institution. The abolition of the slave trade and 
subsequent move of carriers on the high seas to change their shipping flag and sail under a 
nation not bound to the abolition of the slave trade,33 is an example of drift. 
Hypothesis 2: If the institutional discretion for interpretation and implementation is 
altogether low (strong antislavery law and strong level of enforcement) and if veto 
possibilities for the preservers of the status quo are weak, the actors’ position towards the 
institution are the same as in H1. 
 
30 International Labour Office, 2005, 2, 5; US State Department, June 2017. 
31 US State Department, June 2018, p. 196–198. 
32 LINDNER/TAPPE, 2016, p. 9–10; VAN ROSSUM, 2016. 
33 SHERWOOD, 2007, 34, 40, 95. 
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H2a: If the Zeitgeist is antislavery, proslavery actors seek to induce change. They 
might seek the preservation of the institution and the status quo, and only act against it in 
disguise. In this environment, proslavery actors behave like subversives. Mahoney and Thelen 
predict displacement, the removal of old rules and the installation of new ones.34 But under 
the given conditions, open change of the rules towards the removal of abolitionist rules or the 
reinstitution of slavery laws, are highly unlikely: Strong antislavery policies, effective 
implementation and a supporting Zeitgeist make this impossible. But, with weak veto 
possibilities on the side of antislavery actors, the outcome could be pockets of reinstitution of 
slavery where it appears legitimate to use it for singled-out groups, and where antislavery 
actors cannot prevent it, for instance in the case of forced prison labour or the army, which 
then resembles layering. The case of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) could be one 
example. The abolition of slavery was arguably not strongly protected by the Constitution, 
and GDR only joined the ICCPR (International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights)35 in 
1973, but even after the ratification of the ICCPR the GDR adopted legal provisions that 
allowed for forced prison labour.36 
H2b: If under the same conditions the Zeitgeist is proslavery, antislavery actors are the 
preservers of the status quo. It can be expected that proslavery actors speak openly in favour 
of slavery and act towards its relegalisation. In this environment, proslavery actors behave 
like insurrectionaries or opportunists. Displacement of antislavery laws, and the 
(re)installation of slavery and forced labour are possible. Without looking too closely at this 
case, the example of revisions of Stalinist Soviet Union since the 1920s could be an example 
of displacement of achievements regarding the abolition of slavery and forced labour made by 
revolutionary Russia in 1905.37 
Hypothesis 3: The institutional discretion for interpretation and implementation is 
altogether high (weak law and low level of enforcement) and veto possibilities are strong 
from the perspective of those who want to preserve the status quo. In this scenario, antislavery 
actors are disappointed with the ineffective implementation and the insufficiency of the law. 
They strive towards change of the status quo while preserving the spirit of the institution. 
They attempt to change the status quo at the rules level as well as at the implementation level, 
maybe towards legal reform offering a definition at the rules level. Proslavery actors profit 
from this situation and occupy veto possibilities. The existing antislavery law grants them 
 
34 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 16. 
35 The ICCPR Art. 8/ 3. (a) provides for the abolition of forced and compulsory labour. 
36 WÖLBERN, 2015; Deutsche Demokratische Republik, April 6 1968, Prämble, Art. 2 (3), Art. 19 (3); United 
Nations. 
37 HELLIE, 2014, p. 119.  
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enough discretion to interpret the law and allows them to continue their business. They intend 
to preserve the status quo, block any forms of change, and ultimately undermine the 
institution. 
H3a: If the Zeitgeist is antislavery, proslavery actors can prevent attempts of 
antislavery actors to change the institution, but they cannot do so openly. Under the 
institutional conditions, Mahoney and Thelen suggest parasitic symbionts to be the major 
change agents. But I suggest that antislavery actors are likely to behave like subversives when 
there are rules in contravention to the abolition of slavery and cause displacement, or 
conversion on the implementation level behaving like defenders, as in the discussed case of 
Lieberman.38 Another example of this scenario is the case of Brazil which denied having a 
forced labour problem until 1995. The new government, elected in 1994, changed its attitude 
and in cooperation with civil society, began to establish extensive law enforcement 
programmes.39 
H3b: Under the institutional conditions but in times of proslavery Zeitgeist, 
antislavery actors are likely to be the preservers of the status quo while the proslavery actors 
attempt to (re-)legalise slavery. With strong veto possibilities on the side of the preservers of 
the status quo, proslavery actors are likely to behave as Mahoney and Thelen predict: Like 
parasitic symbionts, who seek to change enforcement but not the rules and thereby contribute 
to the drift of the institution. 
Hypothesis 4: If the institutional discretion for interpretation and implementation is 
altogether high (weak law and low level of enforcement) and if veto possibilities for the 
preservers of the status quo are weak, the position of pro- and antislavery actors towards the 
institution is the same as in H3. 
H4a: If the Zeitgeist is antislavery, proslavery actors are the upholders of the status 
quo. Antislavery actors are the change agents. Mahoney and Thelen suggest that the change 
agents behave like opportunists, actors who “do not actively seek to preserve”40 the institution 
but also do not try to change it because of the high costs of trying to induce change. With 
proslavery actors as preservers of the status quo but endowed with weak veto possibilities to 
block change, antislavery actors are probably seeking change at the rules level, not the 
implementation level.41 They behave like insurrectionaries who actively seek change through 
 
38 Measured in backlog of the bureaucracy and the absence of impositions of remedies, LIEBERMAN, 2007a, 
p. 11–12.  
39 COSTA, 2009, v. 
40 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 26. 
41 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 29. 
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displacement of contravening legislation.42 If there is no contravening legislation, antislavery 
actors likely seek to improve existing legislation and thereby behave like subversives, adding 
layers. According to Mahoney and Thelen, change takes place rather at the outcome level—
changing the interpretation of the rules instead of the actual rules. Therefore, their predicted 
mode of change is conversion, where the formal rules remain unchanged but new 
interpretations change the enactment of these rules.43 I diverge from this interpretation and 
suggest that under the given circumstances displacement and/or layering are likely. 
H4b: If the Zeitgeist is proslavery, proslavery actors are the defenders of the status 
quo and antislavery actors the change agents. Mahoney and Thelen suggest that the change 
agents in this scenario behave like opportunists, who “do not actively seek to preserve 
institutions.”44 They argue that mobilisation for active change of rules is more costly than the 
reinterpretation of the rules; consequently, the latter is more likely the choice of action.45 
Therefore, they predict the mode of change is conversion, where the formal rules remain 
unchanged but new interpretations change the enactment of these rules.46 Taking the Zeitgeist 
into consideration, the change probably looks different: Antislavery actors striving for change 
and proslavery actors having only weak veto possibilities at their disposal, formal change is 
potentially less costly. Antislavery actors either induce change as insurrectionaries in the form 
of displacement, removing the old rules, or by adding new layers, behaving like subversives. 
This situation compares to the move of the British Parliament to displace the rules of the 
Slavery Abolition Act that provided provisions for apprenticeships and which inherently 
violated the spirit of abolition.47 
The following four pairs of hypotheses account for mixed institutional characteristics 
regarding discretion of interpretation and level of enforcement. 
Hypothesis 5: If the institutional characteristics are mixed with weak institutional 
rules but a strong level of enforcement, and veto possibilities are strong for those who want to 
preserve the status quo, actors’ positions towards the institution are probably the following: 
Antislavery actors are satisfied with the effective implementation. Change being costly but the 
spirit of the weak institution being effectively implemented, antislavery actors preserve rather 
than change the institution. The existing antislavery law grants implementers a high level of 
 
42 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 24. 
43 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, 17, 18, 27. 
44 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 26. 
45 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 29. 
46 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, 17, 18, 27. 
47 An Act to amend the Act for the Abolition of Slavery in the British Colonies, Parliament of the United 
Kingdom, April 11 1838; cf. DRESCHER, 2009, p. 264. 
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discretion to interpret the rules, but they choose to interpret it stringently. The proslavery 
actors are the change agents at the outcome level, but they act illegally. 
H5a: Proslavery actors act against the institution in disguise. They might uphold the 
spirit of the law but violate it on the ground, where possible. According to Mahoney and 
Thelen, these actors behave like insurrectionaries or opportunists. If they dominate, they cause 
change through layers at the implementation level. The outcome is comparable to (H1a) with 
pockets of illegal slavery, such as the suggested example of individual instances of forced 
prostitution, or forced labour in agriculture in Europe.48 
H5b: If the Zeitgeist is proslavery, proslavery actors speak in public in favour of 
slavery and act against antislavery laws. Despite effective enforcement, proslavery actors 
work openly against antislavery legislation and either attempt to remove existing antislavery 
legislation, by adding undermining layers, or cause change at the enforcement level by 
moving the administration and enforcement agencies to apply less stringent implementation. 
Also, they behave like insurrectionaries or opportunists. In this environment, proslavery 
actors seek change at the formal level but are confronted with the veto possibilities on the side 
of the antislavery actors and are therefore more successful at inducing change at the 
enforcement level. Mahoney and Thelen associate insurrectionaries with displacement and 
opportunists with conversion,49 but the most likely mode of change under the condition of a 
weak law and strong implementation is either conversion or drift. Drift as change at the 
enforcement level is the most likely outcome. 
Hypothesis 6: If the rules are weak but enforcement is strong; and veto possibilities to 
prevent change are weak, pro- and antislavery actors have the same disposition towards the 
institution as in H5. 
H6a: If the Zeitgeist is antislavery, antislavery actors are satisfied with the 
implementation status, but probably seek to change the legal status quo in order to secure the 
spirit of the rules and improve legal provisions in cases of violations. At the rules level, only 
antislavery actors are likely to be the change agents. Proslavery actors might want to preserve 
the weak legal status quo but only can act for change at the implementation level, even though 
violations are rather low in number and change at the implementation level. This scenario is 
probably marked by stability of the institution. 
H6b: If the Zeitgeist is proslavery, proslavery actors act against the institution, not 
necessarily in disguise. Slavery has been abolished, but the norm has not become Zeitgeist or 
 
48 US State Department, June 2018, 69, 83, 97, 106, 156, 161, 164, ff. 
49 MAHONEY/THELEN, 2010b, p. 28. 
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changed into an antislavery Zeitgeist. A comparable case for this situation is the American 
South after the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment—as discussed in the case of the norm 
development, the adoption of an act does not necessarily mean that it has become a Zeitgeist. 
Proslavery actors were able to make use of and pass new legislation at the regional level for 
share cropping, for instance. These laws allowed for the continued exploitation of the 
liberated slaves which virtually translated into the continuation of slavery after its abolition, 
essentially undermining the spirit of the law by layering.50 
Hypothesis 7: If the institutional rules are strong and enforcement weak, and veto 
possibilities are strong, the positions of actors vis-à-vis the institution are the following: 
Antislavery actors are satisfied with the rules but strive for changing enforcement. Proslavery 
actors, on the other hand, are content with the enforcement level and, under those conditions, 
are probably not interested in changing the rules. Since the status quo does not affect them, 
for instance due to the absence of criminal prosecution, they defend the status quo at the 
implementation level. 
H 7a: If the Zeitgeist is antislavery, antislavery actors are the drivers for change and 
the level of enforcement. Because of the strong veto on the side of the proslavery actors, they 
cannot change the institution at the rules level. Since the rules are strong this is also not 
necessarily the preferred option. Antislavery actors behave like defenders, supporting and 
abiding by the rules and undertaking active moves to realise the spirit of the institution. An 
example discussed in this dissertation is the case of the BLSA (Bonded Labour System 
(Abolition) Act) of 1976. After initial success in liberations, the government failed to continue 
liberations. NGOs stepped in, making use of the judicial system and administration to enforce 
the spirit of the institution, causing layering by the addition of new actors.51 
H7b: If the Zeitgeist is proslavery, proslavery actors profit from the situation and 
therefore defend the status quo and potentially strive for change at the rules level. The 
Zeitgeist is on their side. Antislavery actors attack the status quo and attempt to improve 
implementation. Antislavery actors try to prevent changes at the rules level but strive for 
change at the implementation level as defenders. Under the given conditions change is 
unlikely, and a probable outcome is stability of the status quo. 
Hypothesis 8: If the institutional discretion for interpretation and implementation is 
mixed with strong law and ineffective enforcement, and veto possibilities are weak, the 
disposition of actors regarding the institution are similar to those of H7. 
 
50 Winters discusses the example of Tennessee, WINTERS, 1988, p. 2–3. 
51 See a first preliminary attempt to describe these developments in my own publication, MOLFENTER, 2016, 
p. 66–69. 
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H8a: Antislavery actors are interested in changing the enforcement status of the 
institution. Since the law is strong, their efforts target the implementation level. Proslavery 
actors profit from the status quo since the strong law does not translate into an effective 
implementation status, but because of the antislavery Zeitgeist, an open attack against 
antislavery legislation is unlikely. Antislavery actors are the actors of change as defenders and 
the scenario is similar to the situation in H7a: The BLSA provided strong rules but weak 
implementation; therefore, civil society and the judiciary stepped into this gap causing 
layering as new actors. 
H8b: If the Zeitgeist is proslavery, proslavery actors violate the institution and are not 
interested in its defence. Antislavery actors are eager to preserve the legal status quo but not 
the enforcement status. Not endowed with strong veto possibilities, proslavery actors can 
induce change at the rules level acting like insurrectionaries. In this situation the actual 
removal of antislavery provisions becomes likely, therefore change by displacement. An 
example for this case is post-slavery-abolition France: In 1774 the French National 
Convention abolished slavery. Overriding the opposition of the senate, Napoleon reinstituted 
slavery and the slave trade in April 1802.52 
 
 
 
52 RODRIGUEZ, 2007, p. 456–457. 
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Act V, 184353 
 
 
 
53 Governor-General in Council, April 7 1843, p. 4. 
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Workman’s Breach of Contract Act, 185954 
 
 
54 Legislative Council of India, May 5 1859, p. 275–277. 
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Indian Penal Code, 1862, Sec. 367, 370, 371, 37455 
IPC, Sec. 367: “Kidnapping or abducting in order to subject person to grievous hurt, slavery, 
etc.--Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person in order that such person may be subjected, or 
may be so disposed of as to be put in danger of being subjected to grievous hurt, or slavery, or 
to the unnatural lust of any person, or knowing it to be likely that such person will be so 
subjected or disposed of, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term 
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 
 IPC, Sec. 370: “Buying or disposing of any person as a slave.--Whoever imports, 
exports, removes, buys, sells or disposes of any person as a slave, or accepts, receives or 
detains against his will any person as a slave, shall be punished with imprisonment of either 
description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.”  
IPC, Sec. 371: “Habitual dealing in slaves.--Whoever habitually imports, exports, 
removes, buys, sells traffics or deals in slaves, shall be punished with transportation for life,56 
or with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding ten years, and shall also 
be liable to fine.” 
IPC, Sec. 374: “Unlawful Compulsory Labour.-Whoever unlawfully compels any 
person to labour against the will of that person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either 
description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.” 
 
  
 
55 Indian Penal Code, Legislative Council of India, October 6 1860. 
56 Changed into “imprisonment for life” by Act 26 of 1955, Sec 117. 
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The Bihar and Orissa Kamiauti Agreements Act, 192057 
An Act to make provision regarding agreements for the performance of certain kinds of 
labour in 2 [the States] of Bihar [and Orissa.] 
Whereas it is expedient to limit the period and regulate the terms of, and otherwise to 
make provision regarding agreements for, the performance of certain kinds of labour; 
And Whereas the previous sanction of the Governor General has been obtained under Section 
79 of the Government of India Act, 1915, to the passing of this Act; 
It is hereby enacted as follows :-  
1. Short title and extent. –  
(1) This Act may be called the Bihar and Orissa Kamiauti Agreement Act, 1920. 
(2) It extends to the whole of [the States] of Bihar [and Orissa] including the Santhal 
Parganas [and district of Angul]. 
2. Definitions. - In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context, -  
(1) ‘advance’ means an advance of money or in kind or partly of money and partly in 
kind, and includes any transaction which is, in the opinion of the Court, substantially 
an advance; 
(2) ‘executant’ means the party to a Kamiauti agreement who undertakes that he or 
some other person shall perform labour; 
(3) ‘kamia’ means a person who under the terms of a Kamiauti agreement is to 
perform labour; 
(4) ‘kamiauti agreement’. 
(a) means an agreement written or oral, or partly written and partly oral, 
wherein the consideration for the performance of labour by any person is or 
includes one or more of the following, namely, an advance made or to be made 
to any person, the interest on such advance, a debt due by any person, the 
interest on such debt; and 
(b) includes any transaction which, in the opinion of the Court, is substantially 
such an agreement; but 
(c) does not include 
(i) an agreement to work entered into by a skilled workman, 
(ii) an agreement to work outside the area to which this Act extends, or 
(iii) an agreement to supply a cart and cartman. 
(5) ‘labour’ means agricultural labour and includes domestic service or labour whether 
indoor or outdoor. 
3. In subsisting kamiauti agreements, labour deemed performed and advance and debt 
discharged after one year. In respect of every Kamiauti agreement subsisting at the 
commencement of this Act, each of the following shall, if it has not previously occurred, be 
deemed on the expiry of one year from such commencement to have occurred. -  
(a) all the stipulated labour to have been duly performed, and every obligation to 
perform labour or to provide a kamia to have been discharged; 
(b) the advance, principal and interest, to have been repaid; 
(c) the debt and interest thereon to have been discharged. 
4. Future kamiauti agreement unless satisfying certain conditions void and inadmissible to 
registration. –  
(1) A Kamiauti agreement entered into after the commencement of this Act shall be 
wholly void -  
(i) unless the full terms of the agreement between the parties are expressed in 
an instrument duly stamped according to the law for the time being in force; 
 
57 Government of Bihar and Orissa, 1920. 
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(ii) unless the person making the advance or to whom the debt is due, delivers 
to the executant a counterpart of the said instrument at the time of the 
execution of the instrument; 
(iii) if the period expressed or implied during which the labour is to be 
performed exceeds, or might in any possible event exceed, one year; 
(iv) unless it provides that on the expiry of the period during which the labour 
is to be performed, all liability shall be extinguished in respect of any advance, 
debt or interest which is the consideration or part of the consideration of the 
agreement; 
(v) unless it provides for a fair and equitable rate of remuneration for the 
labourer. 
[(2) No Kamiauti agreement which is void under clauses (i) to (iv) of sub-section (1) 
of this Section shall be admitted to registration.] 
5. Kamiauti agreement void on death of labourer or other executant, and liability to labour 
extinguished. - A Kamiauti agreement shall become void on the death either of the kamia or 
of the executant, or if such kamia or executant is dead at the commencement of this Act, as 
such commencement; and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Kamiauti agreement 
or in any law, no liability to perform labour or in respect of the non-performance thereof shall 
survive against the estate or against any heir of the deceased, nor shall any suit be brought to 
enforce such liability. 
6. Bar to suits on kamiauti agreements when void. - Notwithstanding anything contained in 
the Indian Contract Act, 1872, when a Kamiauti agreement is void under Section 4 or 
otherwise, or becomes void under Section 5, no suit shall lie for restoration of or 
compensation for any advantage received by the executant, or, in particular, for the recovery 
of any advance, debt or interest which is the consideration or part of the consideration of the 
agreement. 
7. Bar to suits on kamiauti agreements except for recovery of value of labour not performed 
without just cause. –  
(1) Except as provided in this section, no suit shall lie against the executant of a 
Kamiauti agreement or any other person in respect of non-performance of labour, or in 
respect of any advance, debt or interest which is the consideration or part of the 
consideration of the agreement. 
(2) If during the period of a valid Kamiauti agreement the kamia without just cause 
withholds the stipulated labour or does not perform it with reasonable assiduity, then, 
subject to the provisions of Section 5 and notwithstanding the provisions of section 3 
(a), a suit shall, if brought within three months after the termination of the period, lie 
against the executant for recovery of the net value of the labour so withheld or not 
performed, but no decree shall be passed in such suit for a sum exceeding the principal 
of the advance or of the debt, and the costs in the suit. 
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LN Slavery Convention, Art. 1-2, 192658 
Article 1 
For the purpose of the present Convention, the following definitions are agreed upon:  
(1) Slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers 
attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.  
(2) The slave trade includes all acts involved in the capture, acquisition or disposal of 
a person with intent to reduce him to slavery; all acts involved in the acquisition of a 
slave with a view to selling or exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale or exchange 
of a slave acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged, and, in general, every act 
of trade or transport in slaves.  
Article 2 
The High Contracting Parties undertake, each in respect of the territories placed under its 
sovereignty, jurisdiction, protection, suzerainty or tutelage, so far as they have not already 
taken the necessary steps:  
(a) To prevent and suppress the slave trade;  
(b) To bring about, progressively and as soon as possible, the complete abolition of 
slavery in all its forms.  
 
  
 
58 League of Nations, 1926. 
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Children (Pledging of Labour) Act, 193359 
 
 
 
59 Reforms Office/Government of India, 1939, p. 119–129. 
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Prevention of Free or Forced or Compulsory Labour Bill, 
194960 
 
 
 
60 Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative), April 5 1949, 137, 141-142; The bills circulated in 1948 and in 
1949 are exactly the same, cf. Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative), July 1 1948, p. 155–156. 
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Forced Labour Convention (C29), Art. 1-2, 193061 
 
Preamble  
The General Conference of the International Labour Organisation, 
Having been convened at Geneva by the Governing Body of the International Labour Office, 
and having met in its Fourteenth Session on 10 June 1930, and 
Having decided upon the adoption of certain proposals with regard to forced or compulsory 
labour, which is included in the first item on the agenda of the Session, and 
Having determined that these proposals shall take the form of an international Convention, 
adopts this twenty-eighth day of June of the year one thousand nine hundred and thirty the 
following Convention, which may be cited as the Forced Labour Convention, 1930, for 
ratification by the Members of the International Labour Organisation in accordance with the 
provisions of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation: 
Article 1 
1. Each Member of the International Labour Organisation which ratifies this Convention 
undertakes to suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms within 
the shortest possible period. 
2. With a view to this complete suppression, recourse to forced or compulsory labour 
may be had, during the transitional period, for public purposes only and as an 
exceptional measure, subject to the conditions and guarantees hereinafter provided. 
3. At the expiration of a period of five years after the coming into force of this 
Convention, and when the Governing Body of the International Labour Office 
prepares the report provided for in Article 31 below, the said Governing Body shall 
consider the possibility of the suppression of forced or compulsory labour in all its 
forms without a further transitional period and the desirability of placing this question 
on the agenda of the Conference. 
Article 2 
1. For the purposes of this Convention the term forced or compulsory labour shall mean 
all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty 
and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily. 
2. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this Convention, the term forced or compulsory 
labour shall not include--  
(a) any work or service exacted in virtue of compulsory military service laws for 
work of a purely military character; 
 
61 International Labour Organisation, 1930, bolt and italics in the original. 
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(b) any work or service which forms part of the normal civic obligations of the 
citizens of a fully self-governing country; 
(c) any work or service exacted from any person as a consequence of a conviction 
in a court of law, provided that the said work or service is carried out under the 
supervision and control of a public authority and that the said person is not hired to 
or placed at the disposal of private individuals, companies or associations; 
(d) any work or service exacted in cases of emergency, that is to say, in the event 
of war or of a calamity or threatened calamity, such as fire, flood, famine, 
earthquake, violent epidemic or epizootic diseases, invasion by animal, insect or 
vegetable pests, and in general any circumstance that would endanger the 
existence or the well-being of the whole or part of the population; 
(e) minor communal services of a kind which, being performed by the members of 
the community in the direct interest of the said community, can therefore be 
considered as normal civic obligations incumbent upon the members of the 
community, provided that the members of the community or their direct 
representatives shall have the right to be consulted in regard to the need for such 
services. 
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The Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 197662 
(ACT NO. 19 OF 1976) 
[9th February, 1976.] 
An Act 
to provide for the abolition of bonded labour system with a view to 
preventing the economic and physical exploitation of the weaker sections 
of the people and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. 
BE it enacted by Parliament in the Twenty-seventh Year of the Republic of 
India as follows: 
CHAPTER I 
PRELIMINARY 
1 . Short title, extent and commencement.—(1) This Act may be called the 
Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976. 
(2) It extends to the whole of India. 
(3) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the 25th day of October, 1975. 
2 . Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,— 
(a) “advance” means an advance, whether in cash or in kind, or partly in 
cash or partly in kind, made by one person hereinafter referred to as the 
creditor) to another person (hereinafter referred to as the debtor); 
(b) “agreement” means an agreement (whether written or oral, partly written 
and partly oral) between a debtor and creditor, and includes an agreement 
providing for forced labour, the existence of which is presumed under 
any social custom prevailing in the concerned locality. 
Explanation—The existence of an agreement between the debtor and creditor is 
ordinarily presumed, under the social custom, in relation to the following forms 
of forced labour, namely: 
Adiyamar, Baramasia, Basahya, Bethu, Bhagela, Cherumar, Garru-Galu, 
Hali, Hari, Harwai, Holya, Jana, Jeetha, Kamiya, Khundit-Mundit, Kuthia, Lakhari, 
Munjhi, Mat, Munish system, Nit-Majoor, Paleru, Padiyal, Pannayilal, Sagri, Sanji, 
Sanjawat, Sewak, Sewakia, Seri, Vetti; 
 
(c) “ascendant” or “descendant”, in relation to a person belonging to a 
matriarchal society, means the person who corresponds to such 
expression in accordance with the law of succession in force in such 
society; 
(d) “bonded debt” means an advance obtained, or presumed to have been 
obtained, by a bonded labourer under, or in pursuance of, the bonded 
labour system; 
(e) “bonded labour” means any labour or service rendered under the bonded 
labour system; 
(f) “bonded labourer” means a labourer who incurs, or has, or is presumed 
to have, incurred, a bonded debt; 
(g) “bonded labour system” means the system of forced, or partly forced, 
 
62 Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, October 25 1975. 
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labour under which a debtor enters, or has, or is presumed to have, 
entered, into an agreement with the creditor to the effect that,— 
(i) in consideration of an advance obtained by him or by any of his 
lineal ascendants or descendants (whether or not such advance is 
evidenced by any document) and in consideration of the interest, if 
any, due on such advance, or 
(ii) in pursuance of any customary or social obligation, or 
(iii) in pursuance of an obligation devolving on him by succession, or 
(iv) for any economic consideration received by him or by any of his 
lineal ascendants or descendants, or 
(v) by reason of his birth in any particular caste or community, he 
would— 
(1) render, by himself or through any member of his family, or any person 
dependent on him, labour or service to the creditor, or for the benefit of 
the creditor, for a specified period or for an unspecified period, either 
without wages or for nominal wages, or 
(2) forfeit the freedom of employment or other means of livelihood for a 
specified period or for an unspecified period, or 
(3) forfeit the right to move freely throughout the territory of India, or 
(4) forfeit the right to appropriate or sell at market value any of his property 
or product of his labour or the labour of a member of his family or 
any person dependent on him, and includes the system of forced, or 
partly forced, labour under which a surety for a debtor enters, or has, 
or is presumed to have, entered, into an agreement with the creditor 
to the effect that in the event of the failure of the debtor to repay the 
debt, he would render the bonded labour on behalf of the debtor; 
[Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that any system 
of forced, or partly forced labour under which any workman being contract 
labour as defined in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Contract 
Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (37 of 1970), or an inter-State migrant 
workman as defined in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Inter-
State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) 
Act, 1979 (30 of 
1979), is required to render labour or service in circumstances of the nature 
mentioned in sub-clause (1) of this clause or is subjected to all or any of the 
disabilities referred to in sub-clauses (2) to (4), is “bonded labour system” 
within the meaning of this clause.] 
(h) “family”, in relation to a person, includes the ascendant and descendant 
of such person; 
(i) “nominal wages”, in relation to any labour, means a wage which is less 
than,— 
(a) the minimum wages fixed by the Government, in relation to the same 
or similar labour, under any law for the time being in force, and 
(b) where no such minimum wage has been fixed in relation to any form of 
labour, the wages that are normally paid, for the same or similar labour, 
to the labourers working in the same locality; 
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(j) “prescribed” means prescribed by rules made under this Act. 
3 . Act to have overriding effect.—The provisions of this Act shall have 
effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any 
enactment other than this Act, or in any instrument having effect by virtue 
of any enactment other than this Act. 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
ABOLITION OF BONDED LABOUR SYSTEM 
4 . Abolition of bonded labour system.—(1) On the commencement of 
this Act, the bonded labour system shall stand abolished and every bonded 
labourer shall, on such commencement, stand freed and discharged from any 
obligation to render any bonded labour. 
(2) After the commencement of this Act, no person shall— 
(a) make any advance under, or in pursuance of, the bonded labour system, 
or 
(b) compel any person to render any bonded labour or other form of forced 
labour. 
5 . Agreement, custom, etc., to be void.—On the commencement of this 
Act, any custom or tradition or any contract, agreement or other instrument 
(whether entered into or executed before or after the commencement of this 
Act), by virtue of which any person, or any member of the family or dependant 
of such person, is required to do any work or render any service as a bonded 
labourer, shall be void and inoperative. 
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